05000353/FIN-2014003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Corrective Actions Following Repeat Test Failures of a High Pressure Coolant Injection System Level Instrument |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the failure to adequately evaluate and correct repeat calibration test failures in April 2012 and in February 2014 on the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system suppression pool level transmitter LT-055- 2N062F. This resulted in LT-055-2N062F, a technical specification (TS) required instrument, being in a degraded and unreliable condition. The inspectors determined that failure to adequately evaluate and correct the condition was reasonably within the ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. LGS personnel promptly replaced the instrumentation and returned the HPCI system to an operable status prior to the Unit 2 startup. LGS also entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) for resolution as Issue Reports (IRs) 1646041, 1651480, and 1659171. This NRC-identified finding is more than minor because it affected the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of the reliability and availability of structures, systems, or components to maintain the functionality of containment and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was associated with the functionality of the reactor containment but didnt represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of containment, the containment isolation system, and heat removal components and, the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters. In addition, the logic for the HPCI pump suction transfer from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool on high level in the suppression pool is a one-out-of-two logic. The inspectors determined that this function was available because the other channel which performs the function was not affected by the finding and was available during the time period in question with the exception of during brief testing periods. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, Evaluation, because LGS personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the issue to ensure that resolutions addressed the causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. |
| Site: | Limerick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000353/2014003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Turilin E Dipaolo F Bower J Ayala J Bream R Montgomery R Nimitz |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Limerick - IR 05000353/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Limerick) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Limerick)
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