10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, required, in part, that measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials and parts that are essential to the safety -related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Contrary to those requirements, on October 20, 2016, the licensee discovered that an incorrect splice kit for the 1C containment cooler fan was installed on May 4, 2015. The design called for a bolted V splice, but the licensee installed a bolted in- line splice kit that was not suitable for use inside containment in accordance with Environment Qualification Package A -506152- 0029E, Rev. 2. This error resulted in the inoperability of the 1C containment cooler during periods of the Unit 1 operating cycle 27 (May 7, 2015 October 1, 2016). Specifically, there were four periods during applicable modes (modes 1 4) when the 1C containment cooler was the selected cooler for train B for a period greater than seven days, which exceeded the allowed completion time per
TS 3.6.6. Upon discovery of the incorrect containment cooler splice kit in -use, the licensee removed and replaced the bolted in- line splice with an approved bolted V splice kit. The repairs were completed and tested on October 25, 2016. The finding was determined to be Green, very low safety significance, because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, nor did it involve an actual reduction in function of the
hydrogen igniters using the
Barrier Integrity screening questions. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as CRs 10288801 and 10317447
