05000336/FIN-2017007-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Replace Auxiliary Feedwater Solenoid Valves within the Required Frequency |
Description | The inspection team identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Procedures, because Dominion did not implement procedures as required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A.9, Procedures for Performing Maintenance, to properly maintain the environmental qualification of safety-related auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves 2-FW-43AS and 2-FW-43BS. Specifically, Dominion failed to implement the recurring work event task and associated work order to ensure that these auxiliary feedwater solenoid valves were replaced prior to exceeding the qualified life of the solenoid coil and elastomer components. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report 1076005, planned replacement of the solenoid valves, and calculated an alternate ambient temperature for use in determining the qualified life of the solenoid valves. Dominion re-performed the qualified life calculation using this revised ambient temperature and extended the qualified life to support operability. The inspection team determined that this issue was more than minor because it adversely impacted the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This issue is also similar to more- than-minor examples 3.j and 3.k presented in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, this performance deficiency resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt as to the operability and reliability of the solenoid valves for both auxiliary feedwater regulating valves, and thus, both trains of auxiliary feedwater. As such, Dominion needed to conduct additional engineering evaluation to extend the service life of the solenoid valves, thus justifying that the valves would continue to perform their safety function. The inspection team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the reliability of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and the structure, system, or component maintained its operability or functionality. The inspection team determined that no cross-cutting aspect was applicable because the finding was not indicative of current performance. |
Site: | Millstone |
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Report | IR 05000336/2017007 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21N |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Bickett J Brand D Werkheiser G Dentel |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Millstone - IR 05000336/2017007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Millstone) @ 2017Q3
Self-Identified List (Millstone)
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