05000333/FIN-2016001-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Post-Maintenance Testing of the Reactor Building Ventilation System Resulted in Short-Term Inoperability of Secondary Containment |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4, Procedures, for FitzPatrick staffs failure to perform adequate post-maintenance testing (PMT) following maintenance on a limit switch in the reactor building ventilation system in August 2014, that, along with another unrelated component failure in the reactor building ventilation system, resulted in secondary containment pressure, relative to the outside pressure, exceeding the TS limit of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge. As immediate corrective action, operators started both trains of the standby gas treatment system (SBGTS), which restored secondary containment pressure to within the TS limit. Operators subsequently secured the A refuel floor exhaust train and placed the B train in service. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-04166. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, as a result of this event, secondary containment was not preserved, in that secondary containment pressure exceeded the limit of TS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency was not a pressurized thermal shock issue, did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment, and only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the reactor building and SBGTS. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because FitzPatrick staff did not ensure that procedures for PMT of the reactor building refuel floor exhaust damper limit switch following maintenance performed in August 2014, were adequate to support the nuclear safety function of the secondary containment [H.1]. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2016001 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Burritt B Sienel E Knutson J Schoppy J Schussler |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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