05000317/FIN-2013005-02
Finding | |
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| Title | Preconditioning of Containment Air Coolers Emergency Outlet Valves |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because CENGs in-service test (IST) procedures did not provide instructions to preclude preconditioning of the containmen
air cooler (CAC) emergency outlet valves. Specifically, STP-O-065B-2, 21 SRW Subsystem Operability Test, was written such that a full stroke of the CAC emergency outlet valves was allowed prior to performance of the IST stroke time testing of the valves in the open direction. As a result, the 21 CAC emergency outlet valve, 2-CV-1582, was preconditioned during the last four surveillance tests performed on the valve and the 24 CAC emergency outlet valve, 2-CV-1593, was preconditioned during three of the last four surveillance tests performed on the valve. Immediate corrective actions included entering this issue in the CAP. Corrective actions included revising STP-O-065B to prevent future preconditioning of all the CAC emergency outlet valves. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, preconditioning of the CAC emergency outlet valves prior to performing IST stroke time testing could mask valve degradation. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not affect the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, and component (SSC), did not represent a loss of system function, did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, and did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment, designated as having high safety significance in accordance with the maintenance rule program, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The inspectors determined that the finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because CENG staff failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, CENG staff did not provide a complete and accurate procedure that would preclude preconditioning of the CAC emergency outlet valve during in-service testing H.2(c). |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
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| Report | IR 05000317/2013005 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Schroeder E Torres J D'Antonio M Orr P Presby R Rolph S Kennedy |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2013005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
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