The inspectors identified an
NCV of
10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) associated with the licensee\'s failure to perform a
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for operation of the plant with less than the design basis time allotted for ice condenser ice basket fusion. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly interpret design and licensing basis requirements associated with protection against external events (i.e., seismic) and as a result did not perform a
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for plant operation with ice baskets that had less than the design basis time allotted for ice fusion. The licensee performed an evaluation of
past operability and determined that the ice condenser would have continued to perform its pressure suppression function even with additional ice fall from the potentially unfused ice baskets. Because this issue affected the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function, the violation was reviewed under the traditional enforcement process; however, the underlying technical issue was evaluated using the
Significance Determination Process. The violation was determined to be of more than minor significance because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that a
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. The inspectors reviewed the Seismic, Flooding, and Severe Weather Screening Criteria screening questions in
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that Question No. 3 was applicable. The violation was of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve the total loss of a safety function identified by the licensee through
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Individual Plant Examination of External Events or similar analysis, that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting area component related to this finding.
