05000313/FIN-2009003-06
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Unit 2 Technical Specification, Section 6.4.1.a, Procedures, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 9.a, requires, in part, that procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above requirement, the licensee failed to provide adequate work orders for maintenance performed on service water valves 2CV-1421-2, -1425-1, and -1400-1 from 2002 to 2005. Specifically, steps placed in maintenance Procedure OP-2402.094, to address a previously identified issue in 1997 to securely attach the motor-operated valve splined adaptor to the valve stem during maintenance using spot drilling where the setscrew impacted the key and using Loctite to secure the setscrew, were not referenced or included in any of the applicable work documents for the valves listed above. This was licensee identified because a walkdown performed by operations personnel in April 2009 noted the splined adapters that connect the Limitorque gearbox to the valve stem had slid down and was out of the gearbox on valves 2CV-1421-2 and 2CV-1425-1 and not fully inserted on valve 2CV-400-1. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because: (1) the finding was not a qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability of the service water system; (2) it did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) it did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; (4) it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant per 10 CFR 50.65, for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and (5) it did not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2009-00934 which included an apparent cause evaluation |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000313/2009003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra P Elkmann C Graves A Sanchez J Josey J Clark J Mateychick R Kellar J Rotten |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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