05000302/FIN-2010002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Take Compensatory Actions When a MCR to CSR Floor/Ceiling Interface Access Hatch Was Open. |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Crystal River Unit 3 Operating License Condition 2.C.(9), for failure to take compensatory actions when a main control room (MCR) and cable spreading room (CSR) floor/ceiling interface access hatch was open rendering the CSR Halon fire extinguishing system inoperable. Once identified, the licensee initiated nuclear condition report (NCR) 266356 in the corrective action program to address this issue. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, i.e., fire, and degraded the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the finding adversely affected the suppression fire extinguishing system capability defense-in-depth element. The inspectors evaluated this finding under NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors determined that a Phase 2 SDP was required for this finding because the CSR Halon concentration was highly degraded; a fire could occur due to non-qualified cables or transient combustibles while the hatch between the MCR and CSR was open; a duration factor (exposure time) was between 3 and 30 days; and control room operators evacuated the MCR in response to the fire. However, Phase 2 SDP of IMC 0609 Appendix F does not currently include explicit treatment of fires leading to MCR abandonment, either due to fire in the MCR or due to fires in other fire areas. Therefore, a Phase 3 SDP evaluation for this type of finding was needed. A Regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 SDP for this finding and concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The major assumptions and the dominant accident sequence were discussed in the 4OA5 analysis section of this report. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because it does not reflect current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Crystal River  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000302/2010002 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Reyes T Morrissey P Higgins R Chou R Aiello S Ninh M Sykes N Smith K Schaaf |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Crystal River - IR 05000302/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Crystal River) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Crystal River)
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