05000298/FIN-2017009-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement an Adequate Procedure for Equipment Control |
| Description | Green . The team reviewed a self-revealed, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.0.2, Conduct of Operations Procedure, Operator Logs and Reports, Revision 106, for conducting sealed valve audits. Specifically, this procedure only checked that the seals were installed, and did not check that the valves were in the correct position. This resulted in an extended period of time that the Division I residual heat removal (RHR) system was unknowingly inoperable. The licensees immediate corrective action was to revise Station Procedure 2.0.2 to include direction s to check the position of sealed valves in addition to checking that the valve sealing devices were installed. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR- CNS -2017- 00553. Failure to maintain Station Procedure 2.0.2 for conducting sealed valve audits, in violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor , and therefore a finding, because it affected the con figuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to correctly identify and correct out of position Division I RHR minimum flow isolation valves resulted in unnecessarily and unknowingly extending the inoperability time of the Division I RHR subsystem by 39-45 days. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At -Power, the inspectors determined that the violation required a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a loss of safety function for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. A senior reactor analyst performed the risk evaluation and determined that the violation was of very low safety significance (Green). The team determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect within the human performance area, resources, because leaders did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee had approved Station Procedure 2.0.2, Conduct of Operations Procedure, Operator Logs and Reports, Revision 106, for conducting sealed valve audits without including the fundamental direction to ensure that the sealed valves were in the correct position [H.1]. |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2017009 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2017 (2017Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Hernandez |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2017009 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2017Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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