05000289/FIN-2016007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR 50.55a (g)(4), In-service Inspection Requirements, requires in part, that throughout the service life of a boiling or pressurized water-cooled nuclear power facility, components (including supports) that are classified as ASME Code Class 1, must meet the requirements, except design and access provisions, and preservice examination requirements set forth in Section XI of editions and addenda of the ASME Boiler Pressure and Vessel Code (BPVC) that become effective subsequent to editions specified in paragraphs (g)(2) and (g)(3) of this Section, and that are incorporated by reference in paragraph (b) of this Section, to the extent practical within the limitations of design, geometry, and materials of construction of the components. Section XI of the ASME BPVC, 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda, Table IWF-2500-1, Examination Category F-A Supports, requires VT-3 examination of 100 percent of the ASME Class 1 supports, other than piping supports, every ISI Interval (examination item F1.40), as modified by Notes 1, 2, 3 and 5 of Table IWF-2500-1. Contrary to this requirement, from initial plant operation until November 14, 2015, (when Exelon staff completed the initial required VT-3 examination), Exelon failed to perform the required VT-3 examination of ASME Class 1 supports, other than piping supports, (i.e. seismic support plates and associated load path components) on the TMI control rod drive mechanism assemblies. Exelon staff entered the issue into their corrective action program as IR 01678190. The inspectors evaluated this finding using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and adversely affects the objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event and was not associated with pressurized thermal shock of the reactor coolant system boundary. |
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000289/2016007 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kern J Richmond M Halter T O'Hara |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.55a |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Three Mile Island - IR 05000289/2016007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Three Mile Island) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Three Mile Island)
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