05000289/FIN-2012004-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Maintain Combustible Loading in the Bwst Tunnel within Fhar Limits |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of license condition DPR- 50, section 2.C.(4), Fire Protection, for Exelon storing transient combustibles in excess of the fire loading allowed near the borated water storage tank (BWST). Specifically, on July 11, the inspectors identified eight bags of trash/transient combustible materials stored within 50 feet of the BWST which is in excess of the allowed fire loading in accordance with the Fire Hazards Analysis Report (FHAR) and transient combustible control program. The inspectors determined that the failure to maintain combustible loading in the BWST tunnel within the FHAR limits was a performance deficiency that was within Exelons ability to foresee and correct. Exelon promptly removed the improperly stored transient combustibles and entered the performance deficiency into their corrective action program as issue report 1388097. Corrective actions were implemented to alert technicians of the restrictions on transient combustible materials near the BWST. This finding was determined to be more than minor since it is similar to more than minor example 4.k of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, because the fire loading was not within the FHAR limits. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screen and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors determined the finding affected the administrative controls for transient combustible materials. Additionally, the inspectors determined that this issue was more than minor because it affected the protection against external events attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors conducted a phase 1 SDP screening using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, and the inspectors determined that the finding affected the category of Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls in that combustible material was not being properly controlled, the finding had a low degradation rating, and the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because Exelon failed to appropriately ensure interdepartmental coordination during the work activities such that the transient combustibles were promptly removed from the BWST tunnel. |
Site: | Three Mile Island |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000289/2012004 Section 1R05 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Werkheiser G Hunegs J Heinly |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
' | |
Finding - Three Mile Island - IR 05000289/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Three Mile Island) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Three Mile Island)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||