|Fort Calhoun Station|
|2852017001R00 - NRC Website|
|Person / Time|
|From:||Fisher M J|
Omaha Public Power District
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
|Download: ML17131A261 (4)|
Estimated burden per response lc comply with this mandatory coilection request50 hours
. Reported lessons !earned are incorporated into the licensing process and fec back tc industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FDA, Privacy and informatics Collections Branch (7-5 F53). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocoliects.Reso.email@example.com, and to the Desk Officer, Cffice of information and Regulatory Affairs.
NEOB-10202, (3150-313L), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. I' a means used to .mpiose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number. tie NRC may not cond.;ct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information cc! ection.
Fort Calhoun Station
3. LER NUMBER
2017 - 00 001
Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is a two-loop reactor coolant system of Combustion Engineering design. Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) permanently ceased power operations on October 24, 2016 and as of November 13, 2016, all fuel was removed from the reactor vessel and placed into the FCS spent fuel pool and has so certified as required by 10 CFR 50.82(a).
In accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62 Rev 1 Reporting of Safeguards Events the following information is submitted.
1. Date and time of the event: The Safeguards event was discovered on March 13, 2017, at1600 hours
Central Daylight Time (CDT).
4. Safety systems affected or threatened: No safety systems were affected or threatened by the discovery of the unattended opening into the Vital Area. While still classified as a Vital Area in FCS's Physical Security Plan, no safety systems necessary for the plant's current mode of operation and configuration are present in the area.
5. Type of security force onsite: FCS maintains a proprietary security force.
6. Number and type of personnel involved: Ten individuals from FCS security management and site maintenance personnel were involved with the initial discovery of the safeguards event.
7. Method of discovery of incident: The Vital Area barrier degradation was discovered by FCS Security management during a maintenance pre-job walk down for decommissioning activities.
8. Procedural errors involved: Maintenance procedure "Tool Pouch/Minor Maintenance" did not provide adequate guidance to determine if a plant barrier impairment was necessary prior to performance of maintenance. The discovery of the deficiency is governed by Security procedure "Observation and Inspection of Security Barriers.
9. Immediate actions taken in response to event:
a. Implementation of compensatory security measures in the Vital Area b. A search of the Vital Area and a review of the appropriate alarm log(s) was performed. No suspicious activity was identified c. All work that could result in potential unattended barriers was placed on hold comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), L.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-3001, or by e-mail to NEOB-1C202. (3150-0104), Cffice of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 2C503. if a means used to impose an information collection does not display a =Ter.* valid OMB control number; the tiRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information oollecticn.
Fort Calhoun Station
3. LER NUMBER
2017 - 00 001 d. A review of plant drawings, a walk down by Security staff and an alignment meeting between Maintenance and Security staff to confirm no other unattended opening existed e. All Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) were walked down in the Vital Area with no issues identified 10. Corrective action taken or planned:
a. A site wide communication on Security requirements was distributed to increase station personnel awareness b. A revision to station procedures "Tool Pouch/Minor Maintenance", "Maintenance Planning", and "Facilities Maintenance Process" to ensure aspects of Plant Barrier Impairments procedure are specifically addressed c. The Manager Maintenance to re-enforce the specific roles and responsibilities for Maintenance supervisors during decommissioning activities d. Maintenance supervisor's to establish/re-enforce the decommissioning project responsibilities between Maintenance Program Specialists and station Maintenance craft personnel 11. Local, State or Federal law enforcement agencies contacted: No law enforcement agencies were contacted for the Safeguards event. The NRC was notified for a one hour report of Reportable Safeguards Events under 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G Section I (EN 52609).
12. Description of media interest and press release: No media interest or press releases occurred for the Safeguards event.
13. Indication of previous similar events: The root cause associated with this Safeguards event (CR 2017-00870) identified previous occurrences during outages without security compensatory actions in place. No evidence of malicious activates were identified. Also, boundary, such as underground pathways, was discovered that was not monitored by intrusion detection equipment or observed by security personnel at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.
14. Knowledgeable Contact: Mr. Chris Heimes, Director Site Security, can be contacted for additional details.
Chris Heimes Director Site Security Omaha Public Power District (402) 533-6419 (402) 880-5299 (Cell) cheimesa,oppd.com