05000282/FIN-2017003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, requires, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Specifically, the licensee established procedure 5 AWI 3.12.4,
26 Post-Maintenance Testing, Revision 24, as the program for selecting and documenting post maintenance tests (PMTs) and return to service tests to ensure that SSCs would perform their intended function when returned to service. Contrary to the above, on September 20, 2017, the licensee failed to assure that testing required the demonstrate that three safety injection system actuation relays would perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures, which incorporated the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. The three safety injection system actuation relays had not been tested following replacement during planned maintenance. Specifically, while reviewing PMT activities performed on the D5 EDG on September 19, 2017, the licensee identified three safety injection system actuation relays that had not been tested following replacement during planned maintenance. As a result, the D5 EDG was declared inoperable at the time of discovery on September 20, 2017. In response, the licensee performed an in-depth review of all recent D5 EDG maintenance activities to ensure that all PMT requirements were met and performed SP 2150, D5 Diesel Generator Function Test, on September 21, 2017, to adequately test all three safety injection system actuation relays and an additional D5 EDG slow start test to fully demonstrate operability of D5. Because the inspectors answered No to all questions under Exhibit 2.A of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at-Power, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The above issue was documented in the licensees CAP as CAP 501000002920. Corrective actions included performing an apparent cause evaluation, department clock reset, and planned changes to 5 AWI 3.12.4 to ensure all required PMT activities are performed satisfactorily prior to returning SSCs to service. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2017003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2017 (2017Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Haeg P Laflamme P Zurawski S Bell D Reeser R Baker B Dickson |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2017003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2017Q3
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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