05000272/LER-2017-001

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LER-2017-001, Containment Integrity Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
Salem Generating Station - Unit 1
Event date: 11-09-2017
Report date: 01-08-2018
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2722017001R00 - NRC Website
LER 17-001-00 for Salem Generating Station, Unit 1 Regarding Containment Integrity Inoperable for Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
ML18008A079
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 01/08/2018
From: McFeaters C V
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N17-0206
Download: ML18008A079 (5)


0001, or by Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Salem Generating Station — Unit 1 05000272

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

Westinghouse-Pressurized Water Reactor {PWR/4} Containment Leakage Control System {BD}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Discovery and Event Date: 11/09/2017

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, at 000 percent rated thermal power (RTP).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRRENCE

On November 9, 2017 at approximately 2300, Salem Unit 1 was operating in MODE 3 when operators found steam leaking into the auxiliary building outside containment. Operators entered S1.0P-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow, and dispatched operators to locate and isolate the leak. Operators determined the steam was from the 14 steam generator through normally closed valves 14GB47 and 14GB48 steam generator blowdown {WI} line nitrogen supply valves. The steam leak was isolated at 2314 when operators closed normally open manual valve 14GB3. The following chronology explains how the event occurred:

Salem Unit 1 established containment integrity while in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. While in Mode 5, operators opened 14GB47 and 14GB48 to sparge the 14 steam generator. The procedure was not completed and the open valves were not tracked as exceptions to containment integrity. Salem Unit 1 entered Mode 4, Hot Shutdown, on 11/07/17 at 2238. Reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature was 200 degrees Fahrenheit.

RCS pressure was 1580 psig. Salem Unit 1 entered Mode 3, Hot Standby, on 11/09/2017 at 1918. RCS temperature was 350 degrees Fahrenheit. RCS pressure was 1580 psig.

Contrary to limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.6.1.1 requirements, Salem Unit 1 operated in MODE 4 and MODE 3 for 24.

6 hours
6.944444e-5 days
0.00167 hours
9.920635e-6 weeks
2.283e-6 months

with containment integrity not established because normally closed valves 14GB47 and 14GB48 were open.

In addition, Unit 1 failed to comply with LCO 3.0.4 on two discrete occasions because entries into applicable MODEs were made while LCO 3.6.1.1 was not met. The first occasion occurred when Unit 1 entered MODE 4 on 11/08/17. The second occasion occurred when Unit 1 entered MODE 3 on 11/09/17. On 11/09/17 at 2316, the condition was corrected by closing 14GB3, and then closing normally closed valves 14GB47 and 14GB48. RCS temperature was 475 degrees Fahrenheit. RCS pressure was 1980 psig.

0001, or by Internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Salem Generating Station — Unit 1 05000272 NUMBER NUMBER

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause for leaving the 14GB47 and 14GB48 open is human performance. Operators did not implement LCO tracking as required by OP-SA-108-115-1001, Operability Assessment and Equipment Control Program, when exceptions to containment integrity were taken to sparge the 14 steam generator. Procedures will be revised to assure containment integrity exceptions are tracked.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event.

The operating crew responded correctly to the event. The applicable abnormal operating procedure was properly entered and documentation met expectations.

All SSCs needed to shut down the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident were available. The 14 steam generator blowdown manual isolation valve, 14GB3, was available and could be closed if required to isolate the 14 steam generator from atmosphere.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

A review of this event determined that a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines, did not occur. This event did not prevent the ability of a system to fulfill its safety function to either shutdown the reactor, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

A review of Salem licensee event reports for the previous three years identified no other similar events.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

This was a human performance error for which performance management actions have been taken to correct the behavior. The performance management actions include reinforcement of standards and expectations with the individuals involved, training to disseminate the experiential learning through the licensed operator requalification training program, and a department level clock reset.

COMMITMENTS

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this LER.