05000271/FIN-2014002-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Monitor the Unavailability of the Fire Water to Service Water Crosstie |
| Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, paragraph a(1), because Entergy did not evaluate the fire protection system for (a)(1) classification even though the unavailability performance criterion had been exceeded. Specifically, Entergy did not recognize that the fire water system to service water system crosstie function was risk-significant and that its unavailability (nine days in 2013 and 34 days in 2014) was required to be monitored. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report CR-VTY-2014-01064. The inspectors determined that the failure to recognize that the fire water system to service water system crosstie function was risk-significant, to monitor the crosstie function?s unavailability (nine days in 2013 and 34 days in 2014), and to evaluate the fire protection system for 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) classification was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergy?s ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, since Entergy personnel did not recognize that the risk significant function was not being tracked against the unavailability performance criterion no actions were taken to address exceeding that criterion and no changes were made to the temporary pump design to reduce additional unavailability. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not represent an actual loss of function of a non-technical specifications train of equipment designated as high safety-significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the performance deficiency was not the underlying cause of the unavailability in 2013 or 2014. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because Entergy did not challenge the unknown reason why no system was accruing maintenance rule unavailability while the station was in an elevated risk condition, i.e. Yellow, with the fire water pumps out of service. |
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000271/2014002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Burket R Mckinley S Rich S Rutenkroger |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Vermont Yankee - IR 05000271/2014002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Vermont Yankee) @ 2014Q1
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||