05000271/FIN-2011002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Foreign Material Exclusion Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance (Green) of Technical Specifications 6.4, Procedures, was identified for inadequate implementation of Entergy procedure EN-MA-118, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 6, which resulted in foreign material intrusion into the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system. Specifically, Entergy did not establish a Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Zone 1 around the open RHRSW system between completing the closeout inspection and system closure following pump replacement. Entergy\'s immediate corrective actions included conducting a stand down, reinforcing the standards and requirements for FME controls and general procedural compliance, as well as reinforcing expectations for the attention to detail of work practices. Entergy entered the issue into their corrective action program to evaluate for additional corrective measures. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, (ie., core damage). Specifically, foreign material made its way into the \'A\' Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (RHR HX) and rendered the \'A\' RHRSW train inoperable for several days. A review of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, Minor Examples, revealed that no minor examples were applicable to this finding. The inspectors used IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined that the finding required a Phase 2 review because the \'A\' RHRSW train had an actual loss of safety function for greater than its allowed outage time (7 days). This finding was assessed using IMC 0609 and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on a Phase 2 analysis. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance crosscutting area, Work Practices component, because Entergy personnel did not follow EN-MA- 118. Specifically, they did not establish a FME Zone 1 after the system closeout inspection. H.4(b) |
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000271/2011002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jackson D Spindler S Rich |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Vermont Yankee - IR 05000271/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Vermont Yankee) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Vermont Yankee)
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