05000266/LER-2016-003

LER-2016-003, Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Event date:	04-02-2016
Report date:	06-01-2016
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2662016003R00 - NRC Website

LER 16-003-00 for Point Beach, Unit 1, Regarding Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications

ML16153A159
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/01/2016
From:	Coffey B Point Beach
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 16-003-00
Download: ML16153A159 (4)

comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects,Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

3. LER NUMBER

2016 003 - 00

Description of the Event:

At 0229 on April 2, 2016, Unit 1 entered MODE 4 from MODE 5 without satisfying all of Technical Specification 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling System Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) as required by LCO Applicability 3.0.4.

LCO Applicability 3.0.4 does not permit entry into a MODE of applicability when an LCO is not met, unless the associated actions to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE for an unlimited time or after performance of an acceptable risk assessment and the appropriate risk management actions have been established. At 0307 on April 2, 2016 it was discovered that components were not operable as required by Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6 to permit entry into MODE 4 per LCO 3.0.4. At 0308 on April 2, 2016, the affected control switches for the two Containment Accident Recirculation Fans were positioned to auto, operability was restored and LCO 3.6.6 was met.

This 60 day licensee event report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Cause of the Event:

The cause of the operation or condition prohibited by technical specifications was failure to physically validate indications to ensure required equipment operability. Less than adequate oversight of the MODE transition contributed to the event.

Analysis of the Event:

The condition was discovered during reactor startup activities after the reactor had been shut down for several weeks for a planned refueling. The condition of the fuel in the reactor at the time of the event had a low residual heat capacity. Adequate heat removal capability for the containment is provided by two separate engineered safety features systems. These are the containment spray system and the containment air recirculation cooling system.

The containment air recirculation cooling system is designed to recirculate and cool the containment atmosphere in the event of a loss of coolant accident and thereby ensure that the containment pressure cannot exceed its design values. The containment air recirculation cooling system is designed on the conservative assumption that the core residual heat is released to the containment as steam. Two of the four containment cooling units and one of two containment spray pumps will provide sufficient heat removal capability to maintain the post-accident containment pressure below the design values assuming the core residual heat is release to the containment as steam.

Safety Significance:

The condition was determined to be of very low safety significance. Any design basis accident that could have occurred during the 39 minutes that the containment accident recirculation fans were not operable would not have exceeded design containment pressure or temperature limits because of the relatively low reactor coolant system residual heat. Two of the four containment accident recirculation fans were operable with the balance of the safety systems, structures or components needed to shut down the reactor, maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident were operable or available. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.

comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Corrective Actions:

The two containment accident recirculation fans were immediately positioned to the required position for the MODE of operation. Corrective actions have been created to conduct training to all crews that will cover command and control, implementation of technical specifications, operating experience of this event, and revision to the cold to hot shutdown procedure.

Similar Events:

corrective action of LER 2013-002-00 are not the same as this event.

Component Failure Data:

None