05000263/FIN-2018012-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | This violation of very-low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee CAP. Therefore, this finding being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.Enforcement:Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Appendix I,Evaluation of High Energy Line Breaks Outside Containment,Table I.5-2, Table of System Effects,Revision 36P, listed the Division II emergency power system as available during HELBs outside containment. Contrary to the above, on July 29, 1974, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically,the Division II emergency power system would not be available during a HELB outside containment.Procedure B.09.07-05, Operations Manual Section 4.16 kV Station Auxiliary, Revision 53,had actions that required entry into the lower 4kV area to permit repowering Division II emergency power systems but this area would be inaccessible during the event. Significance: The performance deficiency was determined to be more-than-minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in a condition were the Division II emergency power system would not be available during HELBs outside containment. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, 11 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, using Exhibit 2, Mitigating System Screening Questions,and concluded the violation was of very-low safety or security significance (Green)because the licensee reasonably demonstrated an alternate strategy was available to timely reach and maintain cold shutdown conditions. Corrective Action References: CAP501000011837, CAP 50100001593 |
Site: | Monticello |
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Report | IR 05000263/2018012 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2018 (2018Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21M |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Benjamin A Dahbur J Park M Jones W Hopf C Baron K Stoedter |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2018012 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2018Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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