05000263/FIN-2015002-07
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Finding | |
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Title | Operations with a Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) Without Secondary Containment Operable |
Description | A violation involving a failure to have secondary containment operable during Operations with the Potential to Drain the Reactor Vessel (OPDRV) was identified. Specifically, from April 23, 2015 through May 8, 2015, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant performed a total of three activities within two work windows without setting secondary containment, which is a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.4.1. The NRC issued Enforcement Guide Memorandum (EGM)11-003, Enforcement Guidance Memorandum on Dispositioning Boiling Water Reactor Licensee Noncompliance with Technical Specification Containment Requirements During Operations with a Potential for Draining the Reactor Vessel, Revision 2, on December 13, 2013, allowing for the exercise of enforcement discretion for such OPDRV-related TS violations, when certain criteria are met. The NRC concluded that Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant met these criteria during the activities for which the EGM was invoked. Therefore, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, to exercise enforcement discretion and refrain from issuing enforcement for the violation. Between April 23, 2015 and May 1, 2015 and again between May 2, 2015 and May 8, 2015, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) performed OPDRV activities while in Mode 5 without an operable secondary containment. An OPDRV is an activity that could result in the draining or siphoning of the RPV water level below the top of fuel, without crediting the use of mitigating measures to terminate the uncovering of fuel. Secondary containment is required by TS 3.6.4.1 to be operable during OPDRV activities. The required action for this specification is to suspend OPDRV operations. Therefore, entering the OPDRV without establishing secondary containment integrity was considered a condition prohibited by TS as defined by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The NRC issued EGM 11-003, Revision 2, on December 13, 2013, to provide guidance on how to disposition boiling water reactor licensee noncompliance with TS containment requirements during OPDRV operations. The NRC considers enforcement discretion related to secondary containment operability during Mode 5 OPDRV activities appropriate because the associated interim actions necessary to receive the discretion ensure an adequate level of safety by requiring licensees immediate actions to (1) adhere to the NRC plain language meaning of OPDRV activities, (2) meet the requirements which specify the minimum makeup flow rate and water inventory based on OPDRV activities with long drain down times, (3) ensure that adequate defense in depth is maintained to minimize the potential for the release of fission products with secondary containment not operable by (a) monitoring RPV level to identify the onset of a LOI event, (b) maintaining level monitoring to ensure secondary containment can be closed before inventory is drained to the RPV flange, (c) maintaining the capability to isolate the potential leakage paths, (d) prohibiting Mode 4 (cold shutdown) OPDRV activities, and (e) prohibiting movement of recently irradiated fuel with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed in Mode 5, and (4) ensure that licensees follow all other Mode 5 TS requirements for OPDRV activities. The inspectors reviewed this licensee event report (LER) for potential performance deficiencies and/or violations of regulatory requirements. The inspectors also reviewed the stations implementation of the EGM during the OPDRVs for which the EGM was invoked. Based on review of the following items, the inspectors determined that the licensee met the EGM requirements for discretion: 1. The inspectors observed that the OPDRV activities were logged in the control room narrative logs and that the log entry appropriately recorded that the standby source of makeup designated for the evolutions. 2. The inspectors noted that the reactor vessel water level was maintained at least 21 feet and 11 inches over the top of the RPV flange as required by TS 3.9.6. The inspectors also verified that at least one safety-related pump was available as the standby source of makeup designated in the control room narrative logs for the evolutions. The inspectors confirmed that the worst case estimated time to drain the reactor cavity to the RPV flange was greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 3. The inspectors reviewed Engineering Change documents which calculated the time to drain down during these activities and the feasibility of pre-planned actions the station would take to isolate potential leakage paths during these periods of time. 4. The inspectors verified that the OPDRVs were not conducted in Mode 4 and that the licensee did not move recently irradiated fuel during the OPDRVs. The inspectors noted that MNGP had in place a contingency plan for isolating the potential leakage path and verified that two independent means of measuring RPV water level were available for identifying the onset of LOI events. TS 3.6.4.1 required, in part, that secondary containment shall be operable during OPDRV. TS 3.6.4.1, Condition C, required the licensee to initiate action to suspend OPDRV immediately when secondary containment is inoperable. Contrary to the above, between April 23, 2015 and May 1, 2015 and again between May 2, 2015 and May 8, 2015, MNGP performed OPDRV activities while in Mode 5 without an operable secondary containment. Specifically, the station performed the following OPDRV activities without an operable secondary containment: 12 Recirculation System pump upper seal replacement; 12 Recirculation System modifications to add and replace valves; and 11 Recirculation System modifications to add and replace valves. Because the violation occurred during the discretion period described in EGM 11-003, Revision 2, the NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5, Violations Involving Special Circumstances, of the NRC Enforcement Policy and, therefore, will not issue enforcement action for this violation (EA-15-130). In accordance with EGM 11-003, Revision 2, each licensee that receives discretion must submit a license amendment request within 12 months of the NRC staffs publication in the Federal Register of the notice of availability for a generic change to the standard TS to provide more clarity to the term OPDRV. The inspectors observed that Monticello is tracking the need to submit a license amendment request in its CAP (CAP 1476012). LER 05000263/2015-001-00 is now closed. This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05. |
Site: | Monticello |
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Report | IR 05000263/2015002 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer M Ziolkowski N Mcmurray P Voss P Zurawski R Elliott S Bell T Bilik |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73 Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2015002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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