05000259/LER-1982-039, Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal

Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal

ML20055B868
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/06/1982
From:	Carter S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20055B865	List: 05000259/LER-1982-039, Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal
References
LER-82-039-03L-02, LER-82-39-3L-2, NUDOCS 8207230402
Download: ML20055B868 (2)

LER-2082-039, Reissued LER 82-039/03L-0:on 820609,fuse Blew Resulting in Inboard Primary Containment Isolation.Caused by Shorted Coil for Relay 16A-K66B,GE Type CR120A.Fuse & Relay Coil Replaced & Hydrogen Analyzers Returned to Normal

Event date:
Report date:
2592082039R00 - NRC Website

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1. 5 60 El DOCKET NUMBER GS 69 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CON',EQUENCES h 10121 l During normal operation. fisse 16A-F19 blev due to the failure of the coil for relay l IO l3l l 16A-K66B, resulting in an inboard primary containment isolation. The isolation  !

I o l 4 l l resulted in the closure of the inboard and outboard isolation valves for "A" and "B" I o s l H analyzers (T.S. 3.7.H.3). There was no effect on public health and safety in 1 7

0 6 l that T.S. 3.7.H.3 allows ooeration for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with the hydrocen annivcer out of l 10171 I service. The valves were closed for about 2-1/2 hours. I 101H 1 l I DE CODE SU80 E COMPONENT CODE SU8 COO'E S E 10191 7 8 l sl Ol@ Lt.1@ Laj@ la I e I t i A Iy I S l@ U@ 12J @

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40 42 43 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h I 810 l l The coil for relay 16A-K66B. CE type CR120A. Model #5500000lG002. shorted causins- I

' i l fuse 16A-F19 to blow. The fuse and the reinv coil were renlaced and the IL I e

i 2 l analyzers and other systems affected by the inboard primary containment isolation werel

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i 3 l returned to normal. This is a random failure. No further recurrence control is I c

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• Form BF 17 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant BF 15.2 2/1?/82

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

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BFRO 259 / 8239 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.n.3 i

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b. (2)

• Date Due NRC 7/8/82 i' Event Narrative:

Unit 2 was operating at 77-percent power; unit 3 was operating at 95-percent power. These units were not affected by this event. During normal operation with unit 1 operating at 98-percent power, an operator observed panel 9-42 fuse failure annunciation. Investigation revealed that fuse i 16A-F19 failed due to the failure of the coil for relay 16A-K66B. The blown fuse resulted in an inboard primary containment isolation which g closed the H2 analyzer isolation valves, thereby preventing sampling of

[ the torus and drywell atmospheric conditions (Technical Specification 3.7.H.3). The isolation caused the following valves to close: 1-FCV p 18, 1-FCV-64-19, 1-FCV-64-29,1-FCV-64-31, 1-FCV-64-32, 1-FCV-64-34, 1-FCV-76-17, 1-FCV-90-254A, 1-FCV-90-254B,1-FCV-90-257B, 1-FCV-74-102, 1-FCV j 103, and 1-FCV-32-62. This placed the valves in the isolated condition as allowed by Technical Specification 3.7.D.2. The isolation started the

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standby gas treatment system and resulted in the isolation of the unit 1 e reactor building and the refueling floor ventilation system. Load was reduced for about two hours from 1040 We to 718 We to slow the rise in 1 main steam tunnel temperature. Fuse 16A-F19 and the coil for relay 16A-K66B were replaced and all systems were returned to normal within 2-1/2 hours. Technical Specification 3.7.H.3 allows operation for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with the hydrogen analyzer out of service. The failure of the coil for relay 16A-K66B is considered a random failure. No further recurrence control is planned.

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• Previous Similar Events:

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BFRO-50-259/8034, 8163 Y 260/7918 296/8009

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