05000244/LER-2010-001
| - | |
| Event date: | 01-07-2010 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 03-05-2010 |
| 2442010001R00 - NRC Website | |
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER
FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Thomas Harding, Licensing Director (585) 771-5219 == 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT ==
MANU- REPORTABLE MANU- REPORTABLECAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENTFACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX A DB N 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR == SUBMISSION ==
- YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) CI NO DATE On January 7, 2010, during review of fuel moves in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) in preparation for a fuel assembly canister sipping evolution, Reactor Engineering personnel identified that two fuel assemblies were misclassified per Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) 3.7.13 and stored in incorrect locations.
Event investigation identified that both assemblies, utilizing the 2001 methodology, had been placed in their correct storage location when last positioned in 2001. In 2005, the fuel database was migrated, updated and minor assembly burnup adjustments were made utilizing specific weights for each fuel assembly, resulting in a small ( the time of the change, this was considered insignificant and was not evaluated against TS 3.7.13 figures.
The upgraded database shifted the assemblies' burnups from slightly above the fuel classification line, to slightly below.
The two fuel assemblies were relocated to assure compliance with LCO 3.7.13 on January 8, 2010. An additional corrective action includes completion of fuel burnup validation and reconciliation calculations.
Based on the multiple conservatisms in the criticality analysis, the minor change in the calculated burnup, and the considerable margin in the soluble boron concentration in the spent fuel pool, there was no nuclear safety consequence caused by this event.
historically entered as region average (i.e., the total MTU in all assemblies for the region divided by the number of assemblies) for the first few fuel batches.
After retirement of NFAC, Reactor Engineering personnel elected to use MWD generated by each assembly and assembly specific weights, since this information was available. This was a onetime reconciliation to support NMMSS reporting. At this time reactor engineering personnel recognized there were minor changes ( while others decreased. Surveillance Requirement 3.7.13 was not performed for each assembly in the SFP using the new data at this time since it was not foreseen that such a small change would result in a change in the fuel category. However, this change resulted in a shift from slightly above the fuel classification line, to slightly below as shown in TS LCO 3.7.13. This was identified on January 7, 2010 when Reactor Engineering personnel were performing verifications in support of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) fuel sipping activities. Immediate actions were initiated to move the fuel assemblies to the correct locations.
Fuel assemblies DO5 and D17 were placed in the proper locations and TS LCO 3.7.13 was exited on January 8, 2010.
event was due to the Reactor Engineer not recognizing the potential to impact LCO 3.7.13 classification changes when the database changes were made in 2005 to incorporate "best available" data. While the engineer understood the TS requirements, there was no specific action that would have prompted the performance of the surveillance activity following the database upgrade.
.) Soluble boron credit methodology was originally employed to establish a target Keff value of 0.98051 for the spent fuel pool at zero soluble boron. The allowance for biases and uncertainties is determined to be 0.01592 providing an upper limit on Keff of 0.99643. The changes identified in fuel weight were within the inherent uncertainties of the calculation. Based on current calculations and acceptance criteria, total boron concentration required to meet Keff of uncertainties. Ginna Technical Specifications require >2300ppm in the spent fuel pool. Therefore at no time would Keff have increased to greater than 0.95 since the 2001 reconfiguration. If the SFP were flooded with unborated water, there is no realistic probability that Keff would have increased to >0.99643.
Based on the above considerations, the nuclear safety consequences of this event are very low.
This event does not have any impact on NRC performance indicators.
IV�CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL == STATUS: ==
Fuel assemblies DO5 and D17 were relocated in compliance with LCO 3.7.13.
B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE
Note: There are no regulatory commitments in this Licensee Event Report Lonq Term Corrective Actions:
Reactor Engineering personnel will complete fuel burnup validation and reconciliation calculations. This will document Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.13 for current fuel configuration in the SFP. Additional corrective actions associated with the human performance weaknesses are documented in the site Apparent Cause Evaluation.
J RC FORM 366AA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-2007) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INSEQNTIAL IUER.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant YEAR NUMBER NNO V.A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
A. FAILED COMPONENT
None == B. PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILAR EVENTS ==
A review of Ginna events over the past five years identified the following similar events:
C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EllS) COMPONENT == FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM ==
REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
IEEE 803 FUNCTION IEEE 805 SYSTEM == COMPONENT IDENTIFIER INDENTIFICATION ==
DO5 N/A DB D17 N/A DB == D. SPECIAL COMMENTS ==
None