05000244/FIN-2016001-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Title 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) requires that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operating license under this part shall follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities. Section IV.B.1 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, requires, in part, that the means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of State and local agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. Contrary to the above, prior to January 7, 2016, Exelon procedure EP-AA-110-203, GNP Dose Assessment, Revision 003, did not consider the possibility of two different flow rate values through the plant vent. The plant vent has the capability to flow through filters when new fuel assemblies are added to the SFP resulting in the potential for two different flow rates out the ventone with the filters in service (69074 cubic feet per minute) and one without the filters in service (50560 cubic feet per minute). Due to the error, during certain events, Exelon would have inappropriately determined the event contaminant release rate to be higher than actual, resulting in the early declaration of an emergency action level. Upon identification, Exelon entered this into its CAP as AR 02609057 and implemented dose assessment compensatory measures to be used in EP-AA-110-203, Attachment 7, Ventilation Systems Flow Rates, table data. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, issued September 22, 2015, because a deficient emergency classification process which would result in an overclassification, but would not result in unnecessary public protective measures should be considered Green. |
| Site: | Ginna  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000244/2016001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dimitriadis A Siwy H. Anagnostopoulus J Petch N Perry |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix E 10 CFR 50.54 10 CFR 50.54(q) |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Ginna - IR 05000244/2016001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Ginna) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Ginna)
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