05000237/FIN-2013005-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadvertent Lo-Lo Reactor Water Level Indication Received During Maintenance Resulting in Unavailability of the 2/3 EDG to Unit 3 |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures , was self-revealed on November 17, 2013, when the 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable to Unit 3 with an Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) signal present on Unit 2 due to sensing a low reactor water level condition. Specifically, while the licensee performed procedure DIS 0263-07, Revision 20, Unit 2 ATWS RPT/ARI and ECCS Level Transmitters Channel Calibration Test and EQ Maintenance Inspection , in conjunction with Anticipated Transient Without a Scram (ATWS) level transmitter replacements, a failure to remove trip relays in addition to performing all transmitter replacements at the same time resulted in an unexpected Lo-Lo reactor water level trip signal, subsequently resulting in the auto initiation of the Unit 2 EDG and the 2/3 EDG, causing the 2/3 EDG to be inoperable to Unit 3. The licensee immediately restored the ATWS trip relay circuitry, clearing the Lo-Lo reactor water level signal. This enabled the EDGs to be returned to a standby condition and, thereby, restored 2/3 EDG availability to Unit 3. The licensees failure to properly implement the steps in the procedure was a performance deficiency that was determined to be more than minor, and thus a finding, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Configuration Control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. The finding was of very low safety significance because each of the questions provided in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, were answered no. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, for failing to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work activity on the plant. Specifically, the licensee committed a human performance error by failing to adequately address the impact of work activity changes on the plant and implement the required prerequisites. |
Site: | Dresden |
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Report | IR 05000237/2013005 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | D Betancourt D Melendez Colon G Roach J Cameron J Laughlin M Holmberg N Shah R Elliott R Jickling T Go |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2013005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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