05000219/FIN-2015008-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Untimely Corrective Actions to Restore Design Conformance of Two SDV Vent & Drain Valves Pressure Regulator Valves |
| Description | The NRC identified an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to promptly correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, corrective actions to restore design conformance of scram discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valve pressure regulator valves V-6-961 and V-6-962 were not taken at the first opportunity of sufficient duration which was refueling outage 25 (1R25). Additionally, justification of the basis for deferral of corrective actions beyond the restart from 1R25 on October 2014, was not documented, reviewed, or approved by site management and/or oversight organizations as required by station procedure OP-AA-108-115, Section 4.5.5. Consequently, two non-conforming pressure regulator valves which perform a safety-related function remained installed following plant startup from 1R25, without appropriate evaluation and approval. Immediate corrective action included licensee determination that V-6-961 and 962 and the associated SDV vent and drain valves (V-15-119 and 121) remained operable, but non-conforming. Exelon entered the issue into their corrective action program as IR 2482851. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control and barrier performance attributes of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the operational capability of the containment barrier to protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 5.c in Appendix E of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, because the control rod drive system was returned to service following 1R25 with two non-conforming (non-safety-related) pressure regulator valves installed in a safety-related application. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not affect the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary; did not affect the radiological barrier function of the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool systems or boundaries; and did not represent an actual open pathway in containment or involve a reduction in the function of hydrogen igniters. The team assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Consistent Process (aspect H.13) because the organization did not use a consistent systematic approach to evaluate component operability after Exelon upgraded the classification of three pressure regulator valves from a non-safety to a safety-related status. |
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
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| Report | IR 05000219/2015008 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kern J Brand J Schoppy P Krohn |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Oyster Creek - IR 05000219/2015008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Oyster Creek) @ 2015Q2
Self-Identified List (Oyster Creek)
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