ML20217C806
| ML20217C806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217C775 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-98-01, 50-324-98-1, 50-325-98-01, 50-325-98-1, NUDOCS 9803270178 | |
| Download: ML20217C806 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1998001
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-325, 50-324
Report No: 50-325/98-01. 50-324/98-01
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)
Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. Units 1 & 2 j
Location: 8470 River Road SE
Southport NC 28461
Dates: January 26-30, 1998
Inspectors: K. Barr, Chief. Plant Sup) ort Branch ,
W. Sartor. Exercise Team _eader ;
J. Kreh. Radiation Specialist
G. Salyers. Radiation Specialist
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Approved by: J. Jaudon. Director '
Division of Reactor Safety
PR D 00 324 Enclosure 2
G PDR
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT
{' NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-325/98-01 and 50-324/98-01
L This routine, announced inspection was the observation and evaluation of the
biennial emergency preparedness exercise for the Brunswick Nuclear Plant.
l- This NRC/ FEMA evaluated exercise was a plume exposure pathway exercise with
i full partici)ation by Brunswick. Nuclear Plant and the State of North Carolina, ,
and Brunswic( and New Hanover Counties. The exercise was conducted on
. January 29. 1998, from 8:00 a.m. to 1:46 p.m. This report summarizes the j
observations of the four-person NRC team that assessed the adequacy of the '
licensee's emergency preparedness program as it implemented its emergency
plan and procedures in response to the simulated accident. A separate FEMA
report will be issued that evaluates the performance of the State and
counties.
The NRC team observed the licensee's response in the Control Room Simulator
(CRS). the Technical Support Center (TSC). the Operational Support Center
(OSC). and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Based on the performance
observed, the team concluded that the licensee successfully demonstrated its
ability to implement the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing
Procedures, with one exception: the failure to provide protective actions
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recommendations with the initial General Emergency notification. Independent j
of the exercise a violation was identified addressing an administrative j
oversight in a recent plan revision. I
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Procram Areas Evaluated and Results
l > Scenario--The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for
testing the integrated emergency response capability, and exercise
preparations were organized. (P4.1)
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> Control Room Simulator (CRS)--The Shift Superintendent / Site Emergency
Coordinator and his CRS staff were very effective in performing initial
emergency responsibilities. (P4.2)
- Technical Support Center (TSC)--Command and control of TSC operations by
the SEC were judged to be exemplary. Emergency declarations were made
timely, and accident mitigation activities were well coordinated with
the OSC. (P4.2)
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> Operational Support Center (OSC)--The OSC's emergency response
L performance was good. Good planning was displayed in repair team
development and deployment. Effective command and control was
L demonstrated by the Emergency Repair Director (ERD). The post exercise
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critique in the OSC was thorough, open and self critical. (P4.2)
facility responsibility by not providing off site agencies with off site
Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)in a timely manner. This
failure was identified as an Exercise Weakness. Except for the Exercise
Weakness, command and control of the EOF and timeliness of off site
notifications were good. Off site dose projections were completed
satisfactorily, although a software inconsistency was detected but not
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fully evaluated during the exercise. Restrictions on food consumption
l were not effectively communicated to all EOF staff. Status boards were
well maintained, but position logs were not. The State of North Carolina
was effectively integrated into the EOF organization. (P4.2)
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Report Details
IV. Plant Support
P3 EP Procedures and Documentation
P3.1 Emeroency Resoonse Plan
a. Insoection Scooe (82301)
As part of the inspectors' preparation for the exercise evaluation. the
Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) was selectively reviewed to
identify the various commitments and provisions for emergency response,
b. Observations and Findinas
The version of the RERP in effect at the time of the current inspection
was Revision 49. which had become effective December 3. 1997. During
the course of selective review of the RERP (as well as the Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures), the inspectors identified a discrepancy
in the licensee's planning commitments. In an effort to incorporate the
NRC's 1996 " exercise rule" change, which allowed licensees to conduct
full-scale exercises biennially instead of annually. the licensee
revised its RERP (in Revision 46. effective May 29, 1997) to require
exercises every two years but failed to include a requirement for an
"off-year" drill between exercises.Section IV.F.2.b of Appendix E to
10 CFR Part 50 specifies that "the licensee shall take actions necessary
to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained
during the interval between biennial exercises by conducting drills,
including at least one drill involving a combination of some of the
principal functional areas of the licensee's onsite emergency response
capabilities." Although the licensee was conducting integrated 4
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drills at least five times per
year (any one of which would probably have fulfilled the requirement for
an off-year drill). the current RERP (Revision 49) did not contain any '
requirement or commitment to this program. The inspectors concluded
that a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) occurred in that Revision 46 reduced
the effectiveness of the RERP without Commission approval (VIOLATION
50-325, 50-324/98-01-01: Failure to follow 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirement
that revision of the emergency plan must not reduce its effectiveness)
c. Conclusions l
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A violation was identified for decreasing the effectiveness of the RERP i
in Revision 46. )
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P4 Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness (EP) 4
l P4.1 Exercise Scenario ;
a. Insoection Stone (82302)
The inspectors reviewed the exercise scenario to determine whether
provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
portion of the basic elements of the licensee's plan. ,
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b. Observations and Findinas
LThe' licensee submitted its emergency exercise scose and objectives for
the' Brunswick Steam Electric Plant to the NRC wit 1 a letter dated
November 6, 1997. The 1998 biennial emergency exercise scenario was
submitted with a letter dated December 5. 1998. A review of the package
indicated that the scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and-
offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient
information to the State of North Carolina, and Brunswick and New
Hanover counties for their 3articipation in the exercise. The inspector
noted that the control of t1e exercise was also well organized.
c. Conclusion
The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the
integrated emergency capability, and exercise preparations were well
organized.
P4.2 Emercency Resoonse Facility (ERF) Observations and Criticue
a. Exercise Evaluation Scooe
During this inspection, the inspectors obrarved and evaluated th'e
licensee's biennial full-participation, emergency preparedness exercise .
in the control room simulator (CRS), technical support center (TSC). l
o>erational support center (OSC), and the emergency operations facility 4
( EOF) . The inspectors assessed licensee recognition of abnormal plant
conditions, classification of emergency conditions, notification of
offsite a' !ncies, development of PARS. command and control,
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communicz :ons, and the overall implementation of the Emergency Plan.
In addition, the inspectors attended the licensee's post-exercise
critique to. evaluate the licensee's self-assessment of the exercise.
Acceptance criteria is contained in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, site
Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan implementing procedures, and industry
guidance in NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1. Rev.1 " Criteria for Preparations
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness
in Support of Nuclear Power Plants".
b. ERF Observations. Findinas. and Facility Critiaues
- b .1 Control Room Simulator (CRS)
Observations and Findinos
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The CRS shift was briefed on the initial conditions at 7:55 a.m. and
immediately assumed shift responsibilities. The Shift
Superintendent / Emergency Coordinator correctly classified the Unusual
Event and Alert conditions, and the notifications of offsite agencies
were made correctly and promptly. The CRS Emergency Coordinator
maintained effective command and control as he implemented the Emergency
Plan.
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! ! Conclusion
The Shift' Superintendent / Site Emergency Coordinator and his CRS staff
were very effective in performing initial emergency responsibilities. .,
b.2 Technical Suocort Center (TSC)
Observations and Findinos !
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The order to staff the TSC and EOF was issued via an announcement from I
the Control Room Simulator (CRS) on the public-address system (PA) at
8:27 a.m. (The OSC was inadvertently not mentioned in that initial l
announcement.) TSC positions were all filled'by arriving personnel as '
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of 9:14 a.m.. which was 47 minutes after the order to commence
l activating the facility. Much of this delay was attributable to the
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process of incorporating the TSC into the Protected-Area (34 minutes). '
Although the decision to begin activating the ERFs was discretionary
l because a NOUE classification was still in effect. at 8:51 a.m. an Alert
was declared and a rapid turnover from the Control Room to the TSC.
should have become important. The total time required for TSC
activation (which occurred at 9:40 a.m.) was 73 minutes as measured from
the PA announcement, which met the licensee's timeliness goal for.TSC
activation.
Once activated, the TSC functioned efficiently and professionally.
Personnel continuously monitored plant conditions using information from
three large-screen video monitors which displayed (simulated) plant data
in real time. These data were supplemented by well-maintained status
boards which documented such information as essential equipment out of
l service. event chronology. OSC mission tracking, and fission-product-
barrier status. Command and control of TSC operations by the Site
Emergency Coordinator (SEC) were judged to be exemplary. Periodic
briefings (with audio fed to the OSC) facilitated the flow and exchange J
of plant status information. The TSC staff was observed to be
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exceptionally attentive and participatory during these briefings, and
the use of " repeat backs" seemed to enhance the focus of the management
group. Personnel regularly devoted effort to anticipatory evaluation so
l as to be better prepared for possible changes in plant conditions.
The declarations of Site Area Emergency (at 10:26 a.m.) and General
Emergency (at 11:49 a.m.) were timely and correct. The TSC and OSC
functioned in a coordinated and proficient manner to establish repair
l. priorities for OSC damage-control teams.
Conclusions i
Command and control of TSC operations by the SEC were judged to be
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exemplary. Emergency declarations were made timely and accident l
mitigation activities were well coordinated with the OSC. ,
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b.3 Ooerational Sucoort Center
Observations and Findinos
l The Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were activated prior to the
l 8:51 a.m. Alert emergency declaration. A Notification Of. Unusual Event
l (NOUE) emergency declaration was declared at 8:09 a.m. . Brunswick's
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Emergency Notification system was activated at 8:22 a.m. and again at
. 8:26 a.m. ' At 8:27 a.m. . the plant ) aging system instructed emergency
, response personnel to activate the ERFs. The ins)ectors observed the
l OSC staff start arriving at 8:36 a.m. Everyone wor (ed together and
! efficiently converted a conference room into the OSC control center.
l Minimum staff recuirements were noted and verified, and at 9:00 a.m. the
OSC was activatec.
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, The inspector observed the OSC Emergency Repair Director (ERD) exercise
l effective command and control. The ERD conducted OSC briefings that
L -were consistently clear. thorough, and sufficiently frequent. The
- briefings were announced prior to starting and key personnel
l participated in the briefings. Also, the OSC monitored Technical
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Support Center (TSC) briefings. After each briefing, the OSC and TSC
l: would compare Repair Mission (Team) status boards for: priority, mission
i scope, and status. The ERD often monitored the Emergency Response
! Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer display in the OSC and
anticipated changes in plant conditions.
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The OSC staff worked well together in efficiently dispatching
repair missions. An emergency Radiation Work Permit (RWP) was
- _ written for the emergency. As repair missions were needed. .
tracking sheets were used to assemble, brief, track, and debrief-
repair teams. Repair missions were effectively tracked on a
mission status board that was continuously up-dated as to mission.
status, priority, and team composition. OSC missions were
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prioritized and re-prioritized as plant emergency conditions
changed. The repair missions
conditions, radiation levels, personal safety relating
and temperature towas
conditions plant .
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continuously monitored, and the teams were up-dated on changes in
emergency conditions that would affect the team. The OSC
t effectively dispensed twenty-four repair missions in a timely ,
manner. !
OSC control points were established and personnel accountability
within the OSC was maintained by logging personnel in and out of
the OSC. The inspectors noted that the access control point to i
the OSC was not located in the optimum location for controlling
access to the OSC. It was located approximately thirty feet from
the entrance door to the building housing the OSC. The inspector
noted that access could be easily gained to the OSC without
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passing by the access control point. The licensee stated that the
access control point location was chosen primarily because of the
availability.of a telephone jack.
The inspector observed that radiological surveys were periodically !
taken within the OSC.
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Conclusions
The Operational Support Center's emergency response performance was
good. Good planning was displayed in repair team development and
deployment. Effective command and control was demonstrated by the ERD.
b.4 Emeraency Doerations Facility
Observations and Findinas
During this day shift exercise, minimum required staffing of the EOF was-
achieved within 14 minutes of the announcement, made at 0827 a.m.. to
activate the response facilities. Due to delays in activation of the
, ' Technical Support Center (TSC), telephone communications between the E0F i
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and TSC were not established until 27 minutes after the EOF had achieved
minimum required staffing.
Plant Security Officers staffed a Control Point at the entrance to the
EOF within 23 minutes of the announcement to activate the facility and
satisfactorily maintained control of personnel entering the facility.
i Overall command and control of the E0F was very good. with one i
l significant exception associated with one off site message.- Within
approximately 20 minutes of facility activation, the Emergency Response
Manager established his expectations for the facility to focus on off
site issues. Through out the exercise, the Emergency Response Manager
3rovided clear directions of the EOF staff, held periodic facility
3riefings at which he clarified selected information to assure the
facility staff understood and integrated the briefing information, and
maintained control of possible facility distractions. Communications
between managers in the EOF were good.
Video 3rojection of selected real time simulator parameters was used by
the E0 staff to maintain a good awareness of plant and radiological
effluent conditions. The EOF staff frequently consulted the flowchart
of plant Emergency Action Levels and looked ahead for possible future
emergency declarations.
Status boards were well maintained and used by the EOF staff. About an
hour after the declaration of the General Emergency, a review of the log
entries for four EOF managers revealed that one had maintained his log i
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u) to date and the remaining three managers had not made any entries for i
l tie previous 50 minutes. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 13 minutes, and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. l
L respectively. i
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Early in the event, the Radiation Contrcl Manager proactively directed j
the use of assumed )lant-release scenarios to do dose projections to ;
provide early insigits for possible off site radiation dose i
consequences. Additionally, he looked ahead, using current meteorology
and weather forecasts, at the most likely off site sectors that would be
involved in any Protective Action Recommendations. He communicated that ,
information to the EOF staff during several of his facility briefings. !
The Radiation Control Manager was proactive in communicating with the !
State of North Carolina representative in the EOF who was closely
following the radiological aspects of the event. The Radiation Control l
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Manager also communicated effectively with the EOF managers with the
i exception of one instance where, in responding to questions from the
l Emergency Response Manager. the Radiation Control Manager provided an
incorrect response as to why off site computer dose projections were not
directly comparable to field team air dose measurements. The Radiation
Control Manager was proactive in initiating on site radiation surveys to
detect any unmonitored ground-level releases.
l Projections for off site doses were completed satisfactorily. However.
l the inspectors and the licensee identified an inconsistency in the
release data provided by different output options of the dose projection
software. In several cases with the same initial conditions, the
cuantities of radioactive noble gas and iodine released from the plant
ciffered by about a factor of 100. The Radiation Protection Manager
elected to provide the lower release data to off site agencies because
he believed that option of the software to have been properly validated.
The RPM's decision appeared to be appropriate. The licensee identified
this inconsistency in its exercise critique process and assigned
Condition Report 98-00273 for corrective action. 1
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Coordination was very good between the TSC and the EOF regarding
transfer of responsibility for issuance of off site notification
messages. Transmissions of the off site notification messages, issued
from the EOF after the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency
declarations, were begun within 15 minutes of event declarations. With
the exception of message #8. the content of initial and follow up
messages provided sufficient plant information. effluent release data.
and off site dose projection data to off site agencies. Message #8 was
the initial notification to off site agencies after the General
Emergency had been declared. Although previous efforts in the EOF had
been to project future Protective Action Recommendations for use by off
site agencies, message #8 failed to contain any off site Protective
Action Recommendations. Consequently, off site agencies did not receive
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licensee Protective Action Recommendations until message #9 was issued
at 12:18 p.m. Since message #8 contained no Protective Action
Recommendations from the licensee, the State took no action to initiate
off site evacuation until after receipt of message #9. Between the
declaration of the General Emergency and the actual oral transmission of i
Protective Actions Recommendations to the State communicator, a period !
of approximately 47 minutes elapsed. This failure to provide Protective i
Action Recommendations to off site agencies in a timely manner
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represents an Exercise Weakness and is identified as Inspector Followup ;
Item (IFI) 50-325/98-01-01. 50-324/98-01-01. Failure to Provide Timely l
Protective Action Recommendations. At the time the Emergency Response i
Manager was starting his review message #8, his attention was diverted
by a telephone call from the TSC and oral communications initiated by l
other EOF managers. The Protective Action Recommendations made in l
l message #9 were appropriate for the plant conditions, off site dose l
projections. and meteorological conditions.
l During the exercise, between 11:51 a.m. and 12:52 p.m.. the Radiation
Control Manager placed restrictions on the consumption of food and
smoking in the EOF. Those restrictions were not communicated to
personnel outside the main EOF room including the security control point
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and in the dose assessment area. As a result, personnel in those areas
continued to consume food for about 30 minutes after the restriction was
imposed.
Representatives from the State of North Carolina, after their arrival at
the EOF, were very effectively integrated into the functioning EOF
organization through one-on-one communications with their licensee
counterparts and through their participation in periodic facility
briefings.
Conclusions
The EOF failed to fulfill a crimary facility responsibility by not
providing off site agencies with off site protective action
recommendations in a timely manner. This failure is an Exercise
Weakness.
Except for the Exercise Weakness, command and control of the EOF and
timeliness of off site notifications were good. Off site dose
projections were completed satisfactorily although a software
inconsistency was detected but not fully evaluated during the exercise.
Restrictions on food consumption were not effectively communicated to
all EOF staff. Status boards were well maintained but position logs
were not. The State u" North Carolina was effectively integrated into
the EOF organization.
b.5 Licensee Facility Critiaues
Following the exercise. the licensee conducted facility critiques where ;
the players provided their own assessment of their performance and l
identified areas that needed improvement. Overall. the facility !
critiques in the CRS. TSC, and OSC were observed to be thorough. open '
and self critical. Deficiencies as well as strengths were self
identified by the exercise participants, resulting in an effective
critique process. The EOF facility critique had a low threshold for
problem identification and was a good self assessment. Licensee players
did not identify their failure to provide Protective Action
Recommendations to off site agencies. Some examples of items identified !
by the players were:
The State representative identified some continuing failures of
radio communications equipment that hampered communications
between the licensee and the State field survey teams.
Licensee personnel identified the need to improve display of plant
data, communications difficulties associated with the delay of the
TSC activation. the need to follow the " unaffected unit" more
j closely, a drill control problem regarding false information
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provided by a player. the software output data inconsistency in
off site radioactivity release data. failure to adequately
communicate food consumption restrictions in the EOF, the need to
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have the dose assessment function be more self-sufficient, the
l need for better consistency in describing plant conditions as
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stable or degrading, inaccurate off site message descri3tions of
releases being ~ below normal operating limits", and otler
equipment malfunctions.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting
The Team Leader presented the inspection summary to licensee management
on January 30, 1998. The summary indicated the exercise was fully
satisfactory with the exception of the exercise weakness for failing to
provide timely protective action recommendations following the General
Emergency Declaration. The violation identified because of the
Emergency Plan inconsistency was addressed as a separate issue not
associated with exercise performance.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
G. Atkinson. Supervisor-0n Line Scheduling
C. Cashwell. Supervisor. Emergency Preparedness
M. Christinziano Manager. Environmental and Radiation Center-
B. Deacy. Acting. Manager. Outage and Scheduling
W. Dorman. Licensing Supervisor
J. Gawron Manager. Nuclear Assessment
C. Hinnant. Vice President. Brunswick Nuclear Plant
K. Jury.-Manager. Regulatory Affairs-
B. Lindgren. Manager.' Site Support Services
J. Lyash Plant General Manager
G. Miller Manger. Brunswick Engineering Support Services
S. Tabor. Senior Analyst'. Regulatory Affairs
G. Thearling. Senior Analyst. Regulatory Affairs
M. Turkal.-Project Engineer. Regulatory Affairs
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 82301: Evaluation-of Exercises for Power Reactors
IP 82302: Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Ooened
50-325', 324/98-01-01 IFI ' Exercise Weakness - Failure to Provide Timely
Protective Action Recommendations (Section P4).
Attachment (7 pages):
Exercise Objective and
Narrative Summary
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A
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- CONFIDENTI AL***
1998 BNP NRC Evaluated Exercise
Narrative Summary
.................................................................
Note:
This exercise is a full participation exercise with the State of North Carolina, Brunswick
and New Hanover Counties.
The exercise will be conducted with the Brunswick Plant Simulator in the interactive
mode. Times given are for planning purposes only. Actual times may vary due to
dynamic response of the operators on the Simulator. The Brunswick Simulator models
Unit 2 only.
...............o...........e.....................................
0745
The drill begins with both Unit 1 and Unit 2 at 100% power. The Operations shift will
take the watch at approximately 0745.
Unit 1 Initial Plant Conditions:
The plant is at 100% on day 350 of a continuous run.
( Eauinment Out of Service:
RCIC is under clearance in day 2 of a 4 day Outage.
l A SLC Pump is under clearance.
Unit 2 Initial Plant Conditions:
The plant is at 100% on day 540 of a continuous run. The plant is preparing to shutdown
for refueling outage in 14 days.
Eauipment Out of Service:
IIPCI is under clearance in day 3 of a 5 day Outage. The turbine is uncoupled.
Meteoroloeical Information:
Forecast: Weather is clear
Wind Direction from 145-160 degrees and steady
Wind Speed 5-10 mph
Temperature liigh 45 Low 35
Conditions at time of release: (Weather will be loaded into ERFIS)
l
Wind Direction from 150 degrees
!
Wind speed 7 mph
Temperature 40 degrees
Stability class D
O
,
!
I
,
!
l
73 0800 Unusual Event
The plant receives a seismic alarm. Confirmation from the National Earthquake Center,
National Weather Service or Murray & Trettel is available upon request. The Simulator
does not have a seismic recorder. Operators will be required to review the procedure and
explain what actions are necessary to obtain the seismic reading. The Controller will
report to the operator that the seismic monitor reading is .03g (approximately 4.8 on the
Richter scale - noticeable tremor).
0845 Alert
A second seismic alarm will be received. The Controller will report to the operator that
the seismic monitor reading is .09g (approximately 5.8 on the Richter scale - moderate
tremor). The SEC should declare an Alert based on greater than .08g on seismic
instrumentation. This will require a controlled plant shutdown per AOP-13.
Over the next 15 to 45 minutes, the Operations crew should reduce power by taking the
Recirculation pumps back to minimum. When reactor power reaches approximately 50%,
with Recirculation pumps at minimum, the annunciators on panels XU-1, XU-2, XU-3,
P601 and P603 will begin to flash. The annunciator failures will be a result of the
earthquake and caused by trash in multiple relays causing the relays to continuously flash.
The operators should stop all plant transient activities until the annunciators can be
p repaired. This will become an additional classification after 15 minutes The annunciators
() may be a success mission for the OSC. At approximately 1005, the cards will be
I
reinstalled / replaced and annunciators will be restored to normal operation.
A Pneumatic Nitrogen System (PNS) flange leak will occur near the nitrogen tank. This
is a success mission for Operations / Maintenance.
1015 Site Area Emergency
The Reactor Water Clean Up system (RWCU) will suffer a small line break into
secondary containment on the 66' elevation outside of the Triangle room. An HP will call
the Control Room and report steam on the 50' in the area of the Triangle room. Since )
power level should be near 50%, radiation data will be available if E&RC responds to l
investigate the steam leak. Radiation levels will be minimal since there has been no fuel
failure and the readings are based on nonnal coolant activity.
When Operators attempt to isolate the steam leak using RWCU G31-F001 (Inboard !
valve) and G31-F004 (Outboard valve), both valves remain open creating a loss of 2 of 3
Fission Product Barriers. The SEC in the TSC should declare a Site Area Emergency.
The Operations crew should also initiate a manual reactor scram. When the scram occurs
,
there will be a spurious Group 1 isolation (closure of MSIVs). When the Operations crew
l attempts to operate Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) to reduce reactor pressure, all SRVs will
n fail to operate due to loss of Control Power caused by tripping of supply breakers in the
1
() DC Distribution Panels 4A and 4B from faults on SRV Logic bus. SRV failure to operate
. .
1
I
Q
b'
will prevent reactor pressure from being reduced. SRVs will still lift on over-pressure
causing a slow loss ofinventory.
At approximately 1130, Reactor Core ir.olation Cooling (RCIC) will fail due to Governor
Control problems. If an operator is dispatched, he will find the Governor leaking oil and l
RCIC will have tripped on overspeed. Loss of RCIC will cause the reactor water level to
reach Top of Active Fuel (TAF) within approximately 15 minutes. One Control Rod
Drive (CRD) pump (the other pump fails to start) and Standby Liquid Control (SLC)
pumps are available for high pressure injection. The reactor water level will continue to
lower until TAF is reachd.
I145 General Emergency
Upon reaching TAF, a fuel failure will result as the core is uncovered. By procedure, the !
Control Room Operators are required to Alternate Emergency Depressurize (AEDP) the
reactor to the Turbine Condenser (in the Turbine Building) to reduce reactor pressure j
allowing water injection using low pressure systems. Low pressure systems will function !
as designed. Due to no vacuum, the Turbine Rupture diaphragms will rupture causing a
release into the Turbine building.
This vent path will create a monitored ground level release from the Turbine Building
through the Turbine Building Ventilation system. The Ventilation System will suffer
n seismic damage to the charecal beds and ilEPA filters in turn allowing a monitored but
() unfiltered release. An elevated release from the Stack will occur accounting for
approximately 10% of the release magnitude. This release path will be both monitored
and filtered.
Fuel failure may not be evident on Control Room instrumentation until the reactor is
depressurized due to the failed fuel being contained within the vessel. When MSIVs and
bypass valves are opened per AEDP, the Main Steam Line rad monitors will rise and
Drywell liigh Range Radiation monitors will exceed 5000 R/hr. This will indicate that
the last Fission Product Barrier has been breached. The SEC should declare a General
Emergency based on either EAL. The SEC may also declare the General Emergency
when TAF is reached, before the AEDP is completed, based on a loss of 2 of 3 Fission
Product Barriers with the potential for the loss of the third, or based on Unable to provide i
makeup RCS. )
i
Estimated radiation levels at the nearest sample point to center line at the site boundary
will be approximately 5 mrem /hr 10 minutes aller AEDP. At two miles, dose rates will
be approximately 1 mrem /hr 30 minutes after the release starts. Venting will continue
i until the exercise is terminated.
!
Wind direction will be from 150 degrees steady at 7 mph. This will cause the plume to
mose in the general direction nf the town of Boiling Spring Lakes.
O
v
i
l
. .
- 1330 Termination
'
The exercise will be terminated at approximately 1330. If all objectives have been
demonstrated, the exercise may be terminated prior to this time at the discretion of the
Drill Director.
1
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