ML20216G243

Insp Rept 50-382/87-11 on 870516-0615.Violation Noted: Failure to Follow Approved Test Procedure During post-mod of Station Mod 615 on Essential Chiller Control Circuitry a

ML20216G243
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/21/1987
From:	Jaudon J, Luehman J, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216G203	List: ML20216G200 ML20216G210 ML20216G243
References
50-382-87-11, NUDOCS 8707010047
Download: ML20216G243 (8)

See also: IR 05000382/1987011

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APPENDI_X B 1

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'V'. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV 'l 1

NRC Inspection Report: 50.382/87-11 License: NPF-38 ,

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Docket: 50-382 1

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Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)  !

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

Inspection. Conduct  : May 16 thr ugh June 15, 1987

Inspectors: f/// (41/J%

,G. Luehman, Senior Resident Inspector

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T. R. Stalier, Residen.t Inspector

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Approved: ,

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P. Jaudon', Chief ' Date /

ifeactor Project Section A '

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Inspection Summary

Inspection conducted May 16 through June 15, 1987 (Report 50-382/87-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1) Plant Status,

(2) Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup, (4) Monthly Maintenance, (5) Monthly

Surveillance, (6) ESF System Walkdown, (7) Routine Operational Safety

Inspection, and (8) License Conditions. I

Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to

follow written procedures, paragraph 4), j

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted i

Principal Licensee Employees j

J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations-

• N. S. Carns, Plant Manager,. Nuclear

P. N. Backes, Corporate QA Manager (Acting)

S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical: Staff

J. R. McGaha, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance  ;

J. N. Woods, Quality Manager, Nuclear

A. S. Lockhart, Nuclear Operations. Support and Assessments Manager

R. F. Burski, Engineering Service Manager

• G. E. Wuller,-Onsite Licensing Coordinator

T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, Nuclear

• Present at exit interview. l

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In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held ~ discussions

with various operations, engineering, technical. support, maintenance, and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

2. Plant Status

On May 25, 1987, at-1:43 p.m. (CDT), the plant tripped from 100 percent

power because of a low level condition in the No.~2 steam generator (S/G).

The low level condition occurred'after a fuse blew in the "B" main feed- >

pump controller causing pump speed to be re 6ced to minimum and inadequate- )

feed flow to maintain S/G 1evel. After con.pletion of work on the "B" main '

feed pump controller, Valve CAP-104, and r,amper CCS-102B and removal of

lubricating oil (leaking from a reactor coolatt pump) from the containment

sump, the reactor was returned to critical at 9:22-p.m.' on May 27th.

Early in the morning of May 28, 1987, licensee operations personnel

overfilled the spent fuel pool (SFP). The SFP water flowed into the ,

ducting on the upper portion of the pool wall, down into the fuel handling- I

building ventilation units located on the -35 level, and onto the i

surrounding floor. This event occurred while operations personnel were

filling the SFP to clear a low level alarm. After the operator began the

filling operation, he left the area apparentlyLto return when control room 1

personnel informed.him that the'high level alarm was received. The' d

control room high level. alarm was subsequently received, but oecause the -

' control room operators were involved in a plant startup,.the annunciator-

was acknowledged without further actions being taken. 1

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The NRC inspectors ' reviewed the licensee's FHB decontamination plans a'nd l

discussed'this event with plant management. The NRC. inspectors emphasized  ;

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to plant management that this event is illustrative of a growing number of

recent eventt, involving personnel errors which include two recent reactor

trips (LER 382/87-12) and two inadvertent FHB ventilation actuations

(LERs382/86-26and382/87-06).

No violations of deviations were identified.

3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup

The following LER was reviewed and ciosed. The NRC inspectors verified

that reporting requirements had been met, that causes had been identified,

that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability

had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. Additionally,

the NRC inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were

involved, and that violations of. regulations or Technical Specification (TS)

conditions had been identified.

(Closed) LER-382/86-19, " Reactor Trip Due to a Turbine Trip Caused by a

Hi-Hi Level in Moisture Separator Reheater Drain Tank 2A." The NRC

inspector verified that a plant monitoring computer group, to monitor all

turbine trip logics, has been established per Condition Identification

Work Authorization CIWA 028778. Station Modification Request'(SMR) 1523,

which addresses design drain flow characteristics, has been evaluated by -

the licensee and is scheduled for the second-refueling outage.

Installation of a control room annunciator' under SMR 1730 has 'been

scheduled by the licensee for completion. by December 31,.1987.

No violations or deviations-were identified.

4. Monthly Maintenance

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Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related' systems and'

components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that the activities

were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides,

industry codes or standards, and in conformance with TS.

On May 20,1987, .the NRC inspector observed a portion of the'

post-modification testing of Station Modification 615 on the "A" essential-

chiller control circuitry. During the testing, it was noted by the NRC

inspector that an approved test procedure was.not used, which is contrary

.to the requirements of paragraph 5.8.4 of Procedure PE-2-006, Revision ~8,

" Plant Engineering Station Modification." The testing was conducted by

the test engineer and an electrician who consulted a wiring drawing to

place the appropriate electrical test jumpers. The particular drawing

used to conduct the above evolution was not a controlled copy. The'

failure.to use a controlled drawing is contrary to the-requirements.of

paragraph 1.0 of Procedure UNT-4-002, Revision 1, " Field Control of.

Technical Documents."

The NRC inspector discussed the above observations with the assistant l

plant manager for operations and maintenance and the maintenance-

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superintendent. Testing under Station Modification 615 was suspended by

the licensee to review the adequacy of test control. The failure to use

an approved test procedure and the failure to use a controlled copy of the

drawing of the essential chiller control circuitry is an apparent

violation (382/8711-01).

On June 9, 1987, as part of the inspection followup to the problems

identified above, the NRC inspector observed a portion of the work

performed on essential chiller "AB" under the Condition Identification

Work Authorization (CIWA) 028813. This CIWA covered the implementation of

the same modification on the "AB" chiller as was performed on the

"A" chiller. The review of the work instructions showed them to be much

improved. The NRC inspector's observations included various electrical

terminations, and corresponding quality assurance verifications.

While observing a portion of the corrective maintenance performed on

the A/B Emergency Feedwater pump, under CIWA 028823, the NRC inspector

observed the assigned quality assurance (QA) inspector assisting the

electrician with the soldering of an electrical connector. The NRC

inspector discussed this observation with a QA supervisor noting that  ;

paragraph 5.1.4 of Procedure QP-10-001, Revision 3, " Inspection," l

prohibits individuals who performed or directly supervised the activity 1

from inspecting that activity. The QA supervisor explained that, yes, in j

the strict sense, the QA inspector has assisted in the work by holding )

some electrical leads for the soldering, but this also gave him the best '

location for observing the actual activity, which was the soldering. The

NRC inspector agreed that the individual's involvement was minimal,

however, if some involvement on the part of QA inspectors is to be allowed

in the activity to be inspected, guidance limiting the extent needs to be

available. I

No other violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surveillance

The NRC inspectors observed and reviewed TS required testing and

verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate

procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting

conditions for operation (LCO) were met, and that any deficiencies

identified were properly reviewed and resolved.

On May 20, 1987, the NRC inspector observed performance of the applicable

portions of Procedure OP-903-046, Revision 7, " Emergency Feed Pump

Operability Check," and Procedure OP-903-047, Revision 4, " Emergency

Feedwater Actuation Signal Test," for the A/B Emergency Feedwater Pump,

following governor repairs.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. ESF System Walkdown j

The Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) system was. verified operable '

by performing a walkdown of the accessible and essential portions of the I

system on May 27 and 28, 1987.

The NRC inspector used the ACCW standby system valve lineup specified on

Attachment 8.1 of OP-2-001, Revision 4, in conjunction with

Drawing LOV-1564-G-160.

On completion of the inspection, the NRC inspector made the following-

comments to licensee management:

a. The ACCW pump "B" recirculation header vent valve ACC-106B was found

to be labeled incorrectly as ACC-120B, the "B" Component Cooling

Water-(CCW) heat exchanger shell drain valve.

b. Several tail pieces downstream of vent and drain valves did not have

pipe' caps installed as shown in the ACCW system

Drawing LOV-1564-G-160.

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c. -Valves ACC-119A and ACC-119B are included as CCW heat exchanger shell

drain valves of Procedure OP-2-001, Revision 4. These valves do not i

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exist and are not included in the ACCW system Drawing LOV-1564-G-160.

This was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/86-11.

At that time a' temporary change was promulgated:.to correct the

Procedure, through an administrative error, the change was not- . ,

incorporated into a permanent change. When this was brought to the i

attention of the licensee, a change was promptly approved to l

Procedure OP-2-001 to delete those valves from the standby valve

lineup. The administrative error was considered an isolated case

and not related to the valve issue; therefore, this was not

considered a violation, j

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Routine Operational Safety Inspection

By observation during the inspection period, the NRC inspectors verified

that the control room manning requirements.were being. met. In~ addition, y

the NRC inspectors observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of  !

system status was maintained. The NRC inspectors periodically questioned

shift personnel relative to their awareness.of the plant conditions.

Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspectors verified compliance. i

with selected TS and limiting conditions. for' operations. - l

During the course.of the inspection, Observations relative to protected ,;

and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary i

integrity, search, escort, 'and badging.

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On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the

specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being

conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were

periodically checked and equipment operability and calibration frequency

were verified.

The NRC inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of overall

status of plant and of any significant safety matter related to plant

operations. Discussions were held with plant management and various  ;

members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of

operating logs and data sheets were reviewed daily.

The NRC inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits

to the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities

in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems

and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder

readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeeping.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. License Conditions

(Closed) 2.c.4, " Licensee Shall Propose Broad Range Toxic Gas Detection

System for Inclusion in License." In a submission dated January 13, 1987,

the licensee provided the required proposed technical specification to the

NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Because of problems with

the old Broad Range Toxic Gas Detection (BRTGD) system, the licensee

informed NRR that a six-month evaluation period, at the beginning of core

cycle two, would be necessary for the present BRTGD system. The system

will be ready for Technical Specification implementation at the end of the

evaluation period (July 1987).

(Closed) 2.c.9.d, " Provide Smoke Detectors in the Control Room Prior to

Startup from the First Refueling." The NRC inspector verified that the

smoke detectors have been installed,'and that they have been included in

surveillance Procedure ME-3-001, " Accessible and Non-Accessible Fire

Detectors."

(Closed) 2.c.9.e, " Complete Modifications Resulting from Spurious Signal

Analysis Prior to Startup Following the First Refueling Outage." It was

determined by the licensee that additional color coding and labelling was l

needed on the breaker cubicles for the components identified by the

2.c.9.e analysis. The NRC inspector verified the above labelling and

painting was accomplished.

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(Closed) 2.c.9.f, " Electrically Independent Neutron Flux Indication at

LCP-43 to be Installed Prior to Startup from the First Refueling." In

order to address the NRC inspector's concerns discussed in paragraph ..

fourteen of NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-01, the licensee has provided

lighting at the panel in the cable spread area and painted an access path

to the panel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 15, 1987, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged

the NRC inspectors findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary

any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC inspectors during

this inspection.

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