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Category:General FR Notice Comment Letter
MONTHYEARML20161A0122020-06-0808 June 2020 Comment (48) of Martin Kral on Holtec International HI-STORE Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project ML20115E5482020-04-24024 April 2020 Comment (23) of Pam and Greg Nelson on Holtec International HI-STORE Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Project ML18155A3262018-06-0404 June 2018 Comment (49) of Eva M. O'Keefe on Very Low-Level Radioactive Waste Scoping Study ML18158A1872018-06-0101 June 2018 Comment (51) of Gayle Smith Concerning Nuclear Waste in San Onofre Research and Action Is Needed to Protect the Public ML18158A1862018-05-29029 May 2018 Comment (50) of Joanna Mathews Concerning San Onofre Nuclear Station to Find a Permanent Solution for the Nuclear Waste ML18155A3252018-05-29029 May 2018 Comment (48) of Quentin De Bruyn Opposing to San Onofre Waste Situation ML18066A5612018-03-0707 March 2018 Comment (161) of Matt Collins Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5552018-03-0707 March 2018 Comment (157) of Kathleen Morris Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5582018-03-0707 March 2018 Comment (159) of Anonymous on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5292018-01-22022 January 2018 Comment (140) of Patricia Martz Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5262018-01-22022 January 2018 Comment (139) of Abell Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5252018-01-22022 January 2018 Comment (138) of Michelle Schumacher Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5532018-01-22022 January 2018 Comment (155) of Jan Boudart on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5302018-01-16016 January 2018 Comment (141) of Erin Koch on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5322018-01-10010 January 2018 Comment 142 of Dave Rice on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5372018-01-0808 January 2018 Comment (146) of Carey Strombotne on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5392018-01-0404 January 2018 Comment 147 of Phoebe Sorgen on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5512018-01-0303 January 2018 Comment (153) of Alexander Bay Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5562018-01-0303 January 2018 Comment (158) of Lee Mclendon Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5492018-01-0303 January 2018 Comment (152) of Shari Horne Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18066A5242018-01-0303 January 2018 Comment (137) of Joseph Gildner Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5962018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (60) of Matthew Stein Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A1932018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (44) of Mha Atma S. Khalsa Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5952018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (59) of Chelsea Anonymous Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A1952018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (45) of T. Strohmeier on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5932018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (57) of Patrick Bosold Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5702018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (56) of Katya Gaynor on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5692018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (55) of Robert Hensley on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5672018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (54) of Angela Sarich Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A1972018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (46) of Cheryl Harding Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5632018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (52) of Viraja Prema on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A5622018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (51) of Larisa Stow-Norman Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A4982018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (66) of Nancy Alexander Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18033A4962018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (65) of Lorna Farnun Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A2002018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (49) of Starr Cornwall Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A1992018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (48) of Daryl Gale on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6822018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (94) of Jennifer Quest on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18032A1922018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (43) of Frances Howard Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6992018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (108) from Anonymous Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities; Request for Comment on Draft NUREG ML18037A6972018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (107) of Diana Dehm on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6922018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (104) of Ari Marsh on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6912018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (103) Christina Koppisch Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities; Request for Comment on Draft NUREG ML18037A6902018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (102) of Helen Hanna on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6892018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (100) of Cindy Koch Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6882018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (101) Angela Ravenwood Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities; Request for Comment on Draft NUREG ML18037A6872018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (99) of Melissa Brizzie Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18036A1912018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (72) of J. C. Chernicky Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6812018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (93) of Ricardo Toro Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18037A6802018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (92) of Stan Weber Regarding Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities ML18036A2082018-01-0202 January 2018 Comment (89) of B. Grace on Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities 2020-06-08
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
- JJ m.9 Tn Tn F~Ii C)C)-A m l.AJ U)ýý (a 0 SUNSI Review Complete Template = ADM -013 E-RIDS= ADM-03 Add= B. Benney (bjb)
Wright, Darlene From: Vinod Arora [vinnie48in@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2013 12:45 AM To: vinnie48in
Subject:
fyi The World's Foremost Renowned Professeur Titulaire, Michel J. Pettigrew, Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal, on the subject of fluid elastic instability and turbulence-induced vibration in 1970's states, "It is concluded that, although there are still areas of uncertainty, most flow-induced vibration problems can be avoided provided that nuclear components are properly analysed at the design stage and that the analyses are supported by adequate testing and development work when required.
There has been no case yet where vibration considerations have seriously constrained the designer." Violette R., Pettigrew M. J. & Mureithi N. W. state in a 2006 research paper, "In nuclear power plant steam generators, U-tubes are very susceptible to undergo fluid elastic instability because of the high velocity of the two-phase mixture flow in the U-tube region and also because of their low natural frequencies in their out of plane modes. In nuclear power plant steam generator design, flat bar supports have been introduced in order to restrain vibrations of the U-tubes in the out of plane direction.
Since those supports are not as effective in restraining the in-plane vibrations of the tubes, there is a clear need to verify if fluid elastic instability can occur for a cluster of cylinders preferentially flexible in the flow direction.
Almost all the available data about fluid elastic instability of heat exchanger tube bundles concerns tubes that are axisymmetrically flexible.
In those cases, the instability is found to be mostly in the direction transverse to the flow. Thus, the direction parallel to the flow has raised less concern in terms of bundle stability." Channel 1ONews Question to MHI: Edison says that a letter from MHI to the NRC proves that SCE believed the San Onofre nuclear plant's steam generators were safe when installed and that safety measures were not sacrificed for licensing reasons. Is that true?MHI Answer: MHI's top priority is, and always has been, the safe and reliable operation of all the plants and components that it designs, engineers, supplies and supports.
In designing steam generators, minimizing tube wear due to tube vibration is always given a high priority, and this was a priority for MHI during the design of the SONGS replacement steam generators (RSGs). The SONGS RSGs were designed according to industry standards and our customer's specifications.
The design went through an extensive review process which included the participation of third-party experts and MHI believed they would operate as expected:
safely and successfully.
No safety measures were sacrificed in the design.Note: MHIl Root Cause states, "The forced outage of Unit 3 and the subsequent discovery of thousands of U-bend tube wear indications in both Unit 2 and Unit 3 after such a short operating period was wholly unexpected.
Such an. outcome should have been prevented by the conservative design and the precision manufacture.
The identification of the unexpected tube degradation led to an extensive evaluation as to the causes the degradation and the questioning of the original design assumptions." Root Cause: Root Causes" are defined as the basic reasons [e.g., hardware (design deficiency), process (e.g., mechanistic or operational parameters), or human performance errors (e.g., Root Cause: Root Causes" are defined as the basic reasons [e.g., hardware (design deficiency), process (e.g., mechanistic or operational parameters), or human performance errors (e.g., lack of critical questioning
& investigative attitude, lack of solid team work and alignment between the designer and manufacturer, lack of academic research and Industry benchmarking, etc.) for a problem, which if corrected, will prevent recurrence of that problem., etc.) for a problem, which if corrected, will prevent recurrence of that problem.SONGS SG Root Cause: Negative Safety Culture (Production over Safety)Contributing Causes 1. Human Performance Errors* Lack of critical questioning
& investigative attitude by SCE/MHI* Lack of solid team work and alignment between MHI & SCE AVB Design Team* Lack of academic research and Industry benchmarking by SCE/MHI 1 a"
of 10CFR 50.90 License Amendment Process by SCE/MHI and Defective 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation/Screen
- Complacency, Ignorance and Time Pressure by SCE/MHI* Lack of Benchmarking of Computer Codes and Full Scale Mock-up Testing by MHI* Inexperienced Designer and Low Cost/Inexperienced/Aggressive/Ignorant Manufacturer Blind Trustby NRC Commission in SCE's Error Likely Conservative Assumptions, Unexpl ained Safety Explanations and False Public Safety Sermons 2. Design Deficiencies
-SCE* Increase of the tube bundle heat transfer surface area from 105,000ft2 (OSG) to 116,100 ft2 (an 11% increase) to generate more heat, more heat and more profits* Increase in the number of tubes from 9,350 (OSG) to 9,727 (RSG), 7% increase in heat transfer surface area and low tube-to-tube clearances 0 RSG tube bundle being taller than that of the OSG (Average Length of Heated Tube increase from 680- 750 inches -equivalent to 700 tubes, 7% increase in heat transfer surface area* Lack of In-Plane AVBs (Incorrect Assumptions)
- Low-frequency 56 HZ retainer bar to fit excessive number of tubes* Reduction in Tube Wall thickness from 0.048 inches to 0.043 inches to pump more RCS Flows* Removal of Stay Cylinder 3. Operational Causes -To generate more heat, more power and profits -SCE* Operation at Low Steam Pressures* Increased Reactor Coolant Flows* Poor Circulation Ratios 2