ML17209A817

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Generic Ltr 81-04 Requesting Review of Current Plant Operations to Determine Capability to Mitigate Station Blackout Event & Promptly Implement Emergency Procedures
ML17209A817
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/03/1981
From: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML17209A816 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-44, REF-GTECI-EL, TASK-A-44, TASK-OR GL-81-04, GL-81-4, TAC-43912, NUDOCS 8103160796
Download: ML17209A817 (4)


Text

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Ncp lq UNITEO STATFS NUCLEAR REGULATORY COIViMISSION WASHINGTON. O. C. 20555 Attachment 2

~ ~~~ ~

TO ALL LICENSEES OF OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS ANO APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICEHSFS (EXCEPT FOR ST.

LUCIE UNIT HOS.

1 h 2)

SUBJECT:

BIERGEHCY PROCEDURES AHO TRAINING FOR STATION BLACKOUT E'/ANTS (Generic Letter 81-04)

A recent decision by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (ALAB-603) concluded that station blackout (i.e., loss of all of-,site and onsite AC power} should be considered a design basis event or St. Lucie Unit Ho. 2.

An amendment to the Construction Permit for St. Lucie Unit No.

2 was subsequently issued on September 18, 1980.

The HRC staff is currently assessing station blackout events on a generic basis (Unresolved Safety Issue A-44).

The results of this study, which is scheduled to be completed in 1982, will identify the extent to wnich design provisions should be included to reduce the ootential for or consequences of a station blackout event.

However.

the Board has recommended that more immediate measures be taken to ensure that station blackout events can be accommodated while cask A-44 is being conducted.

Although we believe tnaz, qualita:ively, there apoears to be sufficient time available following a s tation blackout event to res tore AC power, we are not sure if licensees have adequa ely prepared their operators to act during a station blackout vent.

Consequently, we request that you review your current plant operations to determine your capability to mitigate a station blackout event and promptly implement, as necessary, emergency procedures and a training program for station blackout evenu.

Your review of procedures and training should

consider, but not be limited to:

a.

The actions necessary and equipment available to maintain the reactor coolant. inventory and heat removal with only OC power available, including consideration of the unavailability of auxiliary systems such as ventilation and component cooling.

b.

The estimated time available to restore AC power and its basis.

c.

The ac.ions for restoring offsite AC power in the event of a loss of the grid.

d.

The actions for res oring offs i te AC power when i ts los's is due to postulated onsite equipment failures.

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e.

Tne actions-necessary to restore emergency onsite AC power.

Tne actions required to restart diesel generators should include cons,ideration of loading sequence and the unavailability of AC power.

Consideration of the availability of emergency lighting, and any actions required to provide such lighting, in equipment areas where operator or maintenance actions may be necessary.

Precautions to prevent equipment damage during the return to normal operating conditions following restoration oi AC power.

For examole, the limitations and operating sequence requirements which must be followed to restart the reactor coolant pumps following an extended loss of seal injection water should be considered in the recovery procedures.

The annual requalification training program should consider the emergency procedures and include simulator exercises involving the pos ulated loss of all AC power with decay heat removal being accomplished by natural circulation and the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater system for PMR planu, and by the steam-driven RCIC and/or HPCI and the safety-relief valves in 8WR plants Me conclude that the actions described above should be completed as soon as they reasonably can be

! i.e., ~ithin 6 months)

In addition, so that we may determine whether your license should be amended to incorporate this require-ment, you are requested, pursuant to 550.54(f}, to furnish within ninty (90) days of receipt of this letter, an assessment of your existing or planned acili ty procedur s

and training programs with respec.

to the matt rs described above.

Please refer to this letter in your response.

in the event that completion within 6 months can not be met, please pr opose a revised date and justification for the delay.

il This request for information was approved by GAO under a blanket clearance number R0072 which expires November 0,

1983.

Corrments on burden and duplication may be direct d to the U.S.

General Accounting Office, Regulatory Reports

Review, Room 5106, 441 G Street, N., Mashington, O.C.

20548.

Sincerely, Oarrel G. 'Eisenhut, Oirector Oivision o7 Licensing Office of Nuclear Reac.or Regulation

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