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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20249A7661998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License NPF-3 ML20249A7551998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 223 to License NPF-3 ML20216B9401998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License NPF-3 ML20216B8381998-04-14014 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 220 to License NPF-3 ML20202C6131998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License NPF-3 ML20199J9511998-01-30030 January 1998 SER Related to Exemption from Section Iii.O of App R,To 10CFR50,for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20203C1401997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License NPF-3 ML20203B2141997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License NPF-3 ML20203C2701997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0491997-02-11011 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License NPF-3 ML20128L3001996-10-0202 October 1996 SER Supporting Dbnp IPE Process of Identifying Most Likely Severe Accidents & Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20058M9591993-09-28028 September 1993 SE Accepting Licensee Response to GL 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' ML20057A3791993-08-20020 August 1993 SE Concluding That Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan for Plant Has Unacceptable Exam Sample as Discussed in Encl Inel TER ML20056G4301993-08-18018 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Requests for Relief.Licensee Made Changes to Subj Program to Include Exercising & fail-safe Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater Valves AF-6451 & AF-6452,in Response to TER Anomaly 8 ML20126A3051992-12-0808 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 176 to License NPF-3 ML20056B2721990-08-20020 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code 3 Piping ML20248H6371989-10-0303 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 139 to License NPF-3 ML20248D8271989-09-29029 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 890228 & 0630 Submittals Presenting Proposed Designs to Comply w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Requirements ML20248E2771989-09-20020 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 138 to License NPF-3 ML20248B3801989-09-20020 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 137 to License NPF-3 ML20247E6901989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation of Audit of Facility Design for Resolution of IE Bulletin 79-27 Re Loss of non-Class IE Instrumentation & Control Power Sys Bus During Operation.Preventive Maint & Testing Program Should Be Developed for Bus Power Sources ML20245K1871989-08-15015 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 136 to License NPF-3 ML20245F5791989-08-0404 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 134 to License NPF-3 ML20245H9531989-08-0404 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 135 to License NPF-3 ML20247J8731989-05-18018 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License NPF-3 ML20245G0371989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 131 to License NPF-3 ML20245F0631989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License NPF-3 ML20244D4031989-04-13013 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 130 to License NPF-3 ML20196D9601988-12-0808 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Util Response Concerning Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability Study.Util Should Ensure That Sys Mods Do Not Result in Net Reduction in Sys Reliability ML20207K7911988-10-0404 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Operation in Cycle 6 W/O Removing Flaws in Cracked HPI Nozzle ML20207K1071988-09-19019 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License NPF-3 ML20207H9271988-08-24024 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License NPF-3 ML20207H3891988-08-19019 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License NPF-3 ML20207E3931988-08-0202 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 114 to License NPF-3 ML20207D5171988-08-0202 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License NPF-3 ML20150C4621988-03-0909 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License NPF-3 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K1231999-10-14014 October 1999 Revised Positions for DBNPS & PNPP QA Program ML20217D5441999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle1999-09-0303 September 1999
- on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle
ML20211R0811999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1999-003, :on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With
ML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20210Q8541999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20209E6231999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-013, :on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With1999-06-24024 June 1999
- on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With
ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20195F4871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20207E8011999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-981933, Design & Licensing Rept DBNPS Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project ML20207F4351999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504 ML20206M6341999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20205M2931999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1999-002, :on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With1999-03-0505 March 1999
- on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With
ML20207J1461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20199E2501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20205K5781998-12-31031 December 1998 Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss ML20206B0101998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for Fiscal Yr Ending 981231,encl ML20197J3441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-012, :on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With1998-11-17017 November 1998
- on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With
05000346/LER-1998-009, :on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With
05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With
ML20195D0001998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process 05000346/LER-1998-010, :on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with1998-10-26026 October 1998
- on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with
05000346/LER-1998-008, :on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With1998-10-0101 October 1998
- on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With
ML20154H5801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-007, :on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With1998-09-22022 September 1998
- on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With
ML20151W1611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Dbnps.With 05000346/LER-1998-006, :on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources1998-08-21021 August 1998
- on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources
ML20237E3171998-08-21021 August 1998 ISI Summary Rept of Eleventh Refueling Outage Activities for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20237B1681998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236U5011998-07-23023 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980624,Unit 1 Site Damaged by Tornado & High Winds.Alert Declared by DBNPS Staff,Dbnps Emergency Response Facilities Activiated & Special Insp Team Deployed to Site by Nrc,As Result of Event ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-004, :on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired1998-07-13013 July 1998
- on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired
05000346/LER-1998-005, :on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations1998-07-11011 July 1998
- on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations
ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236N7451998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-003, :on 980519,Mode 3 Entry Without Completion of Surveillance Requirement Occurred.Caused by Failure of I&C Technicians to Perform Each Sp as Written or Adherence. Revised Procedure1998-06-18018 June 1998
- on 980519,Mode 3 Entry Without Completion of Surveillance Requirement Occurred.Caused by Failure of I&C Technicians to Perform Each Sp as Written or Adherence. Revised Procedure
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
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1 UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30006 4001 y*****)'
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
_ RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 232TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 FIRSTENERGY NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO.1 DOCKET NO, 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l By application dated March 9,1999, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC, the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1, Technical Specifications (TS).
The amendment would revise the TS in response to an application dated March 9,1999 (Licensing Action Request 97-01). The proposed changes would increase the inservice inspection interval, and reduce the scope of volumetric and surface examinations for the reactor coolant pump flywheels.
2.0 BACKGROUND
The reactor coolant system (RCS)is described in the Davis-Besse Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 1.2.2, " General Station Description - Nuclear Steam Supply System,"
and Section 5," Reactor Coolant System." Additionalinformation is provided in USAR Appendix 5A," Safety Evaluation of RC Pump Motor Flywheels."
The function of the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) In the RCS is to maintain an adequate cooling flow rate by circulating a large volume of primary coolant water at high temperature and pressure through the RCS. The RCPs are provided with flywheels that serve to provide angular momentum that willimprove the coastdown flow characteristics of the RCS in the event of a trip of the RCPs.- However, in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, these flywheels may be subjected to overspeed conditions. The centrifugal forces that could result from excessive overspeed could cause a flywheel to fail, becoming a missile hazard. Analyses have been performed to assure that the' maximum postulated RCP overspeed conditions would not result in failure of a structurally sound flywheel.
A concern regarding overspeed of the RCP and its potential for failure led to the issuance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.14, " Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity," in 1971 (subsequently updated as Revision i dated August 1975). Since then, most licensees for PWR plants, including Davis-Besse, have adopted the guidelines of RG 1.14 to conduct their RCP flywheel 9906140014 99060s l
PDR ADOCK 05000346 P
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examinations. These requirements are normally specified in the individual plant's TS, as is tM case for Davis-Besse. The current TS Surveillance Requirement 4.4.10.1.a prescribes inspection activities that ensure that the flywheels are structurally sound.
Westinghouse Topical Report WCAP-14535A, " Topical Report on Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Inspection Elimination," was approved, with certain conditions, on September 12, 1996, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff. This report provides the basis for relaxing part of the flywheel inspection guidelines as listed in RG 1.14.
In the safety evaluation (SE) for WCAP-14535A, the staff stated that the evaluation methodology for RCP flywheels is appropriate s.nd the criteria are in accordance with the design criteria of RG 1.14 for a fatigue life of at least 10 years. In addition, the staff specified:
Criterion (1)
Licensees who plan to submit a plant-specific application of this topical report for flywheels made of SA533B material need to confirm that their flywheels are made of SA533B material. Further, licensees having Group-15 flywheels need to demonstrate that material properties of their A516 material is equivalent to SA533B material, and its reference temperature, RTer, is less than 30 'F.
l Criterion (2)
Licensees who plan to submit a plant-specific application of this topical report for their flywheels not made of SA533B or A516 material need to either demonstrate that their flywheel material properties are bounded by those of SA533B material, or provide the minimum specified ultimate tensile stress, S, the fracture o
toughness, K, and the reference temperature, RTer, for that material. For the latter, the licensees should employ these material properties, and use the j
methodology in the topical report, as extended in the two responses to the staffs RAI (request for additional information], to provide an assessment to justify a change in inspection schedule for their plants.
Criterion (3)
Licensees meeting either (1) or (2) above should either conduct a qualified in-place ultrasonic testing (UT) examination of the volume from the inner bore of the flywheel to the circle of one-half the outer radius or conduct a surface examination (MT and/or PT) of exposed surfaces defined by the volume [the phrase " defined by the volume" was removed after a clarification from the staff) of the disassembled flywheels once every 10 years. The staff considers this 10-year inspection requirement not burdensome when the flywheel inspection is conducted during scheduled ISI inspection or RCP motor maintenance. This would provide an appropriate level of defense in depth.
These conditions require that flywheel material either satisfy Criteria (1) and (3) or Criteria (2) and (3). In addition, the staff required that " Licensees with Group 10 flywheels need to confirm In the near term that their flywheels have an adequate shrink fit of the flywheels at the maximum overspeed."
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3.0 EVALUATION The licensee has proposed to change the RCP flywheel inspection intervals in accordance with the above criteria of the staff SE. In particular, TS 4.4.10.1.a, which currently reads:
4.4.10.1 in addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5:
- a. The reactor coolant pump flywheels shall be inspected per the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.4.b. of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975.
.would be changed to read:
4.4.10.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5:
- a. Inservice inspection of each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall be performed at least once every 10 years. The inservice inspection shall be either an ultrasonic examination of the volume from the inner bore of the flywheel to the circle of one-half the outer radius, or a surface examination of exposed surfaces of the disassembled flywheel. The recommendations delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975, Positions 3,4 and 5 of Section C.4.b shall apply.
This change replaces Positions 1 and 2 of Section C.4.b of RG 1.14 with the proposed text, but continues to ensure the application of Positions 3,4 and 5.
Topical Report WCAP-14535A, Table 2-1, " Summary of Westinghouse and Babcock and Wilcox Domestic Flywheel Information," lists the Davis-Besse flywheel material as SA533B, with a note stating that one spare RCP motor has a flywheel made of SA508 material. The facility FSAR indicates that the flywheel material is ASTM A533 69A, Grade B Class 1. The licensee confirmed that the A533 flywheel material is the same alloy and the installed flywheels thus meet Criterion (1). The licensee provided mechanical properties of the SA508B (Class 3) spare flywheel material, and compared them with SA533B properties. The staff confirmed that the property values provided for both materials are in agreement with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section lil values, and that the SA5088 (Class 3) properties are bounded by the SA533B properties. In addition, the ASME Code Section XI K curve for SA533B is also applicable to SA508B (Class 3). The licensee further stated that the Material Test Certification for the SA508B (Class 3) material lists the nil-ductility transition temperature as <10 *F.
Therefore, Criterion (2)is satisfied for SA508B (Class 3). In addition, the proposed wording in TS 4.4.10.1.s regarding examinations is consistent with Criterion (3).
The staff has determined that flywheel material SA5338 satisfies Criteria (1) and (3), and flywheel material SA5088 (Class 3) satisfies Criteria (2) and (3). The staff has also verified that the Davis-Besse flywheels do not belong to the Group 10 identified in WCAP-14535A and therefore, no additional analysis is needed to address the issue of shrink fit. Since all the flywheel material at Davis-Besse satisfies the requirements of the Topical Report staff SE, the proposed change is acceptable.
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4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issue.qce of the amendment. The State offidal had no comments.
5.0 '
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility,
component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or changes'a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluent that may be,
' released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public -
comment on'such finding (64 FR 24196). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
l The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the i
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors: A. Hansen, W. Long Date: June _8, 1999 l
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