IR 05000324/1982012

IE Insp Repts 50-324/82-12 & 50-325/82-12 on 820420-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas inspected:small-scale Radiological Emergency Exercise on 820421

ML20054G573
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	05/20/1982
From:	Huffman G, Jenkins G, Mcfarland C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054G568	List: IR 05000324/1982012 ML20054G567
References
50-324-82-12, 50-325-82-12, NUDOCS 8206220075
Download: ML20054G573 (8)

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/ %, UNITED STATES 8 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t r REGION li g - 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 g ***** s Report Nos. 50-325/82-12 and 50-324/82-12 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Facility Name: Brunswick Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Inspection at Brunswick Plant near Southport, North Carolina Inspectors: '

f-&- # 2 McFarland Date Signed

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. . Huffman {g Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: D. O. Meyers, Senior Resident Inspector, L. W. Garner Resident Inspector O

Approved by: -

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G. R. Jenfns, Chief Date S~1gned EmergencyPreparedness Section Division of Emergency Preparedness and Operational Support SUMMARY Inspection on April 20-22, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 36 inspector-hours on site in the areas of observing a small scale radiological emergency exercise on April 21, 198 Results In the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000324 G PDR j

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. Furr, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• S. Elleman, Vice President - Nuclear Safety

• R. Dietz, General Manager, Brunswick Plant

• E. Morgan, Manager, Plant Operations

• J. R. Bohannon, Manager, Nuclear Training

• S. McManus, Director of Nuclear Safety C. R. Gibson, Assistant to General Manager

• G. Oliver, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control i *M. D. Hill, Manager, Maintenance

• P. J. McNeil, Shift Operations Supervisor

• R. G. Black, Jr., Director, Emergency Preparedness

• W. F. Trolenberg, Corporate Emergency Preparedness

• R. A. Indelicato, Emergency Preparedness W. R. Hatcher, Security

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 22, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspecte . Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspectio . Exercise Scenario The emergency exercise scenario, developed by the licensee, appeared to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.47(b)(14),10CFR50, Appendix E. Paragraph I and specific criteria of NUREG 0654, Section N.3 and provided for a sequence of simulated events beginning ith an Unusual Event and progressing through sequentially escalating classes to a Site Area Emergency. The sequence of simulated events provided for the mobilization of the licensee's emergency organization onsite and the use of the local ambulance service and the community hospital. The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on April 8 and April 20, 198 >

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The exercise scenario included the 'following postulated emergency conditions: During the process of transferring spent fuel from the Unit 1 fuel pool to the Unit 2 fuel pool a fire occurs in the motor of the overhead-crane that is moving a 70 ton spent fuel cask over the Unit 1. fuel pool. These events were to initiate an Unusual Even The spent fuel cask drops, strikes the bottom of the pool and strikes the fuel racks. A person surveying the damage is injured, contaminated and subsequently taken to the hospita The potential for loss of water and uncovering the fuel racks was to be the cause to initiate an Aler The cask has fallen over and crushed some spent fue The water leaking from the bottom of the fuel pool (elevation 78) causes loss of power in the Reactor Building (elevation 50) Motor Control Center, the Standby Gas Treatment System, the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water pumps and the Reactor Water Clean Up system. The Reactor Building roof vent monitors alarm and indicate high radiation levels. These events were to initiate a Site Area Emergenc Radiological monitoring and damage control work progresse The leaking fuel pool water is contained and recycled into the drywel Electrical power is restored to the Reactor Building Motor Control Center and related components. The contamination is contained and the reliability of the water level in the fuel pool is assure Recovery is declared and the exercise is terminate The exercise scenario provided a reasonable sequence of events and the players responded with a serious attitude and realistic respons At the exercise critique CP&L recognized the need for having a spontaneous emergency exercise, i.e. without predisposition of personnel and facilitie The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(1),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II. The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response

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organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the capability for long term or continuous staffing of the emergency resp ,se organization was demonstrated. The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(2), 10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that the initial and augmented onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions as described by Section 3 of the Brunswick Emer-gency Plan and Implementing Procedure PEP The interfaces among the onsite response activities and the corporate support activities appeared to be well establishe The Shif t Operating Supervisor's (SOS) response to the initial responsi-bilities in assuming the role of Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) was considered to be too informal and too involved in the details of doing the emergency response activities rather than directing the activities as required by PEP 2.1. The initial assessment of the potential emergency was slow, hence the notification of the unusual event was late and the call for augmentation personnel was late. At the exercise critique CP&L identified as items to be improved the need for an announcement by the SOS that an emergency existed and that he was now acting as the SEC, and the need for timely actions relative to the initial assessment and the notification of augmentation personnel. The CP&L corrective actions for the SOS's initial response to emergency activities will be inspected during a subsequent inspection (50-224, 225/82-12-01)

The activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) by the Station Manager and the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) by the Vice President, Nuclear Operations were initiated and conducted in a timely manner and as specified in PEP The inspectors had no further questions in this are .

8. Emergency Classification System This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as i

required by 10C FR50. 47( b)( 4) , 10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.D.

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The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in Section 2 of the Radiological Emergency Plan and in Implementing Procedures PEP 2.1 through 2.5. The system needs to be modified to include non-reactor system incidents, i.e. releases from the-fuel pool area or other Reactor Building incidents. The present system depends on analyzing a reactor coolant -sample and/or a containment vessel sample for a source term. Revisions to such documents as Appendix F to the plan and PEP 3.4.1 should be considered (50-224, 225/82-12-02). .The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Notification Methods and Procedures This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response - organizations has been established as required by 10CFR-50.47(b)(5), 10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organization and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization. The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public was not actuated for this exercis The inspector noted that early in the exercise there was some difficulty in the timely notifications of the State. During the CP&L critique the licensee identified the difficulty as an area needing evaluatio The inspectors noted that' at one period of time one of the two licensee communicators to the response organizations was continuing to inform them of the Alert while the second communicator was informing them of the Site Area Emergency. This was due to-the fast moving scenario and due to the delay in transmitting messages to the State due to a recent change in message form Revisions to such documents as PEP 3.1.1 should be considered to direct the communicators to inform the response organizations of the current status under circumstances similar to the above (50-224, 225/82-12-03). The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Emergency Communications This area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(6), 10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I J

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The inspectors verified that primary and alternate means for communications among the various response organization were provided.and that, in general, communications among these organizations and among emergency response personnel were adequate. A few communication related problems were noted'as follows: Emergency announcements over the public address (PA) system could not be heard in the TSC or EOF. The audibility of emergency alarms and communications has been addressed in IE Bulletin 79-18. These require-ments should be extended to the administrative buildings that are used for the TSC and EOF (50-224, 225/82-12-04).

l Messages from the Control Room (CR) to TSC need to be verified periodically to assure completeness. The inspector observed that the

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TSC did not use information provided by items 1 and 2 of message 13 l relative to a release through a reactor building vent. The information l posted on the status board related to information provided by items 3 l and 4 of messages 13 relative to releases in the fuel storage area The items 1 and'2 information was apparently not used for the accident assessment work. Routine verification of messages snould be required (50-224, 225/82-12-05). The inspectors observed that the conference table arrangement of personnel and the use of hand held telephones in the TSC and EOF caused some noise related problems. The staff was observed using the plant telephones rather than the dedicated telephones. These communication i problems were also identified by CP&L at the critique and the CP&L followup will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-224, 225/82-12-06). The inspectors observed that the entries on the status boards were not sufficient to provide a clear understanding of the current plant emergency classification. The plant status should be posted at the CR, OSC, TSC and E0F throughout the emergency (50-224, 225/82-12-07).

The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(8), 10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors verified that the emergency facilities provided to support the emergency organization were adequate and appeared to function throughout the exercise. These facilities included the Control Room (CR) The Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), the near-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the Media Center. The inspectors observed the activation, staffing and operation of the CR, TSC and E0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

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a. Control Room - After the TSC was activated the information flow was one

, directional to the TSC. The CR did not receive information relative to I

the inplant or onsite Health Physics surveys nor the recovery work related to the fuel pool leakag .

The CR did direct the recove ry of the_ worker who was injured and contaminated while assessing the damage of-equipment in the Reactor Building at elevation 50. At the critique the CP&L evaluators noted that the CR staff performed well technically, but the correct use of l procedures was not evident in several incidences: (a) failure of the

} SOS to announce his role as SEC, (b) failure to announce Unusual Event, (c) Alert declared late, (d) lack of directions for persons evacuated from the Reactor Building, (e) late notification of State and other agencies of emergency status, (f) the lack of maintaining a fire watch and of not declaring an "all clear" until long after the fire was extinguished. Followup of the corrective actions for the above obser-vations will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection (50-224, 225/82-12-08).

b. Technical Support Center (TSC) - TSC was activated at 1030 and staffed promptly upon notification by the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothl With the exception of communications problems noted in paragraph 10, the TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff. The SEC at the TSC did not have any messages posted on the status boards between 1100 and 1145, then a backlog of messages were posted. The radiological controller verbally provided messages to the TSC radiological control manager rather than using or modifying the exercise message / drill cards provided. The excessive verbalization appeared to be unnecessary coaching. There was little or no radio-logical information posted on the status boards. When the SEC informed the State of the Site Area Emergency at 1234 the message did not have a protective action recommendation. The source term calculation was not initiated until 124 At the critique the CP&L evaluators noted that the 1234 message used 8:00 a.m. weather data which was significantly different than 10:00 a.m. or 12 noon weather; hence different wind characteristics. The need for current posting on the status boards of the information provided by, and received by, the TSC, and the need for better control of the messages to the SEC and to the offsite agencies, was identified (50-224,225/82-12-09).

c. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The EOF was staffed after the Alert and activated at 1348 (af ter the Site Area Emergency at 1153).

The Recovery Manager received a thorough briefing from the Site Emergency Coordinator in the TSC prior to activating the EOF. The EOF

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staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency respon-sibilities and the E0F operations proceded smoothly. The recovery work

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provided for a method of collecting and recycling the fuel pool waterJ and restoring the electrical power to the Reactor Building equipmen The emergency was resolved and the exercise terminated at 154 The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Accident Assessment This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems and equipment for a;:assing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as requird by 10CFR50.47(b)(9),10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of the radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. At the Brunswick Plant the engineering accident assessment team functioned to analyze the plant equipment status during the accident and to make recommendations to the Site Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition. The radiological assessment group provided continuous updates on inplant radiation hazards and potential releases of radio-activit The inspectors observed the CP&L computer analysis of dose assessment dat The computer also produced isopleths based on the dose assessment analysis and the meteorological data. The inspectors also observed the mobile van used for the field analysis of offsite environmental monitoring sample Radiological assessment personnel were assigned to the TSC and E0 The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Exercise Critique i

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by

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10CFR50.47(b)(14), 10CFR50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F, and specific

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criteria in NUREG 0654,Section II.N.

A formal CP&L critique of the emergency exercise was held on April 22, 1982 l with all controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and NRC j personnel attendin Deficiencies and weaknesses in the emergency i

preparedness program, identified as a result of this exercise were presented. Followup of corrective actions taken by CP&L for identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be accomplished through subsequent NRC

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