IR 05000424/2023090

NRC Inspection Report 05000424/2023090 and 05000425/2023090, and Investigation Report 2-2022-006; and Apparent Violation

ML23047A033
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/30/2023
From:	Laura Pearson Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Brown R Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
EA-22-108, OI 2-2022-006 IR 2023090
Download: ML23047A033 (10)

Text

March 30, 2023

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2023090 AND 05000425/2023090, AND INVESTIGATION REPORT 2-2022-006; AND APPARENT VIOLATION

Dear R. Keith Brown:

This letter refers to the investigation completed on October 31, 2022, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) regarding the Southern Nuclear Operating Companys (SNC) Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Vogtle), Units 1 and 2. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether a former supervisor and two employees of a contractor at Vogtle deliberately logged onto an incorrect radiation work permit (RWP) prior to entering Unit 1 containment during the 1R23 refueling outage. A factual summary of the OI investigation is provided as Enclosure 1.

The incident occurred during the night shift on September 20, 2021, when the three individuals entered Unit 1 containment while logged on an auxiliary building RWP. Based on the results of the NRCs review of the OI investigation report, one apparent violation (AV) was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/

about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The AV is discussed in the inspection report provided as Enclosure 2.

The AV involves the failure to comply with RWP 21-0010, which was a self-brief RWP with electronic dosimeter alarm setpoints appropriate for certain areas of low radiological risk and did not allow access into containment. Use of this RWP to enter containment effectively bypassed certain administrative controls implemented by the radiation protection department during the refueling outage, such as pre-entry briefings on current radiological conditions and the ability to monitor worker exposures in real-time using transmitting dosimetry. When the three individuals entered containment on RWP 21-0010, contrary to NMP-HP-302, Restricted Area Classification, Postings, and Access Control, they caused SNC to be in violation of Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 5.4.1. In addition, the NRC has concluded that the actions of the supervisor in this incident appears to have been deliberate.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:

(1) respond to the apparent violation addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter, (2) request a Pre-decisional Enforcement Conference (PEC), or (3) request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the conference; however, the PEC will be closed to public

R. observation since information related to an Office of Investigations report will be discussed and the report has not been made public. If you decide to participate in a PEC or pursue ADR, please contact Binoy Desai at 404-997-4519 within 10 days of the date of this letter. A PEC should be held within 30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000424,425/2023090; EA-22-108 and should include for each apparent violation: (1) the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response.

Additionally, your response should be sent to the NRCs Document Control Center, with a copy mailed to Laura Pearson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II, 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Atlanta, GA 30303, within 30 days of the date of this letter. If a response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a predecisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that a violation has occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.

In lieu of a PEC, you may also request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.

ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues.

Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at http://www.nrc.gov/

about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.

In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

R. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Binoy Desai at 404-997-4519.

Sincerely, Signed by Pearson, Laura on 03/30/23 Laura M. Pearson, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000424 and 05000425 License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Enclosures:

1. Factual Summary 2. Inspection Report 05000424/2023090 and 05000425/2023090

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000424 and 05000425 License Numbers: NPF-68 and NPF-81 Report Numbers: 05000424/2023090 and 05000425/2023090 Enterprise Identifier: I-2023-090-0004 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Waynesboro, GA Approved By: Binoy Desai, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 2

SUMMARY The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a NRC inspection at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Workers Entered Unit 1 Containment on the Wrong Radiation Work Permit Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Applicable Apparent Violation Not Applicable 71152A AV 05000424,05000425/2023090-01 Open EA-22-108 An apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when two contract employees, along with and under the direction of a contract supervisor, entered Unit 1 containment on a radiation work permit (RWP) that did not allow containment access.

Enclosure 2

INSPECTION RESULTS Workers Entered Unit 1 Containment on the Wrong Radiation Work Permit Cornerstone Severity Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Not Apparent Violation Not 71152A Applicable AV 05000424,05000425/2023090-01 Applicable Open EA-22-108 An AV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when two contract employees, along with and under the direction of a contract supervisor, entered Unit 1 containment on a radiation work permit (RWP) that did not allow containment access.

Description: During the night shift of September 20, 2021, a contract supervisor and two contract employees were performing various tasks inside Unit 1 containment and the auxiliary building in support of the 1R23 refueling outage. The supervisor and crew received a briefing from radiation protection (RP) on radiological conditions inside containment and were instructed to use RWP 21-1003, with electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm setpoints appropriate for work in that area. Early in the shift, they had entered containment twice using the correct RWP. Later in the shift, they planned to perform another entry into containment; however, at the direction of the supervisor, they bypassed the radiation protection (RP) trailer where containment briefings were performed and logged onto a different RWP (RWP 21-0010) at a separate auxiliary building login terminal. RWP 21-0010 was a self-brief RWP with ED alarm setpoints appropriate for low-risk auxiliary building areas which did not allow access into Unit 1 containment. The workers also failed to use the correct (transmitting) electronic dosimeters (EDs) for containment entry during login, meaning that their dose and dose rate were not monitored by RP personnel in real-time. At multiple points during the login process the two subordinate workers questioned whether RWP 21-0010 was correct. The supervisor repeatedly told them that it was the correct RWP and instructed them to enter the number as directed and the workers ultimately complied. The group then entered the radiologically controlled area (RCA), dressed out in protective clothing, and entered Unit 1 containment. At some point, the two workers were told to wait just inside the containment entrance while the supervisor proceeded down to the 197 elevation to inspect a work area near a high radiation area. Shortly after emerging from the elevator on the 197 elevation, the supervisor received an ED dose rate alarm of 48 mrem/hr on a set point of 25 mrem/hr. The entire group immediately left containment and reported to RP.

Corrective Actions: The licensee temporarily revoked RCA access for the three involved individuals, performed supplemental surveys of the area where the ED alarm was received, and performed an investigation of the events. The supervisor was subsequently terminated by his employer, Day and Zimmerman.

Corrective Action References: Condition Reports 10828724 and 10828726 Performance Assessment: The inspectors determined this violation was associated with a minor performance deficiency.

Enforcement: The ROPs significance determination process does not specifically consider willfulness in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it is necessary to address this violation, which involves apparent willfulness, using traditional enforcement to adequately deter non-compliance.

Enclosure 2

Violation: Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 requires that the procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, Appendix A, be established, implemented, and maintained, for access control to radiation areas, including a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) system.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) Procedure NMP-HP-302, Restricted Area Classification, Postings, and Access Control, Version 12.8, Section 4.1 Step 15 states, Entry requirements into any RCA will be defined by a Radiation Work Permit.

SNC RWP 21-0010 allowed radiological work to be performed in certain low-risk areas, including the auxiliary building, fuel handling building, control building, turbine building, and outside areas, but did not allow access into Unit 1 or Unit 2 containment.

Contrary to the above, during the night shift on September 20, 2021, during the 1R23 refueling outage, the licensee failed to follow RWP 21-0010, as required by TS 5.4.1.

Specifically, three contract employees entered Unit 1 containment on RWP 21-0010, which did not allow containment access.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an apparent violation pending a final significance (enforcement) determination.

Enclosure 2