ML20072S670

Control of Heavy Loads (C-10), Oconee Nuclear Power Station Units 1,2 & 3, Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20072S670
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	03/31/1983
From:	Steven Roberts FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	Clemenson F NRC
Shared Package
ML15238A796	List: ML20072S670
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR TAC-08065, TAC-8065, TER-C5506-374-2, TER-C5506-374-3, TER-C5506-374-375-37, NUDOCS 8304070286
Download: ML20072S670 (28)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I

.1

. Attachment a

(5' TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

..~

+

s CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS (c-10) l Y

i DUKE POWER COMPANY I i OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION UNITS L 2, AND 3 '

}.

[ ,

NRC DOCKET NO. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287 FRC PROJECT C5506 t

I HRC TAC NO. 08065, 08066, 08067 FRC ASSIGNMENT 13

{ NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASKS 374, 375, 376 i

i ,

'( I i f?

epared@

h ,

S. Roberts j Franklin Research Center Author: l

! D. J. Vito 20th and Race Streets Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Loader:

i, I. H. Sargent Preparedfor i

' 1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer:

f i F. Clemenson 4 lk '

L h' b rch 31, 1983

'} This report was preparec' sas an arJount of work sponsored by an agency of the United States

}'

Government. Neither the iniMJ States Government nor any agency thereof, or any of their i employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights.

, Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:

' ' c$ & 4' 75

' Principal Author ~

lAW M up Lehder ML \\

. Department Dire [ tor /

Dated - Date: JIM lPT Date: 4 -+-O t t l? a%

b

.00. Franklin Research Center A Division of The Franidin Institute XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDR h~

~

,.- w. 7

{(: -Q ,ma ney; x

1

. , I TEarC5506-374/375/376 .

I CONTENTS i

Section Title a Page 1 INTROD UCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1.1 Purpose of Review . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Generic Background . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background . . . . . . . . 2 l

2 EVALUATION . . / . . . . . . . . . 4 t

i 2.1 General Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . 4 i

)

4 2.2 Interim Protection Measures. . . . . . . . . 19 i 3 CONC LUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.1 General Provisions for Load Bandling

. . . . . . 22 .

i

3.2 Interim Protection . }

1

. . . . . . . . . . 22 4

] 4 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . .- . . . 24 1

-i i

I J

i i

i t

4 i

i i

i l l

j l

-1 iii 00 Funkun Reman:h Cauer A Dheen of The Frannen buenas

)

j J

TER-C5506-374/375/376 1

1 1

FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center l under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission (Office of q Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical

assistance in support of NBC operating reactor licensing actions. The

+

l technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by

$ the NRC.

• 1 J

Ms. S. Roberts, Mr. I. H. Sargent, and Mr. D. J. Vito contributed to the i technical preparation of this report through a subcontract with WESTDC Services, Inc.

i l

l 1

i i

l i

(

)

1 4

l V

00bd Franklin Research Center A Deuemen af The Fransen buemune E

~

i

. i i

i TER-C5506-374/375/376

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSII,OF REVIEW .

t his technical evaluation report documents an independent review of general load handling policy and procedures at Duke Power's Oconee Station Units 1, 2, and 3. This evaluation was performed with the following objectives:

o to assess conformance to the general load handling guidelines of NUREG 4612, " Control of Heavy Inada at Nuclear Power Plants" (1],

Section 5.1.1 o to assess conformance to the interim protection measures of l NUREG-0612, Sectior. 5.3. '

1.2 GENERIC BACKGROUND  !

Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing l criteria ated the adequacy of massures in effect at operating nuclear pcwer i

! plants to ensure the safe handling of heavy 1cada and to recommend necessary l. ,

changes in these measures. Sis activity was initiated by a letter issued by

[l the NBC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting - I information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel. [1

. i* 1 he results of Task A-36 were eported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy  ;

Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." h e staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents and should be upgraded.

, In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff I

developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-part objective

using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. . Se first pcetion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in i

NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling systems at i

p ...

UUUU Frenidin Research Center A Chuum af The FreWen huhAB t

, e. .

-tw' -si 9 7 e e es T @ + ^ -*-- ' -"W eWM--4-*--~hV' 'rw--* e 4 --T"---'"W*W '*-*W^+"'

T M 5506-374/375/376 nuclear power plants are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Sections 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or (2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small.

Acceptat ility of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four

, accident analysis evaluation criteria.

A defense-in-depth approach was used to develop the staff guidelines so as to ensure that all load handling systems are designed and operated so that their probability of failure is appropriately small. The intent of the guidelines is to ensure that licensees of all operating nuclear power plants perform the followings o define safe load travel paths through procedures and operator training so that, 'to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment o provide sufficient operator training, handling system design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612. Section 6 of NUREG-0612 recommended that a program be -

initiated to ensure that these guidelines are implemented at operating plants.

1.3 PLAh'r-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND On December 't2, 1980, the NBC issued a letter (3] to Duke Power, the Licensee for Oconee Station, requesting that the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.

UUUU Franklin Research Center A Dhaman af The PregehtIRaSAB

h

' ~

TEIb-C5506-374/375/376 On June 26, 1981, Duke Power provided a partial response [4] to this request.

The completed initial response was provided in subsequent reports on July 30, i 1981 [5], August 31, 1981 [6], and October 1, 1981 [7], and February 1, 1982

{i,

[8]. '

Based on References 4 through 7, a draft technical evaluation report (TER) was prepared and informally transmitted to the Licenses. A telephone conference call was subsequently conducted on April 20, 1982 involving representatives of the NRC, FRC, and Duke Power to discuss unresolved issues in this draf t TER. As a result of the conference call, Duke Power provided  ;

additional information in submittals dated October 8, 1982 [9] and November 5, 1982 (10] as well as information transmitted to FRC via the NRC on December 22, 1982 [11]. References 4 through 11 have been incoporated into this final technical evaluation.

4 i

i 4

l i

i I

e 4

i i,

i i

! i l

i 4

1 1

4 l

3-00 Franklin Research Center A Dhmeen of The Fraseen insukee .

4 -4 - -w-.--- y,4 , p y.--p,, ,. -

1 m

TER- C5506-374/375/376

2. EVALUATION i

This section presents a point-by-point evaluation of load handling provi-sions at Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 with respect to NRC staff guidelines j provided in NUREG-0612. Separate subsections are provided for both the general

! guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 and the interim measures of NUREG-0612, j Section 5.3. In each case, the guideline or interim measure is presented, i Licensee-provided information is summarized and evaluated, and a conclusion as to the extent of compliance, including recommended additional action where appropriate, is presented. These conclusions are summarized in Table 2.1. .

1 .

2.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES ,

The NRC has established seven general guidelines to provide the

defense-in-depth appropriate for the safe handling of heavy loads. They are identified under the following topics in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

)

o Guideline 1 - Safe Load Paths I o Guideline 2 - Load Handling Procedures j o Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training l j o Guidelina 4 - Special Lif ting Devices i

o Guideline 5 - Lif ting Devices (Not Specially Designed) }

o Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) i o Guideline 7 - Crane Design.

a These seven guidelines should be satisfied by all overhead handling systems and programs used to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in the spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load j drop may damage safe shutdown systems.

f f

2.1.1 NUREG-0612, Heavy Ioads Overhead Handling Systems

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems identified the follow-ing systems in the vicinity of irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment as  ;

t subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612: i t

e A OMoun of The Fremen huomme

b E

a by Table 2.1 Oconee Stetton Unite 1, 2, and 3/WUAEG-0612 Comp 11ance Matrie as 3

b AD Weight Interte Ieteria or Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guide!!se 7 Maseure 1 f3 Capacity Safe Road Csane operator spectet Lifting Crane - Test Technical Measure 6 special e'

meavy toads rathe Procedures p'sh (tonal Tr ein t ras Deelees stings and Inspection Crane Desten speelfleetione Attentlon yh 1. Units 1/2/3 peactor 185/20 - -

C - -

C C -

C h

g andg. Polar Cranes ,

e Shield 15 C C -

C C - - -

C 31ock av mead 106.4 C C --

C C - - -

C RV Upper 30 C C -

C C -

~

~

laternale

~

C

, indesing 25 C C -

C C - -

q, Fleture C

8 Reactor 50 C C -

C C - -- - -

Coolant Pump Ptator Assillery Building

2. Evaporator 1.5 C C - -

C - - - -

PM se>nor ei1

3. E2l 4 C C - -

C - - -

Notete (11 - e4

4. BBS 2 C C - -

C - - -

notets (21 --

U9 S. Waste 2 C C - - _ ~ ~

O

~

Drumming ~ On Notet w 4

6 N

u

=J C = Licensee action complies with NUREG-0612 Guideline. Un

- = Not applicable. N W

-J On a

9

1 1

n s 4 U$ m8j&Nw4uNU*

6 n a t o ieei rrt t eucn - -

t see aapt

- - - - - - -c - - - - -

l est M A e

n o

1li e at l eca r ri e eunl -

t shf - - - C - - C - - - -

aacl l eee MTe p s

n 7

le e e n e i D l -

e e - - - C - - C - C - - -

d n i a u r G C n

6t o ,

si eet nTc i e l - p ,

e s -

d en - - - C - - C - C = - -

i nI ua Crd Cn a

S e s n

i g l n .

e i d l - - ~ - C C - - ~ C C -

l s a

C

)

t. g n

n 4i o t .

cI ef s .e nie 1 i l Lcl - - - - C C - - ~ - - -

3 el e d ae e iiD l uc b Ge p ~

a s T

r 3 o t

eag =

nr n t ei t pn d

eOi a - - - C - - - - C - ~ -

l er unT Ca r C

2 s

e e n r i u

• l d .

e e -

d c C C C C C C C C - C C C i o u P r

G 1

d ea noe e.

i l

Lh t eea - - C C C df P C C C - C C C C -

ia -

_ uS G w o

y t tl h ia 5 5

_ grcn i

e oaopt 6 5 6 0 0

9 2

0 2

3 4 2 1 2 0 1

W aI 1 C

t ) n e a e 2 u tl e ) l n l ( o e ao r e- a d r n r t

_ d s

a N

eN ye r

r

- A er 2

1 e

t l)

P o2 o(

e t .

uxr FuC t

A y

ml t er re l t u

h S

oa t r aC r

e g

n a .

e r

n e i m

phr 1

a net t o al t ss e nl n nlt c nl r nl o y es th cpo l co l co all It eea pur ees pua s eoa eon po>

yt no eo ac ex smt ut n g ao y

eo el o P o NN i pol sCes bi GN NE iuo MPM OMM DC DaH sFC SFC M SPl dl v ni

_ a . . ac . . .

e . . . . 0 1 t a 2 3 N 6 7 8 9 1 1 SF 1 1 e

1m4 =

=

=

cE 3 0:Ign:T O$g Ep

S Table 2.1 icont.)

"? er .

weight Interim Interim g or Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guldallne 7 Measure 1 Messere 6 g Capacity safe Load Crane operator special Lifting Crane - Test Technical special a at Heavy loads itons) Pathe Procedures Training Deelces Slings and Inspection Crane Design specificatlone Attentlon e 1 . second g'Q. Floor i C C - - - - - - --

g skluipment se MonoraiI d

4 Turbine Building

15. Pump Alsle 12 C C C C - C C - -

Crane

16. T*nbine 180 - -

C - -

C. C - -

Alsie Crane

• Generator 180 C C - C C - - - -

tow 120 C C -

C C -- -- - -

1 Pre.eure motor Diaphragme 4 C C - -

C - - - -

h ings 2 C C - --

C - - -- --

17. Turbine 25 C C C - -

C C -- -

Building Aust!!ary Crane .

1s. u ater Bay s0 - -- C - --

C C - -- *i Crane Feeduater 20 C C --

C C - -- -- -

Heater g Shell m O

m Pumps 13 C C --

- C -- -- - -

b Misc. 10 C C - -- C

_ ~ -- -- -

(W

19. Cbndensate 4.5 C C - - - - - - - 4 m .ter Pump gw Monoraits lle) 4 m

, , , - - . . - . - - .----.-w-* -w =====-ee a--w --*

_ W 66="

TER-C5506-374/375/376 e

1. Reactor building polar crane

2. Auxiliary building (spent fuel pool) o Evaporator pump monorail o LPI hoist (3) m o Reactor building spray hoist (2) o Waste drumming hoist o Decay heat cooler hoist (3) o Domineralizer area hoist (2) ,

4 o HPI hoist (2) '

o Spent fuel cooler monorail (2) o Spent fuel pool crane (2) j o Spent fuel pool auxiliary crane (2) i

. 3. Standby shutdown facility o Generator room crane l o Equipinent hatch monorail o Second floor equipment hatch monorail

4. Turbine building

o Pump aisla crane i 1

o Turbine aisle crane o Turbine aisle auxiliary crane o Heater bay crane I o Condensate boostor pump monorail (10).

'Ihe Licensee has also identified numerous other load handling devices tat have been excluded from satisfying the criteria of the general guidelines

' NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, based on the following criteria:

1

1. physical sept. ration of load impact points and any systems or a

components required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, and/or i t.

2. handling device capacity.

r c.

to UOO Franklin Research Center A Chaman of The Fm huume

i l

TER-C5506-374/375/376 4

I l b. Evaluation and Conclusion j Based upon review of the Licensee's submittal, the Licensee's identifica-l tion of load handling systems that are subject to the NUREG-0612 guidelines is l con'aistent with the intent of NUREG-0612.

(

2.1.2 Safe Ioad Paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(111 l " Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment. Se path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members,. beans, etc., such that if the load is dropped, l the structure is more likely to withstand the impact. R ose load paths e

should be defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

'f Deviations from defined load paths shculd require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."

I a. Sununary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions l

5 The Licensee has stated that safe load paths for all load handling systems identified as " handling heavy loads in the vicinity of vital equipment" i

i have been established. Heavy loads are considered to be those weighing 1500 i

lb or more. Vital equipment includes those systems necessary for safe

{ shutdown and decay heat removal and .those involved with spent fuel handling.

i Se safe load paths for cranes follow beams and avoid vital systems where possible. Se safe load paths for monorails are the vertical projections of

. the beams onto the floor.

} Se safe load paths for cranes have been painted on the floor. Monorails

!, do not require safe load paths to be painted since the' loads cannot deviate t

j from the monorail alignments.

! The purpose of the various safe load paths is described in directives 4

j that include enclosures showing the actual paths.

i l The Licensee states that monorails require no measures to ensure that loads travel along safe load paths. Measures taken to ensure that heavy loads j handled by cranes remain within safe load paths include l

l  ; rankun Research Center

, A Demmen of The Frannen bushee y-. . . -

, l ,

j

i. i

TER-C5506-374/375/376 L

1. placing the safe load paths on general arrangement drawings

2. painting the paths on the floor at the station i '.

j 3. implementation of Station Directive 3.3.28 (m) with enclosures for j each crane. The enclosures are attached to or placed in the appropriate crane or hoist and includes

a. a sketch of the safe load path

b. instructions for special lif ts

c. appropriate procedures where required and any restrictions on the lif t or hoist.

The Licensee has furthur stated that, if it became necessary, a procedure would be written for any deviation from established safe load paths. However, such an occurrence is not foreseen [10]. -

b. Evaluationx Review of the Licensee's response and drawings indicates that suitable aafe load paths have been identified for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy loads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool or to impact safe shutdown equipment. Sufficient information has been provided to verify that deviations from established load paths will require written alternatives.

c. Conclusion Oconee Station complies with Guideline 1.

2.1.3 Load Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1[2)1

" Procedures should be developed to cover load handling operations for heavy' loads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum, procedures

..shculd cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612.

These procedures should includes identification of required equipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."

~'

00er.niaina.3e.,acen, 1 A on===. The r=een men .

- ^- ~~- - ~~ ""

__ _ z: : _ __ _ _ _ _

u

• TER-C5506-374/375/376

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and conclusions The Licensee states that the load handling station directives fully comply with the requirements set forth in Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG-0612 for load handling procedures. These directives explain the safe load paths and include enclosures describing safe load patha, instructions for special lif ts, appropriate procedures, and any restrictions placed on the crane or hoist.

b. Evaluation

The specific procedures identified by the Licensee for load handling at i

t Oconee Station satisfy the criteria of Guideline 2 based on the Licensee's verification that station directives fully comply with the requirements set l

forth in Section 5.1.l(2) of NUREG-0612. The station directives include l enclosures for each crane. These enclosures include sketches of safe load 4

t paths, instructions for special lif ts, the appropriate proceduras (where

} required) , and restrictions.

1 f c. Conclusion 4

Oconee Station complies with Guideline 2 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.

2.1.4 Crane operator Training (Gulisline 3, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(3)]

4

" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in

! accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976 ' Overhead and Gantry j Cranes' '[121."

i j a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions j The Licensee has indicated that Oconee Station does comply with ANSI

( B30.2-1976 for crane operator training.

i l b. Evaluation and Conclusion

}

Oconee Station complies with the criteria of Guideline 3 of NUREG-0612 on 4 the basis of the Licensee's verification that no exceptions are taken to the t

guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976.

4 4 I l

U000 ~. rr.nks,n R

n r.ch. ceni.,  !

i  ; i

TER-C5506-374/375/376

=

2.1.5 Special Lif ting Devices [ Guideline 4, NURBG-0612, Section 5.1.l(4)1 "Special lif ting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, ' Standard for Special Lif ting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [13].

This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry ,,

heavy loads in areas as defined above. For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard. In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the odebined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on characteristics of the crane which will be used. This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight (static load) of the load and of the intervening components of the special handling device."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee has indicated that special lifting devices at Oconee Station comply with the apolicable ANSI standard and NUREG-0612 guidelines.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Ocones Station complies with Guideline 4 of NUREG-0612. This conclusion ,

is based on the Licensee's certification that special lif ting devices used are in full compliance with design, fabrication, inspection, and testing requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1.l(4) .

2.1.6 Lifting Devices (Not Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5, NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(5)]

"Lif ting devices that are not specially designed abould be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings'

[14]. Bowever, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load. The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and dynamic load. Where this restricts slings to use on only certain cranee, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes us with which they may be used."

c. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions The Licensee states Umat use of lif ting devices at the Oconee Station n, complies with the applicable ANSI standards and NUREG-0612 guidelines. Lifting

?

nkDn m .Res,ewd_i Cener

I l

l l

• TER C5506-374/375/376 i .

. devices used consist of the appropriate size and number of chain-falls, chokers, and slings as determined by the rigger. In making a selection, the rigger draws on experience and elementary and advanced rigger training.

Choker and sling sising is determined by the estimated weight of the load. If additional information is needed, the Rigger's Bandbook is used.

Slings are being checked to ensure that tags are attached showing load capacity. ANSI 30.2 and the Rigger's Handbook are given as guides for load capacities. No slings are restricted to use on a particul.5r crane.

b. Evaluation oconee Station substanti 11y satistles the criteria of this guideline on the basis that lif ting devices are used in accordance with the applicable ANSI standards and NUREG guidelines. In addition, the Licensee has provided I

reasonable assurances that dynamic loads are properly accounted for by conservative selection of slings in accordance with the Rigger's Handbook.

Furtheracre, based on guidance contained in CMAA-70 (15) that the crane design dynamic loading should be considered to be 0.5% of the static load per fps of hoisting speed, in conjunction with the Licensee's statement that no hoist at Oconee Station (subject to NUREG-0612 guidelines) has a speed greater than 30 fpa, an additional allowance for dynamic loads may be disregarded since they can be expected to be a reasonably small percentage of the overall static load.

c. Conclusion Oconee Station complies with Guideline 5.

2.1.7 Cranes (Inspection, Msting, and Maintenance) (Guideline 6, NUREG-0612.

Section 5.1.l(6)1 "me crane should be inspected, tasted, and maintained in accordance with Chepter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less r

-U-l N Yr Y. A -

l.

u _

l i '

TER-C5506-374/375/376 than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during

, refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during power opera-1 tion. Al*SI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly. For such cranes having limited usage, the inspections, I

test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use) ."

a. Susunary of f.icensee Stateinents and Conclusions The Licensee has indicated that the Oconee Station crane inspection, testing,.and maintenance programs comply with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976, Section 2-1.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Oconee Station complies with Guideline 6 of NUREG-0612.

2.1.8 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NOREG-0612, Section 5.1.l(711 "me crane should be designed to meet the applicable criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ~' Overhead and Gantry Cranes, ' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [15]. An alternative to a specification in ANSI B30.2 or CMhA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied."

a. Sununary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Duke Power Company has evaluated its overhead heavy load handling systems for design compliance with CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976. Se Licensee states that the generator room crane in the standby shutdown facility is exempt from CMAA-70 and ANSI B30.2-1976 design requirements beususe it is a manually operated, single girder overhead traveling crane.

Se Licensee states that, with the exception of the generator room crane, the cranes listed in Section 2.1.l(a) were designed in accordance with Duke Power Company specifications, Electric Overhead Crane Institute (BOCI) Speci-fication 61 [16], and USAS B30.2.0-1976. A comparative study of CMAA-70 versus EOCI-61 identified 13 items of difference between the two specifications.

ankEn Research Center

• A Osumen of the Femen sumnes

I 1

TER-C5506-374/375/376 i

i j 1 Sese items are enumerated below, with the Licensee's cossments regarding l compliance with the requirements of CNAA-70.  !

1. %rsional forces. CMhA-70, Article 3.3.2.1.3 requires that twisting j moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces acting eccentric to the

) horizontal neutral amis of a girder be calculated on tha tasis of the dist.ance j between the center of gravity of the load, or force center line, and the girder a

shear center measured normal to the force vector. ECCI-61 states that such moments are to be calculated with reference to girder center of gravity. For

, girder sections symmetrical about each principal central axis (e.g. , box l section or I-beam girders cosmonly used in cranes subject to this review), the f shear center coincides with th's centroid of the girder section and there is no i

u difference between the two requirements. Such is not the case for nonsymmetri- l

{ cal girder sections (e.g., channels) . Nonsymmetrical girder sections were not  !

used in the construction of the cranes at Oconee Station and therefore are not an issue. i

2. _ Longitudinal stiffeners. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1 specifies (1) the 1l maximum allowable web depth / thickness (h/t) ratio for box girders using longitudinal stiffeners and (2) requirements concerning the location and I

~

minimum moment of inertia for such stiffeners. EOCI-61 allows the use of longitudinal stiffeners but provides no similar guidance.

Se Licensee states that the allowable h/t ratios for girders using

{

2 longitudinal stiffeners on Oconee Station cranes do not exceed ratios specified in CMAA-70. Longitudinal stiffeners used on crane girders at Oconee station are located very close to the placement specified in CMAA-70, Article l

3.3.3.1, which the Licensee states does not isignificantly affect the capacity of the girder, and therefore is adequate. Longitudinal stiffeners used on the turbine aisle, the auxiliary turbine aisle, and the heater bay cranes at i I

l j Oconee Station were sized according to AISE No. 6,1949, " Specification for uI Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes for Steel Mill Service." Se Licensee j states that this industry standard, accepted at the time the Oconee Station

} cranes were fabricated, provides an adequate margin of safety in stiffener

{ design. Se longitudinal stiffeners on the polar cranes at Oconee Station do fulfill the moment of inertia requirements of CMhA-70.

i ps uuud Franklin Reneerch Ceneer A human af Tha harem summas

_ . _ . ..,.. .... -.._ _ ... . _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ _.o-.--,-.,.. .

r ,

--9r ..w , ,, , --- . - , - ,,-v. -.p--e

.. _ . . . . , . _ . . m_

ww-..- . , , , .4

--w..-- --. . , . ._

u -

-.-r -+w'-'r

l TER-C5506-374/375/376

3. Allowable compressive stress. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 identifies allowable compressive stresses of approximately 50% of yield strength of the recommended structural material (A-36) for girders, where the ratio of the distance between web plates to the thickness of the top cover plate (b/c ratio) is less than or equal to 38. Allowable compressive stresses decrease linearly for b/c ratios in excess of 38. BOCI-61 provides a similar method for calculating allowable compressive stresses except that the allowable stress decreases from approximately 50% of yield only af ter the b/c ratio exceeds 41. Consequently, structural members with b/c ratios in the general range of 38 to 52 designed under BOCI-61 will allow a slightly higher compressive stress than those.-designed under CMAA-70.

The Licensee states that girders with b/c ratios in excess of 38 were not used during the design and construction of cranes at Oconee Itaclear Station.

4. Fatique considerations. CMAA-70, Article 3.3.3.1.3 provides substantial guidance with respect to fatigue failure by indicating allowable stress ranges for various structural members in joints under repeated loads.

BOCI-61 does not address fatigue failure.

At Oconee Station, cranes lifting loads at or near their rated capacities do so approximately 2.38 times per year at the maximum, which totals 95 cycles over the 40-year life of the plant. Since this is far below the 20,000 loading cycles specified by CMAA-70, fatigue is not a concern for cranes at Oconee Nuclear Station. '

5. Boist rope requirements. CHAA-70, Article 4.2.1 requires that the capacity load plus the botton block divided by the number of parts of rope not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength. EOCI-61 requires that the rated capacity load divided by the number of parts of rope nos exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength.

The Licensee states that the " maximum crane load weight, plus the weight of the bottom block divided by the number of parts of rope does not exceed 20 percent of the manufacturer's published breaking strength for cranes at Oconee."

i l

! A '

i ll00Granuiin,n..e.,ch ae r .

C.e.nie,

TERK:5506-374/375/376 f 6. Drum design. CMAA-70, Article 4.4.1 requires that the drum be designed *o withstand combined crushing and bending loads. 30CI-61 requires only that the drum be designed to withstand maximum load, bending and crushing loads, with no stipulation that these loads be combined. Drum design calculations were based on the combined crushing and bending loads.

l

7. Drum design. OIAA-70, Article 4.4.3 provides recosmonded drum groove depth and pitch. BOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. Drum groove and pitch on cranes at Oconee Nuclear Station generally satisfy the recommendations of CMAA-70. '1he Licensee states that small variations do occur but are not significant enough to adversely affect reeving stability and rope wear.

8. Gear design. CMAA-70, Article 4.5 requires that gearing horsepower l

\

rating be based on certain American Gear Manufacturers Association Standards and provides a method for determining allowable horsepower. EOCI-61 provides no similar guidance. Gear horsepower ratings at Oconee Nuclear Station were based on design allowables and calculation methodology identical to that incorporated into CMAA-70. i

9. Bridge brake design. OIAA-70, Article 4.7.2.2 requires that bridge brakes, for cranes with cab control and the cab on the trolley, be rated at least 75% of bridge motor torque. EOCI-61 requires a brake rating of 50% of )

bridge motor torque for similar configurations.

The Licensee states that bridge brakes designed under USAS B30.2-1976 and ANSI B30.2-1976 are required to stop bridge motion within a distance in feet equal to 10% of full load speed (in feet per minute) when traveling at full speed with full load. Therefore, in the Licensee's opinion, the performance of bridge brakes subject to this review will be equivalent to those designed under CMAA-70.

10. Hoist brake design. OtAA-70, Article 4.7.4.2 requires that hoist holding brakes, when used with a method of a control braking other than mechanical, have torque ratings no less than 125% of the hoist motor torque. i BOCI-61 requires a hoist holding brake torque rating of no less than 100% of 1

the hoist motor torque without regard to the type of control brake employed.

1

e TER-C5506-374/375/376 he Licensee states that hoist brake design is in compliance with that certified in CMAA-70 for the applicable cranes at Oconee Station.

11. Bumpers and stops. CMAA-70, Article 4.12 provides substantial guidance for the design and installation of bridge and trolley bumpers and stops for cranes which operate near the end of bridge and trolley travel. No similar guidance is provided in EOCI-61. Guidance for the design of bumpers and stops on bridge cranes at Oconee Nuclear Station was obtained from USAS B30.2-1976. We provisions of this specification generally meet those of CMAA-70. The Licensee states that variations between the existing bumpers and stops on cranes at Oconee Station and the requirements of CMAA-70 do not significantly affect the performance or safety of those cranes.

12. Static control systems. CMAA-70, Article 5.4.6 provides substantial guidance for the use of static control systems. EOCI-61 provides guidance for magnetic control systems only. Static control systems in use at Oconee are in compliance with CMAA-70.

13. Restart protection. CMAA-70, Article 5.6.2 requires that cranes not equipped with spring-return controllers or momentary-contact pushbuttons be provided with a device that will disconnect all motors upon power failure and will not permit any motor to be restarted until the controller handle is brought to the OFF position. Controllers used at Oconee Station are of the spring-retura or momentary-contact pushbutton type.

b. Evaluation Oconee Nuclear Station cranes substantially meet the intent of this guideline on the basis that the cranes were originally built to ECCI-61. In addition, for those criteria in CMAA-70 noted to be more restrictive than the requirements of EOCI-61, the Licensee has demonstrated compliance with CMAA-70 or provided reasonable assurance that existing design meets the intent of the j CMAA criteria.

, c. Conclusion I

! Oconee Station complies with Guideline 7.

i a .a .

l t

TER-C5506-374/375/376 2.2 INTERIM PROTECTION MEASURES  !

L The NRC has established six interim protection measures to be implemented I at operating nuclear power plants to provide reasonable assurance that no heavy loads will be handled over the spent fuel pool and that measures exist to reducs 'he potential for tecidental load .Iraps tu ispect ou f ael la the l core or spent fuel pool. Four of the six interin measures of the report consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load Paths; Guideline 2, Ioad Handling Procedurest Guideline 3, Crane Operator Trainings and Guideline 6, Cranes ,

(Inspect [ ion, Testing, and Maintenance) . The two remaining interim measures i cover the following criteria ~

1. Heavy load technical' specifications

[

2. Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.  !

The status of the Licensee's implementation and an evaluation of these interim protection measures are summarized in the succeeding paragraphs of this ,

section.

2.2.1 Technical Specifications [ Interim Protection Measure 1, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1)] (

" Licenses for all operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area should be revised to include i

a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7,  ;

' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit f handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementa-tion of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1." '

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions '

The Oconee Technical Specifications have been revised to meet the requirements of Interim Protection Measure 1 of NUREG-0612 by adding Section 3.8.14 to the Oconee Technical Specifications, which prohibits the handling of loads in excess of 3000 lbs in the fuel storage pool area.

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Oconee Station complies with Interim Protection Measure 1.

ranklin Resea

~.~ rch Center

. _ , . ._ .,,e rw, -

W ^

TEllHC5506-374/375/376 i

2.2.2 Administrative Controls [ Interim Protection Measures 2, 3, 4, and 5, NUREG-0612, Sections 5.3 (2)-5.3 (5) ]

' Procedural or administrative measures [ including safe load paths, load handling procedures, crane operator training, and crane inspection] ...

can be accomplished in a short tiles peried and need not be delt.yed for completion of evaluations and modifications to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1 of (NUREG-0612] ."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions Suasaries of Licensee statements and conclusions are contained in discussions of the respective , general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3,

2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

l b. Evaluations, conclusions, and Recommendations Evaluations, conclusions, and recommendations are contained in I discussions of the respective general guidelines in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.7.

2.2.3 Special Reviews for Heavy Loads Over the Core [ Interim Protection Measure 6, NUREG-0612, Section 5.3 (1) 1 '

"Special attention should be given to procedures, equipment, and

! personnel for the handling of heavy loads over the core, such as vessel j internals or vessel inspection tools. His special review should include the following for these loads: (1) review of procedures for installation of rigging 'or lif ting devices and movement of the load to assure that sufficient detail is provided and that instructions are clear and concise; (2) visual inspections of load bearing components of cranes, slings, and special lifting devices to identify flaws or deficiencies ,

that could lead to failure of the component; (3) appropriate repair and replacement of defective components; and (4) verify that the crane operators have been properly trained and are familiar with specific.

procedures used in handling these loads, e.g., hand signals, conduct of operations, and content of procedures."

a. Summary of Licensee Statements and conclusions  !

he Licensee states that Oconee Station has previously implemented most provisions of this interim protection measure. The last remaining provision, inspections of load-bearing components, is currently being implemented.

l,- l Frankun R l m manCenter 4om .en.esearch

TER-C5506-374/375/376

b. Evaluation and Conclusion Oconee Nuclear Station complies with Interim Protection Measure 6.

B 0

nklin Research C. enter A Daemon of The Franhan burmas L

TEA-C5506-374/375/376

3. COICLUSION This sumanary is provided t.o consolidate the results of the evaluation I contained in Section 2 concerning individual NRC staff guidelines into an I overall evaluation of heavy load handling at Oconee Nuclear Staton. Overall conclusions and reconenended Licensee actions, where appropriate, are provided l with respect to both general provisions for load handling (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1) and completion of the staff recommendations for interim protection (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) .

l 3.1 GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR LOAD HANDLING The NRC staff has established seven guidelines concerning provisions for handling heavy loads in the area of the reactor vessel, near stored spent fuel, or in other areas where an accidental load drop could damage equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The intent of these guidelines is twofold. A plant conforming to these guidelines will have developed and implemented, through procedures and operator training, safe load travel paths such that, to the maximum extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment. A plant conforming to these guidelines will also have provided sufficient operator training, handling system design, loed handling instructions, and equipment inspection to ensure reliable operation of the handling system. As detailed in Section 2, it has been found that load handling eperations at Oconee Nuclear Station can be expected to be conducted in a highly reliable manner consistent with the staff's objectives in all areas of crane safety and reliability as expressed in these guidelines.

3.2 INTERIM PROTECTION The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Section 5.3) certain measures that should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance that handling of heavy loads will be performed in a safe manner until final implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0 612, Section 5.1 is complete. Specified measures include the implementation of a technical specification to prohibit anklin Research Center A De of As F#epeeninamuse

l .

TEIH:5506-374/375/376 the handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pools compliance with Guidelines 1, 2, 3, and 6 of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1; a review of load handling procedures and operator training; and a visual inspection program, including component repair or replacement as necessary of cranes, slings, and special lif ting devices to eliminate deficiencies that could lead to component failure. Evaluation of information provided by the Licenses indicates that Oconee Station has complied with the staff's measures for interim protection.

}

1 UUUU Franklin Research Center A Ohemen of The Frqueen m

' ' ' ' *~ o *-

y .-

<. sow:v7s-- m mm .a ., 7 n a s, . .. . n . .n . . . , . . , , , .. ,,,

A

TER-C5506-374/375/376

4. REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Inads at Itaclear Power Plants" NRC, July 1980

2. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)

Letter to all Licensees

Subject:

Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NBC, 17 May 1978

3. NRC Letter to Duke Power

Subject:

Request for Review of Heavy Load Handling at Oconee Station 22 December 1980

4. W. O. Parker (Duke Power)

Letter to the NRC

Subject:

Control of Heavy Inads Review, Oconee Nuclear Station Turbine Building 26 June 1981 .

5. W. O. Parker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, Oconee Nuclear Station Standby Shutdown Facility Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel 30 July 1981

6. W. O. Parker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Inada, Oconee Nuclear Station Auxiliary Building 31 August 1981

7. W. O. Parker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads, Oconee Nuclear Station Reactor Building 1 Octcber 1981

8. W. O. Parker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NRC)

Subject:

Control of Heavy Inada, Oconee Nuclear Station Turbine Building and Standby Shutdown Facility 1 February 1982 nklin Research Center A Opneen of The Fween tumune

. . . . . - - . . . . . - _ . _ _ _ _ --.._7.._., _ _.. . ..

TER-C5506-374/375/376

9. H. B. Tucker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stolz (NBC)

Subject:

Response to Draft TER on Control of Heavy Loads at Oconee Nuclear Station Oc tober 8, 19 82

10. H. B. Tucker (Duke Power)

Letter to J. F. Stola (NTC)

Subject:

Response to Draft TER on Control of Heavy Loads at Oconee Nuclear Station November 5,1982

11. Telephone conversation of S. Roberts (FRC) and P. Wagner (NBC)

Subject:

Oconee Station December 22, 1982

12. ANSI B30.2-1976

" Overhead and Gantry Cranes" e

13. ANSI N14.6-1976

" Standards for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) er More for Nuclear Materials"

14. ANSI B30.9-1971

" Slings"

15. CMAA-7 0 l

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" 1975

16. EOCI-61

" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" 1961 i

i 000 Franklin Research Center A Dhamen of The Fremen insumme

_,,.u..-,...,%,........,.y- .

..- .,.r.-we=.**4.-~**~~w- -- - '

1