ML20079M337

Proposed Changes to Tech Spec 3/4.3.2 Re ESF Actuation Sys Instrumentation to Require Testing of Certain Relays at 6-month Intervals

ML20079M337
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	01/25/1984
From:	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML13302A634	List: ML20079M334 ML20079M337
References
TAC-51613, TAC-54710, TAC-54711, TAC-55119, NUDOCS 8401270274
Download: ML20079M337 (48)

Text

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DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES NPF-10-4 AND NPF-15-4 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS This is a request to revise Section 3/4.3.2, Table 4.3-2, " Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements' of the Technical Specifications for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2.

DESCRIPTION The surveillance requirements for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation, including automatic actuation logic, are specified in Technical Specification 3/4.3.2, Table 4.3-2. The surveillance requirements for the ESFAS automatic actuation logic include semiannual channel functional tests of the ESFAS subgroup relays, per Note 4 of the table. This semiannual

-testing requirement for SONGS subgroup relays was based on the then-current requirement for testing of the similarly functioning ESFAS slave relays in -

plants with a Westinghouse designed NSSS. However, the Combustion Engineering (C-E) designed NSSS in SONGS does not have provisions to bypass the subgroup relay contacts, so that subgroup relay testing at SONGS necessarily actuates the . connected equipment for each relay (contact by contact jumpering to L

. preclude such actuation is both impracticable and potentially unsafe).

Although actuated equipment assignments to the subgroup relays were made so as '

to minimize the number of relays which cannot be tested at power, for about a fourth of the SONGS ESFAS subgroup relays, plant shutdown will either occur as a result of this subgroup relay actuation or is required to prevent unsafe plant conditions which would occur if the connected equipment were actuated with the plant at power. A list of the SONGS ESFAS subgroup relays, identifying those which cannot be tested at power on this basis, was provided i~

to the staff in SCE's letters of December 17, 1982 and January 28, 1983.

It is proposed to change the subgroup relay testing frequency for only those relays which cannot be tested at power, from at least once per 6 months to testing at each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if not tested in the previous 6 months. The testing frequency for subgroup relays which can be tested at power and for equipment actuated by the subgroup relays (for example, pumps and valves subject to routine ASME Section XI testing) would remain unchanged. As described in the SCE letter of December 17,1982, ESFAS availability, based on a reliability analysis, is not significantly affected by increasing the functional test interval for all subgroup relays from 6 months to as much as 18 months. Since all the ESFAS subgroup relays for SONGS l

' are the same type, continued 6-month surveillance testing of those subgroup relays which can be tested at power in conjunction with the proposed cold shutdown testing of only those relays which cannot be tested at power will maintain the required ESFAS reliability. '

EXISTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (S)

See Attachment A.

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (S)

See Attachment B.

8401270274 840125 l PDR ADOCK 05000361 P <

PDR i

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' SAFETY ANALY M The proposed change discussed above shall be deemed to constitute a significant hazards consideration if there is a postive finding in any of the j following areas.

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1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No -

The proposed change does not affect the configuration or function of

.the ESF actuation system as described in FSAR Section 7.3. The proposed change affects only the surveillance interval for those ESFAS subgroup relays which cannot be tested at power and does not affect the configuration, function or surveillance intervals for any other plant equipment, structure or system. A reliability analysis has been :ompleted, as discussed in SCE's letter to the Staff

' December 17, 1982, which demonstrates that ESFAS availability is not significantly affected by the proposed change. In addition, the proposed change will eliminate the plant shutdown /startup transients associated with the current ESFAS subgroup relay testing interval, and hence will have a beneficial rather than adverse affect with respect to plant component fatigue life, qualified environmental life, and other design parameters. As such. all accident probabilities, consequences and scenarios remain bounded by existing analyses.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluted?

l Response: No See above discussion. -

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3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? ,

Response: No

See above discussion.

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SAFETY AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION l

Based on the above Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this I action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of.

the station on the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement.

ATTACHMENT A EXISTING SPECIFICATION e

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS t

CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED 1

! 11. FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

j b. Airborne Radiation j ). Gaseous S R M *

11. Particulate / Iodine S R M

• j c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3)

• i j 12. CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

a

b. Airborne Radiation i ). Gaseous (2) (2) (2) All j 11. Particulate (2) (2) (2) All i

111. Iodine (2) (2) (2) All

c. Containment Area Radiation (Gamma) S R M 6 i

d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All TABLE NOTATION

) (1) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

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{ (2) In accordance with Table 4.3-9 Surveillance Requirements for these instruments channels.

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(3) Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energiration/deenergiration of each initiation relay and verificiation of the OPERA 8ILITY of each initiation relay.

! (4) A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energiration/deenergiration of each

subgroup relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay.

1 (5) Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS.

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With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.

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N ATTACHMENT B i

PROPOSED SPECIFICATION

+

t

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Cantinuedl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED

. 11. FUEL HANDLING ISOLATION (FHIS) i a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

i b. Airborne Radiation i 1. Gaseous S R M

• a 11. Particulate / Iodine S R M

• l c. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) *

12. CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION (CPIS) i

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A. -

j b. Airborne Radiation

{ 1. Gaseous (2) (2) (2) All

! 11. Particulate (2) (2) (2) All 111. Iodine (2) (2) (2) All j c. Containment Area Radiation

! S (Gamma) R M 6 i d. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. R(3) All i

)

TABLE NOTATION

< (1) Each train or logic channel shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

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" (2) In accordance with Table 4.3-9 Surveillance Requirements for these instruments channels.

(3) Testing of Automatic Actuation Logic shall include energization/deenergiration of each initiation j relay and verificiation of the OPERABILITY of each initiation relay.

I 1 (4) A subgroup relay test shall be performed which shall include the energization/deenergization of each l sui, group relay and verification of the OPERABILITY of each subgroup relay. Relays exempt from j testing during riant operation shall be limited to only those relays associated with plant

] equipment which cannot ba operated during plant operation. Relays not testable during plant operation shall be tested during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> unless tested during the i previous 6 months.

l (5) Actuated equipment only; does not result in CIAS.

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With irradiated fuel in the storage pool.

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Revision 1 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED Q{ANGES NPF-10-41 AND NPF-15-41

. , AUD.SAF.ETY, ANALYSIS . , ,

This is a reiuest l to revise Techniciti Specification 3.2.8, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE.

Existing Specifications Unit 2: See Attachment "A" Unit 3: See Attachment "B"

_ Procosed Scecifications Units 2 and 3: See Attachment "C" Descriction .

Unit 2 LCO 3.2.8 uses the phrase " average pressurizer pressure". Because there is no adequate definition of the werd average in the context of pressurizer pressure, the word average was reroved from the Standard Technical Specification (STS) during the period berween the issuances of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 lice.ses and, as a result, does not appear in Unit 3 ICO 3.2.8.

During normal steady state operation (i.e., plant power level constant with no

- changes being made to plant operation), pressurizer pressure is maintained at a nominal 2,250 psia by the pressurizer pressure control system. Above the normal operating pressure range, pressurizer spray flow is proportionally increased as pressurizer pressure rises to reduce the pressure to within the normal range. The control system parameters are adjusted, taking into account centrol system hysteresis, to optimize pressurizer pressure stability and prevent simultaneous actuation of the heaters and sprays. .In this configuration, the pressurizer pressure will overshoot the 2,275 psia upper limit for brief periods during a limited number of expected plant maneuvers while the pressurizer pressure control system is reacting to the pressure increase. Some examples of the kinds of changes in plant operations which result in these brief pressurizer pressure excursions above 2,275 psia are:

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Approximate Time Exceeding 2275 psia

, with Pressurizer Estimated Pressure Control Sys;.em Event Peak Pressure in Operation

1. Starting of a reheater drain 2,298 psia 50 seconds -

pump resulting in a +50 Btu /lbm .

feedwater enthalpy change

2. 100% to 90% step reduction in 2,284 psia 40 seconds steam flow ,

3. 15% to 100% ramp in turbine power 2,282 psia 15 minutes level at beginning of core life

4. 15% to 100% ramp in turbine power 2,280 psia 15 minutes level at end of core life

5. 100% to 15% ramp in turbine power 2,276 psia 20 seconds at beginning of core life

6. 200% to 15% ramp in turbine power 2,276 psia 20 seconds at end of core life The intent of the werd " average" in Unit 2 LCO 3.2.8 was to account for these brief controlled excursions of pressurizer pressure outside of the normal steady state operating range. This flexibility is required to avoid violations of the LCO during routine changes in plant operation such as those

noted above. The proposed change restores this flexibility. Se provision requiring that the .tutematic pressurizer pressure control system be in cperation and limitations in the period that the upper limit can be exceeded during changes to plant operations provide assurance that pressurizer pressure l

will be maintained within the limits assumed in the accident analyses.

Safety Analysis 2e proposed change discussed above shall be deemed to involve a significant I

hrzards consideration if there is a positive finding in any one of the fo11cwing areas:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Respense: No The purpose of Specification 3.2.8 is to ensure that pressurizer pressure is maintained within the range of initial conditions assumed in the FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analyses (2,000-2,300 psia). D e proposed change t

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continues to provide assurance that pressurizer pressure will be maintained within the analyzed range while providing the required operational flexibility currently afforded by the word " average" in Unit 2 -

LCO 3.2.8. Because the word " average" is subject to a wide range of interpretationsj the current LCO provides significantly less assuranu that pressurizer pressure will be maintained within the specified limits than the proposed change. .

~

We proposed change serves to'diafntain pressurizer pressure within the range assumed as initial conditions in the FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analyses. Werefore, the proposed change does not involve significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously analyzed.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any

. accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change maintains plant operations within the range of initial conditions assumed in the Accident Analyses. The proposed dange does not affect the configuration or operation of the plant. Werefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change

(

involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No me proposed change maintains pressurizer pressure within the range of initial conditions assumed in the Accident Analyses. W erefore, it does not involve a reduction in any margin of safety. .

Safety and Significant Hazards Determination .

Based on the Safety Analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the proposed dange does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFRSO.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not l

result in a conditicn which significantly alters the 1:: pact of the station an the environ =ent as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

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POWER O!5TF.IEUTION LI!!!T5 PRE 55U:.!ZER PRESSURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.E The average pressurizer pressure shall be maintained between 2025 psia and 2275 psia. ,

APPLICAEILITY: MODE 1 ACTION:

With the average pressurizer pressure exceeding its lir.it, restore the pressure to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> er reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THE:M.AL POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.2.8 ine average pressurizer pressure shall be determined to be within its ,

. limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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f I l 1 PCf.CR DISTRIDUTIOt1 LIMITS PRESSURIZER PRESSURE LIMITING cot 1DITIOtt FOR OPERATIOt1 _ 3.2.8 Pressurizer pressure shall be maintained between 2,025 psia and 2,275 psia. Pressurizer pressure may exceed the upper limit for periods of less , than one-half hour provided that the aatomatic pressurizer pressure control eystem is in operation. - - . ' APPLICABILITY: K)DE 1 ACTIOti: With the pressurizer pressure exceeding its limit, restore the pressure to within its limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or reduce THER!RL POWER to less than 5% of RATED TEEA%L POWER within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. SUR7EILIR1CE REQUIREMENTS  ; '4.2.8 - The pressurizer pressure shall be determined to be within its limit at

least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

l ~ l l ce w T: l 1 VPF-10-8a PPF-15-84 Rev. O DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10-84 AND FPF-15-84 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS FACILITY CPERATING LICENSE NPF-10 AND PPF-15 - ~ 'lhis'is a request td revise Section 2.C(5) of Facility Operating L1 cense No. NPF-10 and NPF-15. Existing License Conditions

• Section 2.C(5) Environmental Oualification (Section 3.11 SER, SSER f3, SER f4)

License Condition 2(C)5 is subdivided into 4 parts. Part a. presently states: Unit 2

a. By June 30, 1982, SCE shall be in compliance with the provisions of NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment," Revision 1, dated July 1981, for safety-related . electrical equ.ipment exposed to a harsh environment.

Unit 3 a. Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the facility shall be in compliance with the provisions of NUREG-0588, " Interim Staff Position on Environmental Oualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment, " Revision 1, dated July 1981, for safety-related ~ electrical equipment exposed to a harsh environment. Part b. presently' states: .. Un i t - 2 .

b. Complete and auditable records shall be available and maintained at a central location which describe the environmental qualification method for all safety-related electrical equipment in sufficient detail to document the degree of compliance with NUREG-0588, Revision 1, datec July 1981. Such records shall be updated and maintained current as equipment is replaced, further tested, or otherwise further qualfied to document complete compliance by June 30,1982.

Unit 3

b. Complete and aucitable recorcs shall be available and maintained at a central locaticn which cescribe the environmental qualification status for all safety-related electrical equi ment. Such records

' shall be upcatec arc maintaineo current as ecuipment is replaceo, further testeo, or otherwise further qualified to document complete compliance. r 2 Part c. presently states: Unit 2

c. Prior to exceeding five (5) percent pcwer, SCE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the maintenance program procedures.

Unit 3

c. SCE shall implement and keep in effect at all times the environmental qualification maintenance procedures identified in the SCE letter of August 23, 1982, as modified by the NRC letter of August 30, 1982.

Part d. presently states: Unit 2

d. Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, 3CE shall provide affirmation of implementation of the. improved surveillance program procedures. -

Unit 3

c. Prior to startup folicwing the first refueling outage, SCE shall provide affirmatien of implementation of the improved surveillance and improved maintenance program procedures.

preccsed License Ccncitien License Ccncition 2.C(5) for Units 2 and 3 would be revised to read as follows: (5) Environmental cualification (Section 3.11 SER, SSER!3, SSER!4)

a. Prior to startup following the second refueling outage after l March 31, 1982 or by March 31, 1985, whichever is earlier, the i

facility shall be in compliance with the provisions of 10 CFR l Part 50, Secticn 50.49 for electrical equipment important to safe y exposed to a harsh environment.

b. Complete and auditable records shall be available and maintained wnich describe the environmental qualification status for all electrical ecuipment important to safety presently installed or stored for future use. Such records shall be updated anc maintained current as equipment is replaced, further tested, or otherwise further qualified to _ document complete ccepliance.

c. SCE shall implement and keep in effect at all times environmental cualification maintenance procecures equivalent to those identifiec in the SCE le::cr of August 23, 1982, as mocified by the NRC letter of Augus: 30, 19E2.

. d. Prior to startup following the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982 or by Parch 31, 1985, whichever is earlier, SCE shall provide affirmatien of implementation of the improved surveillance _. and improved maintenance program procedures. Reason for Proposed Change , The purpose of this proposed change is to clarify the environmental qualification program legal commitments for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. The existing environmental qualification License Condition .2.C(5) for Units 2 and 3 does not reflect the NRC's current requirements as stated in 10 CFR 50.a9. Part a. of License Condition 2.C(5) references NUREG-0588 and has an implementation date of June 30, 1982. NUREG n588 was superseded by 10 CFR 50.a9 on February 22, 1983. The equipment cui.ently qualified under NUREG-0588 is still qualified under 10 CFR 50.49. The equipment qualification program must now be in place by the end of the second refueling outage or by March 31,1985, whichever occurs earlier. . Part b. required complete and auditable records be maintained in a central location. 10 CFR 50.49 dropped the central location requirement but records must be available and maintained now for all electrical equipment important to safety installed or stored for future use. This requirement applies equally to that ecuipment which has been qualified and that which is awaiting qualification. SCE currently has complete and auditable records available for Units 2 ano 3 in the General Office. In an effort to further enhance the environmental qualification program, the files are being placed into a standard format and entered into the Corporate Documentation Management system at San Cncfre. Procedures are currently being developed which will update and maintain recorcs at San Onofre as equipment is replaced, further tested or qualified. Part c. recuires implementation of a maintenance program. SCE procedures l which comply with such a program are identified in the SCE letter of August 23, 1982 as modified by the NRC letter of. August 30, 1982. Additional precedures are required for replacement schedules, parts procurement, and installation procedures for parts subject to age related degradation which must be incorporated into the maintenance program prior to February 16, 1984, i Station procecures are currently being revised or written to meet this ! deacline. Part d. requires implementation of an environmental qualification surveillance program to detect age related degradation and any improved maintenance programs precedures recuired by such a surveillance program. These programs must be implemented prior to startup following the second refueling outage or Marcn 31, 1985, whichever is earlier. SCE is currently developing surveillance pecgrcm guicelines. The improved maintenance program will be developed based on the surveillance program recommencations. i . , . .a. The proposed wording for License Condition 2.C(5) will satisfy these requirements. Safety Evaluation The-proposed change discussed above shall be deemed to' involve a significant hazards consideration if positive findings are made in any of the following ~ areas: -

1. . Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The environmental qualification program as previously reviewed by the hRC staff in the November 15, 1982 Safety Evaluation Report of Unit 3 has not changed in content or scope. The potential for extending the L implementation date for full qualification frem the present date of the ' end of the first refueling outage to. >2rch 31, .1985 does. exi st. . Currently the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump' motors are the only pieces of electrical equipnent that are not cualified for a harsh environment. .The addition of a forced lube oil cooling system to the AFW pump motors has been proposed to the NRC staff to qualify the motors. Implementation of this modification is scheduled for the first refueling outage of each unit. If this procesed mcdification is not acceptable to the kRC staff, then-the qualification of the AFW pump motors will possibly be delayed. i SCE will continue to visually inspect the steam line feeding the turbine-driven pump on a daily basis until the AFW pump motors are qualified. - The potential for extending the implementation date for the surveillance program also exists. SCE currently plans to meet the present implementation date of the end of the first refueling outage for each unit. Unforeseen problems in implementing the surveillance program may result in a delay. However, the maintenance procedures described in License Condition 2.C(5)c are considered to be adequate to ensure ecuipment qualification during the interim period. Thus, it is conclucec that there will not be a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any i accident previously evaluated?

Rescense: No The pro;csed change clarifies SCE's legal requirements with rescect to tne environmental qualificaticn program for San Onofre Units 2 and 3. A potential extension of the present imolementation date for full , cualification coes not create the possioility of a new or cifferent kinc cf accident frem any accicent previously evaluatec. , . - . . . - - , _ , , - - - - - - _ - _ . _ _ _ . , ~ , , . . _ , _ _ _ , _ _ . , . - . - - - _ . . , - , , ~ _ - , , _ _ _ . - - - - ~ l .- -5

3. Will the operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No As stated above, the proposed change discussed above will'not involvs a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Safety and Significant Hazards Consideration Determination Based on the Safety Evaluation, it is concluded that: (1)theproposedchange does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92: and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the statien on the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement. O e ,; l' NPF-10-91 ./- ( NPF-15-91 Rev. 0 ,e ._ v DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10-91 AND NPF-15-91 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS . This is a request to revise Technical Specification Section 4.8.1.1.2.d.6, Surveillance Requirement for Diesel Generator Testing, for San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3. DESCRIPTION This revision is requested in accordance with the Generic Letter 83-30, which has brought to our attention an inconsistency between the San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Technical Specifications and the provisions of GDC 17, Regulatory Guide 1.108, and the NRC Standard Review Plans Sections 8.2 & 8.3.1. EXISTING S ECIFICATION I See-Attachment "A" ! F3,CFCSED 5 ECIFICATICN s l See Attachment "E" j SAFETY EVALUATIONS The proposed change discussed above shall be deemed to constitute a significant hazards-consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas.

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: "No" See below

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance wi-h -his pro;: sed

amendment create the possibility of a new or cifferen- kind of j' accident-from any accident previously evaluatec?

Response: "No" See below I l ~ ~2-

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed --

amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? Response: "No" See below . The proposed change is a2ministrative in nature such that it reflects the revised staff position. This proposed change is similar to the example vii, of amendments that are not considered likely to involve significant hazards considerations, of Federal Register Volume 48, NO. 67 published on Wednesday, April 6,1983. _ ._ SAFETY AND SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETERMINATION BasedentheSafetyEvaluation,itiscon$1cdedthat: (1) the proposed change ._ does not constitute a _signi.f.icant hazards censideration as defined by . 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the Station en the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement. 1391u 1 4 Attachment "A" 4 e a@ s l l e em-e g-- - - -- e p- -a w e ev--- v- = y--==-a - ew a =-f~-- - - - ^- ---- -- -- - --em3 . e' , ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) __ , 4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. .In accordance with' the . frequency specified in Table 4.8-1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1. Verifying the foi level in the day fuel tank,

2. Verifying the fuel level in the fuel storage tank,

3. Verifying the fuel transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank,

4. Verifying the diesel starts from ambient condition and accelerates to at least 900 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds. The generator voltage and frequency shall be -

4360-+-436 vo.its and 60 + 1.2 Hz within 10 seconds after - the sIart signal. The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using the manual start signal.

5. Verifying the genera:ce is synchronized, leaded to greater than or equal to 4700 kW in less than or equal to

. 77 see:nds, a-d c;erates with a lead greater than cr equal to 4700 kW for at least an acciti:nal 6C minutes, and

6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to ;-ovide sta-:by powa- to the associated eme gency busses.

b. At least once per 31 days and after each o;eration of the diesel where the period of operation was greater than or e;ual to I hour by che: king for and removing ac:umulated water frc. the day tank.

~

c. A- least once per 92 days and from new fuel cil prict to additien to the storage tanks by verifying that a sample obtained in at::rdance wi-h ASTM-0270-1975 has a water and sediment centen: of less than or e: val to .05 volume percent and a kine .atic viscosity G40*C cf greater than or equal to 1.9 but less than or equal to 4.1 when tested in a:::rdance with ASTM-0975-77, and an im;urity

level of less than 2 mg of insolubles per 100 ml. when tested in a

:ordance with ASTM-02274-70.

d. At leas . once per IS c:nths during shutdown by:

, 1 Subje::frg the diese'. t: an ins;e:-fon in a::: :ance wi.h I pr:ce:.res ;;re:ared in c:njunciten with its mar.#a::u-er's re::m a ca-': s for this class of s andby se v':e.

2. Verifying -he genera cr ca:abili y to ref e:: a 1:ad of

, greater than er e: val to 655.7 kW while main aining v:1:a;e at 4360 436 volts and frequency at 60 2 6.0 H:. 51'. :'. :;E..':7 2 If: 8-3 ELECTRICAL p0WER SYSTEM SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Verifying the generator capability to reject a load of 4700 kW without tripping. The generator voltage shall not .

exceed 5450 volts,during and following the load rejection. A. Simulating a' loss of offsite power by itself, and: a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency busses and 1 cad shedding from the emergency busses. b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energizes the emergency busses with permanently connected loads within 10 seconds and operates for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the permanently connected loads. After energi:ation, the steady state voltage and frequency , of the emergency busses shall be maintained at,, , , , , , 4360 1 436 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz during this test.

5. Verifying that on an ESF test signal (without loss of offsite power) the diesel generator starts en the aute-start signal and c;erates on standby for greater than or equal to

~ 5 mina.es. The steady state ganarator voltage and fre uency - shall be 4360 + 436 volts and 60 + 1.2 H: within 10 se::nds afdr the ano-start signal; the generator voltage and frequen:y shall be maintained within these limits during this test.

6. Verifying that on a si.tulated Icss of t!.e diesel generat:r (with offsite power not available), the loads are shed from the emergency busses and that subsequent loading of the diesel generator is in a::ordance with design requirements.

7. Simulating a less of offsite p:wer in conjunction with an ESF test sigr.al, aad a) Verifying de-energization cf the emergency busses and 7 lead shedding frem the emergency busses.

b) Verifying the diesel starts on the auto-start signal, energt:es the emergency busses with per anently c:nnected Icads within 10 seconds, energizes the auto c:.ne::ed e eegency (ac:fdent) loads through the lead se:cen:e a .c :;erates for greater than er equal to 5 minu es wrile its generator is leaded wi .h the e e gency 1:ats. Af er leading, the s eacy state v:ltage anc fae:vency of the emergency busses shall be . aintainst a: 4260 + 436 vcits anc 60 - 1.2/-0.3 H: caring this test. - ' SAN ONO RE :JN I2 3'a E-a +i=-=r-me< --- *y - M-'- +--y w ---*pr- ELECTRICAL p0WER SYSTEM SUP.VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Centinued)

c. Verifying that all automatic diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, generator differential and -

low-low lube oil pressure, are automa,tically bypassed.

8. Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least -

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 5170 kW and during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to greater than or equal to 4700 kW. The generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained at 4360 + 436 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz within ~ 10 seconds after the start signal; the steady state generator voltage and frequency shall be maintained at 4360 + 436 volts and 60 + 1.2/-0.3 Hz for the first two hours of this test and 4360 + 436 volts and 60 + 1.2 Hz during the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> of this test. Within-5 minutes after - c:mpleting this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test, perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.d.45. S. Verifying that the aute-::nnected loads to each diesel generat:r de n:t ex:end 4700 kW.

10. Verifying the c'iesel gene at:r's et; ability to:

a) Synchr:ri:e with the offsite p:ver scurce while the genera::r is leaded with its e:ergency loads upon a simulated restorati n of offsite p:wer, b) Transfer its leads to the offsite p:wer source, and c) Se rest: red to its standy status.

11. Verifying that with the diesel generator operating in a test m:de (cor.ne :s: :: i ts bus), a simulated safety infection signzi overrices the tes: mcde by (1) returning the diesel generator t: standby operation and (2) aut:matically t

energi:es the emergency 1 cads with Offsite p:wer.

12. Verifying tha each fuel transfer pu : transfers fuel from each fuel st: rage tank :: the day tank of each diesel via the installe: : :ss c:rne::icn lines.

1 I s SAN ONCF;E-."CT 2 3.* 3-E r .. ELECTRICAL FO'**ER SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) __

13. Verifying that the autcmatic load sequence timer is OPERASLE

. with the intervtl between each load block within + 10% of - its design interval.

14. Verifying that lockout relay K23 prevents diesel generater

• starting when the diesel generator is actuated.

e. At least orice per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator interdependence by starting the diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdowa, and verifying that the diesel generators accelerate to at least 900 rpm in less than or equal to 10 secords.

f. At least once per 10 years by:

. 1. Draining each fuel oil storage tank, removing the . . . ._ . . accumulated sedirent and cleaning the tank using a sodium hypechicrite solution or the equivalent, and

2. Performing a pressure test of those portions of the diesel fuel oil system designed to Section III, subsection ND of the ASME Code at a test pressure equal to 110 percent of the system design pressere.

s SAN ON:.:RE-J.',:7 2 3/4 S-5 Attachment "B" 1 I 4 1 l l f 1 Revised Surveillance Requirements for Diesel Generator Testing 4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shal' be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. (No change)

. b. (No change)

c. (No change) .... ,

d. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

._1- ..(No_c,hange) ,

2. (No change)

3. (No change)

4. (Nochange)

5. (No change)

6. Delete Surveillance Requirement which reads:

" Verifying that on a simulated loss of the diesel generater, with offsite power, not available, the loads are shed from the emergency busses and that subsequent loading of the diesel generator is in accordance with design requirements."

6. (Was Item 7 - no change)

7. (Was Item 8 - no change)

8. (Was Item 9 - no change)

9. (Was Item 10 - no change) -

l

10. (Was Item 11 - no change)

11. (Was Item 12 - no change) i 12. (Was Item 13 - no change)

13. (Was Item 14 - no change) j, . e. (No change) j f. (No change) t f-l

l 9 i . DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGES NPF-10-97 AND NPT-lS-97 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3/4.6.4.1 HYDROGEN MONITORS Existina Specifications: Units 2 and 3: See Attachment "A" ' Proposed SDecifications: Units 2 and 3: See Attachment '8"

Description:

Southern California Edison Company's (SCE) letter dated September 2, 1983 described actions which were being taken to reduce the length of time the calibration gas containment isolation valves are open for hydrogen (H2) monitor calibration. Specification 4.6.4.1 currently requires the use of 1%

and 4% concentration H2 gases. In addition, the manufacturer reconnends the use of a zero percent gas to determine the zero yoint which is indicative of---

sensor condition and SCE also uses a 10% H2 gas. SCE requested manufacturer (General Electric) assistance in an effort to reduce the calibration time, thereby improving maintenance of containment integrity. The vendor has stated that the sensor is inherently linear and that only a 0% H2 gas and one other on scale concentration of hydrogen gas (e.g., 4%) need be used for l calibration. The proposed change requests the substitution of a 0% H2 gas for the current 1% H2 gas listed in Specification 4.6.2.1 This will enable

- SCE to eliminate the use of the 1% H2 gas from the calibration. The elimination of the 1% and 10% H2 calibration gases will result in a l

significant reduction in the length of time the containment isolation valves j

are required to be open.

The proposed change revises the ACTION to Specification 3.6.4.1 to allow operation with two H2 monitort inoperable for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> and requests an exception to Specification 3.0.4'with one monitor inoperable. The addition of an ACTION which addresses the inoperability of two monitors is censistent with ACTION 21 for all other accident monitoring instrumentation covered by l Specification 3.3.3.6. This would avoid an unnecessary shutdown in accordance l with Specific.ation 3.0.3 because the Technical Specifications fail to address l the case of both H2 monitors being found inoperable.

4

r-

-2 The proposed ' change requests an exception from Specificatior 3.0.4 when one Fp rronitor is inoperable. The current ACTION allows continued operaticn fcr up to thirty days if a P2 monitor had been discovered to be inoperable ircediately after entry into NODE 1. Without a 3.0.4 exception, the same _.

l incperability discovered while in NODE 2 would prevent entry into N00E I and continued operation. While this may provide some infinitesimal reduction in risk, the benefit of this is unclear when compared with the costs of -

interruptions of plant operation. Additionally, the hydrogen monitors serve no operating function in the plant. Their sole function is to assist the operator in deciding whether or not the hydrogen recombiners should be started in the ur.likely event that an accident: occurs. The hydrogen monitors are not the sole source of this information. The Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) also will provide H2 concentration information in sufficient time relative to the design bares hydrogen buildup to allow the operator to make decisions regarding operation of.the hydrogen recombiners.

Safety Analysis The proposed change discussed above shall be deemcd to involve a significant ha:ards consideration if there is'a positive finding in any one of the following areas:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an acticent previously evaluated?

Response: No The hydrogen monitors do not serve a function relating to plant operaticn and are not initiators of any accident previously evaluated. The H2 menitors do contribute to post accident decision. making regarding initiation of the Hg recombiners. However, as noted above, the PASS can also provide this information. The proposed change to the surveillance requirements ensure instrument operability in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. This allows a decrease in the length of time the calibration gas containment isolation . valves must be open, thereby enhancing containment integrity. Because the same level of

, instrument operability is preserved by the proposed change, theri e is no l

impact on the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

2. .Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The hydrogen monitors do not perform a functional role in plant oceration. The procesed change relates only to the hydrogen mcniters anc oces net affect tne configuraticn of the plant or its operation.

Therefc. a, the propcsec cnange dces not create the possibility of a new Or different kinc of ac:icent frem any previously evaluatec.

. , . . - . . , . . - , . , . . . - - , ,. - . . . -. . - . ~ , - - , , - . . . . , , , . . . - . . - . . . _ - - - - . - . - . - - .

3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No -

The hydrogen monitors are not related to any margins of safety. The ,

proposed change concerns only the hydrogen monitors and therefc e does -

not reduce any safety margin.-

Safety and Significant' Hazards Detirmination Based on the Safety Analysis, it is oncluded that: (1 does not involve a significant hazards consideration as) defined bythe proposed ch,a 10 CFR 50.92; and (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the hRC Final Environmental Statement.

t O

O 9

i

~

i

~ .

ATTACHMENT "A" l -

1 i

, . , . . - - . . - - - - , - . , . , , , , ~ , , - . - - . . . , , - . . _ - - . - , _ .

[. CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

_3 / * . 5. A CO'dEUSTIEL- GA5 CONTROL HYDRCGEN MCN!TCR5

_ LIMITING CONDITION FOR GrERATION 8 3.6.4.1

. Two-independent containment hycregen monitors shall be 0.eeKA2LE .

APPLICAEILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION: .

With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable acnite status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hcu .

_ SURVEILLANCE RECUIREMENTS

• 4.6.4.1 cf a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once S2 days san;:le gaseson a STAGGERED TEST EASIS, by perfer=ing a CHANN centaining:

a.

i One vc1cce percent Jiydregen, balance nitrogen, and b.

Fcur volume per: ,z hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

l l

l l

l -

1 l

l l

SAN ChCFRE-UNIT 2 2/4 6-25 * '

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

_3/4.6.4 CCMEUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL -

HYOROGEN MONITORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

3. 6.'4.1 =

Two' independent con. tainment hydro. gen monitors sh.d11..be OPE APPLICABILITY: ? MODES 1 and 2. ~

ACTION: .

'. .-. i.

With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, resto're the inoperable sonitor to OPERA 3 status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STAND 8Y within the next 6 hcurs.

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SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen mor. iter shall be demenstrated OPERABLE by the perfor=ance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and, at least once per 92 daysgases sample on a STAGGERED containing: TEST BASIS, by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION usin -

a. One volume percent hydrogen, balance 'rif trogen, and, , , .

b. 'Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen;

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f NC','15IE2 SAN ONCFRE-UNIT 3

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ATTACRMENT "B"

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. ab.' CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 5 3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL ,

HYOROGEN MONITORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY _: MODES 1 and 2. . .

ACTION:

a. With one hydrogen monitor inop'erable, restore the ir. operable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the '

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b. With two hydrogen monitors inoperable, restore at least one hydrogen monitor to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

c. With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. The performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and L

b. At least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using the following sample gases:

1) Nitrogen, and ii) Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

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N F-10-98 NPF-15-98 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-10/15-98 AND SAFETY f. VALUATION This is a request to revise License Conditions 2.C(14)a and 2.C(12)a, Fire .

Protection, of Facility Operating Licenses NPF-10 and NPF-15, respectively.

~

-F.xisting License Conditions

' ~

Unit 2 . . * ~ 7.

2.C (14) Fire Protection (Section 9.571, SFR, SSER 94, SSER 95, Section 1.12,

~~

SSER #5)

, a. SCE shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions

- of the approved Fire Protection Plan as amended through

.Anendment 10 and tne NRC staff's Fire Protection Review

- . described in the SER and Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER.

. ..C it 3

~

~

2.C (12) Fire' Protection (Section 9.5.1, SER, SSER $4, SSER 95, Section 1.12, ,, , , ,

SSER v5 ) ,

I

a. SCI shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisicas of the approved Fire Protection Plan as amended through A.endment 11 and the NRC staff's Fire Protection Review described in the SIR, Supplements 4 and 5 to the SER,,and in the Safety Evaluation issued with this license. In addition, SCI shall meet the technical requirements of Section III.G, " Fire

• Protection of liafe Shutdown Capability,* III:J-*Bnergency -

l Lighting,' and III.0 " Oil Collection Syste:n for Beactor Cociant j - P=p" of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.

P ::esed Licea.se Conditions Units 2 and 3 i Add the following sentence to each units existing license condition:

"Cnly those deviations' from the Fire Protection Plan that violate the requirements of Section III.G, III.J, and III.O of AppendLZ R to 10 CFR

! -SO and are not otherwise subject to Tect.nical Specification Limiting Conditions for operation shall be reported in accordance with License Condition 2.G.*

Reasen for Preccsed C.ange b.e purpcse of this proposed change is to clarify the inconsistent and l redundant reperting rgirements of San Oncfre Uni s 2 and 3 Licea.se C:ndi ica 2.G as it pertains to the Fire Pr0:ec' ion License Conditions 2.C.{14) of Cai:

2 Licea.se NPF-10 and 2.C.(12) of Unit 3 License NPF-15.

- - , , . _ _ . . , . . _ . - . ~ , ,,,__._.m.___.,__L_._____,_.,_._.___._,,_,.__._,____ ,, , .

2 --

Technical Specification Limiting conditions for Operation (LCD) 3.3.3.7, 3.7.2.1, 3.7.8.2, 3.7.8.3, and 3.7.9, as well as their associated Action

.staterents and surveillance Requirerents are intended to ensure that fire detection and protection systens associated with safety related equipent are raintained in a condition to perform their intended function or that 7 ~

cc:pensatory measures are indeed in place. Violation of these Te&nical Specifications is reportable under existing Technical Specification resorting requirements as well as 10 CFR 50.73 which will beccrae effective January 1, 1984. .. . _ ..

..m

- .s.

The provisions of the Fire Bazards Analysis were implemented by virtue of . ..

design and construction under an approved and effective Quality Assurance -. '

program. they are raintained in effect by cor:pliance with sw&nical - - - - - -

specification Limiting Conditions for Operation and failure to do so is detected by ccepletion of the associated Surveillance Requirements.

Southern California Edison does not believe it is the intent of License Condition 2.G to require the reporting of isolated instances of failure or

• degradation of fire rated asserblies or other provisions of the Fire Bazards Analysis as a violation of the License Condition on fire protection. Clearly, such minor deviations from the Fire Bazards Analysis are not significant -

-- events regairing irrediate notification where Cornission action may be required to protect the public health and safety, and requiring sud reporting is incensistent with current NP.C rule changes intended to reduce the t ad:-inistra:ive burden on licensees of reporting insignificant events having little or ne i.: pact on public health and safety. (Ref. FR-Vol. 48, No.

44/ July 26, 1983) ,

I. ple entatien of redifications to ccrply with the provisions of Section III.G, III.J, and III.O of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 were accepted by the NRC staff as satisfying the provisions of Appendix A to' Branch Tednical Positim E3.UCS3 9.5-1 and reflected in the staff fire protection safety evaluation reports issued concurrent with the San onofre units 2 and 3 operating License. . Sections III.J and III.O of Appendix R are not explicitly addressed by Te nical Specification Limiting Conditions for operation, however, Secticn III.G, ' Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," is indirectly addressed by the Tednical Specification LCO's in that all fire detection and suppressien measures provided in both Units 2 and 3,by design,are intended for the protection of all safety related equipment required to prevent or aitigate the consequences of an accident.

Thus, the failure or absence of fire retardant cable wrapping on a small

. section of the miles of cable routing, or the degradation of a few of the sery l thousand fire barrier penetration seals existing in the units is recognized by Techr.f cal -Scecifications. c:mpensatory measures required to be in place within ene hcur of defect discovery adequately preserves the fire detec:icn and protec.icn intended for all safety related equipent, including that required fer safe shutdown of the unit. Informing NRC within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by telephene, ccnfi. ing by telegram, Irailgram, or facsimile trans rission no la:er than the first working day af:er discovery of such minor deviation and providing a written fellow-up report within 14 days, as required by License C ndi:icn -'.G, is incer.sistent with Tednical Specifications that currently requi:e caly a 30 day written repcrt for such occurrences and whid will ricin r.e wpet. at all after 10 m $0.73 bec::mes effe-.iae on January 1, 1984.

,c .. ..

In surraary, SCE requests that the reporting requirements of License Condition 2.G be clarified in regard to the reporting of minor deviations froc the Fire Eazards Analysis by the addition of the proposed statement to the Fire Protection License Conditions as indicated above. _

Safety Evaluation Se proposed change discussed above shall be deemed to involve'a significant hazards consideration if positive findings are made in any of.the following

• areas: . -

t w. .

3 l

. 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change

-involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences bf an accident previously evaluated? ' ..

Response: No me proposed change does not a'ffect the accident analysis or 5tchnical Specification requirements. .

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change T..'. .~ create the possibility of a new or different kind of, accident from any j accident previously evaluated?

Res:ense: No Se preposed change clarifies SCI':: requirements with respect to the Fire l Fratec: on Plan for San Oncfre Unit 2 and 3. Bis clarification does at:t I

c eate the possibility of a new or different kind of accident frc::: any accident previously evaluated.

3. Will the operation of the facility in accoroance with this proposed l

change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Resoonse: No ,.

i As stated above, the proposed change discussed above will not involve a l eignificant reduction in a margin of safety.

l Oe proposed clarification of the License condition is similar to exa:7 1e l- (i)-of aranc:ents not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration pdlished in 48 FR 14864 dated April 6,1983 in that it is essentially at::inistrative in nature.

Safety and Sicnificant Ea::ards Consideratica Determination l

Based on the safety Daluation, it is concluded that: (1) the proposef change does not constitute a significan hazards censideration as defined by 10 CF3 l

50.92; and (2) there is reascnable assurance that the health and safety of the .

pehlic will not be endancered by tne proposed change; and (3) this action will l nct result in a ecndition whicn signi:icantly alters the it: pact of the staticn  ;

en the environment as described in the NRC r.virormental Statement.  !

l G?t:::2046u )

l __ _._ _ ____ _ _ _ ___ _._ .. _ ._ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _._ ._ _ ___

DECRIPTION Of PROPOSED CHANGES NPF-10-144 AND NPF-15-144 AND SAFETY ANALYSIS This is a request to revise Technical Specification 3.6.1.7. CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM. -

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Existino Specification --

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Prcoosed SDecification .,. ;.,.y.f . ' .- - $ -.;,. y ,rd-; e ,

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Units 2 and 3: _See Attachment 8. .,

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- Specification 3.6.1.7 currently limits operation df .the 8-tach _ containment ;.t'sc.r.'./. .

- " purge system to -1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> per G65 daysr -The San .Onofre 2/3 Safety '.90.a6. . +.V.iv ' - -

Evaluation Report ( Attachment C) indicates that Edison requested the original m -

90 hour0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> limit be extended to continuous operation. ?In the absence of plant - - -

operating data, a limit of.1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> was agreed upon. ., .y

_ Due to unexpectedly high nobe 1' gas activity levels in the Onit 3 containment '

l building a,t 100% power, it has been necessary to operate the 8-inch purge system routinely to avoid allowing containment activity levels from exceeding l the purge activity limit. If the purge activity limit were exceeded, no purging could be performed until the plant was shut down and activity levels had decayed to an acceptable level. On the basis of plant operating .. . .

l experience..the purge time limit needs to be expanded to 3,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> per 365 -

L days. All releases will continue to be governed by the offsite Dose

! Calculation Manual and Technical Specifications 3.11.2.1, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.2.3.

j Sa'etv Analvsis .

The proposed change discussed above s' hall be deemed to involve a significant l ha:ards consideration if there is a positive finding in any one of the folicwing areas:

1. Will the operaton of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or

- consequences of an accident previously evaluatedT Response: No. .

I i

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The proposed change increases the time limitation on the use ef the  ;

8-inch containment mini purge system from 1,000 to 3,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> per '

365 days. The operability requirements for the purge isolation valves and actuation system covered by Technical Specifications 3.6.1.7, 3.6.3 and 3.3.2 are unaf fected by the proposed change. The

. design of the mini purge s'ystem satisfies the guideline of BTP CSB 6-4. In accordance with BTP CSB 6-4, the mini purge isolation '

valves are assumed to be open in the event of a t.0CA. Therefore. - -

the increase in the 1,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> limitation .does ,not affect the probability or consequences of this or any other previously .r-evaluated accident. ' . ...Li.y-  ! E* '

'Y.

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2. 'Will operation of the facility in accordance with this' prop'soed .

~

change create the possi.bility of a new or.different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? .j . p . - .

- : . . . ~ . .. . ..

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Response:'[No.,: 2

. .,, ,, y. ... ,

- Extending the number of allowable purge hours per year does not . -

involve any evolution which is not currentiv oerforme,d. j,. .

3. W111 operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed - -

change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? -N-Response: .No.~

]

i Extending the number of allcwable purge hours per year does not .

place the plant in a different configuration than that which is

! currently utilized routinely.

48 FR 14870 dated April 6,1983 provided examples of amendments not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration. This proposed change is considered to be most similar to example (iv) in that it involves relief from l

l an operating restriction which was imposed prior to licensing because l justification for the relief based on plant operating experience did not exist at that time.

Safety and Sionificant Hazards Det'ermination l

Based on the Safety Analysis, it is concluded that : (1) the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public wil? not be endangered by the proposed change; and, (3) this action l

^

will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the ,

Station en the environment as described in the NRC Final Environmental Statement.

P hith:0577F

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. CC'4 TAI?NENI SYSIEMS c: cs WENT VENTILc:CN SYSTEM .,

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3.5.1.7 Centain snt purge supply and exhaust isolation alves:'sh'll be CFEP.A5LE and:

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2.

a. Each 42-inch centainment purge supply and exhaust .isolatien valve .

.shall be sealed closed.

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b. Eac'h E-inch containment purge supply and exhaust , isolation. valve' -'

- . .may be open for less than or equal to 1000. hours per 365. days. ..

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APPLICASILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. -

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a. With the 42-inch centainmer.t purge supply 'and/or exhaust ,isciation . '.

.._ valve (s) cpen or not sealed c1csed,.or with the E inch p" urge st; ply .. ~

' and/or exhaust isolation valve (s) open.'for.'more'~than' 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> per Y 9 . ;

. . . - . 355 days, close und/cr -seal closed the 'openivalv'e(s) 'within .6ne'.heu'n i,- 7'5.- '.-.i '

or be in at least HOT STANOEY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD .' '

SHUTCOWN withir. the folicwing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.' .. . .

- ' .; L - .

b. With a 42-inch er E-inch centainment purge supply and/or exhaust '

l isciatica valve having a measured leakage rate exceeding the Ifmits '

cf SurveiTlance Rec.uirement 4.6.1.7.3, restore the.incperable  :

valve (s) to ORERAELE status within 24 hcurs or be in at least HCT STANDEY within the next 6 hcurs ar.d in COLD SHUIDOWN within the

~ '

felicwing 30 bcurs. .

.; , ,j_, H, SURVEILLANCE REGUIREMENTS

4. 5.1. 7.1 The 42-inch centainment purge su; ply and exhaust isciaticn valves snali be verified sealed ciesed at,1 east once per 31 days.

4. 6.1. 7. 2 The et=ulu.ive st=e that th" 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isclatica valves are bpen during the past 355 days shall be data =ined at l

1 east ence per 7 days.

4.5.1.7.3 At least once per 3 =enths ea:5 42 inch and each 8 inch pur;e su:cly and exnaust isolatica valve with resilient :.:sterial semis shall be camer. strate: 0.:E:: ELE ty verifying tnat the measurad leakage rate is less than ,

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c. e ual te O.C5 L,. when pressuri:ed te Pa.

MM i 61.c5 3/4 5-12 - AMENCMI.'J E 16 san C.nC. c.E-un:7 2

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ATTACHMENT B

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. COSTAI' MENT SYSTEMS '

c u;.:;w!NT VENT; W :CN SYSTEM .\-

,.,h4 L;".IT.r:3 C CITICN F0E OPE?.ATION

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3.5.1.7 C:ntainment purge supply and exhaust isolation alve{:y. i te OPERm! ~

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ar.d: - - . .

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a. Each 42-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve . ,

shall be sealed closad. . ..

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Each 8-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valve . 3 -

b. .e

• may be open for less than or equal to '3000 hcurs'per 365 ' days. . .

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APPLICAEILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. .'.Q. .-.f 5. .P .gu.2..?.f!.

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a. With the 42-inch containment purge ' supply'and/or.' exhaust. isolation ... .

0"

'. valve (s) c' pen or not sealed c1csed..or with the,E , inch purge 'se; ply c : *s.. ,

'- and/or. exhaust isolation valve (s) open for more ,than 3000 hours0.0347 days <br />0.833 hours <br />0.00496 weeks <br />0.00114 months <br /> per 4 l

~ - '

- 355. days, N 'close Ynd/or seaf ' closed the%eii valve (s) 'withi,n one.ho.u.r.4. - '1'.-. .?. .>

cr be in at least HOT STAN05Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 'and ,in COLD . . ' ,,

SHUTOOWN within the fc11cwing 30 heurt., .', F.$ .:; t , ,

'- .;i. .., . .

b. With a 42-inch or S-inch containment purge supply and/or exhaust is: latten valve having a =casured leakage rate exceeding the lini:s cf Surveillance Recu.irement A.6.1.7.3, restore the inoperable

! valve (s) te OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT i STANDEY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDO*n?i ' "' within the f:11cwing 30 hcurs. . ,.- . -

! SUEVE*LLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

l A.5.1.7.1 The 42-inch centainment purge supply and exhaust isciatien valves

'stail be verified sealed c1csed at,least once per 31 days.

l 4.5.1.7.2 The cumulative ti=e that the 8-inch purge supply and exhaust isolatic . valves are 'open during the past 365 days shall be deta ..ined at l 1 east cace per 7 days.

2.5.1.7.3 At least once per 3 menths ea:h 42 inch and each 8 inch purge L s :::iv a .d exhaust isciation valve witn resiliea saterizi seals shall be ceneis . a a: OPERAE'_E by verifying that the sensured leakage rate is less :. tan er e:ual :: 0.05 t... when pressuri:ed : 7. a Mf 16 M3 ..

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6 EN31NEEkED SAFETY FEATURES .. __

6.2 containment Systems ,

6.2.4 Containment Isolation System

'". 'I 6.2.4.5 Containment Purce System . . ..

\.

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In the SER we noted that there are two purge systems'in San' Onofre 2 and 3; the :

large-volume purge system with 42-inch lines and the'aini purge 'syste's"with .j.. ,: ' ..

8-inch lines. The mini purge system was incorporated into the San Onofre'2 and .-

l 3 design to preclude the need for using the large-voldme 'p' urge systed'during .- .. t L operating modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Power Operation, StartupFHot Standby,2and, Hot Shutdown, respectively).' . Technical Specification 16.3/4 6.5 prohibits. purging ~- . -

"through the large-velume' purge syC.em during operating modes '1/ 2/3 and 4. g. s '.. ,-

l ' '- - -

~....f'.g.h.":-L..&,;.%i.i.Qn.3.~

The mini purge ' supply 'and exhaust ' valves satisfy the operabilityicriteria of : . . . .

' Branch Technical Positiert (BTP) CSB 6-4; therefore, these yk1ves 'can be relied .!(1 W .

- on to close'fpliosing a t0CA.--Also', the closure time of the mini puigisystes" .

isolation valves satisfies the guidelines of BTP CSB 6-4.'.Further evaluation - '

cf the cperability and closure time of the mini purge valves is contained in .-

~

t Subsection II.E.4.2 of. Secticn 22 of. Supplement No. '1 to the Safety Evaluation "

' ~

Report. ,

~

After SER Supplement No. I was issued, the applicantslubmitted a request for a -

change in the Technical Specifications to increase the time limitation on .

purging and venting using the mini purge system, from 90 hcurs to continuous.

The applicants identif.ied the need to maintain activity levels within the con- .

tainment atmosphere sufficiently low to permit personnel access to system ccmponents inside containment for inspection and , maintenance. Although the .

applicants' rationale for exceeding 90 hcurs is reasonable, authorization for

'centinuous use of the mini purge system is not warranted without further justi-ficatien based on plant operating experience. We have discussed this matter with the applicants, and the applicants have agreed to limit mini purge system cperation to 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> per year, per reactor unit, during the ncr=al plant operating medes of startup, pcwer operaticn, hot stand:y, and hot shutdewn. In the cold shutd'cwn and refueling medes, all purging and venting lines may be used simultaneously and without time limitation. We will include these limita-tiens in the Technical Specifications.

Easad on our review, we conclude that the San Onofre 2 and 3 containment iscla-tien systam design c:nfor=s to General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56 and 57, and that the previsions of Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 have been s'atisfied. ~ We c:n-sider this item to be resolved.

l San Oncfra 2/2 55EK!4 6-1 , . ,

wo l

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