ML20245D135
| ML20245D135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1987 |
| From: | Liza Cunningham Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Matthews D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244D847 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8801040053 | |
| Download: ML20245D135 (26) | |
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MEMORANDUM FOR: David B. Matthews, Chief Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: , LeMoine J. Cunningham, Chief Radiation Protection Branch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM: RADIATION PROTECTION In response to your request, enclosed is a radiation protection fact sheet for Pilgrim, as well as responses to a few potential questions regarding Pilgrira (Enclosures 1 and 2, respectively).
eMoine J. Cun(inaham. 'ef p_RadiationProtectionBranch Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Contact:
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ENCLOSURE 1 PILGRIM FACT SHEET: RADIATION FROTECTION
- 1. In terms of exposure of members of the general public, Pilgrim ranks 10th highest among U.S. plants. This is based on a population dose of 94 person-rem accumulated over the years 1975 through 1983 (the latest year forwhichthisinformationisavailable). Exposure of individual members of the public have been within the technical specification (TS) limits.
In the 1970s, the TS limits became more stringent. The present TS limits are the dose design objectives of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 1, which are 100 times less than the public health and safety limits in 10 CFR 20.
- 2. In terms of exposure of workers, Pilgrim has the highest " cumulative average exposure" of any plant in the U.S. Occupational exposure at Pilgrim has averaged (over the years 1973 through 1986) about 1670 person-rems /yr, compared with the BWR industry average of about 830 person-rems /yr. (The PWR industry average is about 500 person-rems /yr.)
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l ENCLOSURE 2 0;estion #1 be studies have shown that certain communities surrounding Pilgrim have cancer rates two to three times the average U.S. rates. Could this be due to Pilgrim?
Response
It is very unlikely that such an increase in cancer rates could be due to Pilgrim for several reasons. First, the radioactive materials released from Pilgrim result in exposures to humans similar to that from nature. Low levels of natural radiation are all around us. Natural radiation (measured in milli-rems per year and abbreviated as mrems/yr) is typically about 100 mrems/yr in the U.S., although it varies from about 70 to about 300 mrems/yr, depending on the location in the U.S. It is important to note that, when exposure to radia-tion is quantified in units of millirems (or rems), there are no differences in the health risks associated with a given amount of radiation, be it natural or man-made. Natural radioactivity is in the air we breathe and the food we eat and drink. For example, the amount of radiation received by humans from potas-sium-40, a natural radioactive material in the body, is about 20 mrems/yr.
Even though human beings have always been exposed to natural radiation, there is no evidence that such exposure has significantly affected human health. The dose to a maximally exposed member of the public near Pilgrim is estimated to be less than 10 mrems/yr. This exposure is a small fraction of exposure to natural background radiation.
Second, even assuming that there is some increased risk due to exposure to low levels of ionizing radiation, any increase in cancer rates would be so small as to be undetectable. This conclusion is based on widely accepted scientific reports, such as those compiled by the National Academy of Science's Advisory Conmittee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. This conclusion is consistent with the recommendations of recognized radiation-protection organizations, such as the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
Question f2 Could the above average cancer rates be due to exposure of workers?
Response
Exposure of workers must be kept within the limits of HRC regulations. While worker exposures at Pilgrim have been high compared with other plants in the U.S., it is still unlikely that this would result in a detectable increase in cancer rates. This conclusion is based on widely accepted scientific reports, such as those compiled by the National Academy of Science's Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation. This conclusion is consistent with the recommendations of recognized radiation-protection organizations, such as the National Council on Rediation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).
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'4 EDO HIGHLIGHTS i PD I-3 DECEMBER 29, 1987 Pilarim - Activities Update 12/?9/87 BEco completed the containment ILRT on December 94, 1987.
In a letter dated December 18, 1987, Senator Kennedy requested NRC to partici-pate in a Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee hearing in Plymouth on the evening of January 7,1988, concerning the proposed restart of Pilgrim. An NRC staff meeting with Kennedy staffers is expected on December 30, 1987
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<I' JANUARY 1988 OVERVIEW REPORT PLANT NAME: PILGRIM PROJECT MANAGER: D.G. MCDONALD MONTHLY OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW FOR JANUARY 1988 The plant continues to be down for an extended outage for refueling, resolution of equipment and operational difficulties, management issues and emergency planning concerns. Restart readiness expected the first part of March.
Monthly Licensing Action Sumary:
TRIPS THIS MONTH 0 TRIPS LAST 12 MONTHS 0 NUMBER OF REPORTABLE EVENTS 2 LICENSING ACTIONS TYPE CATEGORY 1 CATEGOPY ? CATEGORY 3 TOTAL Licensing Actions Opened in 01/88 0 1 0 1 (Projected Categories)
Licensina Actions Closed in 01/88 0 0 2 2 Licensing Actions in Progress 0 0 0 7 ~
January 31, 1988 Licensing Actions Returned (Cat 1) in 01/88 0 For Applications received prior to 9/4/87 Number under review by PM 0 Number reviewed and completed by PM 1 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES AND EVENTS Significant Activities During January 1988 On January 7,1988, Senator Kennedy, a.; Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, held hearings regarding the restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. These hearings were held in the Plymouth High School before a crowd of about 500 individuals. Senator Kennedy received testimony from the following panels and individuals:
-Leaders of local citizens groups
-Massachusetts and local elected officials
-Massachusetts Lt. Governor and Attorney General
-Commonwealth Emergency Planning and Dublic Health Officials
-NRC and FEMA The Major issues of the hearing concerned emergency preparedness in the Pilgrim area, public health issues in the Pilgrim area, the adequacy of the Mark I Containment at Pilgrim and desires to hold formal adjudicatory hearings.
The licensee has requested the staff to defer a planned inspection of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), scheduled for the week of February 8, 1988. BEco requests a deferral until the week of March 7, 1988 while they complete training and documentation necessary for them to be ready for staff review. Resolution of E0P issues may impact BECO's readiness to restart Pilgrim. The staff plans to defer scheduling completion of the E0P review effort until BECo readiness in this area becomes more clear.
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' The first public meeting to hear public comments on the Pilgrim Restart Plan has been scheduled for February 18, 1988 in Plymouth, Massachusetts. Region I
, is coordinating arrangements with the Plymouth Board of Selectmen.
Based on the recommendation of the Pilgrim Restart Panel, a Task Force has been established for the purpose of completing the review of the licensee's Restart Plan, developing the team inspection plan and developing a formal outline for the Readiness Report. L. Doerflein is the Task Force leader and F. Akstulewicz is the NRR participant.
The staff is having internal meetings discussing the Direct Torus Vent options for Pilgrim. A recommended option will be provided to Senior Manaaement in .
mid-Februa ry.
By letter dated January 7, 1988, the licensee provided details of their organizational changes. An amendment reouest to incorporate the changes will be submitted in accordance with Section 6.2.C of the Pilgrim Technical Specifications.
Events None Significant Meetings Scheduled Durina January 1988 (NRR, Region,etc.)
The Pilgrim Restart Assessment Panel will meet at the site on February 17, 1988 to discuss staff coordination of technical reviews and inspections.
NRR Staff will hold a public meeting to hear public comments on the Pilgrim Restart Plan or February 18, 1988 in Pivmouth.
Items for Management Attention Unanticipated demands on Projects staff (Delay in E0P site visit and delays in the fire protection activities) coupled with loss of 0. Gormley as Project Engineer and not being able to fill the vacancy have impacted completion of Pilgrim licensing actions. I? licensing actions recuire completion prior to Restart.
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.s Status of Items Previously Identified for Management Attention G. Requa, Project Engineer from PDII-1, continues to be loaned on a part-time basis to the Pilgrim Project team to assist with the licensing workloed.
Dan MacDonald is designated as the new Pilgrim PM. He will assume responsibilities for Pilgrim on January 18, 1988.
Next Scheduled Refueling Outaae February 1989 cc: D. Mcdonald PDI-3 R/F M. Rushbrook V. Rooney E. Adensam i
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, 07_t. - enq enan9W iueuc reMn to rne % noun. Alan \f NTOL STATUS Dcd CoolMI'q g g%
1}l26177 i/4/ d LICENSEE COMMISSION .
ACTION BRIEFING RESTART PLANT SHUTDOWN PLAN NRR SER ING DECISION PILGRIM 04/12/86 10/26/87C 02/29/88E 03/11/88E 3/25/BSE
%e COMMENTS: RCS HYDRO WAS COMPLETED DECEMBER 10, 1987 AND THE ILRT G a . M'"'.;';-
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BECO IS FORECASTING COMPLETION OF MOST OUTAGE ACTIVITIES BY JANUARY 23, 1988. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER EVENT (11/12/87) AND STOP WORK ACTION (11/09/87) DELAYED COMPLETION OF ONSITE ACTIVITIES. CRITICAL PATH AREAS INCLUDE FIRE PROTECTION AND SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM MODIFICATIONS.
BECO PLANS SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. REALIGNMENT IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE LINE FUNCTIONS REPORTING TO SENIOR VP NUCLEAR AND REALIGN STATION ORGANIZATION.
Me w s. li t y, 6. Lew INITIALREVIEWOFBE[RESTARThLANISINPR ESS AND I EXPECTED TO TAKE UNTIL199-WenlAfW.. LOCAL MEETINGS RECEIVE PUBLIC COMMENTS ON RESTART PLAN ARE PLANNED FOR49980RNURR : INTEGRATED TEAM
' ASSESSMENT OF UTILITY READINESS IS PLANNED FOR FEBRUARY 1988.
RESOLUTION OF 0FFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ISSUES EXPECTED TO BE A MAJOR ISSUE. COMPLETION OF IMPROVED LOCAL PLANS IS NOT EXPECTED BEFORE 1/31/88. SUBMITTAL DATE OF COMMONWEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANS TO FEMA IS UNKNOWN. BECO REQUESTED AN EXEMPTION FROM THE '
. BIENNIAL EP EXERCISE (REQUIRED BY 12/31/87) AND STAFF GRANTED EXEMPTION DECEMBER 9, 1987.
- IN A LETTER DATED DECEMBER 18, 1987 SENATOR KENNEDY REQUESTED NRC I TO PARTICIPATE IN A SENATE LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES Co mITTEE HEARING IN PLYMOUTH ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 7, 1988, CONCERNING THE PROPOSED RESTART OF PILGRIM. AN NRC STAFF MEETING WUH KENNEDY-STAFFERS !! C"";"T~^ ON DECEMBER 0, 1987. E . ,.
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.- FAC3IMILE REQgg3T Date 53 h A) b$
MESSAGE TO: Cicb V >ss4n uppt /PD13 j
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1 TELECOPY NUMBER: 8-9%'- 76B NUMBER.OF PAGES: .IO 2CLUD DG TEIs REQUEST roRM MESSAGE FROM: key [ [K kt a e'6her-L' . S . N . R . c . RECToN I KDC OF FRUSSIA. FENNA.
TRAN5MITTED BY:
DATE & TDE:
VERIFIED BY:
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t.1 What specific actions / steps will NRC take proir to sutheri?ing restart?
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The specific steps in authorizing restart will bet i
1.
Condvet Peb11e meetings in the Plymouth area to solicit comments and cuoueios un thw Rn teri Plan fron the general publice anc present tr.e resolution of those commments and eeneernsg;,(- MPp d' g+
2 Coriplete review of the BECn Restart Plane including resolution of commen*.s endconcernse7::t:0t;,b;.;;;;;,[fromtheCommonwealthandBoarcsof Selectmen within the EPZ.
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- 3. tenduct a Restart Readiness Assessments to include an Integrated Team Inspection of the facility readiness, In general terms, we will be lock *.ng fort a) A stable and eff ee+,1ve management team at the plant, t- ) Managements licensed Senior Reactor Operator, and lacensed Revutor Operator positioris at the plant are filled with e,valified individuals.
e) The work backlog is. Under control, and a system is in place to track the backle3 d) Solid and continuing improvements have been made in long-standing problen arest such as radiation protectione fire protection, and security, c) Bostor. Cdison to be developing its vwn internal high standards of P e r f o r tu erice r and the seant for critien1 self-analysis relettve to those standards.
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NRC utlle of coVrace ter.ti*Ue its detailed inspections wf metty ayecific issuww w i th ire these general eress.
- 4. Complete those reviews necessary to assure that solid improvements have been made in the offsite emergency planning weaknesses.
- 3. Conduct a public meetiris with State Senator Wi".liam Gelden and other petitioners, (if they depire such a swvtany) Lu address their concerns.
- 4. Conduct a full Commission meeting at which restart authorization would be considered.
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'88 07834 NRC KING OF PRUSSIA PO4 e i
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69 %& 1 Expected questions; 3 q
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E.2 How does the loss of Offsite Power Event refleet past management eeneerns.- l The menesement response to the Novesiber 12, 1987 Less of Offsite PeWer event was !
evsluoteft hy ,m Augmented Inst.e:tten Team. Th ! - : wwet woe., issveri- en-De c eertrw
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....a r- n n e r n ; ; . " ^ ;,; . ^d 7 ,,,,2 - t _u s e . hat t>,e e3sponle 0 hgfloss of power,was appropriate - " '
- perteed , a nd reactor plant sa never in question. , @ { # P 7 ,._... + 4 .fety was
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_to encu, m- -i.-t --eti:=- - P ;m - f recovery team was enraert ura- u e diesetion_of. the 0"+ T ":n:3:- conci;tir.; ;' 7:rt: " _-1 *io- rud=y ==m=;? ^t-statten a a n m .a a n = a + - -,ca=+= mu=reic.ht. noeiene s n a. i r'e e r i n a .
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As udrt of the recovery effort. the to eaders assigned responsibility for the '
various peralls1 options being implemen c for power recovery were tasked witt
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.:ddit!:r- t '-: "hperer C;;rdi eta- i u-u;; i::h:d _ith 0.ivraining .het personTiTT-
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- nnrluded that the planning effortc conducted by the % ""te q .t _
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- ^* ::W - determined that an emergency dec1 station under their r_- -
approved emergency plan was not :Tr? =* , A w r%
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Event cla siff stion was periodically reviewed during the course of the event by both ope ons perseririal and DECc management. A review of those actions and discuss s with the personnel involved indicates that proper, prudente and conserva tve actions were being taken.
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Olen wara da ted ::::: :*w The Maintenance Section Mr sger pr id tuch of the coordination vnd directicn of the recovery activity. Undor dir tion of ea *'*a'a*"- "
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Maintenance Section implemented the actions ne essar y to troubleshoot equipner.tv vurrvul fevllwr end rvtvrn evey nents and wy vmb tu wwrvice. This vetivity www somewhat delayed in setting star ed as the sinter.::ee Section Manager did not arrive unmilw until N 30 var meny wortfur e personnr1 were deisyed in resching )
the atta by ths ativerse weather co diti nce and management and cupervitory Persor.nel needed *,o assess the reco er, options. Starting at about 10:00 an, periodic meetings were held in the M ntenance Section Manager's office to assess recovery progress and prov2de.darec to and coordinat2on of the activities of l
site personnel. These meetings appear o have provided and direction to the LOOP l recovery effort. The absence of Operati ns Section representation at these meetings may have impeded a full understa ding of recovery actions by operations !
Persernele and meant that planners asy net sve been asle te fully eensider operational aspects of their decisions.
Overall asnagement of the recovery ofPort a ears to have been somewhat fragmented. The AIT experienced diffi cul y in determining who had overall respersibility for menasing the recove . In general, the Nuclear Operations Manager remained in the Control Room, . cept when attending meetings in the Maintenance Section Manager's office H s operational management involvement was clear, however. his everall direction of s ation Jetivilaws wwwmed lwww clear,
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however, t: + " " a = + 5_= = Ythe cold shutdown condition of the plant (which did not mandate speedy action). and BECO management's stated directive to proceed slowly WVA- W" Jet *4. sWwt ,
and deliberately during the recoveryg B :t;;'.'71 . rw-r: i r =i o r
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+ 1": me r e .v. .nwr ifho ;act or clear knowieose or cuna ini; i- th:
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oreel'.ided be +he n==d +e rear =='y 6 t r ' ;iw.r vvi 5ur tren5Tcreer.
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. '38'07835 NRC KING OF PRUSSIA P07 l
restorat n.via 'backscuttlehack. feeding through the noin ano auxiliary
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t.ransf ormers ) w % not ,timediately pnssible due to the need te clear tags, open the mein genera dice noot 11r.Ps, and and comp 1wle insvlator washdown.
'f BECo managemerit noted effectively and .. ywnwibly its aihiinistr atively Stat t ing the TSC. This contribute to effee ive management of the recovery. Interviews ,
by the NIT indicate that 0 CO per ..nv1 belivvy Liiv TSC could have oeen of even greater value had it been s aff sooner. One noteworthy aspect is that the Nuclear Operations Departeen anager would normally be stationed in the TSC whi setavated pursuant to the Em sency Plar. In that administratively manning the TSC is not specifically de .r1 rd, The N00 Mana3er remained in the Control Roon Had he been ift the TSC, h may h ve been able to more effectively direct the overall recovery effort, tv ,
% M AAM ., j t Deco is reviewins sever si procedures 'r ;d:72:r;- 9 ed ca == e ' av a omined dq4ac *": 9;;;O;i l'i , ; = - : , : :.i., %w w.% '
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O.4.16 Distributto A icnment Electrical System Malfunctions 2 4.144 Degraded Cr'd Voltage L' . 2 3 6 Instrumen Air System 2.2 37 Seevice ir System 2 2.46 Contro Room / Cable Spreading & Computer Room Heating Ventilation and r Conditioning System 5.3.0 Los of Instrument Air 522 High Winds (Hurricane)
T h i (- eav4=e_ fee u=an=ru icMicates a 1 no awaited chanoo i c1 **: :; . . . p -eiit -
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n"aa' -BEto in that it indi ate a proactive stance.
It shows that current BECo management is trysng to prep for possible events, and be rerdy for thair
38 07:36 NRC KING'0F PRUSSIA P08 I
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--nt u = , ...a .u + ,...c.a....... ,, a ... ... ,..a - , w. r = =+
erJL11_Ile n* ""'M r:: ;f ;apr e;;r.t *^'a; ='d b The NRC hm* made **veral recom:1endatters to BECo as a result of this event. .T.h y : : 3;se:rt:0 :r 7:ses e = a m u r. gor. <.u.aea,. ne,.xi],,,-:: r m e =,- m e--- e, COMid ross.slt in i m e e nua ri encennnel eseformance, d in;ressed operational fleMihi14+u dis i,3 ;h;,,;dggg.p;7;;gg _ _
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1 Expected Ovestionsi E . 'J What are the criteria for determining that management is effective?
Yy p kw , y A 'U* *,5 %@ W o.AhM Managerient effectiveness as a e cept that does not easily lend itself to W-ws.- f h #
straight-forwerddefinition. owever, there are certain traits that are typically evident in effectivemanas ent organizations. _Ca== af * "" e *
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- 1. --Sin ttu ;;1 > the organization is established to bring to bear 7
appropriate management attention and focut, on th: :r en ne sia.. e; ee; a*
-- ' M c r 3 ; r. i ; e , 2 a , '-si o udd v a r power yirni, ., , n 2""" inclo g Operations, MaintenenceeSurveillance, Engineering, r<adiologiesi Controls. Security, Emergency P:,annings and '.1 censing.
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- 2. 4Management positions are filled with qualified personnel. Turnover in these positions is controlled such that management development and succession plans nn he implemented without resulting in significant degradation in performance.
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- 1. 4 Management polic.es are clearly stated and widely understood within the org:nization. Polic195 and procedures are satistsetorsly taplemented and rarely vicisted.
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4 Management information systems-;ei:* +ho r=Mprovide :f:',"" e-- 04
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--= d t ; . d : ! organizational performance [ and := m v0 4" -: ;M Oh
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38 07336 HRC KING OF PRUSSIA P10
- 5. Decisionmaking i; *he level in the organization that ensures an adec,vste mana t revsew.
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p f. I't i e r planning and appropriate itssigneeht vf privrativw ere evident within the organization.
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b ff Corporate and si'.e sianagement involvement in site activities are evicent. Management reviews are timely, thorough, and technically sound. +- - ^* - -
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/ I Corrective actions to identified problems are timelyan6_r/itNNy' J ^ c'-! '"""
- the root causes of those proolems.
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i Document Nany EDITS TO DR. MURLEY'S HEARING Requestor's ID- 3 MARLEY ]
Author's Name:
RWessman 1/5/8A i Document Comments:
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, Concerns have been expressed regarding the Mark I Containment at Pilgrim and the Direct Torus Vent modification being considered by Boston Edison. As part of its severe accident research, the staff has developed a program for assessing Mark I containments on a high priority basis. This procram would ,
1 identify appropriate containment improvements to be implemented at Pilgrim and other reactors in the United States with a similar containment design. The possibility of an accident challenging the Mark I containment is so very low that the NRC has determined that operation of reactors with Mark I ,
containments, or restart of Pilgrim, can take place during the containment evaluation process.
As part of their SEP, Boston Edison proposed the installation of a Direct Torus Vent System as one of several SEP measures to improve containment performance at Pilgrim. The Direct Torus Vent provides a path from the torus -
to the plant stack.and would be used to relieve containment pressure in certain severe accident situations. The staff's initial safety assessment of the SEP modifications did not endorse the use of the Direct Torus Vent at this time. The staff has asked Boston Edison a number of questions regarding the use of this system and the utility will not be allowed to place it into service until it is thoroughly evaluated and approved by the staff.
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"'9" V" PILGRIM in a letter dated December 18, 1987, Senator Kennedy requested NRC to participate in a Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee hearino in Plynouth on the evening of January 7, 19AA, concernino the proposed restart of Pilarim. Dr. Murley and W. Russell will testify for NRC. An NRC staff meetino with Kennedy staffers was held on December 30, 1987 1
In an inspection report dated December 72, 198#, the NRC terminated an Order Modifyino License (issued ll/29/A41 for deficiencies in the radiological controls procram. This tennination was based on licensee programmatic improvements confirmed by the ongoino inspection process, itAY fh
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