ML20246P495
| ML20246P495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/1989 |
| From: | Wetterhahn M CONNER & WETTERHAHN, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#389-8870 OL-2, NUDOCS 8907200227 | |
| Download: ML20246P495 (55) | |
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i -. ..a DOLKETED USNRC-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 89 JJL -6 P12:31 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION nr:
. DOC 61 > ' ,'
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
-In the Matter of. ) Docket Nos. 50-352-OL-2
) 50-353-OL-2 Philadelphia Electric Company )
). (Severe Accident
-(Limerick Generating Station, ) Mitigation Design Units 1 and 2) ) Alternatives)
LICENSEE'S MEMORANDUM RELATED TO PROPOSED DESIGN' MITIGATION ALTERNATIVES FOR WHICH AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES COULD NOT BE REACHED Introduction In its June 9, 1989 Prehearing Conference Order, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board or Board) directed the parties to confer and determine which severe accident mitigation design alternatives-(SAMDA's) they agree upon for litigation. The Board requested a stipulation as to those alternatives which the parties agreed should be litigated. As to those on which.they differed, each party was -directed to prepare a memorandum supporting its positic.n , with the stipulation and memoranda to be filed by July 3, 1989.
After a number of discussions among the parties, a document entitled " Report of the Parties," was executed by the Licensee Philadelphia Electric Company (Licensee),
Limerick Ecology Action (LEA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) Staff, the three parties to 8907200227 890703 p
{DR ADOCK 05000352 PDR k
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't. E the proceeding, and served upon the Licensing Board on June 30, 1989. That document contained a statement of the areas of agreement among the parties. This pleading presents Licensee's position regarding those alternatives proposed for consideration by LEA for which no agreement has been reached.
Background
By Order dated May 5, 1989, the Commission directed the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel to convene a licensing board to conduct additional proceedings related to LEA's contention regarding SAMDA's. This action was the result of a February 28, 1989 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989),
which remanded to the NRC, inter alia, the issue of whether SAMDA's should be considered for Limerick pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 54321 g seg.
In its May 5, 1989 Order, the Commission specifically directed this Board to limit its consideration of SAMDA's to those identified by the Appeal Board in Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 693-94 (1985). The Commission observed that those pages contained references to NRC-sponsored studies on severe accident mitigation iden-tified by LEA or submitted to the Licensing Board which provided basis and specificity for the contention. The w_-_____--_______-____
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.e a Commission limited the litigation on LEA's previously rejected contention "to those mitigation alternatives identif.ied by the Appeal Board as being supported with the required basis and specificity" in its decision of October 22, 1985.1/ Thus, only those mitigation alternatives specifically discussed in the Appeal Board decision in the two pages referenced by the Commission and found by it to be described with basis and specificity are candidates for further consideration.
In discussing the basis and specificity of the con-tention, the Appeal Board noted LEA's reliance on the Staff's own studies, done under contract, to identify severe accident mitigation design alternatives specifically for the Limerick facility. In particular, the Appeal Board pointed i to Chapter 7 of NUREG/CR-2666 "PWR Severe Accident Delin-eation and Assessment" (January 1983) as discussing a filtered vented containment system and containment spray system which could lower the risk from a severe accident.2_/
The Appeal Board also examined an NRC contract with R&D Associates (RDA) (Contract No. NRC-03-83-092) which analyzes l_/ Commission " order" at 2 (May 5, 1989).
2/ The Appeal Board notes, however, that the authors of NUREG/CR-2666 did not include consideration of the containment spray system currently installed at Limerick. ALAB-819 at 694 n.5. The Appeal Board also pointed out that the discussion in Chapter 7 was largely qualitative rather than quantitative and no cost benefit for any design feature was performed.
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the cost-effectiveness of a number of specific design features. In examining the RDA study, the Appeal Board
. pointed to the September 15, 1983 status report on the project as containing information on SAMDA's relating to containment heat removal, core residue capture and retention l without concrete attack, and (if anticipated transient without scram events are to be mitigated) a venting system.
The Appeal Board noted that candidate components to fulfill these requirements had been selected by RDA for l l
preliminary conceptual design and cost estimation. The Appeal Board then traced the development of the RDA project and stated that by March 15, 1984, RDA had completed the preliminary design and cost analysis for several particular mitigation systems and formulated the methodology for a quantitative value/ impact analysis. The Appeal Board found that the interim material which was available to the Licensing Board at the time of its ruling on the contention in question appears to have satisfied the threshold basis and specificity requirements because "particular design changes that might be cost effective were at least identified . " -
3/ Limerick, ALAB-819, 22 NRC at 694 (emphasis supplied).
The Appeal Board noted, however, that whether such specific alternatives would ultimately prove to be cost effective was another matter which was not an appropriate inquiry at the contention- admisr. ion stage.
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[ Thus,_in accordance with the Commission's May . 5, 1989 Order, only those design alternatives which were specifical--
ly ; mentioned by the Appeal Board in .ALAB-819 would be subject to further . consideration as SAMDA's. Moreover, at least a preliminary but specific description of.the proposed' alternative and an assertion that the benefits would exceed the associated' costs -would have to be provided to fulfill
, the requirements of basis and specificity, as stated by the l
Appeal Board in ALAB-819.
Explicit in. .the Third Circuit's remand to the Commissions was that the scope of the renewed proceeding be
' limited .to consideration of design alternatives, i.e.,.
physicalichanges to the facility to reduce the consequences of'a severe accident. There is no indication that the Third Circuit or Commission meant to include consideration of broad programmatic or procedural changes or generalized training programs within the ambit of design mitigation devices. Moreover, to be considered a mitigation device, a
' candidate must be intended to reduce, ameliorate or remove the consequences to the public of a severe accident wherein the core is degraded or melted.b This is in contrast to 4/ 869 F.2d at 741.
5/ For example, one of the references cited by LEA in its list of references, R&D Associates, Mitigation Systems for Mark II Reactors -
Preliminary Report, May 1984 (RDA-TR-127303-001) at 1-44 states that:
(Footnote Continued)
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-prophylactic action, designed.for controlling the condition of.
the reactor and fuel'before the core is damaged or" melted.
~ The limited scope of .the remand as described by .the Commission should not be permitted to expand into an overall review' or second-guessing of Commission . safety programs.
Thus, considering the criteria which a proposed SAMDA must
. meet to! qualify for consideration herein, we now turn to the particular matters raised by LEA.b!
Clearly, in' accordance with the Commission's May 5,
-1989 Order, LEA had the obligation to identify to the Board the proposed. alternatives with specificity.1# The Licensing (Footnote Continued)
Fo.e the purposes of this study, the NRC has defined severe accident mitigation as -those actions, devices or systems intended to reduce, ameliorate, or remove the consequences to the public of a severe - accident wherein the core is degraded.or melted.
~6/ Licensee fulfilled the Commission's Order to identify SAMDA candidates by listing ~ them in Paragraph 2 of the Report of the Parties and fleshing them out in its June 23, 1989 response to the May 23, 1989 letter of the Staff transmitting three questions related to SAMDA's.
Subsequent references to Paragraph 2 and its various subsections should be understood to incorporate - the specific descriptions contained in Licensee's June 23, 1989 letter.
7/ "[T]he filing of a vague, unparticularized contention, followed by an endeavor to flesh it out through discovery against the applicant or staff" is strictly ,
impermissible. Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear l Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 468 (1982), aff'd in relevant part, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).
...:, ;s Boar'd need.not and should not have to sif t through LEA's i
voluminous filings and other~ references relating to SAMDA's to determine for itself potential SAMDA candidates. As is readily . apparent,- many LEA references are to ' entire
-documents, none of which LEA provided to this Board. As the Commission recently stated:
Commission practice is clear that a petitioner. may not simply incorporate massive documents by reference . in the basis for or a statement of his con-tentions. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1-and 2 ) ', LBP-76-10, 3 ' NRC 209, 216 (1976).
Such 'a wholesale incorporation by reference does not serve the purposes of a pleading. See Commonwealth Edison Company, rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8,. 23 NRC 241 (1986).
The Commission expects parties to bear their burden and to clearly identify the matters on which they intend to rely with reference to a specific point. The Commission cannot be faulted for not having searched for a needle that may be in a haystack.8_/
To allow LEA to argue, as in effect it does here, that its candidate SAMDA's lie' somewhere within the tomes of materials it has previously submitted or referred to, would be to create an open-ended issue bounded only by counsel's imagination.
LEA has submitted two documents containing its proposed design alternatives. The first entitled " Limerick Ecology
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8/ Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 240-41 l (1989).
Action, Inc. List of Primary Candidates for Severe Accident Mitigation," (List) Attachment 2 to the Report of the.
Parties, consists of nine subheadings. While there is considerable general discussion in each subsection, only a ,
i limited number of candidate alternatives are noted. To the extent Licensee has been able to identify them, they are reviewed herein against the criteria established by the Commission for candidate SAMDA's.
Extremely late in the period allotted by the Licensing Board, LEA sent to the Licensee and NRC Staff a list of approximately 85 items which were unfocused and repetitious and, in Licensee's view, completely contrary to the directive of the Licensing Board to narrow the issues. This was entitled " Supplemental List of Litigable Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives for Litigation of Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. Contention on Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives for the Limerick Nuclear Generating Station" (Supplemental List). The Licensee and Staff had, in good faith, expended considerable time and effort in responding to LEA's original list with the expectation that such efforts also involved the good faith of LEA.
Each of the matters raised in Attachments 2 and 4 to the Report of the Parties is addressed below.
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Licensee's Position on the Alternatives Raised by LEA in its " List" Venting Filter Devices While it is sometimes difficult to decide which i
specific alternatives LEA seeks to raise, LEA's discussion l in this subsection alludes to an add-on filtered vented l containment system and a hard pipe vent from the containment to the plant stack. Inasmuch as Licensee agrees that this alternative is within the ambit of the remand and therefore !
1 has already considered such subsystems (see Paragraphs 2d and 2e of the Report of the Parties), Licensee does not j l
object to consideration of such alternatives to the extent they were defined with basis and specificity and considered by Licensee.
Containment spray Flooding Modifications The general statements in this section are ,
1 impermissible vague to provide basis and specificity for litigation of a design alternative. Moreover, the only alternatives to which LEA alludes relate to capping certain drywell spray locations and modifying the drywell spray rings so as to spray in the vicinity of openings in the
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reactor pedestal. LEA has not shown how this " alternative" l l
specifically derives from any of the alternatives discussed l l
by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819. Nor has LEA demonstrated that this " alternative" was specifically referred to in material available to the Licensing Board. For these reasons, this subsection contains no litigable alternatives.
Containment Heat Removal Augmentation Modifications The only potential alternative for Limerick noted in this section is an augmente3 suppression pool cooling function'. Inasmuch as this item falls within the category of alternatives contained in Paragraph 2a of the Report of the Parties, Licensee does not object to this alternative to the extent it has been defined with basis and specificity and considered by Licensee.
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk Modifications While this subsection refers to recent studies of spent fuel risks at a BWR and a PWR, the Commission's consid-eration of this matter predates even the filing of an operating license for Limerick. The Commission considered the question of zircaloy fire at least as early as the Salem fuel pool proceeding.EI This matter could clearly have been raised previously in support of LEA's contention, but it was not. The record is completely devoid of any request to consider spent fuel pool accidents in 'he context of SAMDA's (or any other context) in the Limerick docket. Certainly, it was not noted by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819.
Furthermore, LEA has further failed to show any nexus between a postulated accident in the reactor and the l 9/ Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-80-27, 12 NRC 435 (1980), aff'd, ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43 (1981).
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hypothesized zircaloy fire, nor has it provided any specificity as to any accident sequence leading to such a fire. This issue is entirely without specificity and basis and cannot properly be an issue for litigation before the Licensing Board within the scope of the Commission's May 5, 1989 Order.
Human Factors Modifications Including Procedures This entire section does not relate to decign alternatives but to human factors and procedure changes.
These were not discussed in ALAB-819 and were not before the original Licensing or Appeal Boards when they considered this contention. Hence, these proposals are entirely outside the scope of the remand and should not be considered by the Board as mitigation candidates. Furthermore, no specificity is given as to how implementation of a revision to emergency operating procedures would reduce the risk nor is any attempt made to quantify the benefit or risk.
Similarly, LEA offers a general allegation that there should be plant specific procedural guidance for operators !
in responding to seismic events. Certainly, the Commission did not contemplate that the Licensing Board would i i
re-examine plant procedures to respond to the Third i
Circuit's decision. Whether lists of relays and breakers should or should not be included in plant procedures is clearly beyond the requirements of the Commission's Order.
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One human factors consideration proposed ' by LEA.'is
. whether control room design review and- fixes for any human engineering deficiencies should be' . expedited. There is no showing that " human - factors" had been-previously raised or considered . by ' ' the Appeal Board in ALAB-819. Also, this portion of the alternative is completely - speculative and provides no specific basis for consideration.- Like the other : matters proposed in this section,. no " design-q.
alternative" has .been suggested. No litigable. SAMDA has been raised'by this section.
Seismic Modifications This section similarly raises matters not previously
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brought to the attention of the Licensing or Appeal Board.'
There is no reason given why it could not have been raised earlier. Certainly, the Appeal Board did not discuss this matter in ALAB-819. Aside from an assertion that a particu-lar wall should be examined.for its ability to withstand a 0.99 force, there is no description of the issue.10/ LEA states that recent, but unnamed, studies have identified the potential for chatter of relays and states that there needs to be a plant-specific assessment to evaluate this risk.
j There is no specificity as to whether and how this problem affects Limerick such as to require a mitigation alternative 'I I
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-10/ This value is six times the acceleration of the safe '
1 shutdown earthquake required by the Commission's regulation as the design basis for Limerick.
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- to be installed.. ' In. any event', any change to. the . seismic design ' of the facility, would be preventative. rather than mitigative. For these reasons, this section presents no litigable mitigation candidate. 4 Reduction of' Transient Initiator Frequency i
The- only matter this section seeks to - raise is the j f
proposed adoption of three new' programs . related . to scram reduction, . reliability. centered maintenance and relaxation of tecnnical specifications. None of these three programs.
is'a design alternative,- nor would any of them mitigate a core melt accident.- Hence, they are not design mitigation alternatives.- There is no . basis for- stating that- any quantifiable risk would be' averted should programs-like this
- be adopted nor any specificity as to the content - of ' the programs to be adopted. No discussion is given as to how these matters derive from alternatives discussed by the Appeal Boar'd,in ALAB-819. There is no litigable alternative within this subheading.
Reactor Vessel Depressurization System Modifications This section suggests the modification of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) at Limerick as recommended by
- NUREG/CR-4920, Vol. 2. Initially, LEA has failed to demonstrate how this matter derived from any of the material before' the Appeal Board when it decided ALAB-819. In any I. event, all three of the suggested hardware changes (the modification of the ADS, the use of bottled nitrogen gas and l
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modification.of the ADS design to permit actuation while the-containment pressure.is.high) have been made'. b Therefore, there is no issue which to litigate raised in this subsection .
Current "Best Estimate" Risk' Reduction Package for Limerick c .. This subsection largely repeats and summarizes the t
. previous section.of LEA's list. .However, Item h appears to be a catchall which would require the Board'to consider the potential need for "other fixes" presumably to be' developed or given specificity and basis later by LEA. Such attempted reservation. is contrary to the requirements of the
- Commission's May 5, 1989 Order as well as this Board's June 9, 1989 Prehearing Conference Order. There are general examples given, but no detailed description of them, no
- assertion that they are cost beneficial nor any showing that they are derived from material available to the Appeal' Board or discur, sed in- ALAB-819. For these reasons, no' new permissible alternatives are contained within this matter.
Licensee's Position on the Alternatives Raised by LEA in its Supplemental List i Inasmuch as this list contains merely general refer-ences and,.to a large extent, duplicative citations, Licens-ee will respond by listing the LEA items in the left column
-11/ This has been documented in the FSAR. See S55.2.2.4.1, 7.3.1.1.1.2 and 9.3.1.3.
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I and presenting the Licensee's position in the right column for the corresponding group of suggested " alternatives."
Licensee submits that, except as they coincide with the alternatives suggested by Licensee and accepted by the NRC Staff, these 85 supplemental " alternatives" do not present a single, new litigable matter before this Licensing Board.
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-Mode of Operation. Neither of these alternatives involves a design alternative, Procedures. nor is it clear they involve mitigation of a' postulated core melt accident. The references 1
given are merely to LEA pleadings and provide no specificity as to the modes of operation or procedures being advocated as mitigation alternatives. There is no statement as to cost beneficiality of these items or their specific application to Limerick. These' items were not discussed in ALAB-819.
Alternatives described The improvements in the in Beyea, Jan and Von containment that LEA wishes Ilippel, " Nuclear considered are not specified in Reactor Accidents: The the list provided by LEA.
Value of Improved There has been no allegation of Containment," Center any applicability of any for Energy and alternatives which might be Environmental Studies, contained in this document to l
Princeton University the design of Limerick or any (PU/ CEES Report #94), assertion that they are cost Jan. 1980 beneficial. This reference was not noted by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819.
Alternatives described The specific alternatives LEA i l
in NUREG/CR-0850 Nov. wishes to have considered are j 1
1981, " Preliminary completely absent from its l
Assessment of Core list. There has been no Melt Accidents at the showing that any alternative Zion and Indian Point within the cited reference Nuclear Power Plants would apply to the design of and Strategies for Limerick, nor any assertion Mitigating their that they are cost beneficial.
Effects" This reference is not one noted by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819. The document refers to Zion and Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants, which are pressurized water reactors (PWR) and not to Limerick, a boiling water reactor (BWR).
Thus, the requisite specificity 1
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. a permit consideration of this item.
Filter venting of These items are merely general containment references to filtered vented containment and allegedly more More reliable reliable heat removal containment heat subsystems, with a citation to removal subsystems a pleading by LEA, which in turn cites a general reference to a then proposed policy statement. They completely lack specificity and any demonstrated relationship to Limerick. However, to the extent that these two items are identical to the alternatives being considered by the Licensee as described in Paragraphs 2a and 2e of the Report of the Parties, Licensee does not object to their consideration.
Alternatives under This item represents merely. !
examination in another general reference to Commission severe alternatives which may be accident research considered under the program Commission's accident research program. No specific, cost-beneficial application to Limerick has been alleged. It is not a reference utilized by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819.
No litigable alternative has been presented.
Filter vented These three items merely containments provide general references regarding filtered vented Filter venting of the containments. The specific containment - Inside reference is to actions which NRC vol. 5, no. 18 were asserted to be taken for (Sept. 5, 1983) reactors in France and at the Indian Point facility (PWR's)
Alternatives and to a program plan to identified in investigate conceptual designs l
NUREG/CR-1029, for filtered vented ,
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" Prog 7am' Plan for the containment. Inasmuch as'the Investigation of Indian Point facility and Vent-Filtered Frer.ch reactors are of designs Containment Conceptual different than Limerick, there Designs for Light is no assertion, with Water Reactors" specificity, of cost-beneficial (Sandia, Oct. 1979) applicability to Limerick. As such, these items lack specific applicability to Limerick. Also, the given references were not cited by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819.
Nonetheless, to the extent that these three items are identical to the alternatives being i
considered by Licensee as described in Paragraph 2e of l i
the Report of the Parties, i Licensee does not object to their consideration.
Various options for The documents cited in these I
core retention items provide only general j identified in references to core retention I l
NUREG/CR-2155 "A concepts and alternatives which !
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Review of the may be considered under the Applicability of Core Commission's accident research Retention Concepts to program. There is no Light Water Reactor specificity as to their containments" (Sandia, applicability to Limerick.
Sept. 1981) -These references are not mentioned in ALAB-819.. LEA Variations of provides no specificity as to filtered-vented the alternatives it wishes l
I containment systems considered based upon the q (Proposed Policy _ NUREG document or Policy Statement on Severe Statement. These items lack Accidents and Related specific applicability to Viewe on Nuclear Limerick and there is no Reactor Regulation, 48 assertion that they are cost i
Fed. Reg. at 16019 beneficial. However, to the 1 (April 13, 1983) extent that these two items are identical to the alternatives being considered by Licensee as ;
described in the Report of the Parties in Paragraphs 2c and 2e, Licensee does not object to i
their consideration.
l Alternatives In AL73-819, the Appeal Board 4
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identified in identified two specific NUREG/CR-2666, Chapter mitigation alternatives: a 7 "Further filtered-vented containment Considerations of system and a containment spray Mitigative Features system. As the Appeal Board for Specific Plants: noted, this NUREG reference Limerick" in PWR lacks any cost-benefit analysis Severe Accident for any design feature and, Delineation and thus, Licensee submits could Assessment not support consideration of an alternative. In any event, as discussed in Paragrapha 2b and 2e of the Report of the Parties, the Licensee has examined alternatives relating !
to drywell spray and filtered vent. To the extent that the alternatives identified in this NUREG contract were examined by Licensee in detail as stattd in Paragraph 2 of the Report of the Parties, Licensee does not object to their consideration.
Alternatives This is merely a general 1
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-Associates reports for. ' contained in the:RDALcontract:
LContract NRC-03-83-092, reports noted'by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819. It.provides no specificity and presents no specific mitigation.
alternatives or cost benefit discussion.for. consideration.
1 Strategy to address This item, " strategy to address-failure mode of' failure mode of overpressure overpressure. failure failure . . .",does not present-
- with either'wetwell or any design alternative for Ldrywell break consideration, let alone an (NUREG/CR-2666, p. alternative with sufficient 7-6) basis and specificity for litigation. The cited page in NUREG/CR-2666 merely discusses different possible release categories and a statement that any alternative to be-considered must address these particular failure modes. This item lacks specificity and any supporting cost-benefit I
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analysis. No litigable i alternative is stated.
Filtered vented Licensee does not object to containment system consideration of this (NUREG/CR-2666, p. alternative to the extent that 7-9) it is already being considered by Licensee, as specified in Item 2c of the Report of the Par t.'.e s .
Upgrading performance Licensee does not object to of containment sprays consideration of this to cope with severe alternative to the extent that environmental it is already being considered conditions in accident by Licensee, as specified in Item 2b of the Report of the Parties.
Filter venting This item specifically strategies suggested references NUREG/CR-2666.
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by work of A.S. ,At pp. 7-9, that document Benjamin and F.T. states-that the discussion'is
- Harper in'" Risk based'upon. work done
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Assessment of Filtered. and Mark III containments.- The Vented Containment additional reference given on Options for-a BWR Mark pp. 7-14'is to a topical-IEContainment" meeting whose subject was BWR Proceedings of the' Mark I containments. Inasmuch International ANS/ ENS as Limerick is a BWR Mark II Topical Meeting on: containment, there is no Probabilistic Risk' alternative stated with
. Assessment, Sept. 1981- specific applicability for Limerick. To the extent, however, that this matter is specifically addressed by Licensee as described in Item 2e of the: Report of the Parties,~ Licensee does not object to its consideration.
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Protection of The referenced discussion diaphragm for relating to diaphragm failure sequences that lead to provides no specificity for a containment failure mitigation alternative for caused by diaphragm Limerick. Its applicability to
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t o failure by modifying any_ plant is speculative-in-
"l the region'under thei that,the modification'should'be d-- -reactor vessel- considered only "if existing-
,- (NUREG/CR-2666,:p. drains do not'. supply a 7-12) sufficient. path." LEA has~
failed'to provide ~ sufficient specificity describing-any cost-beneficial
" alternative" to be considered or its nexus to the Limerick i design.
- Heat removal from Licensee has no objection to containment by low .this item to the extent.it volume flow addresses consideration of a vent-filtered system,- . vented' filtered system or a heat pipe or containment spray system, Containment spray as specifically described in system (NUREG/CR-2666, Report of the Parties at
- p. 7-13) Paragraph 2b and 2e and has already been considered by Licensee. To the extent it addresses a " heat pipe,"
this " alternative" is not supported with specificity by
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the reference and has not been asserted to be cost-beneficial.
Nor is it one of the items noted by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819 as having a basis in NUREG/CR-2666.
Increased reliability While Licensee does not believe of suppression pool that this alternative is cooling with system described in sufficient detail that could be driven or supported with specificity from outside in the referenced NUREG, it containment, and does not object to its closed loop heat consideration to the extent it exchange process coincides with the separate, independent dedicated system for transferring heat from the suppression pool used in conjunction with the drywell spray alternative being considered by Licensee. See Report of the Parties at Paragraph 2a.
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- b High-volume While the alternatives which' vent-filter or high LEA wishes to have considered capacity sprays."if are not described with'any- ,
I operated'in'a timely detail,fto the extent'they are.
manner," thus already being' considered-by requiring procedural.
Licensee, it does.not object.
7 alternatives to assure See Report of-the Parties at timely spray operation Paragraphs'2b and 2e.
Measures.to assure Licensee objects to core debris. bed consideration of this item as a-coolability within SAMDA. The only reference pedestal, including given, NUREG/CR-2666, provides i e.g.,. rubble bed, no specific design. Nor.is suitable flow passages there even an assertion that in pedestal wall, and these' items are measures identified by cost-beneficial. To the extent Swanson in " Core Melt this alternative coincides with Materials Interaction those being considered by the Evaluation" Annual Licensee as described in Progress Report April Paragraph 2c of the Report of 1980 to March 1981, the Parties dealing with core ASAI Report No.81-001 debris control, Licensee does not object to such
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1 Alternatives No specificity is given in its identified in listing as to the alternatives NUREG/CR-3028 "A ' LEA seeks to litigate before Review of the' Limerick the Licensing Board.. There has Generating' Station been no showing that any Probabilistic Risk alternatives which may be p
' Assessment" identified-have specific applicability to Limerick. Nor Alternatives is there any assertion that any identified ~in of them are cost-beneficial for NUREG/CR-3299, "
Core Limerick. These items do not Melt Materials raise any specific alternative
= Interactions applicable to Limerick and thus-Evaluation" are not suitable for litigation. The citations are Alternatives not to any utilized by the identified in Appeal. Board in ALAB-819.
NUREG/CR-2182 " Station Blackout at Browns t Ferry Unit 1 - Iodine and Noble Gas
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1 Distribution and
' Release" (Sept. 1982)
Alternatives identified in NUREG/CR-2672 "SBLOCA Outside Containment at Browns Ferry Unit 1 -
Accident Sequence Analysis" (November 1982)
Alternatives identified in NUREG/CR-2973 " Loss of DHR Sequences at Browns Ferry-Unit 1 Accident Sequence Analysis" (May 1983)
Alternatives LEA has not herein specified identified in R&D the specific alternatives it Monthly Project Status wishes considered, but merely
____.__m.-_._..._. -..___.._.__.__________m.___m
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1 Reports 7 Contract references;18;pages from
- NRC-03-83-092 ~ various~ progress reports kE , Jrelating to.this particular NRC'
. contract.--This11s a catchall i;
-item as evidenced by the fact.
that the next several'dozeni U proposed alternatives--derive-from the same source. However, to the~ extent these alternatives were specifically s
considered and examined in the final RDA report with specificity both as-to cost and as to the benefits to be derived'(Mitigation Systems for Mark II Reactors-RDA-TR-127303-001), Licensee does not object to'their consideration. In fact,'the alternatives being examined:by Licensee contained in Paragraph
'2 of the Report of the Parties were based upon such material.
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Water cooled crucible These items are based upon a core retention device list of alternatives which RDA prepared as to types of Flooded thoria rubble proposed mitigation systems.
bed core retention But according to RDA, " [n] o device classification was made as to feasibility, effectiveness or Water cooled cost of the proposed systems."
refractory tiles core Inasmuch as there is no stated retention device basis for asserting that these devices may be feasible, Pebble-bed covering effective or cost-effective for cooling coils core Limerick, they cannot form the retention device basis of a contention related to SAMDA's. To the extent High-alumina cement these alternatives were covering cooling coils later examined by RDA and l core retention device included in its final report with costs and benefits Magnesium dioxide related to Limerick discussed covering cooling coils with reasonable specificity, core retention device Licensee does not object to the consideration of those Zirconium dioxide alternatives. As discussed in covering cooling coils the preceding item, some of core retention device these alternatives as refined
i
- 3'3 - i by RDA and discussed in its 1
Graphite covering report on its activities I cooling coils core related to Limerick form the retention device basis for Licensee's review of 1 i
Borax bath (thick alternatives as contained in !
layer of borax bricks Paragraph 2 of the Report of sealed in stainless the Parties. Certain of the steel, covering the suggested alternatives are bottom of the reactor clearly not applicable to cavity) core retention Limerick, such as the suggested device alternative of underground siting of the containment IIeavy metal bath vessel. See JA at 170.
(lead, uranium, or Furthermore, one of the copper) alternatives suggested, increased volume of containment Iron oxide (layer of building, is specifically iron oxide over stated as applicable only cooling' coils) to new designs and thus not Limerick. See JA at 170.
Basalt concrete and basalt rubble bed core l retention drive Sand core retention system
Iron' core retention system Flooded cavity (water added to flood entire cavity to vessel for core material to be kept dispersed enough to remain quenched)
Other active cooling systems (special jackets.and piping system in and around the reactor vessel with intention of retaining the molten core within the reactor vessel)
Alternatives for overpressure control from hydrogen or hydrogen burning, including oxygen exclusion, oxygen
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ i
4
-l 4 removal,-oxygen.
f dilution, igniters, l
fans overpressure control from attack on f concrete including special concrete composition of reactor cavity and basemat to limit release of noncondensible gases i
on core-concrete attack, and thin
'basemat composition Overpressure control by venting the containment building with vent to tall ,
i stack, vent to i receiver (another large, closed building to provide larger total expansion volume and greater cooling) and vent to
[ . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
1
.. .. . l condenser-filter such I as sand beds,. gravel beds,. scrubbers, gravel / sand, water pools, sand filters, charcoal ~ filters, chemical scrubbers, all in various combinations Overpressure control by containment heat removal with heat I pipes, modified heat pipes, heat exchangers, spray coolers, fan coolers, secondary suppression pool, and more reliable residual heat removal system by increasing redundancy and ruggedness of RHR system Containment protection against missiles -
l l
g- 4 various ' structures designed to protect the containment penetrations or walls against flying debris or thrashing piping inside containment Special containment structures such as underground siting of containment vessel, berm shield, double containment, containment strength improvements of pressure ratings, increased volume of containment building, and strengthen safety systems by means of armor, bunkers, and heavier construction Fission product removal systems such as enhanced
I g' ' e containment spray
- ' systems, and gas treatment system (special recirculating treatment system to remove fission producto from the containment gas volume)
Alternatives- This item is another catchall. ,
identified in It attempts to raise i
documents identified alternatives purportedly in Appendix A to NRC identified in some 38 documents Response to FOIA provided in response to a 83-432, documents 1-38 Freedom of Information Act request in 1983. To Licensee's knowledge, the 38 referenced documents were not transmitted to either the Licensing or Appeal Boards. They certainly were not discussed in ALAB-819.
LEA has failed to identify any specific alternatives within these references applicable to
39.-
Limerick. There is no assertion that these-alternatives have been analyzed.
in detail and found to be ,
i cost-beneficial for Limerick.
1 Alternatives This is a general reference to identified in LEA two LEA pleadings. Licensee Contentions on the has been unable to determine a Environmental single mitigation alternative Assessment of Severe stated therein let alone any Accidents as Discussed with the requisite basis and j'
in the NRC Staff DES, specificity or supporting Supp. 1 cost-benefit analysis. Theee matters were not referenced in the Appeal Board's discussion in ALAB-819. No litigable alternative is presented.
Alternatives This is a blanket reference to identified in R&D a number of monthly reports Associates Monthly related to the RDA contracts.
Project Status Reports These matters have already been 1
___ - i
NRC Contract NRC discussed. No' specific, 03-83-092- and other cost-beneficial alternatives documents attached to are identified. This item EA Statement of therefore provides no basis for Significance of NRC consideration of any specific Severe Accident alternative.
Mitigation Systems Contract Documents to LEA Contention DES-5 i,
i Alternatives These alternatives relate to a identified in " State specific reference, " State of of_the Art of Reactor the Art of Reactor Containment Containment Systems, Systems, Dominant Failure Modes Dominant Failure and Mitigation Opportunities."
Modes, and Mitigation The first item is merely a Opportunities," Jan. general reference and presents 1984 no specific, cost-beneficial alternatives for consideration
" Operator action" as by the Licensing Board. The part of a " containment next two items relate to mitigation system," operator action, which as defined as a previously discussed, is not a cooperative design alternative. In any 1 combination of event, the descriptions are too ;
1 l
L l 1 devices, subsystems, general to qualify for and components: consideration as a specific
" operator action can cost-beneficial design be a part-of such a alternative. Neither were system" and " operator these references discussed in action or modification ALAB-819. No specific SAMDA is of existing equipment raised by any of these items.
can possibly perform as well as dedicated hardware in some cases and at lower cost."
" State of the Art of Reactor Containment Systems, Dominant Failure Modes, and Mitigation Opportunities," Jan.
1984 Final Report, p. j 1-5
" Operator action can play an important role in accident mitigation providing there is enough time. Such a strategy could potentially be much
42 -
more cost effective than dedicated L
automatic systems with fail-safe initiating methods . . . . [I]t is obvious that changes in current operating procedures both inside the plant . . . and outside . . . may.
offer cost-effective reductions in risk." ,
Alternatives Identified in Documents Identified to ASLB/ALAB Containment heat As admitted in LEA's heading removal (energy for this section, these removal through alternatives were discussed in containment heat documents identified to the removal - active or Licensing Board and the Appeal passive) Board, but not provided to them. Certainly, the Appeal Containment-atmosphere Board did not refer to or rely removal (energy on these references in L__________-_-_-_-___ ._ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - .
~
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removal through ALAB-819. Most assuredly, the l
containment - Commission's adjudicatory atmosphere removal - boards are not required to filtered vented cearch out references to containment systems) support an intervenor's contention. See p. 7, supra.
Increased containment For this reason, these items volume (energy need not be c'.nsidered by the dilution through Licensing Board. These items increased containment present only a very sketchy volume)- outline of suggested alternatives with no Suppression of the specificity as to design burning of hydrogen features or discussion of their and other combustible cost-beneficial nature. The gases-energy-release reference given, NUREG-0850, control through discusses hypothetical core suppression of burning melt accidents at Zion and (e.g., adding inert Indian Point nuclear power gases, Halon, water plants. No nexus between those mists) plants (their potential accident scenarios or potential Controlled burning of SAMDA's) and Limerick is hydrogen and other demonstrated. For these combustible gases reasons, no viable alternative (energy release for consideration is given. To management through the extent that these general
+ .
l controlled burning of statements of alternatives have hydrogen and other been specified by the Licensee combustible gases, and considered in its i e.g., ignition evaluation as described in i
systems) Paragraph 2 of the Report of the Parties and as specified in Core retention its June 23, 1989 reply to the devices- energy Staff's three questions, release control and Licensee does not object to core mass management their consideration.
through core retention For example, containment heat devices (core removal is specified in catchers, core ladle, Paragraph 2a of the cavity flooding, and Report of the Parties.
active and passive Containment atmosphere removal cooling) is a general statement of a filtered vented device Missile shields - considered by Licensee. See kinetic energy Paragraph 2e of the Report of dissipation of the Parties. The item related missiles to increased containment volume appears not to be viable for a Strengthening of facility already constructed containment such as Limerick. The item l structures- energy related to suppression of the absorption enhancement burning of hydrogen and other L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l
through strengthening combustible' gases, while it may of containment be applicable to a PWR, is not structures applicable to a Mark II BWR containment which is inerted during operation. Core retention' devices have been considered by the Licensee and, to the extent discussed in Paragraph 2c of the Stipulation, Licensee does not object to consideration of that alternative. Except as specifically stated to the l
contrary, these items do not present viable. alternatives for consideration by the Licensing Board.
Containment heat These items represent another removal alternatives generalized listing of such as heat pipes alternatives examined by RDA with input surface in under one of its contracts.
the drywell region and LEA goes as far as to utilize discharge surface to references out of the cited RDA the atmosphere report and assert they present
l ..
I
( -., . 46 -
4 .
outside, cold water additional sources that the spray condensers in Licensing Board should examine the drywell, or in an attempt to ferret out surface-type heat litigable alternatives. In l
exchangers to cool addressing these candidate suppression pool water mitigation devices, the authors of the RDA report state that Containment venting of not all of the categories noted clean steam and by LEA are "necessarily nitrogen directly to justified in view of their cost surroundings and v. risk averted. Before venting smaller specific systems can be quantities of selected, each component must contaminated steam and be assessed for practicality, gas through condensers reliability, availability and and filter beds. risk reduction effectiveness at Options also include a specific site." (R&D those examined by Associates, State of the Art of Murfin, NUREG/CR-1410, Reactor Containment Systems,
" Report of the Dominant Failure Mode and Zion / Indian Point Mitigation Opportunities Final Study: Vol. I, 1989, Report (January 1984) at 3-42).
Levy, " Review of Thus, there is no specificity Proposed Improvements, and basis given for these Including Filter / Vent alternatives nor any basis for of BWR Pressure - assuming that these generalized Suppression . . .
" alternatives would have any
. e EPRI NP-1747, Ahmad, specific applicability to et al., NUREG/CR-2666, . Limerick or that they would be "PWR Severe Accident cost-beneficial. Again, to the Delineation and extent these items have been
-Assessment," and considered by Licensee as Reilly, " Conceptual described in Paragraph 2 of the Design of Alternative Report of the Parties, Licensee
. Core Melt Mitigation has no objection to their Cystems for a PWR with consideration, an Ice-Condenser Containment" NUREG/CR-3068 (1982) !
[ note that the Reilly study described as including designs suitable for the Mark II)
Core retention or debris control 1
Combustible gas j l
control - while H2 l
control is provided in ;
Mark II by deinerting containment with nitrogen, additional l
__ ____ _ __ - _ a
i-measures for hydrogen control may be needed (Papazoglou, NUREG/CR-3028 cited)
.to reduce the danger of flammability during service deinerting Increased containment mass holding capability with increased volume, increased pressure capability, improved pressure suppression capability Protection for containment penetrations Vent-filtered This item is a general containment options reference to vent filtered described throughout containment conceptual designs the document within a program plan developed
49 -
under contract with the NRC and would. require the Licensing Board to examine the reference, NUREG/CR-1029, to divine whether there are any specific, cost-beneficial alternatives applicable to Limerick.
Clearly, this item does not state a SAMDA suitable for litigation in this proceeding.
Alternatives Identified in or Suggested by Documents Published After the Denial of the LEA Contention Modifications to This category as defined by LEA reduce seismic risk runs contrary to the specific requirements of the Commission Safety assurance that the alternatives be program specified by the Appeal Board in ALAB-819. For this reason, Alternatives all of these alternatives are identified in defective and should be NUREG/CR-3908, " Survey excluded from further of the State of the consideration. Even more Art in Mitigation importantly, each of the items I
i Systems," July 1984 merely refers to alternatives discussed generally within Alternatives referenced documentation L - . - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - . - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 identified in without specificity, without a NUREG/CR-4920, description of the
" Assessment of Severe applicability of these items to
'l Accident Prevention Limerick and without any basis and Mitigation for finding that any Features: BWR Mark II alternative would be Containment Design cost-beneficial for Limerick.
NOTE: These include The reference to the safety plant features and assurance program clearly goes operator beyond examinations of design action / procedures alternatives. One of the alternatives suggested herein ;
Alternatives refers to BWR 6 " Advance identified in Reactor Design." There is no NUREG/CR-4244, showing that any such
" Strategies for alternative would be Implementing a cost-beneficial or even Mitigation for Light applicable to Limerick.
Water Reactors," Moreover, the final item in January 1988 this category talks about operational alternatives and Alternatives not design alternatives.
identified in Boston Accordingly, these suggested Edison Co., " Report alternatives should not be Pilgrim Station Safety considered by the Licensing Enhancements" as Board.
revised NOTE: these
l-alternatives include both physical and operational plant changes
' Supplemental containment system e.nd other modifications as proposed and installed
.for the Shoreham Nuclear. Power Station Alternatives suggested by the GESSAR II/.BWR 6
" advanced reactor design" Alternatives identified in NUREG/CR-4243, "Value/ Impact Analysis for Evaluating Alternative Mitigation Systems," January 1988 Alternatives
, , )
l 4
identified in NUREG-1150, " Reactor Risk Reference Document," 1987 Operational alternatives identified or suggested by NUREG/CR-4177,
" Management of Severe Accidents," May 1985 Alternatives identifird in NUREG/CR-4025, " Design and Feasibility of Accident Mitigation Systems for Light Water Reactors,"
August 1985, see esp.,
pp. 3-24 to 3-77
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________.__m.mm-___-. I
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c..,
Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, only the specific SAMDA's which are being considered by Licensee as described in Paragraph 2 of the Report of the Parties and as further specified in its June 23, 1989 answer to the NRC's questions of May 23, 1989 need and should be given further consideration by the Licensing Board.
Respectfully submitted, CONNER & WETTERHAHN, P.C.
O Troy B. Conner, Jr.
Mark J. Wetterhahn Counsel for Licensee July 3, 1989
d >** v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of )
)
Philadelphia Electric Company ) Docket Nos. 50-352
) 50-353 (Limerick Generating Station, )
Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Memorandum Related To Proposed Design Mitigation Alternatives For Which Agreement Among The Parties Could Not Be Reached," dated July 3, 1989 in the captioned matter have been served upon the following by deposit in the United States mail this 3rd day of July, 1989:
Morton B. Margulies, Esq. Frederick J. Shon Chairman, Atomic Safety and Atomic Safety and Licensing Licensing Board Panel Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 .
Dr. Jerry L. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry Harbour Joseph Rutberg, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Ann Hodgdon, Erg.
Board Panel Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of General Counsel Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Edward J. Cullen, Esq.
Board Panel Philadelphia Electric U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Company Commission 2301 Market Street I Washington, D.C. 20555 Philadelphia, PA 19101 l l
l
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a
- Charles'W. Elliott, Esq. Gregory E. Dunlap, Esq.
Poswistilo,-'Elliott &- Deputy General-Counsel Elliott Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Suite 201. 17th Floor Harristown II 1101 Northampton St. 333 Market Street' Easton, PA 18042 Harrisburg, PA 17101 Angus Love,.Esq. Mr. Ralph Hippert-
. 107 East Main Street . Pennsylvania Emergency Norristown, PA 19401 Management Agency B151 - Transportation Safety Building Harrisburg,'PA '17120 Michael B. Hirsch,.Esq. Theodore G.' Otto, Esq.
Federal Emergency Department of Corrections Management Agency Office of Chief Counsel 500 C Street, S.W. P. O. Box 598 Rm. 840 Camp Hill, PA 17011 Washington, D.C. 20742
- Docketingfand Service Adjudicatory File (2)
Section Atomic Safety and Licensing U.-S... Nuclear Regulatory Board Panel Docket Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
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