ML20216J659

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SER Approving Revalidation of German Certificate D/4322/AF-85,Rev 0
ML20216J659
Person / Time
Site: 07103037
Issue date: 09/09/1997
From: Chappell C
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216J649 List:
References
NUDOCS 9709180027
Download: ML20216J659 (4)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINoTON, D.C. 3066Hm01 EVALUATION RECORD Model No. BU-D Package Certificate of Approval No. D/4322/AF-85 Revision No. O By application dated November 21, 1996, the Department of Transportation (DOT) requested assistance in evaluating the Model No. BU-D package authorized by German Certificate of Package Approval D/4322/AF-85, Revision O. The request was to evaluate specific contents in the Model No. BU-D package. DOT provided the safety analysis report for the sackage dated November 1987.

Based on the statements and representations in t1e application, we recommend revalidation of the German Certificate of Package Approval No. D/4322/AF-85, Revision 0, for the Model No. BU-D package for the contents described below.

PACKAGING ine Model No. BU-D phage consists of an outer steel container and an inner steel container with concrete insulation between the two containers. Within the inner container the uranium contaminated ash is loaded into three pails made of steel with clamping ring closures. A protective tube of stainless steel (2mm thickness The pails have a max) i mum inner diameter of 285mm.is placed The outer batween container is a the pails and the inner drum with a wall thickness of 1.2mm carbon steel or stainless steel. The drum is closed by a lid with a sponge rubber gasket and a screwed clamping ring.

7 The containment system is the inner container with the lid and closure screws.

The maximum weight of the packaging and contents is 260kg.

CONTENTS AND TRANSPORT INDEX FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY CONTROL Type and form of material UnirradiatedUraniumip5 the form of uranium oxide contain The maximum enrichment of 0is5%andthemaximummassof'gdinash. U is limited to 3509 Maximum quantity of material per package The maximum gross weight of the package is 260 kg. The maximum mass of U is limited to 3509 Transport index The minimum transport index to be shown o, 9r label for nuclear criticality control is 0.1.

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2 STRUCTURAL-The structural evaluation of the package is based on a series of calculations to evaluate.the package requirements under normal- conditions of transport. A series of drop tests was performed to evaluate the package under hypothetical l

accident conditions. 4 The calculations provided in the safety analysis report for normal conditions of transport demonstrated the package's ability to meet the requirements of IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials,1985 edition-(as amended in 1990).

The Model No. BU-D package was evaluated for hypothetical accident conditions by a 9m drop test and a 1 meter puncture test on prototype packages._ Three prototype packages were tested. The drop orientations were on 1) the surface line of the notch of the container, with the tension closure of the outer-container offset by 90' from the impact line-with a subsequent puncture test on the previously damaged area, at room temperature; 2) the lid edge with the tension lock of the outer container offset 90 from the point of impact with a puncture test on-the tension closure of the outer container, at room temperature; and 3) the lid edge in the vicinity of the clamping ring closure with a puncture test onto the lid center. at -15 C to -20 C. The maximum deformation occurred on test packages two and three (outer container deformation of 95mm).

After testing, one of the.three packages was opened to check the condition of the inner container. The inspection indicated no damage to the inner container. The fuel cans within the inner vessel had been deformed.

THERMAL The steady-state and non-staady-state temperature distributions in normal  !

operation _and in the hypothetical accident condition fire were calculated by the applicant with the HEATING-V computer-program. l The structural-components will not be adversely affected by the hot and cold-temperatures specified for normal conditions of transport. The calculations for hypothetical accident conditions indicated no unacceptable temperatures for the packaging materials. .In particular,- the calculated temperature of the seal was 155'C, which is below its service temperature of 200 C.

CONTAINMENT The-radioactive material is a Type A quantity of uranium oxide as ash. The ash'is retained within the inner container of the package under both normal and hypothetical accident conditions.

SHIELDING

-The contents are unirradiated uranium oxide as ash. Shielding is not needed l

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3 for the package to meet the external radiation standards.

CRITICALITY In support of the request the applicant submitted a criticality anglysis for the package. The analysis was performed using the KENO V.a computer code in the SCALE system with the 16-group Hansen-Roach cross section set. The analysis considered a 16x16x10 (5N) triangular pitch array of 2560 packages.

The package model does not include any packaging materials other than the carbon steel shell of the 55-gallon drum and the moderated contents. The model excludes the inner container and the concrete between the inner and the outer containers. The applicant modeled the contents as a sphere inside the outer 55-gallon drum. The applicant performed a series of calculation; to determine optimum internal and interspersed moderation. The applicant determined that the maximum k,,, was for a 26.6-inch diameter sphere of U0, pellets mixed with full density water and no interspersed moderation. The applicant calculated a k , of 0.8456 i 0.0021, for these conditions. The l

applicant confirmed the N,, calculations sing the 27GR0VPNDF4 cross section set. The k approximatel,y,0.75% calculated, using higher than the 27'JPNDF4 with cross section set, were Hansen-Roach cross section set.

The staff performed confirmatory calculations. The staff used the KENO V.a code in the SCALE 4.3 system, with the 44GROUPNDF5 cross section set. The staff used a similar model as the applicant. The staff performed and homogenous calculations for 8000 grams U0, and 352.4 grams of ageterogenous U. The staff determined the heterogenous configuration to be the most reactive loading. The staff performed optimum moderation calculations using both water and polyethylene. The staff determined polyethylene moderation to be the most reactive condition. The staff calculated a maximum k,,, of 0.8890 i 0.0008 for U0, ash.

Based on the applicant's calculations and the staff's confirmatory a'nalysis the

-staff agrees-that the package meets the criticality requirements of IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials,1985 edition (as amended in 1990).

OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES The operating and maintenance procedures for the package are specified in a document referenced in the German Certificate of Package Approval. This document was not included in the information submitted to DOT.

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4 CONCLUSIONS Based on our review of the statements and representations contained in the application and 5 Report No. RB-5304,_ Revision 0, " Safety Report for the TN-BN-D container for Transporting Nonirradiated Uranium 0xide" and for the reasons stated above, we recommend revalidation of the German Certificate D/4322/AF-85 (Rev. 0). The adequacy of the operating and maintenance procedures will be detennined by DOT.

L 2. d CassR.Chappell,yp Chief Package Certification Section Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards i

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