IR 05000261/1998004

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Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-261/98-04 on 980223-25 (Ref 10CFR73.21).No Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
ML20212H246
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/24/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20212H244 List:
References
50-261-98-04, 50-261-98-4, NUDOCS 9803310192
Download: ML20212H246 (2)


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. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: 50-261 License No.: DPR-23 Report No.: 50-261/98-04 Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Company Facility: H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Location: 3581 West Entrance Road Hartsville, SC 29550 Dates: February 23-25, .998 Inspector: D. H. Thompson, Safeguards Specialist Accompanying Personnel: R. Albert, Safeguards Branch, NRR D. Orrik, Safeguards Branch, NRR Approved by: G. Belisle Chief, Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety i

j 9803310192 980324 PDR ADOCK 05000261 O PDR w

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. i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant NRC Inspection Report 50-261/98-04 This safeguards inspection included aspects of licensee plant support. The report covers a three-day period of an announced special inspection by a regional safeguards specialist and selected personnel from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatio The specific areas evaluated were the Physical Security Program for Power Reactor Plant Sunnort _

  • Performance testing of the licensee's access control, personnel entry, intrusion detection, alarm station and alarm assessment equipment verified that the licensee had developed and employed a very good day-to-day security system that met the licensee's Physical Security Plan and Procedures requirements. The installation and operation of the intrusion detection equipment was good. The alarm station equipment was capable of supporting the security syste Alarm station and access control operators were well trained and responded to all alarms and assessments as required. On November 19, 1997, for approximately seven hours, the protected area perimeter intrusion detection system microwave zone (ALMWABZ-1) was inoperative without proper compensatory measures being implemented. This resulted in Non-Cited Violation (NCV) 50-261/98-04-0 * The licensee's response strategy for protection of the vital equipment was very well planned and the execution was '

excellent during three table-top drills and one actual dril i l =_ == v _a es-a encheweb)misdooumemisessenseemL

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