ML20207T560

Insp Rept 50-261/87-02 on 870217-18.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of Limited Exercise to Demonstrate Adequacy of Corrective Actions Taken by Licensee in Response to Weaknesses

ML20207T560
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	02/25/1987
From:	Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207T554	List: ML20207T553 ML20207T560
References
50-261-87-02, 50-261-87-2, NUDOCS 8703240131
Download: ML20207T560 (15)

See also: IR 05000261/1987002

Text

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UNITED STATES -

/ 'o , ~ NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

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REGION ll

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g j 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.

• 4 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 -

...../ FEB 2 71987

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Report No.: 50-261/87-02

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Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company

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P. O. Box 1551

Raleigh, NC .27602

, Docket No.: 50-361 License No.: DPR-23

i' Facility Name: H. B. Robinson

v' Inspection Conducted: Feb uar 17-18, 1987

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-Inspector: &k

W. M. 5artor

3/AM/F7

Uate signed

Approved by: a 6D . 122r /

Date Signed

- T. R. Decker Section Chief

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards ,. .

SUMMARY

Scope: This special announced inspection involved the observation of a limited

exercise to demonstrate the adequacy of corrective actions taken by the

licensee in response to exercise weaknesses identified during the 1986 CY

emergency exercise.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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PDM

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• R. E. Morgan, General Manager

• B. G. Rieck, Control and Administration

• J. Curley, Director of Regulatory Compliance

• B. D. McFeathers, Corporate Emergency Preparedness

• M. Marrow, Robinson Emergency Preparedness

! Other licensee employees contacted included managers, engineers,

technicians, operators, security office members and office personnel.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

H. Krug, Senior Resident Inspector

R. Latta, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

j The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 18, 1987,

l with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector

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described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection

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findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the

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materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this

inspection.

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3. LicenseeActiononPreviousEnforcementMatters(92700)

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4. ExerciseScenario(82301)

The exercise scenario was reviewed and was found to be adequate to

demonstrate the objectives therein. The objectives had been developed by

the licensee to demonstrate the adequacy of corrective actions taken in

response to exercise weaknesses identified during the December 17, 1986,

Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise. These weaknesses included a

delayed first aid response to a simulated medical emergency, an excessive

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time period required for activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC)

and Emergency Operations Facility (E0F), and an incomplete information

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flow from the Control Room to the TSC and from the Communicators to the

State and counties. The scenario provided for a medical emergency and a

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simulated accident which resulted in a General Emergency classification.

! During the simulated accident the TSC and E0F were manned and participated

fully. The Control Room participation was only a player / controller (one

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individual ~ playing 'both roles) and a Consnunicator. Their participation

was limited to providing the exercise messages to the TSC -after it 'was ' f ,Mw .. '

activated 'and to making the offsite notifications prior to the TSC

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assuming this responsibility. Other emergency organizations and personnel-

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did not participate.

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5. Specific Observations 4

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Medical Emergency

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The scenario provided for a medical response to a simulated fall bj a . '

Chemistry technician resulting in a loss of consciousness and ~

contamination of the injured technician and immediate vicinity due to

spilled samples.

The injured, contaminated individual was handled effectively. A. ,

Med-Tech guard was at the scene providing immediate first-aid 1

minutes of the discovery. The simulated patient was properly cared *,

for and was prepared for transport from the site within approximately /-

30 minutes from the time of the accident. Radiological monitoring /^ J "

and contamination control techniques were observed during the medical

- emergency. The medical drill was successful and considered to be a

significant improvement over the December 17, 1986, drill in which ,

t 42 minutes elapsed from the time of discovery of the injured

! individual to the time initial first-aid was provided. -

i b. Technical Support Center

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The TSC was manned and activated 27 minutes after the Alert had been

declared. Command and control appeared to be effective and personnel

appeared aware of ongoing events and knowledgeable of their *

i responsibilities as observed during the status briefings held by the ..

i Site Emergency Coordinator. The primary focus of the inspector's

observations following the TSC's activation centered on the

information flow from the Control Room and the notifications made r.o e

the State and counties. The receipt of information from the control C .

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Room was timely and accurate. However, this information flow was an *

exercise artificiality since the Control Room personnel were not'

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fully playing except for passing information and making -

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notifications. During the licensee's criticue it was noted that

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!- personnel making notifications had signif' cant problems in ,

4 establishing the conference calls for making notifications. The r

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licensee stated that this problem should be corrected with the

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selective signaling feature being added to their telephones during

March 1987. Notifications were adequate in that they were promptly

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initiated and provided significant events and periodic status updates

to the State and counties. ,

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' *~ c. Emergency Operations Facility

The EOF was manned'and activated 31 minutes after the declaration of

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a Site Area Emergency. The licensee's objective for activating the

< E0F did not include setting up the E0F as this had been done the-

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previous day. Communicators were readily available to support the

manning of the' EOF. Again, the E0F appeared to operate effectively

as indicated by the periodic staff briefings conducted by the

Emergency Response Manager. The changes made by the licensee to

provide communicators to the E0F from alternate communicators in the

TSC appeared to support a timely activation of the E0F.

A 6. / Exercise Critique

b The licensee terminated the exercise when they felt they met the

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objectives that verified the adequacy of actions taken to correct the

exercise weaknesses. Later in the day a critique was held in which

'licentee evaluator comments were provided to licensee management.

Hy foll5 wing this the NRC inspector provided observations which supported the

w ,y licenset's successful demonstration of adequate corrective actions.

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, 7.; y Irjspector Followup (92701)

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a. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-261/86-30-03: Exercise

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4 Weakness - TSC and EOF not activated timely. The TSC and E0F were

% timely activated during the limited exercise.

b. (Closed) IFI 50-261/86-30-04: Exercise Weakness - Onsite first-aid

f response was not timely. A med-tech guard was available to provide

r N first-aid to the simulated injury within approximately three minutes

, of the discovery of the injured individual.

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c. (Closed) IFI 50-261/86-30-05: Exercise Weakness - Inadequate

followup messages to the State and counties. Periodic followup

messages were provided to the State and counties.

0 d.' (Closed) IFI 50-261/86-30-06: E0F and TSC status boards not

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. adequately maintained. The status boards in the EOF and TSC were

y; ' / maintained on a timely basis with the significant events.

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Attachment:

.H. B. Robinson Drill Objectives

and Scenario Timeline

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H. B. ROBINSON NUCLEAR PROJECT

87-01 DRILL OBJECTIVEg -

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A. Notification l Mobilization, and Communications

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert,and mobilize RNPD emergency

response personnel.

2. Demonstrate the ability to notify and communicate initial and

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follow-up emergency informati'on to State and Local authorities.

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3. Demonstrate the adequacy and effective use of coassunications

procedures and methods to inform onsite and effsite emergency

response personnel of the status of the emergency situation and the

Plant conditions.

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B. Protective Response

1. Demonstrate the ability to survey, respond to, and treat a

contaminated medical emergency using the proper first aid equipment. '

2. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures necessary for

decontamination of emergency workers and equipment.

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C. Emergency Response Facilities *

1. Demonstrate the initial activation and functional adequacy of the

Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility

(EOF). ~

2. Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of responsibilities from

to the TSC staff and subsequently to the EOF. .

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SCN:86-6045(1) 2.0-1

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Marrative summary

This scenario is based upon a medical emergency, a hydrogen leak'in a vital

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area, failure of ,the reactor to trip on demand, fuel damage, and a loss of

coolant accident.

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Initial conditions establish the Plant at 651 power. The Plant has reduced

power in order to perform OST-551 (Turbine Trip Functional Test) and scheduled

maintenance on "A" Main Feedwater Pump.

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At the beginning of the scenario, a Chemistry Technician is found unconscious

by the ramp beside the RWST, apparently knocked out froh a fall due to an ice

accumulation on the ramp. Several containers from his sample hay have been

opened and spilled on the Chemistry Technician. An Und'sual Event should then

be declared due to " injured and contaminated personnel."

At 08:40, the condenser vacuum trip does not function correctly during the

performance of 087-551. A work request is generated, maintenance is notified,

and an I&C Technician is dispatched to investigate the problem.

At 08:45, a construction worker notifies the control room about a hydrogen '

line rupture on the east side of the auxiliary building wall. Personnel are

dispatched from the control room and verify that the auxiliary building ,

hydrogen supply header is completely severed just above the intake for HVS-5A C

("A" Emergency Diesel Generator Room).

It was discovered that the CARDOX system has been actuated. Shortly after the

line break is discovered, a hydrogen leak survey indicates levels of >100% LEL

outside the Emergency D/C room. An Alert should be declared at this time due

to " unplanned and uncontrolled entry of flammable or toxic gases into vital

areas in sufficient quantities to endanger personnel." An inspection of the

room will reveal that no fire exists.-

At around 10:30, the turbine trips due to a loss of condenser vacuum. The

lef t turbine stop valve and the left upper governor valve close switches do

not make, and a reactor trip signal is not generated. The operator will not

be able to initiate a manual reactor trip due to both reactor trip breakers

mechanically binding in the closed position. A Site Emergency will be

declared due to this ATWS condition. The EOP Network will be entered, and at

10:45 the reactor is successfully tripped outside the control room. During

the pressure transient, further fuel failure occurs, therefore, increasing

reactor coolant activity substantially. Also, during the pressure transient,

the pressuriser safety valves lift and relieve to the pressurizer relief tank

(PRT).

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SCN 87-576 3.0-1

RNPD-87-01

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' Pressuriser relief valve RC-551'A does not fully ressat after the pressure

transient and continues to relieve to the PRT at a substantilat' rate. During

this same time, "B" sain feedwater pump trips due to HI-HI level in "A" steam

generator, and attempts to restart the pump will be unsuccessful. A Safety

Injection occurs at 11:05. Control board indications and radiation monitors

will confirm a loss of coolant accident and_ substantial fuel damage. When the

reactor fails to trip, a Site Emergency should be declared duai to " failure of

the reactor protection system to initiate and complete a trip which brings the

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reactor to a subcritical condition as indicated by a valid trip signal

generated (manual or automatic) and reactor trip does not take place." The

event should be upgraded to a General. Emergency by approximately 11:45 due to

R-32 A/B >1,000 R/HR. -

The PZR safety valve will fully ressat around 11:30, but only after the

rupture disks on the PRT have blown, releasing main coolant to containment

-steosphere. Containment radiation monitors will increase, and a dose

assessment will be made. Plant Operations staff will stabilise the Plant by

use of the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). Recovery efforts will focus

on maintaining the Plant in a stable condition and r,estoring normal

feedwater. __ _

INITIAL CONDITIONS

HBR Unit 2 has been at 100% power for_the past 28 days. All Plant parameters. *

are stable.

At 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> on February 18, 1987, a s' low power reduction was started in

order to reduce power to 65% for maintenance on "A" main feed pump. While the

unit is at 65% power, osT-551 is scheduled to be performed. ~"A" main feed

pump is to be removed from service at 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> and remain out-of-service for

4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

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"A" Emergency Diesel was removed from service at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> for scheduled

preventive maintenance. It is expected to be returned to service at

1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />.

Reactor coolant activity is 0.5 uci/mi I-131 dose equivalent as analyzed at

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0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />. Due to being at elevated levels, coolant activity is being

closely monitored. Due to increased activity, R-2 setpoint has been increased

to 400 mR/hr and R-6 has been reset to 200 mR/hr.

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A work request has been generated to work on HVEla-CV-69 suction damper due to

it being mechanically bound open.

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Winds are light and variable from the northwest (270*). It will be a bright

sunny day with a temperatures in the low 40s. - -

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SCN:87-576 3.0-2

RNPD-87-01

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OPERATIONAL TIMELINE

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H+00:00 Establish initial conditions

0800 a.m.

Prior to 0300.a.m., Unit 2 had been at 100% power for

28 days. Power descension is'necessary to perform ~

maintenance on "A" feed pump.

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Unit 2 is curre'ntly at 65% power.

Work is scheduled on the condenser vacuum trip mechanism.

U "A" Diesel generator.is out-of-service for quarterly

preventive maintenance. -

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"A" main feedwater pump is out-of-service, 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

maintenance begun. -

Plant RCS showing increasing activity, potential fuel

leakers, R-9 reading.1500 mR/hr

RCS activity, previous sample 0.15 uci/mi I131, 2.2 uCi/mi

gross.

Work Request has been generated on HVEla-CV-69 suction

damper due to it be'ing mechanically bound open.

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Due to increased activity, R-2 setpoint is increased to

400 mR/hr and R-6 has been reset to 200 mR/hr.

The wind is currently out of the northwest (330*) at

2.0 mph. .

H+00:05 A Chemistry Technician exiting the Auxiliary Building from

0805 a.m. sampling has been found unconscious by the ramp beside the

RWST.

H+00:15 Waste disposal Boron Recycle Panel Trouble Alarm

0815 a.m. (APP-002-42) is received on RTGB.

NOTE: An AO should be dispatched to check or change

hydrogen bottle banks, upon changing bottle, the

alarm does not clear. .

H+00:15 An Unusual Event should have been declared by this time due

0815 a.m. to " contaminated and injured personnel being transported to

Byerly Hospital."

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SCN 87-576 3.0-3

RMPD-87-01

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H+00:45 Construction reports the discovery of a line break '

0845 a.m. between the new Radweste Building and Auxiliary Building

above the supply fan louvers of the diesel generator room

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,HVS-5A

( intake).

H+00:50 A0 personnel dispatched to perform a visual surveillance,

0850 a.m. the hydrogen supply line.is.found to be broken above the

Auxiliary Building /DC room air intake. .

A0 will be able to hear a line pressure gas r'elease.

No visible sign of a fire in area detected.

H+01:05 A survey for hydrogen outside the Emergency D/G room shows

0905 a.m.- levels of >1001 LEL.

H+01:20

An Alert should be declared at this time due to 12(d)

0920 a.m. Alert - any unplanned and uncontrolled entry of flammable or

toxic gases into vital areas in sufficient quantities to

endanger personnel. .

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NOTE: A contingency message may have to be issued to

prompt a survey around the Auxiliary Building.and

diesel generator areas. ,

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H+02:28

1028 a.m. Rod control system urgent failure alarm - APP 005-026.

H+02:30

1030 a.m. , Turbine trip due to loss of condenser vacuum en the

condenser. 1bs I&C Technician was working on the vacuum trip

mechanism.

NOTE: EOP Path 1 should be entered utilizing FRP 5.1.

An ATWS occurs because the left stop valve close limit

switch does not trip - it fails open.

PZR hi pressure signal is not received.

Cannot manually drive control rods due to logic cabinet ,

failure. I

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PORV block valves remain closed. l

R, pressure increases .

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R, temperature increases l

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SCN 87-576 3.0-4

EMPD-87-01

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H+02:33 Pressuriser safety valves RC-551A. RC-5518, and RC-551C

1033 a.m. lift. .

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PER safety relief valves t'ailpipe T. E.s increas~e to

approximately 320*F.

R-9 starts increasing due to.. failed fuel.-~ reads

25,000 mR/hr. .

H+02:34 Pressuriser Relief Tank message ,

1034 a.m. Pressure increasing 30 pois

Temperature increasing 250*F -

Tank level increasing 75%

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H+02:35 Reactor is manually tripped.

' 1035 a.m.

H+02:38 Pressurizer Relief Tank message

1038 a.m. * Loss of pressure 0 psig (* denotes rupture disc failure)

Temperature decreased 220*F

PRT level: 100%

Loose part monitor alarm on channel 752 and 753 (lower R,

vessel monitor)

H+02:45 A site emergency should be declared at this time due to 1.0

1045 a.m. Site Emergency - Failure of the reactor protection system to

initiate and complete a trip which brings the reactor to a

subcriticci condition as indicated by valid trip signal

generated (manual or automatic) and.R, trip does not take

place.

H+02:45 Main feedwater pump "B" trips -

1045 a.m.

NOTE: Operations will try to reset pump at lockout relay

on 4160V breaker cabinet; however, attempts to reset

pump will be unsuccessful due to bearing

failure / shaft seizure (standby oil pump did not pick

up).

Steam generators start to boil dry - level decreasing.

Increased Radiation levels for R-2, R-7, R-32 a/b,- i

PZR Safety Relief Valves RC-5518 and RC-551C have closed.

RC-551A is stuck open. TE 469 is reading 320* and there are

indications on the acoustic monitor.

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SCN 87-576 3.0-5

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RNPD-87-01

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Motor driven auxiliary feed pump starts. , .

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R-2 High Offscale .

R-7 Increasing rapidly towards Offscale High

R-32 450 R/hr

R-325 530 R/hr

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H+03:30 TE 469 is now 280*F, pressuriser safety relief valve RC-551A

1130 a.m. has resented. l

H+03:45 A general emergency should be declared at this time based on

1145 a.m. a 3.0 - General Emer8ency. R-32 A/B.) 1000 Elhe.

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s R-2 High Offscale

R-7 High Offscale

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. R32A 1175 R/hr

R328 1230 R/hr I

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H+04:15 Maintenance gets main feedpump "A" available. j

1215 a.m. '

Reactor Coolant activity 8.36E03 uCi/cc.

226' EL Auxiliary._ Building airborne levels

> 1.5 E-04 uci/cc. -

H+04:30 Issue message to begin consideration of recovery efforts

because '

1230 p.m. Plant has reached stable conditions.

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Potential for downgrade

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SCN:87-576 3.0-6

RNPD-87-01

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SCENARIO TIMELINE '

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INITIATING

)lESSAGE

TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SLBetARY

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H+00:00 1. Initial Conditions.are established.

08:00 a.m. -

Note Due to elevated RCS activity, chemistry

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should be on an increased sampling

surveillance. (Cross RCS activity =

2.29 uci/al; I-131 activity = 0.15 uci/ml.)

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H+00:05 2. A Chemistry Technician has bAen injured by the

, 0805 a.m. ramp beside the RWST.

H+00:15 01-C If no one has found the contaminated injured

0815 a.m. chemistry technician, the In-Plant Controller will

make proper notification to the Shift Foreman of

the accident. .

H+00:15 3. Waste Disposal Boron Recycle Panel Trouble Alarm

08:15 a.m. (APP-002-42) is received on RTCB. .

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Note: The Control Operators should notify the

In' side Auxiliary Operator to check on

alarm.

Floating 02-C An Unusual Event should have been declared by this

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time due to " contaminated-and injured personnel

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being transferred to Byerly Hospital."

Note: Declare an Unusual Event.

H+00:20 4. Inside Auxiliary ~ Operator Discovers a " Hydrogen

08:20 a.m. Supply Header Low Pressure" Alarm (APP-011-04) on

Waste Disposal Panel.

Note: Notify Outside Auxiliary Operator to check

Hydrogen Supply System.

If new bottle bank is valved in, the alarm

will still not clear.

H+00:40 5. During the performance of OST-551, the Condenser

08:40 a.m. Vacuum Trip did not perform properly. A Work

Request was generated, and Maintenance notified.

An I&C Technician has been dispatched to

investigate.

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SCN:87-576 3.0-7

RNPD-87-01

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SCENARIO TIMELINE (Continued) ~

INITIATING

, MESSAGE

TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY

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H 00:45 6. Shift Foreman receives a call from Construction  !

08:45 a.m. informing him that a line has been ruptured on the  !

East wall of the Auxiliary Building. I

Note: Some*one should be dispatched to

investigate. ~

H:00:50 7. ~

The Outside Auxiliary Oper tor informs the Shift t

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08:50 a.m. Foreman that the hydrogen line on the East wall of 1

the Auxiliary Building has been ruptured above the '

intake for HVS-5A. Currently, there is no visible

sign of fire.

Note: Shift Foreman should direct the Auxiliary

Operator to isolate the hydrogen header at

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the hydrogen shed. He should also dispatch

someone to survey the area with a hydrogen .

sniffer. C

H+01:05 8. The Emerg'ency D/G Cardox System was found to have

09:05 a.m. been actuated. A survey for hydrogen outside the

Emergency D/G room shows levels of >100% LEL.

H+01:15 3-C CONTINGENCY MESSACE: An Alert should be declared

09:20 a.m. at this time due to 12(d) - any unplanned and

uncontrolled entry of flammable or toxic gas into

vital areas in sufficient quantities to endanger

personnel.

Note: Declare an Alert.

H+02:28 9. " Rod Control System Urgent Failure" Alarm received

10:28 a.m. on APP-005-26.

Note: Shift Foreman should dispatch Operator to

Rod Control Room to investigate.

H+02:30 10. Turbine Trip due to loss of condenser vacuum.

10:30 a.m.

Note: EOP Path 1 should be entered utilizing

FRP 5.1.

Reactor Trip signal is not generated due to Close

Limit Switches not made on left turbine stop valve

and left upper governor valve.

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SCN:87-576 3.0-8

RNPD-87-01

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SCENARIO TIMELINE (Continued) _

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INITIATING

.hESSACE

TyE NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUletARY

H+02:33 11. PZR PORV/ Safety Valve Open Alarm is received on

10:33 a.m. Annunciator Panel APP-001. -

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PRV 551A, 5)18, 551C alare lights are lit on the

RMS Panel. .

H+02:34 12. "PZR Relief Tank Hi/Lo Level, Hi Press / Temp" alarm

10:34 a.m. is received on Annunciator Panel.

APP-003

PRT Level = 75%

PRT Press. = 30 PSIC

PRT Temp. = 250*F

Note:

.

Continue with E0P Network.

H+02:35 13. Reactor is successfully tripped outside the.

10:35 a.m. Control Room. All control rods are fully -

insert ed ., -

H+02:38 14. PRT Press: O psi

10:38 a.m. PRT Level: 100%

PRT Temp. 220*F

RMS-2 indicates >1000 mR hr.

LPMS Alarm is received on Aux. Annunciator Panel

APP-036.

.

When LPMS alarms are investigated, multiple alarms

on Channels 752 and 753 (Lower Ex. Vessel) will be

found.

I

Note: Continue with EOP Network. '

!

H+02:45 04-C A Site Emergency should have been declared by this

10:45 a.m. time due to 1.0 - failure of the Reactor  !

Protection System to initate and complete a trip,

which brings the reactor to a suberitical i

condition as indicated by: Valid trip signal l

generated (Manual or Automatic and Reactor Trip

does not take place). l

l

Note: Declare Site Emergency.

. l

l

l

SCN:87-576 3.0-9

RNPD-87-01

)

..

.

.

i

d

SCENARIO TIMELINE (Continued)

.

INITIATING t

)3SSAGE

TIME NUMBER PLANT EVENT SUMMARY

-

H+02:45 15. "PWP-B Min. Flow Trip" Alarm is received on 1

' 10:45 a.m. Annunciator Panel APP-007. "B" Nein Feedwater

l

Pump trips. Attempts to restart the pump are {

unsuccessful.

Note: Initiate AFW Flow. *

PZR Safety Relief Valve RC 5515 and RC-557C have

' closed. RC-551A is stuck open. TE-469 is reading

320* and there are indications on the acoustic i

monitor. i

H+03:30 16. Annunciator light "PZR PORV/ Safety Valve Open"

11:30 a.m. clears. You are able to reset the alarm for PZR

Safety PRV-551A. ~

,

TI-469 (PZR Safety Relief Line Temp.) indication

trends down slightly.

,

C

Note: Co'ntinue with EOP Network.

H+03:45 05-C A General Emergency should have been declared by

11:45 a.m. this time due to 3.0 - R-32 A/B >1000 R/hr.

,

'

Note: Declare General Emergency.

H+04:15 17. You are notified by Maintenance that "A" Main Feed

12:15 a.m. Pump is available.

Note: "A" Main Feed Pump available.

Secure AFW Pumps.

H+04:30 06-C Due to stable Plant conditions, recovery efforts

12:30 p.m. should be initiated.

i Note: Initiate recovery efforts.

l

.

I

l . .

-

I

SCN:87-576 3.0-10

1

RNPD-87-01

- _. .

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