IR 05000346/1988034

Insp Rept 50-346/88-34 on 881101-03.No Violations Noted. Major Areas inspected:1988 Emergency Preparedness Exercise (IP 82301),involving Observations of Four NRC Insps on Most of Facilities,Equipment & Personnel Involved in Exercise

ML20206M312
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	11/18/1988
From:	Patterson J, Ploski T, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206M309	List: IR 05000346/1988034 ML20206M305
References
50-346-88-34-01, 50-346-88-34-1, NUDOCS 8811300531
Download: ML20206M312 (22)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-346/88034(DRSS)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 Licensee: Toledo Edison Company Edison Plaza 300 Madison Avenue Toledo, OH 43652 Facility Name: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Davis-Besse Site, Oak Harbor, OH Inspection Conducted: November 1-3, 1988 Inspectors:

W$>?Y '

T. Ploski

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Jn J Patterson Date Approved By:

LC. $$

W. Snell, Chief 9/m/as Emergency Preparedne:S Section Date Inspection Summary Inspection on November 1-3, 1988 (Report No. 50-346/88034(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the 1988 emergency preparedness exercise (IP 82301), involving the observations of four NRC inspectors on most of the facilities, equipment, and personnel involved in the exercise.

I Results: No violations, deviations or deficiencies were identified. The overall performance of the licensee's emergency responders was good, although This was the third group of

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some improvement items have been suggested.

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emergency responders who have suce.essfully demonstrated their capabilities

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over the last three exercises. One Open Item was identified (Section 6)

which requires the licensee to re-evaluate the wording and interpretation of an Emergency Action Level relevant to this exercise scenario. Field monitoring teams, the post-accident sampling team, the corporate office's emergency support organization, and the near-site Radiologiccl Testing Laboratory were activated but were not observed during this exercise.

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DETAILS  ; NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room (CR), Technical Support Center (TSC), and

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Emergency Control Center (ECC)

J. Patterson, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams P. Byron, CR, TSC, ECC, and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) s D. Kosloff, CR, TSC, ECC, and JPIC [

L Licensee Personnel Contacted

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D. Shelton, Vice President, Nuclear

J. Scott-Wasilk, Nuclear Health and Safety Directo.-

T. Myers, Nuclear Licensing Director j R. Flood, Operations Superintendent i B. DeMaison, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Manager i

! B. Cope, Onsite EP Supervisor i M. Findley, Offsite EP Supervisor I The above licensee representatives, and 50 other licensee staff involved ,

in the exercise as players, controllers, or as observers attended the -

November 3, 1988 exit intervie l

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l General l An exercise of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Emergency  ;

i Plan was conducted on November 2, 1988, testing the integrated responses l l of the licensee's Emergency Response Organization (ERO) to a hypothetical t

, accident scenario resulting in a sisiulated release of radioactive i material. This early morning hours exercise formally involved only the ,

l licensee's ERO. However, Ottawa County officials utilized this exercise i as a training opportunity. The attachments to this report describe the

! exercise's scope and objectives and the scenario's narrative summary and ,

1 approximate timelin [

General Observations b

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l Procedures .

This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50,  ;

Appendix E requirements using OSNPS Emergency Plan and related [

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I f Coordination

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The licensee's overall response was coordinated, orderly, and ,

I timely. If scenario events had been real, actions taken by the licensee would have been sufficient to allow State and local i authorities to take appropriate actions to protect public health l l

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t c. Observers ,

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Licensee observers monitored and critiqued this exercise along '

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with four NRC representative ;

d. Critiques  ;

The licensee held critiques in each facility immediately following !

the exercise. Lead controllers presented a summary critique to an i audience of about 50 players, controllers and observers on L i

November 3, 1988. That presentation was followed by the NRC's '

I exercise critique, which was given to the same audience.

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5. Specific Observations (IP 82301)

j Control Room (CR)

l lhe Shift Supervisor ($$) in charge of CR activities correctly interpreted information on the severity of the first earthquake as !

, requiring an Alert declaration. He directed his staff to initiate ,

inplant damage assessment The SS then accurately completed an l initial notification message form and ordered the onshift Admin AssistanttotransmitthemessagetoStateandcountyofficials over the dedicated "white phone . These officials were initially

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notified of the Alert declaration in a timely manner. The

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Admin Assistant did have to make a separate call to notify a

Lucas County representative of the emergency declaration, as no one from that county had answered the initial "white phone" call. The i Admin Assistant also had to advise the Lucas County representative on how to accomplish the message verification callbac After declaring the Alert at 2:06 the SS told the Admin j Assistant to activate the Computerized Automated Notification System l (CANS) used by this licensee to activate its Emergency Response l Organization (ERO). In an unsuccessful attempt to avoid confusion,

a controller then gave the Admin Assistant two coded messages for l input to the CANS. The first coded message was to indicate that an

, exercise was in progress. The 'econd message indicated that an

, Alert had been declared. However, the controller mistakenly gave l the Admin Assistant an incorrectly coded message that an off-hours augmentation drill had begun. Consequently, the second coded message wat not properly recognized by the CANS. The ERO's pagers i did not activate. As controllers researched their error, the Admin i Assistant notified offsite officials of the Alert, while the SS

! contacted the Emergency Plant Manger (EPM) and the Emergency l Assistant Plant Manager (EAPM). Both managers were inforfred of the i Alert declaration and the apparent problem with the CANS. They I began to formulate plans to activate the ERO without using the l CAN Per procedures, the EAPM would then report to the CR while

! the EPM would report to the Technical Support Center (TSC).

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However, by that time the controllers had corrected their error l and had given the Admin Assistant the properly coded CANS j message The pagers were finally activated at 2:36 a.m.

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While the problems with the CANS were being resolved, the SS also completed a proceduralized version of the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet. The completed form contained adequately detailed information regarding the Alert declaration and the ongoing response effort The SS instructed another member of his staff to notify the NRC of the Alert declaration, using the completed worksheet as a referenc This call was initiated well within the regulatory time limi The SS wisely decided to have a reactor coolant system leakrate test performed as part of the ensite damage assessment activities shortly after the first earthquake. CR staff soon concluded that the unavailability of both containment spray systems resulted in a 4-hour Limiting Condition for Operation being in effect. An orderly reactor shutdown was then initiated. At about 2:45 a.m., the SS contacted the interim person in charge of the Operational Support Center (OSC) to discuss the status of both containment spray systems and the options for expediting the r* pair of at least one of the The containment spray pump with the cracked casing was correctly recognized as a release path to the environment should plant conditions further degrade. CR staff prudently isolated the pump and disabled the breaker to its closed isolation valve until the casing could be repaire CR staff used the plant's Public Address (PA) system to announce each emergency declaration. Such announcements were timely and were made using preformatted messages that included the emergency classification, but not the reason for the declaratio However, persons within the emergency facilities were promptly told of the reason for each emergency declaration as the exercise progresse Noise levels in the CR were occasionally too high. This was partly due to persons in the CR and the adjacent Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC) talking loudly to each other through the window-sized opening in the wall separating the CR and STSC. As in the 1987 exercise, CR and STSC staff exhibited a tendency not to repeat back orders or other important pieces of informatio Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• CR and STSC personnel should repeat back orders and other important pieces of information relayed to each other to better ensure that such messages are correctly understood, b. Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplant Teams Onshift, Continuous Service Group personnel began staffing the OSC following the Alert declaratio They efficiently rearranged Airniture, mounted status boards, and installed telephones to cone rt an onsite lunchroom into an OSC workspace. Communications were quickly established with the CR. Several inplant teams were quickly formed to assess the containment spray pumps' problem .

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, Additional OSC staff arrived to augment onshift personnel following ;

i' the 2:35 a.m. pager system activation. Incoming personnel were ;

adequately briefed on plant status and ongoing inplant team activities by the interim OSC supervision. Communications were soon i established with the TSC, which had also been activated following the Alert declaration. Communications were well maintained with the t l CR and TSC throughout the exercis l

, OSC status boards were effectively used to track which personnel had l I been assigned to specific inplant items and which personnel, having i

certain specialities, were still available for assignmen OSC i

status boards were also well used to track the teams' missions, I their deployment status, and whether teams had successfully l completed their assignments. Other status boards displayed key l

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events and relevant plant parameter information. A dedicated ;

recorder maintained a detailed log for the OSC Manager, while i another detailed log was kept by an assistant to the Radiological Controls Coordinator (RCC). i

! The OSC Manager demonstrated good command and control of OSC

, personnel and effectively interfaced with the RCC. He received good support from his staff. The OSC Manager occasionally briefed

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j j available personnel on changing scenario events to supplement status !

) board information. However, the briefings could have been more -

{ frequent and could have included more interpretations of the status !

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board entries. A microphone was availabls for the OSC Manager's l

use. He elected not to use the microphone even after receiving (

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several indications from OSC staff that his announcements were l-

difficult to hear in relatively remote areas of the OSC.

! i I Concern was demonstrated for avoiding unnecessary exposure For ;

I example, the RCC was at fint reluctant for ALARA considerations to -

l send a second inplant team to conduct a more detailed examination of .

the dhmaged containment equipment hatch, which was a key element in l

the release path postulated in this scenario. The proposed task i

was debated at some length by the RCC, bis staff, and maintenance L j personnel as containment pressure gradually decreased. To ensure i that the Emergency Director (ED) and EPM would demonstrate an exercise f j objective of deciding whether to authorize an exposure in excess of r i normal regulatory limits, controllers issued a message stating i

! that another hatch examination was necessary. The correct ;

i decision was soon made that each team member could receive a f

simulated whole body exposure of up to 5 REM to perform the hatch j

inspection, which could have expedited release terminatio ;

, t Inplant teams were adequately briefed on their assignment !

Although radios were available in the OSC, they were not issued

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to the teams. Inplant t1ams relied on the plant's Gaitronics system ;

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to communicate with OSC supervisio At the exit interview, the licensee indicated that the radios had been recently acquired and were different from those previously used by OSC staff. The teams had,therefore, been reluctant to demonstrate the use of unfamiliar radio equipment during this evaluated exercise. Team debriefings

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were adequate. However, many debriefings took place in an aisle directly in front of the OSC Manager's workstation and several status boards. Conducting debriefings in this location unnecessarily increased congestion and noise levels near the OSC Manager's workstation. Simulated exposures received by the teams were adequately tracked by OSC staf Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• Briefings given to all OSC staff should be frequent and should expand on the information that is summarized on status board * Briefings intended for all OSC staff should be audib throughout +.he OSC workspac * Inplant team debriefings should take place in a suitable OSC location where they will not adversely impact noise levels and congestion near a supervisor's workstatio c. Technical Support Center (TSC)

Upon his arrival in the TSC, the Emergency Plant Manager (EPM)

contacted supervisors in the CR and the OSC to inform them of his arrival, the status of TSC activation, and to obtain current information on plant status and inplant team activities. Once sufficient staff had arrived in the TSC, the EPH gave a thorough j

briefing on his conversations with CR and OSC counterpart The EPh also provided a well detailed initial briefing to the Emergency Director (ED), who freely moved between the TSC and nearby Emergency Control Center (ECC) during the exercise. The EPH kept the ED very well informed of changes in plant status and the results of inplant

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l teams' efforts throughout the exercis The TSC Engineering Manager automatically assumed the lead role in

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the TSC whenever the EPH went to the ECC to confer with the E0 and

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Emergency Offsite Manager (EOM) on urgent matters. For example, I by about 4:20 a.m. the EPM and key TSC staff had concluded that the reactor trip with the failure of several rods to fully insert, either automatically or manually, did not satisfy all the criteria for a Site Area Emergency declaration per Emergency Action Level (EAL) 3.C.3. The reactor had been brought subcritical with the aid of boron injectio The EPM, EO, and E0M reviewed plant i

status and the wording of this EA They concurred that its criteria were not all applicable. Controllers then issued a contingency message that required the ED to declare a Site Area Emergenc This situation is further discussed in Section 6 of this repor l l

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l The EPM, ED, and EOM later conferred in the ECC regarding the !

I release path. TSC staff had correctly concluded that the first ,

, earthquake had degraded the outer containment equipment hatch, i

! The EPH responded to the ED's and EOM's questions on this release

! sath and discussed options for temporarily repairing the damage

,! Defore plant conditions further deteriorated.

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A contingency message was issued shortly before 4:00 a.m. to have I

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TSC engineering staff analyze onsite seismic data from the first

' earthquake. They correctly determined that the seismic event was f above the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) level but le:,s than the ;

l Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) level. Thus, the Aiart declaration ,

I was re-verifieo as the correct classification. TSC engineering ;

staff initiated a similar analysis after the 5:30 a.m. aftershock

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j 4 and correctly concluded that it had exceeded the SSE level, which j gave further reason for maintaining an earlier upgrade to a Site j Area Emergency classification, i The TSC's EPH and the CR's EAPM prudently ordered another series of '

' plant systems walkdowns following the aftershock, Reactor Coolant

, Pump 2-2 was secured due to indications of leakage. By 5:50 a.m.,

i the EPH had informed the ED that the TSC's Radiological Controls Manager (RCM) had detected increasing containment radiation levels j

and ris*ig containment vent stack monitor readings. The RCH was

instructed to confirm these data while the EPM responded to a !

i scenario message, allegedly from the NRC, requiring that a "

i post-accident sample of the reactor coolant be taken. Issuance of

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this message was poorly timed. It distracted the EPH from focusing l

! on the potential for recommending a General Emergency declaration, l l while he called the onduty Shift Supervisor to coordinate the use '

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l of the Post-Accident Samoling system (PASS) solely for the purpose !

1 of fulfilling an exercise ob;ectiv Had events been real, use of 1

the PASS would have bc ) delayed at least until the system was l determined safe for use following the seismic events, f l

Between about 5:55 a.m. and 6:10 a.m., the EPH and EAPM discussed

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the possibility of recommending that a General Emergency be declared !

j by the E0 for the loss of Fission Product Barriers (FPBs). The RCH :

i again reported increasing containment and vent stack radiation j i reading His computerized data displays then became invalid due to !

the presence of erroneous values in a data file created for exercise

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j analysis which indicated that abnormal radiation measurements in the j vicinity of the containment structure were due to a release and not ,

1 due to the shine from activity being retained inside the l containment. At that point, the E0 entered the TSC and was given ,

! the EPM's recommendation to declare a General Emergency for the >

1 loss of FPBs. Meanwhile, the EOM called the TSC to also recommend f l a General Emergency declaration based on offsite dose projection [

' results. The EOM's call was cut short when the E0 correctly i i declared a General Emergency at 6:13 a.m. for the loss of FPB [

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Subsequent review of the licensee's procedures for declaring emergencies indicated no guidance for an option of upgrading an emergency classification due to the simultaneous existence of unrelated conditions each requiring a lesser emergency

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classification. In this scenario, the 4:30 a.m. Site Area Emergency j declaration was still in effect at 6:00 a.m. since several control

, rods had not yet been fully inserted. By 6:00 a.m., TSC staff had I concluded that another Site Area Emergency EAL's criteria had been

! satisfied due to an aftershock exceeding the SSE level. However, the ED EPM, and EOM lacked procedural guidance to consider upgradIngtoaGeneralEmergencyclassificationduetothe simultaneous applicability of two unrelated Site Area Emergency EALs.

1 TSC staff continued to closely monitor containment parameters. They

, recognized that the release would essentially be terminated either when containment pressure equalled ambient pressure, or when the

] damaged equipment hatch seal had been repaired. One containment spray pump was returned to service by about 7:00 a.m. TSC staff debated the merits of initiating containment spray since their data i

already indicated that containment pressure was essentially equal to

, atmospheric pressur The CR's EAPM was consulted. His containment i pressure and temperature data were significantly higher than those l available in the TSC. The data base available in the TSC had been i developed under the assumption that containment spray would be i promptly begun once the pump had been returned to service. Although

they were unaware of the root cause of this data discrepancy, TSC l staff were adamant in their prudent decision to believe the CR's l data. Containment spray was then initiated to more rapidly reduce l

containment pressure.

! As indicated in Section 6.b, the EPM proceeded with a parallel

! effort to terminate the release by having a second inplant team i make a detailed inspection of the damaged hatch seal so that its i repair could be expedited. The EPH requested and received from tne ED the authority to approve emergency worker exposures for j this inplant team.

! Shortly, after 7:00 a.m., the EPM tasked a member of the TSC

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engineering staff with researching the EAls in order to downgrade j from a General Emergency. This task was thoroughly completed in

about thirty minutes. The E0, EPM, and EOM prudently agreed that l the uncertainty of additional earthquakes was the critical factor i in their decisionmaking. Exercise play in the TSC and ECC was I suspended at 9:05 a.m. so that key personnel could convene for a j prelfrtinary Recovery discussion, as described in Section 5.f. The

, situation properly remained classified as a General Emergency when l that discussion bega Throughout the exercise, TSC status boards were updated in a timely manner with plant parameter data, key events information, and inplant team information. Another status board was effectively used l

to list and track assignments delegated to various engineers within

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the TSC. A dedicated recorder maintained a log of the EPM's conversations and decisions. The EPH consistently required persons to repeat orders and decisions he provided, so that there would be little potential for misunderstanding Based on the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following item should be considered for improvement:

• The licensee should consider adding a procedural option that an emerger.cy classification could be upgraded due to the simultaneous existence of multiple, unrelated conditions associated with lesser emergency classifications, d. Emergency Control Center (ECC)

The ECC, which is this licensee's Emergency Operations Facility, is located across the hall from the TSC. Both facilities are within the Davis-Besse Administration Building (OBAB). The ECC and TSC were both activated following the Alert declaration, in accordance with procedural requirements. The Emergency Offsite Manager (E0M)

in charge of ECC activities and his Emergency Planning Advisor were among the early arrivals in the ECC. They prudently decided to have the DBAB checked for earthquake damage in addition to the normal activation processes taking place within the building's ECC, TSC, Radiological Testing Laboratory (RTL) and Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). A similar action was taken after the 5:30 a.m. aftershoc By about 3:45 a.m. , the ECC was fully staf fed with the exception of the NRC Liaison who is responsible for manning the dedicated communications line to the NRC. This individual was expected to arrive by 4:05 a.m. The ED correctly assumed overall command and control of the licensee's emergency response efforts at 3:50 a.m.,

even though the ECC was not considered fully operational until the NRC Liaison position would be filled. When the NRC Liaison had not arrived by 4:15 a.m., several attempts were made to ascertain his whereabouts before he reported for duty at about 4:30 Another important consequence of the late arrival of the NRC Liaison was that procedural guidance did not allow the EOM to relieve CR personnel of the responsibility for making any offsite notifications until the facility was fully staffe At a5oIit 4:00 a.m. , the EOM informed the E0 that CR personnel would have to provide the required hourly update messages to county, State, and NRC officials since the NRC Liaison was not yet present. This task was completed by CR staff before 4:15 a.m. Meanwhile, the E0M had his staff remotely

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interrogate the EPZ's siren system to ascertain its operabilit '

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t County officials were notified that this remote interrogation was

taking plac County, State, and NRC officials were initially notified of the Site I

Area Emergency declaration in a timely manner by ECC staf The ;

initial notification message to county and State officials was  :

adequately detailed. The NRC Liaison transmitted the initial  :

notification message to the NRC, which had been drafted on a I i proceduralized version of the NRC's Event Notification Worksheet  ;

i and approved by the Liaison's supervisor. Although the message was  !

adequately detailed, it contained several important examples of  !

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licensee-specific terminology which would not be understood by NRC  !

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personnel not intimately familiar with the plant and the licensee's i emergency preparedness progra The message included statements that "RE 1998 was reading 530K and increasing" and that "Subareas 10 ,

and 12 had been closed." The former statement meant that a failed ,

l fuel detector was reading 350,000 counts per minute and increasin ;

1 Subareas 10 and 12 referred to the wildlife refuge and Lake Erie '

q portions of the EPZ which had been closed by offsite officials after the Alert declaratio As described in Section 5.c of this report, the ED correctly t j declared a General Emergency at 6:13 a.m. after receiving i

recommendations from the EPH and the EO ECC staff completed ,

I the associated initial notifications to county, State, and NRC i

officials in a timely manner. Subsequent hourly update messages i j were also made by ECC communicator [

Within five minutes of the General Emergency declaration, the E0, E0M, and a dose assessment staff member were reviewing the latest  !

i offsite dose projection results in order to formulate the initial i

) offsite Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). They quickly ;

detected an error in the calculations, which was due to the same ,

i erroneous values in a computerized scenario data file which had also I i disrupted the Radiological Controls Manager's (RCM) efforts in the  !

I TS A new dose projection was c;uickly generated using i j representative radiological data, j I

The ED and EOM exhibited concern for promptly issuing the initial f PA liowever, in their haste to formulate this recommendation they  !

misread the computer printout listing the revised offsite dose projection results. They interpreted the hourly dose rate values

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as being the 2-hour integrated dose values. As > result, an ,

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incorrect initial PAR was transmitted to county and State officials [

I at 6:25 a.m. The EOM detected this error just af ter the E0 had lef t i

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' the ECC to consult with the TSC's EP The E0M went into the TSC to explain the error to the ED. As a result, a corrected offsite PAR

! was issued at 6:40 a.m. At the exit interview, the licensee ,

l indicated that the format of the relevant computer printout had  ;

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As the exercise progressed, ECC staff kept well aware of what offsite protective actions had been implemer.ted by offsite officials for the populace and farm animals in the EP For example, the EOM verified that offsite officials had closed the wildlife refuge and Lake Erie portions of the EPZ after the Alert declaration per the offsite emergency plans and procedure Latar, the ED was well aware that local officials had elected to shelter rather than evacuate persons within about five miles of the plant due to the of ficials' reasonable concern that bridges and overpasses had to first be inspected for earthquake damag The Radiologicel Monitoring Team (RMT) Coordinator and his staff in the ECC maintained adequate communications with the three RMTs that were dispatched from the DBAB's Radiological Testing Laboratory (RTL) during the exorcise. The teams quickly located the simulated plume and tracked it as it passed through southern portions of the EP The RMT Coordinatt.' also kept the ED adequately informed of the simulated contamina*, ion of one RMT member. The scenario postulated that tho team member had become contaminated when a somple container had broken and its contents had spilled. The ED wal informed when RTL staff had decontaminated this individua ECC status boards vere effectively used to display scenario information. The 60 and EOM occasionally briefed ECC staff on major decisions to supplement status board information. A dedicated logkeeper kept a detailed record of significant events within the EC Based on the findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptable; however, the following items should be considered for improvement:

• All persons within an emergency response facility should not be prohibited from performing their duties pending the late arrival of an individual not in charge of the facilit * Offsite notification responsibilities should be transferred from the CR to ECC staff in a timely manner, so that CR personnel can better focus their attention on mitigating the consequences of abnormal plant condition * The licensee should avoid the use of plant-specific acronyms and jargon when communicating with NRC Duty Of ficers who may lack first hand knowledge of the plant and the plant's emergency preparedness progra * PAR decisionmakers should take the reasonable time needed to verify the accuracy of their recomendations before transmitting them to offsita official '.

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• The format and wording of the computer printout summarizing offsite dose projection results should be re-evaluated to better ensure its correct interpretation by decisionmakers functioning in a high stress situatio e. Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)

Two press briefings were observed during the exercis The licensee's Company Spokesperson was also observed to be oiscussing exercise activities between scheduled press briefings with the EO, E0M, and EP The Spokesperson accurately responded to questions from media roleplayers, if he did not know an answer to a questica, he agreed to research the question and provioe the requested information at the next press briefing, ,

Based on the above findings, this portion of the licer & Ps program was acceptable, f. Recovery Discussion Between 9:45 a.m. and 10:45 a.m., key decisionmakers from the STSC, OSC, TSC, and ECC convened in the Davis-Besse Administration Building for a preliminary discussion of short and longer term Recovery Phase action item The EPH reviewed procedural guidance for satisfying Recovery Phase prerequisites. The group identified a number of items that needed to be satisfied before the situation could be downgraded from a General Emergency. One particular item of uncertainty was the probability for additional aftershocks and the associated potential for additional onsite damag The need was recognized to further essess plant systems and all onsite structures for earthquake damage. These inspection activities were estimated to take several days to complete. High priority was given to walking down the decay heat removal system to identify any damage before its planned use within the next eight hour Higher priority was also given to testing all types of onsite water supplies and sewage systems for radiological and non-radiological cross contamination before their use. Plans were discussed tn invulve Electric Power Research Institute and Perry Nuclear Powei Plant personnel in the efforts to further evaluate seismic data and to identify onsite earthquake damage, The long term Recovery Organization was discussed in some detal The ERO, which has been divided into three teams, would be redefined ,

as a three shift Recovery Organi?ation where feasible. The corporate emergency support organization would remain in effect 4r a variety of tasks includ"1 prncurement, public af f airs, and le@l support. The need for t<9 covery Organization to interface with NRC and internal accident . .tigation groups was recognize The group saw the need to .,,piete onsite equipment and repair tasks already in progress to better ensure that no potential existed for another release. The needs for extensive onsite radiological

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st. % and further core damage assessments were also discussed.

l The utgency of conducting extensive onsite surveys and post-accident samplingwastobeweighedagainsttheneedtoalsoensureemergency workers safety from risks associated with the incompletely assessed earthquake damag The group identified the need to arrange for wholebody counts for onsite emergency responders and for members of the public who had remained sheltered within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) due to the possible road damage postulated ay the scenario. They realized that such efforts proposed for the offsite populace would have to be coordir,ated with offsite officials and the licensee's medical consui tants. The need to interact with Federal agencies, activated in accordance with the Federal Radiological Emei incy Response Plan, was very generally discussed with respect to defining and analyzing the offsite radiological impact of the simulated releas Based ci the above findings, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Exercise Scenario and Controller Actions The proposed exercise objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted in accordance with the established schedule. A deletion of medical objectives was later approved by Region III staff, as medical response capabilities were demonstrated in late October 1988 and were evaluated by FEMA Region V staf The scenario was creative and challengin A "response cell" of controllers was utilized to simulate callers from the NRC as well as various media and concerned citizens. Calls from the simulated NRC emergency responders were used to gather information and to task the licensee's responders with preparing for an NRC Site Team's arriva These calls did not procpt players to take actions to mitigate the accident situation. The response cell" also simulated sources of relevant technical information, such as the National Earthquake Informrtion Center and the National Weather Servic While no significant scenario flaws were identified during the NRC's technical review of the scenario, one significant problem became apparent during the exercise. The licensee's scenario development team had postulated that the Emergency Director (ED) would declare a Sito Are-Emergency by 4:25 a.m. due to an Anticipated Transient Without a Scram (ATWS) conditio However, as indicated in Section 5.c of this report, the E0 and key aides clesrly reviewed the relevant EAL and concurred that all its criteria were not satisfied by current plant condition Controllers then issued a contingency message requiring the Site Area Emergency declaration. an unpopular action that was necessary to keep tha exercise on the intended path. In order to resolve the obvious differing interpretations of EAL No. 3.C.3, the licensee must re-evaluate this EAL, and the associated training, versus current regulatory guidat.ce to better ensure that ATWS conditions will be correctly classified. This is an Open Item. (50-346/88034-01)

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Exercise objective E.12 dealt with tio authorization of emergency workers' simulated exposures in excess of regulatory limits. Prudent controller action was t6 ken to ensure that this objective would be demonstrated. The objective was to be achieved by having an inplant teani inspect the damaged containment equipment hatch. However, the first team dispatched to that location completed a t.unury damage assessment without approaching their normal exposure limit. Controllers in the OSC and TSC then composed an exercise message requiring that a more detailed damage assessment be promptly mad As a result, appropriate players were indirectly forced to address the issue of pre-authorizing exc exposures by their having to dispatch a second damage assessment tea One minor controlier/ player interface problem was noted in the CR. When informing a controller of an intended action, a player expressed himself '

in a tone implying that he was seeking the controller's approval before acting. The controller's response was expressed in a "permission granted" tone of voice rather than as a simple acknowledgetent that the controller had heard the player's statemen No examples of controllers prompting players to begin accident mitigating actions, which might not otherwise have been initiated, were observed at any location during the exercise. Overall controller performance was good. However, as indicated in Sectir,ns 4.a, 4.c and 4.d, exercise participants successfully overcame several problems caused by controller ,

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pe,'formance or scenario data error With the exception of one Open Item, this portion of the licensee's program was acceptabl . Exit Interview

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l On November 3, 1988, the inspectors met with those licensee l representatives identified in Section 2 to present their preliminary inspection finoings. The licensee did not indicate that any of the '

items discussed were proprietary in nature, f Attachments:

I Exercise Scope and Objectives l Scenario Narrative Summary and Timeline

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. . SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.1 SCOPE The 1988 Davis-Besse Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted ou November 2, 1988, will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate the Toledo Edison Emergency Plan and Fmargency Plan procedures. It will also test the emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and take adequate actions to protect the health and safety of the public. The exercise will involve activation of the Toledo Edison Corporate Emergency Response (CER) Organization. Whenever practical, the exercise incorporates provisions for "free play" on the part of the participant The scenario will simulate a sequence of events resulting in a radiological release to the environment. This release will be of sufficient magnitude to warrant State and local agency response to the emergency, but the participation of these organizations will be limite The exercise will incorporate the conduct of the Station's Annual Post-Accident Sampling System Drill, and Semtannual Health Physics

, Drill for analysis of a sample obtained from the Post-Accident

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Sampling System.

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, 1.2 TCLEDO EDISON OBJECTIVES Note: The objective and evaluation refer to the objective and

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m numbers listed below lation form numbers listed (

in HS-EP-0200, Emergency Plau Erill and Exercise Progra Objective General Evaluation Item

, Conduct exercise of the DBNPS Emergency Pla ALL Prepare exercise information packag V Conduct critique of exercis V Establish and complete corrective action V Conduct exercise during different season ALL Demonstrate direction of Emergency Organization and implementation of Emergency Plan and procedare II Commence the exercise between 0000-0600 once every 6 year ALL Demonstrate clear communication between and among Control Room and Emergency Organization response group II

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I 88E - SECTIO ; 1 REY. 2 l

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1-2

. .s Objective Control Room Evaluation Item ,

B.13 Demonstrate the capability for staff augmenta- [

tion in a timely manne V Demonstrate assessment of incident conditio II Recognize EALs and classify inciden III.C, II Demonstrate notification of key official II,D Demonstrate notification of NR I !

j D3 Notify and activate Emergency Personne I.A, I,B p Develop and send initial emergency offsite messag I l Develop and send follow-up emergency message II.D, II D.11 Communicate between Control Room and NR I l

! Continuously monitor and control emergency staf III.S j

Objective Technical Support Center Evaluation Item

, Demonstrate timely activation and staffin I

' Demonstrate arsessment of incident conditio III.A.4 & 6 Recognize EALs and classify inciden III. Determine inplant release source term II Determine magnitude of release from plant system parameters and monitor III.C

' Continuously monitor and control emergency staff II Discussions of reentry and recover III.H, III.A.2 & 3 f

Objective Emergency Control Center Evaluation Item

' Transfer of the Emergency Director dutie II Demonstrate timely activation and staffin I Demonstrate assessment of incident conditio III.H l Recognize EALs and classify inciden II. Demonstrate notification of key official I.C, II Demonstrate notification of NR II.D

, Notify and activate Emergency Personne III.A.6 i, Develop and send initial Emergency offsite

! messag II Develop and send follow-up message II.E, II Continuously monitor and control emergency

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l statf II Recommend protective actions for sheltering and evacuation time to offsite authoritie III.K l Evacuate the Protected Area nonessential personne III.A.13 Discussions of reentry and recover III.A.7 & 8 i

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. .o Objective Dose Assessment Center Evaluation Item Demonstrate timely activation and staffin g Notify and activate Emergency Personne ( Determine inplant release source term II Determine magnitude of release ft.a plant system parameters and monitor II Estimate integrated dose fur Plure Fath and compare with PAG III Continuously monitor and control Emergency staf II Objective Radiological Testing Laboratory Evaluation Item Demonstrate timely activation and staffin I Demonstrate unified collection and analysis of field data, and coordination of samplin II Notify and activate Emerdency Personne I Continuously monitor and control Emergency staf II Objective Radiation Monitoring Teams Evaluation item Notify and activate Emergency Personne I Field monitor within the Plume Exposure EP III.D & J E.14 Decontaminate relocated onsite personne II Objective Operations Support Center Evaluation Item l1 Demonstrate timely activation and staffin I Demonstrate assessment of incident conditio V Notify and activate Emergency Personne I . plement exposure guideline II Continuously monitor and control Emergency staf II E.12 Emergency worker excess exposure per 10CFR2 III.B & C & D E.18 Analyze a sample from a plant system, Post Accident Sample Syste III.A.17 Discussions of reentry and recover III.A.2 & 3 k

88E - SECTION 1 REV. 2

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Objective Joint Public Information Center Evaluation Item Demonstrate timely activation and staffin I Notify and activate Emergency Personne I JPIC operation and space for public medi III Brief media clearly, accurately, and timel II Objective Security Evaluation Item Provide access control to Emergency facilitie II Notify and activate Emergency Personne I Evacuate nonessential personne II Account for all personnel from the Protected Area within 30 minute II Objective Corporate Evaluation Item Demonstrate timely activation and staffin Demonstrate corporate support of Plant staf VI C 88E - SECTION 1 REV. 2

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. Initial Conditions 0 0130, November 2, 1988 DBNPS is on the grid at 100% power and has been operating the equivalent of 298 full power day . Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity .ed dose equivalent Iodine have been increasing steadily ever the past several weeks. Results of the most recent chemical analysis are attache . RCS leakage is as follows:

Pressure Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 gpm Prima ry-Secondary . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 gpm Identifie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 gpm Unidentifie . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.2 gpm The following equipment has been tagged out of service:

• Make-up Pump # Out of service for lube oil pump repair. Estimated time untill availability is 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> * Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump #1-2 is out of service for bearing replacement. The pump is disassembled and the impeller has been shipped to the vendo Estimated time till availability is 6 working day (.

7.2 Onsite Sequence of Events (times are approximate):

Preface:

In developing an accident sequence severe enough to trigger actions that will satisfy every required objective, it was recessary for the Scenario Development Committee to postulate extremely unrealistic and improbable situation Failures to systems and environmental conditions for this exercise were postulated that exceed the engineered design cf the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Statio The plant data presented herein was developed using the Power Safety International - Babcock and Wilcox simulator in Lynchberg, Virgini In order to achieve the required results, initial core conditions were established in the simulator's computer which are outside the capabilities of the Davis-Besse reactor plant to maintain without automatic protective system intervention.

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l 88E - SECTION 7 REV 3

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Real Time T:

0130 -0:30 Initial conditions established with DBNPS Unit 1 at 100% power and 298 effective full power days l

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in this fuel cycle. RCS activity has been slowly r rising over the past three weeks but in within [

Technical Specification limit .

The grid is in a high demand situation, and the  !

Toledo Edison Dispatcher has requested that DBNPS  !

remain at full power until further notic *

f Make-up Pump #1 is out of service for lube oil pump repair, and will be available in approxi- i mately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump  !

1. 1-2 is out of service for bearing replacement, and will be unavailable for the next 6 day ,

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0200 0:00 DBNP3 Unit 1 experiences an earthquake greater '!

a than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) level f k

I Plant staff experience strong vibratory motion.

I The Strong Hotion Recording System and Seismic j Monitoring Equipment are actuate Indications at the Seismic Alarm Panel confirm that OBE l levels have been exceeded. Control Room Staff f

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lose indication on Power Range Channel # l

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\ Control Room St iff perform steps of MS-EP-02820, i Earthquake; and the Shift supervisor declares an  !

ALERT (per HS-EP-01500, Emergency Classification; I

, EAL 8-A-2). HS-EP-01700, Alert, is implemente I

Offsite notifications are made, assembly [

commences, and the Emergency Response t Organization is activata !

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Physical inspection of the plant by operations l

, personnel begins.

l 0240 0:30 Arriving ERO members begin activating the Emer-

! gency Response Facilities. Arriving TSC Engi-

neering staff commence evaluation of the seismic .

! recording in accordance with DB-OP-06414, Seismic [

j Honitoring Syste {

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0330 1

30 Emergency Response Facilities are declared j i operational, and the Emergency Director receives 1 l turnover from the Control Room staf [

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Physical inspection of the plant indicates no  !

apparent damage, however the containment j equipment hatch has been damage i k

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88E - SECTION 7 REV 3

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.* -3-0400 2:00 TPCW Punp 1-1 trips. Operators cannot maintain HLCWT level, which drops to < 5 f t. This re-quires a reactor tri (

Operators attempt a manual reactor trip, but the reactor does not tri Power supplies to the rod drives are deenergized momentarily. The reactor trips, but four rods do not fully inser Operators commence emergency boration and the Emergency Director upgrades the emergency status to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (per HS-EP-01500; Emergency Classification, EAL 3-C-3). Applicable 3 portions of HS-EP-01800, Site Area Emergency are implemente :30 DBNPS Unit 1 experiences an aftershock greater than safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) level Reactor Coolant Pump 2-2 seal failr, and opera-tors trip RCP 2-2. Leakrate through the failed seal is unusually hig :45 Indications of extreme containment radiation levels are received. Containment spray was damaged during the SSE and cannot be starte :50 Indications are received that an atmospheric (

release is occurrin Emergency Director upgrades to GENERAL EMERGENCY (per HS-EP-01500, Emergency Classification, 1-E-1). Applicable portions of HS-EP-01900,

"General Emergency" are implemente Site evacuation will be simulate :00 NRC requests a PASS rempl :10 Offsite doserates exceed PAG limits within the passing plume's boundarie Emergency 2 am reports that the CS pump 1-1 breaker can be replaced, thereby returning containment spray to servic :45 Repair teams complete repairs to containment spray. Containment spray is started, reducing containment pressure and stopping the releas Offsite doserates continue to exceed PAG limits within the plume boundarie An RMT member becomes contaminated and is decontaminate (

88E - SECTION 7 REV 3

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• -4-0800 6:00 Meteorological data becomes unavailabl t 0900 7:00 Due to increased atmospheric dispersion caused by more favorable morning meteorology, of fsite dose-rates return to near normal level Reentry / recovery is discusced among ERO management while the facilities are being deactivate :00 Exercise is terminated.

SSE - SECTION 7 REV 3