IR 05000298/1988023

Insp Rept 50-298/88-23 on 880705-31.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Ler Followup,Operational Safety Verification,Monthly Surveillance & Maint Observations, Radiological Protection & Security

ML20151U245
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	08/08/1988
From:	Bennett W, Constable G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151U244	List: IR 05000298/1988023 ML20151U238
References
50-298-88-23, NUDOCS 8808190002
Download: ML20151U245 (8)

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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0ftMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/88-23 License: DPR-46 Docket: 50-293 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)

P. O. Box 499 Columbus, NE 68601 Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CflS)

Inspection At: Cooper Nuclear Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: July 5-31, 1988 Inspector: kdMWM W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector IdcP Date

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Approved: _

G. L. Constable Chief, Project C, Division of f[f/ff Date~

Reactor Projects e808190002 890810 PDR ADOCK 03000298 o F D .

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Inspection Summary Inspection Londucted July S-31, 1988 (Report 50-298/88-23)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of Licensee Event Reports followup, operational safety verification, monthly surveillance and maintenance observations, radiological protection, and securit Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie l l

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DETAILS (

g Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees 1

• G. R. Horn, Divisicn Manager of Nuclear Operations J. M. Moacham, Senior Manager for Technical Support (SMTS)

R. Brungardt, Operations Manager J. Flaherty, Plant Engineering Supervisor

• G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager

• L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist

• G. R. Smith, Licensing Supervisor

• Gardner, Management Trainee

• W. Faust, Engineering Manager

• R. Moeller, Acting SMTS

• Norvell, Maintenance Manager The NRC inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection perio * Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on July 28, 198 t Plant Status The plant operated at essentially full power during the entire inspection period except for July 15-17, 1988. On July 15, the licensee manually '

scramed the reactor from approximately 80 percent power due to electrical arcing in the main generator, Phase A, outlet bus ducting. After repairs, the reactor went critical on July 16 and was synchronized to the grid on i July 17, Licensee Action on Previoucly Identified Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Violation 298/8806-01: Failure To Ensure Jet Pump Operability -

This item concerned the failure to ensure jet pump operability prior to reactor startup as required by Technical Specifications (TS).

Corrective actions comitted to by the licensee included developing a new recirculation pump flow characteristics curve for ensuring jet pump j operability during suberitical reactor operations, and routing a copy of the new characteristics curve to all licensed operator The senior resident inspector (SRI) verified that the new characteristics curve was available in the control room and had been routed to all l

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licensed operators. In addition, the SRI verified that the curve was correctly used during two reactor startup !

This item is close ~

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-4- i l (Closed) Violation 298/8807-01: Failure to Follow Health Physics l Procedure - This item concerned an individual inside an area covered by'a special work permit (SWP) without meeting all the requirements of the SWP.

l Corrective actions committed to by the licensee included maintenance department supervisors discussing the event with maintenance department personnel, and stressing the importance of adhering to station procedure '

The SRI verified that these discussions were held.

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4. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Followup (92700)

(Closed)LER87-022: This LER documents an inedvertent isolation of the l Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System during calibration and functional l testing of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation logic l circuitry per Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.2.1.2.1. The cause of the event was determined to be personnel error. The technician failed to '

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ensure that the isolation condition inserted by the procedure was reset l prior to reenergizing the valve operato Corrective actions included revising the procedure to caution operators of l the expected system response, and [3rfonning an engineering evaluation to i l determine if improved status information associated with the isolation circuitry could be provide The SRI reviewed the engineering evaluation for this LER. The evaluation specified that Design Change 87-15L would provide isolation status lights in the control room. The SRI verified that isolation status lights are ;

operable in the control room. The SRI reviewed SP 6.2.1.2.1, "PCIS RWCU High Flow Calibration and Functional / Functional Test," Revision 13, dated ;

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i April 14, 1988, and verified that a caution note warns operators of the

! expected system response, and that the operator is directed to verify that ;

l isolation status lights are on or off as require This LER is close LER 88-011: This LER documents an unplanned Group 6 isolation and ,

actuation of the standby Gas Treatment System. The cause of the event was ,

a connunication problem when isolating the 24V DC batteries for l maintenanc Corrective actions included discussing this event with all operations and maintenance personnel emphasizing their responsibilities when isolating ]

equipmen .!

l The SRI verified that discussions of the event had occurred, j l

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. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The SRI observed operational activities throughout the inspection perio Proper control room staffing was maintained, and control room activities ;

and conduct were observed to be well controlled. Discussions with operators revealed that they were cognizant of plant status and understood the importance of, and reason for, each lit annunciator. The SRI observed selected shift turnover meetings and verified that information co1cerning -

plant status was connunicated to the oncoming operators. Tours of accessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm operability of plant eoutpment. Overall plant cleanliness was observed to be good througncut the inspection perio On 'A 15,1988, at approximately 9:45 a.m., a fire was reported in the b>'1 ding. The fire brigade immediately responded. Electrical

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. ..c.s observed in the main generator, Phase A, outlet bus ductin %e :itensee reduced power and manually scranned the reactor from approximately 80 percent power at 9:58 a.m. The SRI was in the control room at the time of the power reduction and scram, and noted that the evolution was performed in a controlled, conservative manner. All actions associated with the shutdown were timely and well planne '

On July 16, 1988, the SRI observed a reactor startup following repairs to the bus ducting. The SRI attended the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) meeting on July 16, which reviewed th. event and authorized restart. The cause of the ev.nt was addressed and reactor startup was authorized in accordance with General Operating Procedure (G0P) 2.1.1.1, "Reactor Startup Review," Revision 2, dated June 30, 198 All conditions and requirements for startup were properly met and ,

documented in GOP 2.1.1.2 "Technical Specification Pre-Startup Checks,"

Revision 7, dated December 10, 1987. The startup was perfonned in a controlled, cautious manner. The reactor was declared critical at 2:18 p.m. on July 16, and synchronized to the grid at 2:35 a.m. on

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July 1 '

During a routine plant tour on July 25, 1988, the SRI noted that two sway

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strut supports for the fuel injection return headers of Diesel Genorators 1A and 1B were loose. The supports being loose du not affect the operability of the diesel generators. The SRI questioned the licensee about how the supports became loose, whether there was a possibility that i any other supports were loose, and whether the licensee had a program for verifying torque values on supports and determining operability. The licensee is researching these questions. The status of a program for ,

verifying support operability is an unresolved item (298/8823-01) pending l

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licensee response to the SRI's question No violations or deviations were identified in this area, i

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f-6-i Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

The SRI observed and/or reviewed the performance of the following Surveillance Procedures (SPs): ,

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. SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 28, dated February 25, 1988: This surveillance was performed to verify operability of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system as required by T The SRI observed and reviewed the performance of this surveillance on July 13, 1988. The test was performed by qualified individuals who were cognizant of all precautions and limitations in the procedure. The SRI reviewed the completed procedure and verified that all test results were acceptable per the procedure and T . SP 6.3.3.2, "HPCI Motor Operated Valve Operability Test,"

Revision 19, dated September 18, 1987: This surveillance was performed to verify timing after packing adjustments on HPCI-16. The SRI observed the performance of this test on July 13, 1988, and subsequently reviewed the performance package. The test was _

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performed by qualified individuals in accordance with the procedur '

The procedure was reviewed by all required personnel including the inservice testing enginee . SP 6.3.6.1, "RCIC Test Modo Surveillance Operation," Revision 18, dated December 17, 1987: This surycillance was performed on July 20, 1988, to verif ,

j Cooling (RCIC)y operability system as required of bytheT Reactor The SRI Core Isolation reviewed this ;

surveillance and verified that test results were acceptable. The SRI  ;

observed the use of this procedure to troubleshoot and repair a i cooling water valve which had not performed acceptably during the l performance of the surveillance. The cooling water valve did not i affect system operability or acceptance criteria of the surveillance, j

SP 6.3.6.1 was utilized properly by qualified operators to recreate 1 J

initial conditions of the cooling water valve failure, and to verify I

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operability after repai l 1 l

. SP 6.3.19.1, "SGT Operability Test /Off-Gas Flow Monitor Functional i i

Test," Revision 20. dated May 17, 1988: This surveillance was performed to meet TS requirements that the system be operated with r heaters on at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month. The SRI observed portions of this surveillance on July 26, 1988. The surveillance was performed by a trainee under the direct supervision of a licensed ,

' operator. The test was performed in accordance with the procedur l The licensed operator directed the performance of each step of the l procedure and explained to the trainee the purpose of each step, and what indications to expect, j No violations or deviations were identified in this area,

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! Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

On July 2. 1988, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump IB failed to start during the performance of Operating Procedure 2.2.69.3, "RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray." RHR Pump 1B was declared inoperable -

and MWR 88-300 was issued to investigate the failure. It was found that the "C" phase motor lead connection in the junction box, on the side of the motor, had failed and was open, y

The RHR pump motor had been replaced in February 1988 due to an unrelated problem. Since installation the motor had been started 15 times and had operated approximately 630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br /> prior to the failur Investigation of the failure revealed that during installation of the new motor, the "C" phase motor lead lug had been determined to be defective J and had been replaced. The lug was replaced with a lug which was the wrong size for the motor wire. The licensee postulated that the oversized -

lug represented an electrical resistance in the motor circuit which i dissipated energy in the form of heat. This thermal stress caused degradation of the connection which then failed completely due to the high .

motor starting current. The SRI examined the failed lug, the ILDs which j came installed with the motor, and samples of the motor wire which came '

with the motor. These examinations demonstrated the difficulty in ,

determining the correct size lug to be used. The SRI concurs with the '

licensee's postulated failure mechanism, and believes the error in lug ,

size selection to be an isolated occurrence. The licensee will document l any corrective action taken in Nonconformance Report 88-165, d

On July 15, 1988, electrical arcing occurred in the main generato .

Phase "A", outlet bus ducting. The SRI observed maintenance personnel i disassemble and inspect the bus ducting. The SRI verified that proper i isolation was performed prior to work. A fire watch was properly posted !

d after the bus was deenergized to watch for reflash. The arcing was l determined to be caused by excessive circulating current induced in the l J bus covers. A current path was provided when the gasket between the l

pennanent and removable bus covers became dislocated, allowing the top removable cover to drop down and make electrical contact with the permanent bus cover. The resulting current flow produced excessive ,

heating of the two top ground straps and ignited the cork gasket, l

> Maintenance personnel replaced all gaskets on the removable bus cover and I broken ground staps. The remaining ground straps and gaskets on the removable covers for the other phases were inspecte On July 23, 1988, operators noted increasing current on the movable l screens in the circulating water bays. Divers inspected Bays A and B and i detennined that there was a large silt buildup inhibiting screen movement I causing the increased current. The silt was subsequently pumped out of i Bays A and The SRI monitored the pumping operation by maintenance l

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8-personne The licensee is planning to pump out silt that may have built up in the other bays in the near futur No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Radiological Protection Observations- (71709)

The SRI verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. Radiation work permits contained appropriate information to ensure that work could be performed in a safe and controlled manner. Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controiled. Radiation monitors were utilized to check for contaminatio .

No violations or deviatic+, were identified in this are . Security (71881)

The SRI observed security personnel perform their duties of vehicle, personnel, and package search. Vehicles were properly authorized and controlled or escorted in the protected area (PA). The licensee continued implementation of the security equipment upgrade during this inspection period. The SRI conducted site tours to ensure that compensatory measures were properly implemented as required because of equipment failure or the security upgrade. Interviews with security personnel demonstrated that they were cognizant of their responsibilities. The PA barrier had ,

adequate illuminatinn and the isolation zones were free of transient materia No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Unresolved Item (92701) <

An unresolved item is one about which aoditional information is required a

in order to determine if it is acceptable, a deviation, or a violatio There is one unresolved item in this repor Paragraph Item N Subject 5 298/8823-01 Program for Inspection of Supports

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1 Exit Interview (30703)

An exit interview was conducted on July 28, 1988, with licensee representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. Other meetings

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between the SRI and licensee management were held periodically during the inspection period to discuss identified concern j

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