IR 05000155/1988005

Insp Rept 50-155/88-05 on 880217-0419.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety,Maint Operation, Training,Security & Mgt Meeting

ML20153G480
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	05/02/1988
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153G472	List: IR 05000155/1988005 ML20153G469
References
50-155-88-05, 50-155-88-5, NUDOCS 8805110246
Download: ML20153G480 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

Report No. 50-155/88005(DRP)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers T 'pany 212 West . Avenue Jackson, MI i Facility Name: Big Ro . int Nuclear Plant

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Inspection At: Charlevoix, Michigan Inspection Conducted: February 17 through April 19, 1988 Inspectors: S. Guthrie D. Schrum A ,

Approved By: .J

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_ Inspection Summary i Inspection on February 17 through April 19, 1988 (Report No. 50-155/88005(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector and Region based inspectors of Operational Safety, Maintenance Operation, Training, Security, Management Meetin Results: Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. No significant safety items were identifie ;

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• T. Elward, Plant Superintendent

• Petitjean, Planning and Administrative Services Superintendent

• G.-Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Alexander, Technical Engineer

• R. Abel, Production and Plant Performance Superintendent

• L. Monshor, Quality Assurance Superintendent D. Staton, Shift Supervisor 3 W. Trubilowicz, Operations Supervisor

• J. Beer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent D. Kelly, Maintenance Supervisor D. Ball, Maintenance Supervisor W. Blosh, Maintenance Engineer M. Acker, Senior Engineer J. Toskey, General Engineer L. Darrah, Shift Supervisor J. Horan,. Shift Supervisor R. Scheels, Shift Supervisor G. Boss, Reactor Engineer D. Moeggenberg, Engineering Supervisor

• R. Buckner, Nuclear Plant Training Administrator

• J. Rang, Director Nuclear Training

• P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Technical Department * Denotes those present at exit intervie . Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment sphere and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct i

interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented

! in accordance with the station security plan.

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The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Liquid Poison, Emergency Condenser, Reactor Depressurization, Post Incident, Core Spray and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barrelin During the period March 11-18 the inspector observed implementation of whole body frisking with contamination monitors placed at access control and at the radiologically controlled area boundary near the machine sho Installation of the sensitive monitors was one aspect of licensee efforts to reduce the number of contamination incidents observed over the last two years. As predicted by the licensee, the detection of contamination on individuals exiting via access control increased dramatically. Appropriate written guidance was provided to plant personnel on how to use the whole-body frisker and the required actions upon discovery of contamination. Radiation protection technicians were available to deal with the increased number of individuals requiring decontamination. Approximately 20 pairs of work boots were determined to have high levels of loose and/or fixed contamination and were replaced by the licensee. At one point technicians estimated approximately 80% of all persons exiting via access control were found to have some low level contamination, primarily on shoe A preliminary evaluation of the high number of contamination discoveries indicated areas of low level contamination were to be found throughout the plant. The licensee deployed four persons to decontaminate high traffic areas, reviewed and expanded daily contamination swipe surveys, and began a "from the top down" decontamination of the containment sphere, The licensee commenced a study to determine methods to differentiate between true contaminations and alarms resulting from noble gases from minor steam leaks clinging to polyester clothing. As an interim measure, paper coveralls and rubber shoe covers were provided for personnel touring or working in areas of potential contamination, On March 11 the inspector reviewed an incident which occurred the previous day when a fuel bundle was relocated within the spent I fuel pool from a position in the "D" rack to a position in the "A" rack location. The bundle had already been partially inserted into the designated location at the time of the fall. Based on interviews with fuel handlers and a review of the licensee's corrective action process, the inspector was unable to determine if the root cause was operator error, equipment malfunction, or both. The individual operator had successfully moved four bundles previous to the dropped l bundle, and several attempts were required to eventually grapple the l bundle. No obvious defects in the condition of the grapple were identified by licensed operators on the scene, although the grapple was replaced prior to any further fuel moves.

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l The licensee immediately verified that no noble gas was released by performing air sampling. Area monitors and survey instruments showed no increase-in area radiation levels, and there was no indication of airborne activity on the continuous air monitors and stack gas monitors. Absent any indication of failed fuel, the Shift Supervisor elected to not evacuate containment or implement the Site Emergency Plan. The requirements of Emergency Procedure EMP 3.4, Fuel Damage While Refueling, were not implemented based on the absence of any symptomatic indication of fuel damage. The licensee indicated plans to have the dropped bundle inspected for damage by the fuel vendor during the outag c. Prior to shutdown for refueling on April 9 the inspector reviewed the licensee's proposed change to control rod insertion. In past years operators have shut down the reactor by inserting rods one notch at a time in the reverse order of the approved and analyzed withdrawal sequence. The licensee's proposed change calls for operators to drive selected control rods from full out position 23 to full in position zero. Other rods would be driven one notch at a time to an analyzed position then driven directly to zero. The new insertion sequence would not be used until the turbine generator was disconnected and the reactor was subcritical and below one percent power. With this revised approach the licensee hopes to minimize the number of spurious Reactor Protection Systems (RPS) actuations resulting from electrical noise at low reactor power, minimize the opportunity for mispositioned control rods due to operator error, and release licensed operators from rod manipulation duties approximately two hours earlier than when rods are driven notch by notch, thus making them available for other duties associated with shutdown. The licensee, in the development of the revised insertion sequence, identified-plateaus for rod positions because of flux peaking considerations and to ensure compliance with Technical Specification limitations on rod wort The inspector referred the matter to Regional specialists for further revie On April 9 the inspector interviewed operators who had used the revised insertion sequer.ce to shut the reactor down the previous evening. There was no evidence of mispositioned control rods, and licensed operators were able to complete control rod insertion approximately one and one-half hours earlier than in previous shut downs. There were no spurious RPS actuations from electrical noise at low power levels, d. On April 14-15 the inspector observed fuel handling activities on the refueling deck and in the control room by licensed operators during two different shif ts. Appropriate coninunications were observed between the two locations, and fuel location and accountability status boards and records were observed in use at both locations. Appropriate concern was observed for minimizing the spread of contamination, including regular washdowns of the fuel

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transfer cask. The activity was conducted under the direct supervision of the Shift Supervisor on the refueling deck and in accordance with procedural requirements. Radiation monitoring in the refueling area was operabl No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

, During the week of April 11 the inspector reviewed licensee testing l of steam drum relief valves conducted in conformance with the requirements of ANSI /ASME OM-1, 1981, "Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Pressure Relief Valves",

l which defines test frequency and required actions should a valve

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fail to test satisfactorily, l

On April 14 the steam drum relief valve installed in position

, RV-5000 was tested using Surveillance Procedure TR-28, ASME l Section XI, Steam Drum Relief Valve Testing. The prescribed lift l setting was 1565+-15 ps The valve's initial lift was at 1544.9, approximately 5 psig below the lowest allowed valve lift settin Subsequent tests yielded similar results at 1546 psig and 1544 l psig. There was no evidence of disc to seat adhesion observed

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during relief valve testing in previous outages. At the close of the inspection period the low lift setting was under review by the licensee and regional staf On April 14 and 15 the inspector observed portions of the removal .

! and shipment of the "B" Reactor Depressurization System (RDS) Target l Rock depressurization valve. The valve was being sent to an offsite

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repair and test facility for replacement of a cracked main seat and for testing. Appropriate radiological measures for control of the

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contaminated valve were in evidence. System tagging for component

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isolation was verifie l

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. On April 18 the inspector observed commencement of Facility Change (FC) 599-A-01, Installation of Wide Range Neutron Monitors. The modification involves replacement of intermediate and power range nuclear instrumentation that was of original plant design with modern solid state wide range instrumentation. The April 18 commencement involved installation of jumpers to permit reopening and manual control of all containment isolation valves. Those isolation valves isolate on loss of power supply and include sump and ventilation valves which can not remain isolated for the estimated four week duration of the modification. The jumpers block the isolation signal originating from the Reactor Protection System and permit full operator manual control. At the time the modification commenced, all fuel was offloaded from the reactor vessel and the plant manager's permission for containment integrity suspension had been obtaine On April 18 the inspector observed portions of Surveillance TR-84, Emergency Diesel Generator Inspection and Repair. The surveillance, performed during each refueling shutdown, replaces fuel filters and diesel fuel injectors, verifies generator voltage regulator controls, and tests the fuel delivery system and battery charger. The surveillance used vendor involvement to assess the condition of the diesel generato No violations or deviations were identified in this this are . Training On February 26 the licensee was notified by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Accreditation Board that the five remaining training programs had been approved for accreditation. The training programs include i Chemistry, Radiation Protection, Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical l

Maintenance, and Management / Technical Trainin No violations or deviations were identified in this are . Security On February 19 the inspector reviewed the licensee's action to address concerns described in Section 8.a. of report 155/87026(DRP) related to admittance to the protected area of non-work related knives or items which could be construed as weapons. The licensee provided guidance to security officers and granted security supervisors authority to decide on the t acceptability of a given item. The licensee elected not to generate a l prohibited items list or provide specific guidance to security personne The concerns will be referred to regional security specialist I

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. Management Meeting On April 11 members of licensee management and staff met with the Regional Administrator and members of Regional management and staff in Glen Elly During the Meeting the licensee introduced to the Regional Administrator Mr. Gordon L. Heins, newly appointed Senior Vice President, Energy Supply, and Mr. David Hoffman, newly appointed Vice President, Nuclear Operation In other meetings, the licensee presented a description of the Integrated Living Schedule in use at Big Rock Point as a method of prioritizing plant improvement projects. The licensee sought and the staff provided comments on how to more efficiently integrate into the licensee's schedule all inspector identified items requiring licensee response and/or corrective actio . Temporary Instruction 2515/90 During this reporting period, Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/90, Inspection of Licensee's Implementation of Multi-Plant Action Item B-58, Scram Discharge Volume Capability inspection was performed. A copy of this inspection report that addresses all listed items has been forwarded to the Region III technical support staff for final coordination and closecu The inspectoe verified that the licensee was in full compliance of all selected criteria in TI 2515/90 in accordance with their long term commitment . Material I Control and Outage Preparation The licensee is in the final phases of transferring their parts operation from a stockroom in the Office Building to a refurbished warehous Since material control, especially during outages, has been a problem area the inspector was concerned that a move of this nature, occurring so close to the scheduled outage, would aggravate a chronic problem.

i Specific concerns included:

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• How will moving into the refurbished warehouse impact on the

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licensee's ability to locate parts for jobs planned for the outage?

• Will the move to the warehouse increase the chances for getting incorrect parts issued for a job?

What effect will the move to the warehouse have on pre-staging of parts for outage maintenance?

The inspector reviewed the following procedures:

Volume 1, Procedure 4.2.1, Rev. 4, "Material Control" Volume 1, Procedure 4.3, Rev. O, "Outage Control and Planning" NADP VII-3, "Receipt Inspection"

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These are administrative procedures' which identify the programs and provide the broad guidelines for implementing them. Procedure 4. provides instructions for warehouse personnel for the receipt, handling and storage of safety-related (Q) parts and supplies. NADP VII-3 provides instructions to QC personnel for receipt in;pections of Q material The insraector also interviewed a warehouseman, a stock clerk, the warehouse supervisor, and a QC Supervisor, toured the old stockroom, and toured the refurbished warehous With regard to the first concern, the inspector noted that the refurtished warahouse is considerably larger than the previous stockroom which allows a much more organized storage system. Because of the differ ences in configuration between the facilities, the location identification system previously used could not be retained. Parts loca*; ions can be obtained from several sources:

• The location of a part with a corporate stock number can be obtained from the warehouse computer terminals. Prior to the move to the refurbished warehouse the Big Rock Point supply system had not fully implemented the corporate Material Management System. As part of the transition to the new facility, the corporate system is being implemented so that all parts in the warehouse will have a corporate stock numbe * The location of safety-related parts with a purchase order number can be obtained from NADP 0719 "Controlled Material Balance Form" which has the location on i * The location of non-safety parts can be obtained from a warehouse receipt log which records all-purchase order numbers and the location of the part To minimize the chances for losing parts, the licensee., in addition to cataloguing the the relocated parts under the corporate stock number system with the new location number, is cross-referencing between the old and new systems. To further aid in locating parts the old location system identification has been marked on the shelves along with the ne These measures appear prudent; however, their effectiveness should be monitored during the current outag The measures taken by the licensee with respect to the first concern also appear to appropriately address the second concern. The more organized storage system, the implementation of the corporate stock system, and the cross-referencing of old and new location nomenclature should minimize the chances that the move will cause the issuance of incorrect part ,

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With regard to the third concern, existing procedures require that parts which are to be pre-staged be marked as such on the QA Material Issue Ticket for Q parts and the Material Issue Ticket f(,' non-Q parts. For the outage the old stockroom will be used for pre-staging, keeping pre-staged parts physically separated from regular issue. With more space available for pre-staged parts, this process should be more efficient as a result of the move-to the refurbished warehous The licensee's programs appear to properly address the problems that could arise from the change in their warehouse operation and the inspector has no further questions in this matter. The effectiveness of the licensee's efforts in this area should be monitored as part of the routine outage inspection progra . Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.

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