ML20125B831

Discusses Site Visit of Facilities for Routine Insp & Review Actions Taken in Response to IE Bulletin 79-19, Packaging of Low Level Waste for Transport & Burial

ML20125B831
Person / Time
Site:	BWX Technologies, 07001201, 07000824
Issue date:	10/31/1979
From:	Ketzlach N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Crow W NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
IEB-79-19, NUDOCS 7912280594
Download: ML20125B831 (4)

Text

_ _ _ -

. 4 30%

% .. x' ' -/

ib ' i Distribution:

' Docket File 70-27 Docket File 70-824 OCT 311979

--p-Docket File 70-1201 NMSS r/f FCUF r/f Docket l'o. 70-27 POR (3)

Docket No.70-824 IE HQ (2)

RECunningham Docket tio. 70-1201 TFCarter i

WTCrow l NKetzlach(2)

W. T. Crow, Section Leader GPCoryell, R:2 MEMORAtIDUM FOR:

Uranium Process Licensing Section LTyson (3)

FR0ft: fl. Ketzlach Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch

SUBJECT:

IflSPECTION OF BABC0CK & UILCOX flAVAL t!UCLEAR FUEL

! - DIVISION FACILITY, C0i!'!ERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLArlT, AilD LYilCHBURG RESEARCH CE!!TER I. Introduction As FCUF project manager for the Babcock & Wilcox ita' val fluclear Fuel Division (ililFD) fuel fabrication facility, Materials License ilo. Sici-42, I accompanied G. P. Coryell (Region II IE Project Inspector) on the latter's routine inspection of the NilFD facility in Lynchburg, Virginia.

Since fir. Coryell was given the added assignment of reviewing the actions taken by the iciFD. the B&W Comercial fluclear Fuel Plant (CNFP) and the Lynchburg Research Center (LRC) on IE Bulletin No. 79-19, " Packaging of Low-Level Waste for Transport and Burial," dated August 10, 1979, I accompanied him during the visits and inspections of the latter two facilities as well. He is the principal IE project inspector for both the ilMFD and the CNFP facilities.

The IE Bulletin listed action to be taken by licensees to assure the safe transfer, packaging and transport of low-level radioactive waste. The action taken would provide assurance to the NRC that regulatory requirements were being met and provide the Agreement States of i'evada, South Carolina and Washington that have waste burial facilities licensed within their states with assurance the implementation of packaging, transport and burial l of low-level radioactive waste was adeqcate for the protection of the public and the environment.

While at the facilities, I discussed the ililFD arendment application dated August 31, 1979, on a non-interforance basis with the inspections.

90003;40 mee s o SW

..~.-

fcuF NK.ek.. .. .ch:Yh FCuF

. . . . . g WTCrow __ -

..... Bd. ... . .hhf....$.D.N.29.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

H. T. Crow 2 The inspection report will be issued by IE. This report will be directed to the following: 1

1. Cocnents on the amendment application.

2. Comments on lit!FD expansion plans.

3. Comments on current operations at the CilFP in relation to fiaterials License No. Sil!1-1168.

4. Cocnents on current operations at the LRC in relation to P.aterials License ilc. Sil!!-778.

C Discussion A. f!NFD Amendment Application -

By amendment application dated August 31,1979, the N!!FD requested authorization for personnel to remain in the facility (not evacuate) in the event of a power failure. Personnel induced manufacturing operations a

and movement of material throughout the facility would be suspended to preclude a criticality from the movement of fuel during the power outage and personnel would remain at their work stations until further instructed by flNFD management.

Although the criticality monitors are equipped with battery powered emergency supplies, the audible alarm system itself has no back-up i

power supply and would become inoperative in the event of a loss of 1

electrical power to the facility. The liNFD feels that if the power failure occurred as a consequence of severe weather conditions, evacuation of personnel would subject the work force to higher risk of health and safety hazards. The only practical available evacuation assembly area in the security area of the facility is located on an exposed hillside. During summertime thunderstorms and winder snows this would be a dangerous place to locate a large group of people. gg j The only operations that could continue during a power outage due

to the operating characteristics are in the recovery arca and in the component and alloy pickling araas. The !!NFD has not yet demonstrated that a criticality incident can be precluded in the pickling areas during a loss

=W of power. The pi:kiing operations were inspected, reviewed and the

?

l necessary demonstrations that would be required to show a cricicality accident could be precluded were discussed with the fluclear fiatorial Control personnel, (principally with H. H. McClanahan, Manager, fluclear Materials Control, anci R. A. Cordani, recently appointed Nuclear Safety and Licensing  !

Officer), and with top ranagement (J. P. Eckert, Operations fianager and, m ,, n---,.,1 - - , - - ,a o " ..-t g,,g,4,3,2 " , ,7 1 t'a terials flanagcmant).'Thede monstrations are necessary to ensure personn2l

.rri== > ....................... ................~...~ . . . . . ~ . . - ~ ~ . - - ~ ~ . . - ~ ~ ~ ~ . . . .~.....................

l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

t

, j . - * = * ....................... .................~.- ~ ~ ~ . - - - . - . . . ~ - . ~ . - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .

m**

~~.. . . . . . . . . . .

I DATE > ,...........ee.e.e.... . * . ......e............. ...**-*~~*'*m* ** -' *# " * *m m*'"m'* .* ' * * . . . .....n 1

_ , . . . . , . . . . . . , . _ , . . . e.... .. ... ......... . ...,.,............

W. T. Crow 3 safety while remaining in the plant during a power outage. The NNFD plans to provide a safety demonstration that criticality would be precluded.

The alternates are to install an emergency power system to activate the audible alarms in the event of a criticality incident or to continue evacuation in the event of a power outage. NNFD feels the former would be very costly and does not appear warranted. Because of the potential safety

. hazards associatdd with the latter, it would remain an unresolved IE safety item.

Discussions with the IE inspector during the plant visit indicate there is neither a problem associated with the implementation of nor with

=. the effectiveness of the SNM-27 license.

B. NNFD Facility Expansion Plans The NMFD has been given authorization by the NRC to construct expansions of Bays 1A, 3A, and 4A. The safety portions of the application (two) for the expansion are to be submitted at a later date. The safety demonstration of the Bay 4A expansion should be submitted before the end of 1979 and its use is planned for March 1980. Bays 1A and 3A are to be  :

used for a modified fuel fabrication process which was discussed during the visit. The safety portion of the latter amendment application is scheduled for submittal in the fall of 1980. .

C. CNFP Inspection  !

=

During the visit to the CNFP to discuss the status of their action on IE Bulletin No. 79-19, the facility was toured to review the operations

~~~

and discuss safety related activities. The principal contacts durina the visit to the CNFP were W. Heer R. Alto (Manager Manufacturing)(recently and D. Zeff (Manager, appointed Manager Safety, Licensing of Operations),

and Safeguards). There is a potential airborne contamination problem at the second end weld operation of loaded rods. The welding is done in a " clean area" of the facility. At this particular location in the clean area, the  !

airborne activit . although not a health problem, exceeds the action levels l in the license for clean areas. The CUFP investigation of the problem was l reviewed, the operation observed, and a proposed meeting in the offices of l the NRC scheduled for October 25,1979, to discuss a license amendment q requested associated with the contamination control in the " Clean area."

1 Discussions with the IE inspector during the plant visit indicate there d is no other problem associated either with the implementation of or with the

effectiveness of the SNM-ll68 license.

D. LRC Inspection 90003;42 N r N tS  !:it :: t? '_?: '; Ji m

. ...e .~ T .. . J . J ..

.,,.e. 9.n IE Bulletin,,p,,. 79,-19, we ciscussed ,,th,e,,pa t,us,,,o f,,,the . ,R,C , r,es pons es, ,to the_,,,

11:"dUtstS5' ding :o,n, ments ,o, n Eb reneual app ication and r avlewed Be

,w m . . . - . - . . . . - - ~ . ~ . - - ~.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.-~ ~~.~-.

om . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

I I

i W. T. Crow 4 j

= " packaging of excess plutonium glove boxes preparatory to burial. A. Olsen, j

' License Administrator, was the principal' contact during the visit to the

,' LRC.

The License Administrator has not yet received the LRC responses l l.

to the radiological safety corr.ents for submittal to the llRC. l Before we left, he received assurance from management that priority would be given to prepare the required responses.

2. Eleven shipping containers, packaged with plutonium glove boxes 1 to be shipped to burial, are teing stored until the State of l Washington approves the reopening of the burial facility. One '

q glove box, already disconnected from the glove box line and g

~

filled with a solid foam, is awaiting the availability of a shipping container for packaging.

III. Conclusions Coordination of the site visit with Region II (IE) facility principal project inspector provided an opportunity to review the adequacy of the licenses with respect to current and planned operations at the facilities and to review the tit!FD ar..endment application (together with both licensee and regional IE personnel) for authorization to modify the emergency evacuation procddures.

Original Signed By,i N. Ketzlach florman Ketzlach Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Paterial Safety 90003;43 y .

""' ::1 .

}

l l . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l . . , . - . . . . . . . . . . . .

..