IR 05000440/1985054

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Insp Rept 50-440/85-54 on 850814-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Allegations Re Electrical Terminations & Penetration Seals
ML20138A686
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/23/1985
From: Neisler J, Williams C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138A681 List:
References
50-440-85-54, NUDOCS 8510080610
Download: ML20138A686 (6)


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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-440/85054(DRS)

Docket No. 50-440 License No. CPPR-148 Licensee: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Post Office Box 5000 Cleveland, OH 44101

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Facility Name: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 I Inspection At: Perry Site, Perry, Ohio Inspection Conducted: August 14 through 16, 1985

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Inspector: J. H. Neisle f-) 3- [7 Date

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Approved By: . C. Williams, Chief Plant Systems Section 9 -2 3 ' @

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Inspection Sunnary Inspection on August 14 through 16, 1985 (Report No. 50-440/85054(DRS))

, Areas Inspected: Special inspection of allegations relative to electrical

. terminations and penetration seals. The inspection involved a total of sixteen inspector-hours by one NRC inspecto Results: No violations or deviations were identifie ~

8510080610 850927 I

PDR ADOCK 05000440 G PDR _ _ _ _ _ _ . ..

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

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Principle Licensee Employees

, *C. Shuster, Manager, Quality Assurance

  • E. Riley, General Supervisor, CQS

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  • G. Parker, Unit Supervisor Pipe / Mech, CQS
  • K. Comorelli, Lead Quality Engineer, Electrical CQS
  • W. Morris, Quality Engineer, CQS R. Varner, Quality Engineer, CQS
  • M. Kritzer, Unit Supervisor Civil / Structural, CQS
  • F. Sonderoth, Senior Engineer, NED
  • K. Kaplan, Senior Engineering Technician, NLFMS D. Siedlarzyk, Quality Engineer, CQS

R. Czyzewski, Quality Engineer, CQS Brand Industrial Services Company (BISCO)

S. Mathias, Quality Control Superviso?

D. Beahon, Quality Control Inspector

F. Mylet, Superintendent, Reactor Building

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S. Sweeney, Foreman, Diesel Building

  • Denotes those persons attending the exit intervie The inspector also contacted other site personnel including craft workers, engineers, supervisors, and records personne . Allegations (Closed) Allegation RIII-83-A-0093: The Region III allegations coordinator was contacted by the alleger by telephone, who questioned the Region III failure to substantiate his allegation in Region III Inspection Report No. 50-440/84-07. According to the alleger, determinated cables were hanging in compartments YE in Motor Control Center IR24-S018 and compartments G, H, and J in IR24-5019. The alleger stated that the cable in IR24-S018, compartments YE and YH was black in colo NRC Review The compartments referred to in the allegation were opened by plant operations personnel and the NRC inspector examined each conductor within the compartments. No conductor showed any damage that would

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have occurred during determination or re-determination. There was no indication that minimum bend or training radii had been exceeded when work within the compartment was performed.

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The black cables in panel IR24-S018, compartments YE and YH, are two single conductor size 6 AWG cables. These cables are internal wiring installed by the panel manufacturer between a disconnect switch in compartment YE and the transformer Y The alleger stated that he observed the determinated cables prior to making his allegation in 1983. During that time the plant was undergoing preoperational testing. When plant testing is being performed, cables are routinely determinated and re-determinated to facilitate testing. At the Perry site this function is controlled through the Lifted Lead and Jumper Control Procedure and Temporary Alteration Procedure. This activity is under the jurisdiction of the plant testing and operations group, not a construction contractor such as the alleger's employer. Therefore, the alleger may not have been aware of the requirements in this area that were in effect at the time he allegedly observed the determinated cable Conclusion Based on the results of the inspector's examination of each conductor in the compartments identified by the alleger and three previous inspections tha*. addressed the alleger's concerns, this allegation was not substantiated. The wiring in the identified panel compart-ments meets the NRC requirements, b. (Closed) Allegation RIII-85-A-0139: The Perry NRC Senior Resident Inspector received the following allegations from a former employee of Brand Industrial Services Company (BISCO) on August 9, 1985:

Allegation 1 BISCO is hiring travelling craft and firing local people and is not providing proper training for the travelling craft. Craft performing installation work in the field and fabrication shop are not properly trained and qualified to perform that wor NRC Review The NRC inspector examined the training and qualification records of personnel hired during calendar year 1985 and found that those personnel whose records were examined were trained and qualified according to procedure. Technicians who apply sealing material are members of Local 758, Heat and Frost Insulator's Union of South Bend, Indiana. The inspector was informed that Local 758 has jurisdiction for this craft nationwide. Therefore, all sealing material techni-cians (installers) are travellers. Local 758 trains and certifies the technician Support personnel are provided by Local 3, Heat and Frost Insulators of Cleveland, Ohio. Support personnel from Local 3 are certified as journeymen insulators.

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The inspector reviewed documentation that indicated although BISCO crafts were certified journeymen, they had been required to demon-strate their proficiency by taking a practical examination prior to performing safety-related wor Conclusion Based on the inspector's review of personnel records of new employees and documentation of their practical examinations, no adverse condi-tions were identified. This allegation was not substantiate Allegation 2 The installation of TSI fire resistant board on cable trays in the diesel generator corridor is not being properly accomplished. BISCO tried to expedite work in this area and attempted to get quality control approval on deficient wor One specific installation did not have the proper material thickness and Quality Control was requested to approve the installation (a QC inspector was identified).

Quality Control did not approve the installation, but later the work was approve The quality of work was being compromised for schedule concern NRC Review The inspector reviewed Nonconformance Report BISCO-0176, Stop Work Order No. 001, and Corrective Action Report CAR-018. Nonconformance Report BISCO-0176 identified the condition of the penetration in the diesel corridor described by the alleger and the stop work order was issued to assure that work did not continue until the design and acceptance criteria had been established and approved by the license The stop work order was still in effect at the time of this investi-gation. The inspector noted that the nonconformance report and stop work order were issued by the BISCO Field Quality Control Supervisor on August 8, 198 Conclusion Based on the inspector's review of documentation, the quality control group had identified the deficiency, stopped the work, and demon-strated that the process was properly working prior to the alleger's coming to the NRC. This allegation was not substantiate Allegation 3 On the 629 foot elevation in the Unit I reactor building, piping was damaged during installation of a sleeve necessary for penetration sealing when a chainfall was utilized to move the pipin This involved either penetration PRB 3052 or PRB 403 i

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NRC Review The inspector reviewed NCR BISC-0165 dated July 1,1985. This NCR documented BISCO's inability to remove the small wood wedges that had been used to center the pipe in penetration PRB 3052. The NCR was dispositioned use-as-is to leave the wedges in place. The justi-fication for the use-as-is disposition was that the pipe would never become sufficiently heated to cause the wood wedges to ignite and that the wedges would not affect the integrity of the elastomer seals. Visual inspection of the pipe by the NRC inspector revealed a small gouge in the pipe wall near the seal. The depth of the gauge in the pipe wall was measured and determined to be within the allowable limits to maintain the pipe minimum wall thicknes Visual inspection of penetration PRB 4031 revealed a two-inch pipe passing through the penetration. No evidence was observed that a chainfall had been used on this pip Conclusion Based on the review of pertinent documentation and direct inspection of the penetrations, this allegation was not substantiate Allegation 4 Penetration seals using SF-60 sealing material in the Unit 1 shield building wall near the containment vacuum relief lines where the seal material had cracked were improperly repaired by filling the cracks with Kaowool and troweling SF-60 material over the Kaowool. Prior repairs of this nature were performed by removing the deficient material and "re-shooting" the penetration. The alleger indicated that the Kaowool method was used to expedite the work and does not meet quality standard NRC Review The inspector performed a visual inspection of the non-safety related penetrations in the Unit 1 shield building wall near the vacuum relief lines. These seal cracks were repaired according to instructions provided in the engineering approved disposition of Deficiency Report CQS-5162, which required the void created by material separation to be packed with ceramic fiber (Kaowool) and covered with Dow-Corning RTV-732 sealan Conclusion

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l Based on visual inspection of the repairs, review of the deficiency l

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report, and the penetration seals being non safety-related, this allegation is not substantiated as pertaining to nuclear safety-related activities.

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. 3. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspec-tor's comments. The inspector also discussed the likely informational

content with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents /

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1 processes as proprietary.

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