BSEP 03-0129, Revisions to Plant Emergency Procedures
| ML032471612 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/2003 |
| From: | O'Neil E Progress Energy Carolinas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| BSEP 03-0129 | |
| Download: ML032471612 (260) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Progress Energy AUG 2 8 2003 SERIAL: BSEP 03-0129 10 CFR 50.54 (q) UPS. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,TIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324/LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 REVISIONS TO PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Ladies and Gentlemen: In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. is submitting revisions to Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, plant emergency procedures. Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. has evaluated the revisions, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), and has determined that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan; and the Plan, as changed, continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. A list of the revised procedures is provided as . A summary of the revisions is provided in Enclosure 2. Enclosure 3 contains copies of the revised procedures. There are no regulatory commitments being made in this submittal. Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. Gene Atkinson, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness, at (910) 457-2056. Sincerely, Edward T. O'Neil Manager - Support Services Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. Brunswick Nuclear Plant P.OBox 10429 Southport, NC 28461
Document Control Desk BSEP 03-0129 / Page 2 TG-T/tg-t
Enclosures:
- 1. List of Revised Plant Emergency Procedures
- 2. Summary of Revisions
- 3. Copies of Revised Procedures cc (with enclosures):
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region U ATrN: Mr. Luis A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8470 River Road Southport, NC 28461-8869 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Electronic Copy Only) AUN: Ms. Brenda L. Mozafari (Mail Stop OWFN 8G9) 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Ms. Jo A. Sanford Chair - North Carolina Utilities Commission P.O. Box 29510 Raleigh, NC 27626-05 10
BSEP 03-0129 Enclosure 1 Page 1 of 1 List of Revised Plant Emergency Procedures Procedure Revision Effective Title Date OERP 62 07/31/03 Radiological Emergency Response Plan OPEP-02.6.28 8 07/31/03 Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations OPEP-03.5.5 5 07/31/03 Environmental Monitoring And Plume Tracking OPEP-03.6.3 13 07/31/03 Estimate Of The Extent Of Core Damage I__________ I__________ _____ Under Accident Conditions
BSEP 03-0129 Enclosure 2 Page 1 of 3 Summary of Revisions A. OERP, Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Revision 62:
- 1. Changed "CP&L" to "Progress Energy" and deleted "Carolina Power & Light Company" on cover page to reflect company name change.
- 2. Changed "Communications Manager" to "Communications Managers" in Section 3.5.7 to reflect NUREG-0654, Table B-1 required minimum staffing for Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
- 3. Deleted "EOF Habitability Technician" and changed "TSC Habitability Technician" to "TSC/EOF Habitability Technician" in Figure 3.2-1, Brunswick Emergency Organization, to reflect the deletion of the EOF Habitability Technician and need for only one individual for habitability surveys, due to co-location of Technical Support Center and EOF.
- 4. Changed "accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from tanks housing radioactive materials" to "accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from systems housing radioactive materials" in Section 4.2.2.1 for clarification.
- 5. Reworded information describing the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) and analysis of reactor and containment in Section 4.2.2.3. This change reflects the removal of PASS as the primary indicator of core damage and replacement with emphasis on existing instrumentation as the initial indicator of core damage with PASS remaining as an option. This change supports NRC approval of Technical Specification Amendments 226 and 253 for BNP Units 1 and 2 which eliminated the PASS requirement from Technical Specifications.
- 6. Added Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System, as new reference in Section 8.15.
- 7. Revised Section 4.4.6; Figure 1.1-6, Population Totals; Figure 4.4-1, Evacuation Schedule and Warning; and Figure 4.4-2, Evacuation Times, to reflect revised evacuation time estimates for 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
BSEP 03-0129 Enclosure 2 Page 2 of 3
- 8. Changed reference in Section 8.6 to reflect revised evacuation time estimate information.
- 9. Added additional portable survey equipment in Table 5.7-4, Typical Portable Survey Equipment, to reflect current status and corrected typographical errors.
- 10. Added SOER 02-1, Severe Weather, as new reference in Section 8.16 and added reference commitments in procedure, as appropriate.
B. OPEP-02.6.28, Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 8:
- 1. Changed "CP&L" to "Progress Energy" and deleted "Carolina Power & Light Company" on cover page to reflect company name change.
- 2. Changed reference from "Communications Manager" to "Communications Managers" throughout procedure to reflect NUREG-0654, Table B-I required minimum staffing levels for EOF.
- 3. Added information in Section 5.4.1 to clarify time limit for notifying offsite agencies with a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) at a General Emergency classification.
- 4. Updated Attachment 2, Evacuation Zones and Time Estimates/10 Mile EPZ Map, to reflect revised evacuation time estimates for 10-Mile EPZ.
- 5. Added guidance for establishing initial PARs in Section 6.1.
- 6. Added guidance to modify a PAR in Section 6.2.
- 7. Added guidance in Attachment 1, PAR Flowchart, for protective action recommendation decision-making as an enhancement.
C. OPEP-03.5.5, Environmental Monitoring And Plume Tracking, Revision 5:
- 1. Changed "CP&L" to "Progress Energy" and deleted "Carolina Power & Light Company" on cover page to reflect company name change.
- 2. Added Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments No. 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System as new reference 2.9, and added reference commitments in procedure, as appropriate. This change follows approval of Amendments 226 and 253 which deleted PASS from the Brunswick Technical Specifications.
BSEP 03-0129 Enclosure 2 Page 3 of 3 D. OPEP-03.6.3, Estimate Of The Extent Of Core Damage Under Accident Conditions, Revision 13:
- 1. Incorporated PASS Technical Specification change. Procedure places primary focus on radiation levels in the containment as initial indicators of core damage; and the use of PASS is maintained in the procedure to permit a more precise determination of core damage from gas and liquid samples.
BSEP 03-0129 Enclosure 3 Copies of Revised Procedures
If MT I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NProgW=ss Energy BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT Information Use PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME XIII EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (OERP) RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN (ERP) REVISION 62 OERP Rev 62l
REVISION
SUMMARY
Revision 62 of OERP includes changes incorporated from the annual review by Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) members. Changes include:
- Changed "CP&L" to "Progress Energy" and deleted 'Carolina Power & Light Company" on Cover Page to reflect company name change.
- Changed "Communications Manager" to "Communications Managers" in Section 3.5.7 to reflect NUREG-0654, Table B-1 required minimum staffing levels for the EOF.
- Deleted 'EOF Habitability Technician" and changed "TSC Habitability Technician" to "TSC/EOF Habitability Technician" in Figure 3.2-1, Brunswick Emergency Organization, to reflect the deletion of the EOF Habitability Technician and need for only one individual for habitability surveys, due to co-location of TSC and EOF.
- Changed "accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from tanks housing radioactive materials" to "accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from systems housing radioactive materials" in Section 4.2.2.1 for clarification.
- Reworded information describing PASS and analysis of reactor and containment in Section 4.2.2.3. This change reflects the removal of PASS as the primary indicator of core damage and replacement with emphasis on existing instrumentation as initial indicator of core damage with PASS remaining as an option. This change supports NRC approval of Technical Specification Amendments 226 and 253 for BNP Units 1 and 2 which eliminated the PASS requirement from Technical Specifications.
- Added Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System, as new reference in Section 8.15.
- Revised Section 4.4.6, Figure 1.1-6, Population Totals, Figure 4.4-1, Evacuation Schedule and Warning, and Figure 4.4-2, Evacuation Times to reflect revised evacuation time estimates for 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
- Changed reference in Section 8.6 to reflect revised evacuation time estimate information.
- Added additional portable survey equipment to Table 5.7-4, Typical Portable Survey Equipment, to reflect current status and corrected typographical errors.
- Added SOER 02-1, Severe Weather, as new reference in Section 8.16 and added reference commitments in procedure, as appropriate.
OERP Rev. 62 1
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Page(s) Revision 1-10 62 1 1-20 62 2-1 6 62 3 3-32 62 4 4-29 62 5-1 22 62 6 6-12 62 7 7-8 62 8 8-2 62 A-1 -A-3 62 B B-13 62 C-1 -C-3 62 D-1 62 E-1 -E-3 62 F F-5 62 G-1 -G-3 62 H H-10 62 Attachments EAL - 1 OPEP-02.1 Rev. 48 EAL - 2 OPEP-02.1 Rev. 48 OERP l Rev. 62 - 2
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
. . . . 1-1 1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION ........................ ,. .,,,,,,,,,....... 1-2 1.1.1 Plant Site Description ,,,.. . ... 1-2 1.1.2 Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone ... 1-2 1.1.3 Ingestion Exposure Emergency Planning Zone ... 1-3 1.1.4 Demographic Information,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,... ..... 1-3 1.2 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY ...................... ,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,........,1-4 1.3
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCYPROGRAM . ..............................
,,,,,,,,,,,,....1-5 1.3.1 Concept of Operations ... 1-5 1.3.1.1 Emergency Response Activities ..........................................,1-5 1.3.1.2 Emergency Response Resources .1-7 1.3.1.3 Emergency Response Facilities ........................................ ,.1-9 1.3.1.4 Emergency Response Plan Maintenance .1-9 1.4 BRUNSWICK PLANT EMERGENCYPROCEDURES .1-10 1.5 DEFINITIONS 1-10 2.0 EMERGENCYCLASSIFICATIONS ......................... ,,,,,,,...,.,,,,,,.2-1 2.1 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM..,,, 2-1 2.2 UNUSUALEVENT ....................... ...... 2-3 2.3 ALERT ............................................... 2-3 2.4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY .............................. .. 2-4 2.5 GENERAL EMERGENCY . 2-5 3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION .3-1 3.1 NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION . .3-3 3.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION . ............................ 3-4, 3.2.1 Site Emergency Coordinator ., 3-5 3.2.2 Plant Operators .................. ,,,.. 3-7 3.3 Technical Support Center .. 3-8 3.3.1 Plant Operations Director.3-8 3.3.2 Radiological Control Director ., ,,,,,,,,...... 3-9 3.3.3 Technical Assessment Director ...................... ,,,,,....,,.,,,,,,.3-9 3.3.4 Security Director ................. 3-9 3.3.5 Communications Director .................. ,.,,,,. 3-10 3.3.6 Radiological Control Communicator . 3-10 3.3.7 Accident Assessment Team Leader . 3-10 OERP Rev. 62 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Page 3.4 Operational Support Center ..................... ,. ... 3-11 3.4.1 Emergency Repair Director ................... ,,,.,,,,.3-11 3.4.2 Operational Support Center Mission Coordinator .3-11 3.4.3 Operations Coordinator ., 3-11 3.4.4 Environmental & Radiological Control (E&RC) Coordinator............. . .......................... ................................... 3-12 3.4.5 Radiological Emergency Teams .3-12 3.4.6 Fire Brigade ., .. 3-13 3.5 Emergency Operations Facility .. 3-13 3.5.1 Emergency Response Manager .3-14 3.5.2 Administrative and Logistics Manager .3-14 3.5.3 Technical Analysis Manager .................... ,.,,,,,,.3-14 3.5.4 Radiological Control Manager .................... ,,,.,.,,,,,,,,,.3-15 3.5.5 Environmental Monitoring Team Leader .................... ,,,.,,,.,.3-15 3.5.6 Dose Projection Coordinator.. ... 3-15 3.5.7 Communications Manager .................... ,.,,,,,,.3-16 3.5.8 Assistant to the Emergency Response Manager (AERM) . 3-16 3.6 Joint Information Center .................................. ,.,,,,,.,.,.,.,.3-16 3.6.1 Company Spokesperson .....................,,,. 3-16 3.6.2 JIC Director ............................ 3-17 3.6.3 Company Technical Spokesperson..3-17 3.6.4 Administrative Coordinator ................... ,.,,,,,,,.. 3-17 3.6.5 Public Information Director ., . . 3-17 3.7 OFFSITE ORGANIZATION ASSISTANCE,,,... . 3-18 3.7.1 Contracted Services ... ,,..,.., .. 3-18 3.7.2 Local Services Support . 3-19 3.7.2.1 Medical Assistance , 3-19 3.7.2.2 Ambulance Service.. .. . . 3-19 3.7.2.3 Fire Assistance .................... ,,,,.........,,.,. 3-20 3.8 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES..................... ......................................................................... 3-21 3.8.1 State of North Carolina . . ............................3-21 3.8.1.1 Govemor's Office ....................... , , . . 3-21 3.8.1.2 Department of Crime Control and Public Safety. 3-21 3.8.1.3 Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources, Division of Radiation Protection,.. .. 3-22 3.8.2 Brunswick County . ..................
,,,,,,,,,...,,.. 3-22 3.8.2.1 Emergency Management Agency ...................................... 3-22 3.8.2.2 Brunswick County Sheriffs Department ............................ 3-22 I OERP I Rev. 62 1 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Page 3.8.3 New Hanover County .................... 3-23 3.8.3.1 Emergency Management Agency ...................................... 3-23 3.8.3.2 New Hanover County Sheriffs Department .3-23 3.8.4 Federal Agencies . . .3-24 3.8.4.1 Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office..................................................................................... 3-24 3.8.4.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ......... 3-25 3.8.4.3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) ............................ 3-25 3.8.4.4 U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) ................................... 3-25 3.8.4.5 Meteorological Service.................................... 3-25 3.8.4.6 Weather Service .......... 3-26 3.8.5 Agreements . . ........... 3-26 3.9 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION . . ..........................3-26 4.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES ................... 4-1 4.1 ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS ................................... 4-1 4.1.1 General .............. 4-1 4.1.2 Unusual Event .............. 4-2 4.1.3 Alert .............. 4-2 4.1.4 Site Area Emergency .............. 4-3 4.1.5 General Emergency .. 4-4 4.2 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ACTIONS . . .........................4-4 4.2.1 General ,..,,,,, 4-4 4.2.2 Source Term Assessment,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,....... 4-5 4.2.2.1 Effluent and Radiation Readings ...................... 4-5 4.2.2.2 Potential Consequences Based on In-Plant Conditions .,,,,,,,,,,, 4-6 4.2.2.3 Post Accident Sampling and Analysis of Reactor and Containment ...................................... 4-7 4.2.3 Dose Projection and Meteorological Systems . .....................4-8 4.2.4 Emergency Environmental Monitoring . ............................4-9 4.2.5 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) . .....................4-10 4.3 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 4-10 4-10....................... 4.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS . . .4-10 4.4.1 Protective Action - Off Site . .......................... 4-11 4.4.2 Protective Action - On Site . .4-11 4.4.2.1 Warning and Notification.4-11 4.4.2.2 Evacuation & Personnel Accountability .4-12 I OERP I Rev. 62 l 51
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Page 4.4.3 Control of Personnel Radiation Exposures ................................. 4-13 4.4.3.1 Exposure Control Under Emergency Conditions .............. 4-14 4.4.3.2 Exposures During Repair/Reentry Efforts ......................... 4-15 4.4.4 Radioactive Contamination . . ..........................4-16 4.4.4.1 On-Site Personnel ............................................ 4-16 4.4.4.2 Equipment and Vehicles ............................................ 4-16 4.4.5 Treatment of Injured and Contaminated Persons ....................... 4-17 4.4.6 Public Warning and Notification ............................................ 4-18 4.4.7 Protective Actions - Off Site/Public ............................................ 4-19 4.4.7.1 Public Education and Information .4-19 4.4.7.2 General .4-20 4.4.7.3 Evacuation .4-21 4.4.7.4 Shelter ... 4-21 4.4.7.5 Respiratory Protection .............. 4-22 5.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT .5-1 5.1 CONTROL ROOM ........... 5-2 5.2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER . . 5-2 5.2.1 TSC/EOF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM .5-3 5.2.2 TSC/EOF EMERGENCY CONTAMINATED DRAIN SYSTEM.. 5-3 5.3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER 5-4 5.4 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY ................................ ,5-4 5.5 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER . .5-5 5.6 OFF-SITE EMERGENCYFACILITIES . .5-5 5.6.1 North Carolina Emergency Operations Center ............................. 5-5 5.6.2 Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center ....................... 5-5 5.6.3 New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center ................. 5-6 5.7 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES ..................... 5-6 5.7.1 General................ . . . . .. . .. 5-6 5.7.2 Meteorological Instrumentation and Procedures ............... 5-6 5.7.3 Seismic Monitoring .................. 5-8 5.7.4 Radiological Monitors .............. 5-9 5.7.5 Process Monitors .............. 5-10 5.7.6 Laboratory Facilities .............. 5-10 5.7.7 Dose Projection.......... 5-11 I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Pacie 5.8 FIRE DETECTION .................. , , , , , , . .... 5-11 5.9 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT..5-12 5.10 FIRSTAID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES ................................. ,..... 5-12 5.11 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES .5-12 5.12 OFF-SITE ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES........1......................... .......................... ............... ..............., 13 6.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.. 6-1 6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS ..................................... ,,,,, 6-2 6.1.1 Training ..................................... 6-2 6.1.2 Drills and Exercises ............................ 6-4 6.1.2.1 Drills ............................................,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,6-4 6.1.2.2 Exercises ....................................... 6-6 6.1.3 Emergency Planning Coordinator .................................................. 6-8 6.1.4 Public Education ......................................... ,,,,...... 6-9 6.2 REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES.......................................... ........................................ 6-9 6.2.1 Plan Updates..................................................................................6-10 6.2.2 Independent Review ....................... ..................................... 6-10 6.2.3 Off-Site Agreements and Plans .............................................. 6-11 6.3 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ............ ............................................ ............................ 6-11 6.3.1 Emergency Equipment and Supplies,, .. .6. -11 6.3.2 Medical Equipment and Supplies . ............................ 6-,,,,,,,,.... 611 6.4 PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE . ...............................6-12 7.0 RECOVERY 7-1 7-1............. 7.1 GENERAL ............................................. ,,,,.... 7-1 7.2 RECOVERY ORGANIZATION .................... 7-1 7.2.1 Recovery Manager ................... , , , ,,. .. 7-2 7.2.2 Plant General Manager............................................................... 7-2 7.2.3 Technical Analysis Manager........................................................... 7-2 7.2.4 Engineering Manager .................. 7-3 7.2.5 Administrative and Logistics Manager ........................... ,,.. 7-3 7.2.6 Radiological Control Manager .................... 7-3 7.3 RECOVERY PLANNING..7-3...........................,,,,,.,,,,,,,,, 7-3 7.4 ON-SITE RECOVERY ACTIVITIES . .7-3 I OERP I Rev. 62 l 7
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Pane 7.5 OFF-SITE RECOVERY ACTIVITIES ............................. , , .... 7-4 7.5.1 General ............... 7-4 7.5.2 Emergency Cleanup Operations .. . 7-4 7.5.3 Countermeasures ................. 7-5 7.5.4 Monitoring and Dose Assessment ............................... ,.,,,.,,.,.,,,,,,.7-6
8.0 REFERENCES
................................................................8-1.................... .. 8-1 I OERP I Rev. 62 l 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Pacie LIST OF APPENDICES Number Title APP A Brunswick Communications System .A-1 APP B Agreements......................................................................................................... B-1 APP C Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) Off-Site Agency Support Summary ............ C-1 APP D Superseded ......................................................................................................... D-1 APP E Medical Treatment and Assistance ................................................. E-1 APP F Technical Basis for Source Term Mixes ................................................. F-1 APP G Minimum Procedures Required to Implement the Sections of the Plan ........... . G-1 APP H Cross-Reference Between NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criteria and Brunswick Radiological Emergency Response Plan . H-1 LIST OF TABLES Number Title 3.5-1 Notification and Activation of Principal Emergency Response Organizations...........................................3.......................................................... 3-31 4.4-1 Factors Related to Warning/Evacuation Time .............................................. ,.4-23 4.4-2 Representative Shielding Factors for Surface Deposited Radionuclides ............................................. 4-24 4.4-3 Representative Shielding Factors from Gamma Cloud Source ............. ...... 4-25 4.4-4 PF of Various Vehicles and Structures ............................................. 4-26 5.0-2 Functional Objectives of Emergency Facilities ............................................. 5-14 5.7-1 On-site Meteorological Instrumentation ............................ ,,,,,,,,.5-15 5.7-2 Area Radiation Monitoring System Channel Identification & Meter Ranges................................................. ........................................................... 5-16 5.7-3 Process Radiation Monitoring System Channel Identification & Meter Ranges ........ 5-20 5.7-4 Typical Portable Survey Equipment .......................... ,,,,,,,.. 5-22 7.2-1 Designation of Key Recovery Organization Personnel .................................... 7-7 OERP I Rev. 62 l 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Page LIST OF FlGURES Number Title 1.1-1 Brunswick Site Plan ......................... ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,....... 1-14 1.1-2 10-Mile Plume Exposure EPZ............. , , ..... 1-15 1.1-3 Brunswick Site Building and Onsite Emergency Facility Locations .,,,,,,... 1-16 1.1-4 Wind Roses ..... . . . . . . .... 1-17 1.1-5 50-Mile Ingestion Exposure EPZ ..... , , , , . .... 1-18 1.1-6 Population Totals..........................19.................................................... ..... 1-19 1.1-7 Concept of Emergency Planning Zones .,,,, 1-20 2.0-1 Response Sequence to Off-Normal Conditions .................................. ,,,,,,,.. 2-6 3.1-1 Brunswick Shift Organization ........................... ,,,,,... 3-28 3.2-1 Brunswick Emergency Organization .......................... ,,,,,,,...,.,.,,,,,,,,,.3-29 3.4-1 Operational Support Center (OSC) .......................... ,,,,,,,.. 3-30 3.6-1 Joint Information Center (JIC) ....................... 3-32 3,,,,,,,32,,,,............,,, 4.4-1 BNP Evacuation Schedule and Warning................................4.-.27................... 4-27 4.4-2 Evacuation Times - Brunswick EPZ ............................. ,,,,,,,,,,......... 4-28 4.4-3 Protection Factors of Shielding Materials ............................. ,,,,...,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,.4-29 7.2-1 Progress Energy Recovery Organization .............. 7-8 IOERP I Rev. 62 10
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT (BNP) RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN (ERP)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Emergency Program for the Brunswick Nuclear Plant consists of the Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan and its implementing Plant Emergency Procedures. The Radiological Emergency Plan may also be referred to as the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) in other plant documents. Also included are the related radiological emergency plans and procedures of state and local organizations. The purpose of these programs is to provide for the protection of plant personnel and the general public and to prevent or mitigate property damage that could result from an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. The combined emergency preparedness programs have the following objectives:
- 1. Effective coordination of emergency activities among all organizations having a response role.
- 2. Early warning and clear instructions to the population-at-risk in the event of a serious radiological emergency.
- 3. Continued assessment of actual or potential consequences both on site and off site.
- 4. Effective and timely implementation of emergency measures.
- 5. Continued maintenance of an adequate state of emergency preparedness.
The Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness is the BNP Emergency Planning Coordinator. The BNP Emergency Plan and Procedures are contained in the Plant Operating Manual (POM), Volume 13, which consists of the following parts: Book 1, Radiological Emergency Plan (ERP) Book 2, Plant Emergency Procedures (PEP) I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-1
A list of procedures required to implement the plan can be found in Book 2. 1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 1.1.1 Plant Site Description The Brunswick plant site is located in the southeastern portion of North Carolina 2 1/2 miles north of Southport in Brunswick County, and 16 miles south of Wilmington, North Carolina, in adjacent New Hanover County. (See Fig. 1.1-1 and Fig. 1.1-2.) Approximate coordinates of the reactor buildings are latitude 330 57'30" N and longitude 780 00'30" W. The Brunswick Plant utilizes two General Electric Company boiling water reactors. The major structures of the Brunswick plant which contain radioactive materials are the Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings, the turbine building and radwaste building. Figure 1.1-1 shows a site plan for the Brunswick plant and Figure 1.1-3 shows the location of the buildings at the site. 1.1.2 Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone The plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is defined to be the area within an approximate ten-mile radius of the Brunswick plant. Principal exposure sources from plume exposure pathways are: (a)external exposure to gamma and beta radiation from the plume and deposited material and (b) exposure of internal organs to gamma and beta radiation from inhaled radioactive gases and/or radioactive particulates. Figure 1.1-2 shows the ten-mile plume exposure EPZ in relation to the location of the Brunswick plant. The plume exposure EPZ includes portions of the North Carolina counties of Brunswick and New Hanover. The prevailing winds around the Brunswick plant are from the southwest. Figure 1.1-4 presents wind roses for the Brunswick plant site. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-2
1.1 .3 Ingestion Exposure Emergency Planning Zone The ingestion exposure EPZ is defined to be the area within a 50-mile radius of the Brunswick plant. The principal exposure sources from ingestion pathways are contaminated water or food, such as milk or fresh vegetables. The time of potential exposure can range in length from hours to months. Figure 1.1-5 shows the 50-mile ingestion exposure EPZ in relation to the location of the Brunswick plant. The ingestion exposure EPZ includes the North Carolina Counties of Bladen, Brunswick, Columbus, New Hanover, Onslow, Pender, and Sampson, and the South Carolina County of Horry. The region within a 50-mile radius of the Brunswick plant site is predominantly rural, with less than one-half the land devoted to farming. The remainder of the region consists of undeveloped, non-utilized marshes and woodlands. 1.1.4 Demographic Information Demographic information for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone is presented in Figure 1.1-6. The information is presented by (1) local planning zones and (2) distance from plant at 0-2 miles, 2-5 miles, and 5-10 miles, based on the longitude and latitude of the plant site. Since some of the local planning zones extend beyond the 10-mile radius, the total population for the local planning zones is greater than the total population for the 0-10 mile radius. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-3
1.2 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY This document describes the Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan (Plan) which has been prepared in accordance with Section 50.47 and Appendix E, of Title 10, Part 50, of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Plan shall be implemented whenever an emergency situation is indicated as defined in Section 2.0 Emergency Classifications. Radiological emergencies can vary in severity from the occurrence of an abnormal event, such as a minor fire with no radiological health consequences, to nuclear accidents having substantial on-site and/or off-site consequences. In addition to emergencies involving a release of radioactive materials, events such as security threats or breaches, fires, electrical system disturbances, and natural phenomena that have the potential for involving radioactive materials are included in the Plan. Other types of emergencies that do not have a potential for involving radioactive materials are not included in the Plan. The activities and responsibilities of outside agencies providing an emergency response role at the Brunswick plant are summarized in Appendix C and in the state's Emergency Plan. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-4
1.3
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCYPROGRAM The Brunswick radiological emergency program consists of the Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures. The Plan provides the basis for performing advance planning and for defining specific requirements and commitments to be implemented by other documents and procedures. The Brunswick plant procedures provide the detailed actions and instructions that will be required to implement the Plan in the event of an emergency. The Plan and its implementing procedures are briefly described below. 1.3.1 Concept of Operations The Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan describes the general nature of emergency response activities, the available emergency response resources and facilities, and the means for maintaining emergency preparedness. Specific plant implementing procedures have been developed (or existing ones modified) to describe in detail how involved plant and corporate personnel carry out their specific responsibilities as identified in the Plan. 1.3.1.1 Emergency Response Activities The first step in responding to an emergency is recognizing and dassifying the nature of the emergency. Inorder to standardize this process, the four emergency classifications described in NUREG-0654 are adopted for use in this plan. Each class of emergency (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) encompasses a predefined set of increasingly severe circumstances, including plant conditions, instrument readings, and effectiveness of in-plant corrective actions, known as Emergency Action Levels. The process of properly classifying an emergency is important because the subsequent response activities are dependent on the severity of the emergency. OERP Rev. 62 1 1-5
The next step is to notify (and activate as conditions warrant) the proper emergency organizations, both inside and outside Progress Energy. Proper integration of the efforts of the various response organizations is important to prevent omission or unnecessary duplication of key activities. Therefore, the emergency plan identifies in terms of information flow and communications links the interfaces between pertinent organizations, and identifies the role each is to perform. The emergency response measures to be taken by Progress Energy are discussed in detail in this Plan, while those taken by the state and local governments are summarized herein with details provided in the North Carolina State Emergency Plan. Beyond the process of notification and activation of support groups, a variety of efforts must be made to assess and minimize the consequences of an emergency condition. These efforts include estimates of the radiation exposures that may occur to plant and off-site personnel if the emergency is not brought quickly under control. Such estimates can be used to initiate preplanned protective actions. The decisions on protective actions off site, such as taking shelter or evacuation, are the responsibility of state and local authorities. The Plan provides for technical assessments of the course and consequences of the emergency and the means for providing state and local agencies with adequate information upon which to make their decisions. Emergency response activities also include personnel accountability, search and rescue, first aid, personnel decontamination, fire fighting, and damage control. The final step is to declare the emergency over and perform any necessary post-accident recovery activities. The Plan describes post-accident recovery provisions and identifies the transition from the emergency phase to the recovery phase. OERP I Rev. 62 11-6
1.3.1.2 Emergency Response Resources The emergency response resources available to respond to an emergency consist of the personnel at Corporate Headquarters, at other Progress Energy facilities, and, in the longer term, at organizations involved in the nuclear industry. The first line of defense in responding to an emergency lies with the normal operating shift on duty when the emergency begins. Therefore, members of the Brunswick staff are assigned defined emergency response roles that are to be assumed whenever an emergency is declared. The overall management of the emergency is normally performed by the Shift Superintendent until relieved by the on-call Site Emergency Coordinator. Because of his overall knowledge, he is best able to bring the full resources of the plant to bear on controlling the emergency. On-site personnel have preassigned roles to support the Site Emergency Coordinator and to implement his directives. These roles, for the purpose of emergency planning, are cast in terms of emergency teams and assignments, each having a designated leader or primary person and alternate(s) assigned to it. Each team and individual assignment carries with it specific emergency response duties and, where practical, each is provided with an on-shift person to perform those duties on an interim basis. This approach ensures under most conditions that an emergency response duty falls under some predesignated position and provides a smooth transition as additional people are called to the plant, since each one knows ahead of time what his area of responsibilities will be. The Site Emergency Coordinator will also have ready access to the Technical Support Center. This Emergency Facility is comprised of personnel who are knowledgeable of and responsible for engineering and management support. It will assemble shortly after an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency is declared in order to assist the Site Emergency Coordinator and to carry out his directives. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 1-7
Upon declaration of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, or at the discretion of the Site Emergency Coordinator, the Emergency Operations Facility will be activated and staffed by personnel under the direction of the Emergency Response Manager. The position of Emergency Response Manager is staffed by qualified senior plant management personnel. Once the Emergency Operations Facility has been fully activated, the Emergency Response Manager will be responsible for all off-site emergency response including radiological and environmental assessment, determination of recommended public protective actions, and coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies. The Emergency Response Manager will manage the corporate response activities, to relieve the Brunswick plant personnel of any activities that could hamper their response efforts, and to marshall the corporate resources needed to properly respond to the emergency. Progress Energy has a staff of well-trained and experienced engineers, scientists, and technicians. These personnel represent a pool of technical expertise which can be called upon to provide additional support to the emergency response and recovery organizations. Progress Energy personnel will staff a near-site Joint Information Center to interface with the media and general public in order to effectively communicate to the public the nature of an emergency in progress. Available to assist the Brunswick plant in responding to an emergency are Progress Energy personnel assigned to the Shearon Harris and Robinson nuclear plants and the Corporate Offices. In addition as outlined in Appendix C, Progress Energy has arranged for support from outside Progress Energy in the areas of fire fighting, rescue and medical assistance, as well as that support delineated in the state and local emergency plans. Assistance may also be available from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Energy, and General Electric. The industry resources identified by INPO are also available. Progress Energy is a signatory to the mutual assistance agreement developed by INPO for utilities in the nuclear power industry. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-8
1.3.1.3 Emergency Response Facilities Special provisions have been made to assure that ample space and proper equipment are available to effectively respond to the full range of possible emergencies. The emergency facilities available include the Brunswick plant Control Room, Operational Support Center, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and Joint Information Center. Each of these facilities, as well as the North Carolina Emergency Operations Center, the Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center, and the New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center, are described in Section 5, Emergency Facilities and Equipment. 1.3.1.4 Emergency Response Plan Maintenance The Plan, as described in Section 6, provides for maintenance of emergency preparedness by establishing the framework and requirements for training, drills and exercises, and periodic updating. Each Brunswick employee having an emergency response role is trained, and annually retrained, in his area of responsibility and also how his duties fit in with those of others. Each individual must know what is expected of him and what he should expect of others while responding to an emergency. A basic description of the required training for emergency assignment is provided in the Plan. The effectiveness of such training is gauged by the use of drills and exercises. Drills are supervised instruction periods aimed at developing, maintaining, and testing skills in a specific operation such as communications or radiation monitoring. An exercise tests the overall capability of the integrated plant, state, and local emergency organizations to properly respond to an emergency. The Plan sets forth the frequency and content of such drills and exercises and also establishes how lessons learned will be used to improve the Plan. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 1-9
The Plan also delineates the requirements for reviewing, updating, and auditing the Plan and for performing maintenance on and taking inventories of emergency equipment and supplies. An Emergency Planning Coordinator is designated to be responsible for overseeing this process as outlined in Section 6.2. 1.4 BRUNSWICK PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Plant Emergency Procedures (PEP's) are implementing procedures which define the specific (i.e., step-by-step) actions to be followed in order to recognize, assess, and correct an emergency condition and to mitigate its consequences. Procedures to implement the Plan have been developed or existing procedures modified to provide the following information: I. Specific instructions to the plant operating staff for the implementation of the Plan.
- 2. Specific authorities and responsibilities of plant operating personnel.
- 3. A source of pertinent information, forms, and data to ensure prompt actions are taken and that proper notifications and communications are carried out.
- 4. A record of the completed actions.
- 5. The mechanism by which emergency preparedness will be maintained at all times.
1.5 DEFINITIONS Accident - Any unforeseen, or unintentional occurrence or mishap resulting in, or potentially resulting in, physical injury or injury due to radiation exposure or excessive exposure to radioactive materials. Activated - To formally put on active duty with the necessary personnel and equipment to carry out the function required. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-10
Activating - Key personnel are responding as a mandatory step to make the facility operational within the required time. Corrective Actions - Those emergency measures taken to lessen or terminate an emergency situation at or near the source of the problem, to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material, or to reduce the magnitude of a release (e.g., equipment shutdown, fire fighting, repair, and damage control.) Emergency Action Levels - Plant conditions used to determine the existence of an emergency and to classify its severity. The conditions include specific instrument readings (e.g., radiation release rates out of a building vent) that may be used as thresholds for initiating emergency measures such as initiating a notification procedure. Emergencv Classification - The characterization of emergency situations consisting of several groupings including the entire spectrum of possible radiological emergencies. The four classes of emergencies, listed in order of increasing severity (and decreasing probability), are (1) Unusual Event, (2) Alert, (3) Site Area Emergency, and (4) General Emergency. Emergency Instructions - Specific procedures that provide step-by-step instructions to guide plant operations during potential or actual emergency situations. Emergency Operations Centers - Designated facilities designed and equipped for effective coordination and control of emergency operations carried out within an organization's jurisdiction. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - An on-site support facility for the management of overall licensee emergency response including coordination with federal, state, and local officials, coordination of off-site radiological and environmental assessment, and determination of recommended public protective actions. The EOF is located in the TSC/EOFITraining Building. Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) - A generic area defined about a nuclear plant to facilitate emergency planning off site. The plume exposure EPZ is described as an area with a 10-mile radius and the ingestion exposure EPZ is described as an area with a 50-mile radius in NUREG-0654. (See Figure 1.1-7) I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-11
Exclusion Area - Progress Energy-owned property that surrounds the reactor plants as defined in 10CFRIO0. The area is of such size that an individual located at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of the postulated fission product release would not exceed 25 rem whole body dose or 300 rem thyroid dose. This is the property boundary used for off-site dose projections. (See Figure 1.1-1) Joint Information Center (JIC) - A nearsite facility equipped and staffed by Progress Energy, State, County, and Federal Agencies to coordinate the dissemination of information to the news media and general public during an emergency. Ingestion Exposure Pathway - The potential exposure pathway to the public through consumption of radiologically contaminated water and foods such as milk or fresh vegetables. The basis for planning within the 50-mile EPZ. Manning - A person is in the facility to respond to incoming calls. Nuclear Incident - An event or series of events, either deliberate or accidental, leading to the release or potential release into the environment of radioactive materials in sufficient quantity to warrant consideration of protective actions. Operational - The facility is executing its designed functions and tasks. Operational Support Center (OSC) - The place to which emergency response support personnel report and standby in an emergency situation. The OSC is located in the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Building. Plume Exposure Pathway - The potential exposure pathway to the public through (a) whole body external exposure from the plume and from deposited materials, and (b)inhalation of radioactive materials. The basis for planning within the 10-mile EPZ. Population-at-Risk - Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be taken. Proiected Dose - An estimate of the potential radiation dose which affected population groups could receive. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-12
Protected Area - The double-fenced security area with intrusion detection devices immediately surrounding the plant structures. (See Figure 1.1-3.) Protective Action - An activity conducted in response to an incident or potential incident to avoid or reduce radiation dose to members of the public (sometimes referred to as protective measure). Protective Action Guide (PAG) - The projected dose to reference man, or other identified individual, from an accidental release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is warranted. Radiological Emergency - An off-normal situation that has or may have a radiological impact on the public health and safety. Recovery Actions - Those actions taken after an emergency to restore the Brunswick plant and the surrounding environment as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency radiological condition. Restricted Area - Any area, access to which is controlled by Progress Energy for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials. Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) - Severe Accident Management Guidelines are entered when Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are not able to maintain adequate core cooling. Staffing - Key personnel are responding to the facilities as a proactive step to prepare for potential operational status. State - The State of North Carolina. Technical Support Center (TSC) - A center outside of the Control Room that supplies information on the status of the plant to those individuals who are knowledgeable or responsible for engineering and management support of reactor operations in the event of an emergency, and to those persons who are responsible for management of the emergency response. The TSC is located in the TSC/EOFITraining Building. Unrestricted Area - Any area to which access is not controlled by the licensee for protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, and any area used for residential quarters. OERP Rev. 62 l 1-13
SOUTHPORT ROAD Figure 1.1-1 Brunswick Site Plan I OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-141
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( ( ( Figure 1.1-3 Brunswick Site Building and Onsite Emergency Facility Locations I OERP I Rev. 62 1 1-16
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Figure 1.1-5 50-Mile Ingestion Exposure EPZ l OERP I Rev. 62 l 1-18
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POPULATION TOTALS PLANNING ZONES POP'. POP. RING MILES PORPILNG TOTAL MILES CUMULATIVE A 1542 932 0-2 1074 B 1609 16387 02 1074 C T787 1335 2-5 5697 l 67719 D 927 32422 6)-10 IOUO &i I 256g1 E 2077 745 F 3193 1204 GB090 64 25619 lSo 1Tbtaf nto H 818 1073 K 6511 55517 TOTALS 26724 109679 BRUNSWICK SITE *seeFigure 1.1U2 PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone Figure 1.1-6 Population Totals OERP Rev. 62 1-19
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BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 2.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS A key element of this Plan is a preplanned system of notifying and activating various emergency response organizations. This system, in accordance with NRC recommendations, uses graded levels of emergency response where the actions specified are organized according to the general severity of the emergency condition. This section discusses the criteria for determining the level of the emergency condition. It also illustrates how a decision is made to declare that an emergency exists by providing example initiating conditions that could correspond to each emergency class. Section 3 in turn will discuss the plans for notification of off-site agencies and mobilization of emergency teams and how they may vary with the level of the emergency. 2.1 GENERAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM The operating staff is provided formal training to recognize and respond in a logical manner to off-normal plant conditions. Plant abnormal and emergency instructions are designed to allow plant personnel to mitigate the consequences of and correct an off-normal condition as quickly as possible following its occurrence. The procedures identify the conditions requiring implementation of this Plan. Figure 2.0-1 shows the basic response sequence that is followed during any off-normal condition. The types of potential emergencies vary in probability and consequences. Accordingly, any system that categorizes emergencies must be both wide-ranged and flexible. This Plan adopts the NRC recommended standard of four general classes of emergencies and, as described below, includes the methods for determining the class in which a specific type of event should be placed. OERP Rev. 62 2-1
There are three basic tests or criteria that must be considered in deciding which emergency class exists. These are: 1 Radioactivity release: Is a release occurring; and if so, what is its magnitude?
- 2. Core damage: If no release to the environment is occurring, has there been a release of fission products from the fuel? Do the radiation levels in the coolant system or primary containment pose a potential danger to the public?
- 3. Plant degradation: Has the plant responded to equipment failures or external events as designed? If the plant has not responded as expected, what is the prognosis for a safe recovery, or alternately that further degradation will occur (e.g., corrective action is not likely to be successful or cannot be accomplished before a major release occurs)?
The categorization of events and combinations of events according to one of the four emergency classes is implemented through Emergency Action Levels (EALs). These are specific sets of plant conditions, instrument readings, and events which, unless promptly corrected, coincide with the conditions associated with one of the four emergency classes. EALs for the Brunswick Nuclear Plant are included as an attachment to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and are provided in OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions. The EALs have been selected with a view towards ensuring that a reasonable time is available to diagnose the specific cause of the emergency and attempt immediate corrective actions. Once an emergency is declared, assessments of core and containment conditions, projected releases, and resultant exposures are performed. The results, along with other plant status assessments, are reported to off-site agency officials who decide, based on these inputs, whether or not protective actions for the public are to be implemented. The relationship of dose assessment values to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAGs), and the possibility of approaching or exceeding the PAGs, will specifically be reported. Section 4 describes the relationships between emergency classes, PAGs, and various emergency measures. Each of the four emergency classes are discussed below. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 2-2
2.2 UNUSUAL EVENT Unusual events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Determination of an Unusual Event (or any emergency condition) may be accomplished in one or more of the following ways:
- Observations/inspections
- Automatic alarms (e.g., Radiation and Process Monitoring Systems)
- Communications from others (e.g., warnings of severe natural phenomena by the National Weather Service)
As in all cases, the Site Emergency Coordinator will declare an Unusual Event in any circumstance where, in his judgment, the status of the plant warrants it. Initiating conditions are established as EALs for the determination of this class. Specific EALs for an Unusual Event are listed in OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions. An Unusual Event does not require the activation of the entire on-site emergency organization, but the Site Emergency Coordinator can direct that additional personnel come to the site to support shift workers. Off-site emergency organizations shall be notified as necessary for informational purposes and aid from off-site fire fighting, medical services, and security organizations can be requested. Notifications are discussed in Section 3.9, and emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 4. Specific emergency actions to be followed during an Unusual Event are contained in OPEP-02. 1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. 2.3 ALERT Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant. Initiating conditions are established as EALs for determination of an Alert and are listed in OPEP-02. 1, Initial Emergency Actions. Additionally, the Site Emergency Coordinator will declare an Alert whenever he concludes that plant conditions so warrant. OERP Rev. 62 2-3
Events in this class may reflect a significant degradation in the safety of the reactor. However, releases from such events will be small. Off-site mobilization and assessment actions will be initiated to ensure that emergency personnel are readily available to respond if situations become more serious and confirm that radiation levels in the environment do not require protective actions off-site. Notifications and activation of emergency organizations are discussed in Section 3.9, and the emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 4. Specific emergency actions to be followed during an Alert are contained in OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. 2.4 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public. Initiating conditions are established as EALs for determination of the Site Area Emergency class and are listed in OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions. Additionally, the Site Emergency Coordinator will declare a Site Area Emergency whenever he concludes that plant conditions so warrant. The Site Area Emergency class includes Alert conditions where the plant personnel have been initially unsuccessful in restoring the facility to a safe shutdown condition. It also includes Alert conditions where subsequent additional malfunctions have occurred. The Site Area Emergency class is more severe than the Alert class because significant radiation releases may occur. However, most of the initiating conditions associated with the Site Area Emergency class do not result in an immediate release and may never result in a significant release if emergency repairs are successful. Although immediate protective actions are not automatically required, declaration of a Site Area Emergency will set into motion all personnel on site and off site that would be required to perform actions up to and including the evacuation of a near-site area. If circumstances warrant, the process of public notification may begin as directed by the state plan. Section 3.9 discusses the planned process of notification and activation of emergency organizations. Emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 4. Specific emergency actions to be followed during a Site Area Emergency are contained in OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. I OERP I Rev. 62 2-4
2.5 GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. Initiating conditions predictive of a major radiological release are established as Emergency Action Levels for determination of the General Emergency class and are listed in OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions. Additionally, the Site Emergency Coordinator will declare a General Emergency whenever, in his judgment, conditions exist that warrant activation of emergency response efforts including off-site monitoring and prompt public notification. The General Emergency class includes accident conditions that involve severe core damage or melting. Such conditions will result in major releases to the primary containment and extremely high levels of contamination in the reactor coolant. Releases to the environment may be kept low unless leak paths in the primary containment develop (as from containment failure or failures in pumps, valves and other equipment which circulate reactor coolant outside primary containment). If major releases do occur, it is probable that they will occur hours to days after the onset of the emergency and that off-site exposures will approach or exceed EPA recommended protective action guides unless protective measures are instituted. Notifications and activation of emergency organizations are discussed in Section 3.9. The emergency measures to be taken are described in Section 4. Specific emergency actions to be followed during a General Emergency are contained in OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 2-5
THE SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT LEARNS OF AN OFF-NORMAL CONDITION, DETERMINED BY INSTRUMENT READINGS OR OBSERVATION. SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT IMPLEMENTS OPEP-02.1, WHICH FLOWS AS Figure 2.0-1 Response Sequence to Off-Normal Conditions I OERP I Rev. 62 l 2-6
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION There are requirements for action in an emergency that go beyond those encountered during routine operations. To meet these extra demands and provide an effective response to the emergency, the Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan employs an organizational concept that has four features.
- 1. Whenever the Plan is activated (i.e., an EAL is exceeded), a single individual is charged with the responsibility for and authority to direct all actions necessary to respond to the emergency
- 2. The primary responsibility of the individual in charge is to assure that all critical actions (emergency response functions) are carried out. Upon activation of the Plan, he is freed of all other responsibilities and thus able to devote his entire effort to managing the emergency response.
- 3. Specific individuals are assigned the responsibility of carrying out predefined critical actions.
- 4. There is a mechanism established to provide additional resources as necessary to respond to the emergency, which provides continuity of response on each critical action.
This concept of organization is compatible with and integrated into the normal mode of operation. There are a number of procedures to guide operators in responding to equipment malfunctions and instrument alarms. There are also procedures to maintain effective control over contamination and radiation exposures. Emergency procedures basically involve an extension of these existing plant procedures. Organizational control of emergencies is accomplished in several steps. First, as is discussed in Section 2, conditions associated with the various emergency classes are clearly defined. Second, emergency response functions are specified with levels of action appropriate to each emergency class (e.g., notification, off-site radiation monitoring, etc.). Third, individuals are assigned to be responsible for carrying out each emergency response function, with the assignments to cover all phases of the emergency-from its initial declaration to the final recovery operations. OERP Rev. 62 3-1
Finally, the position of Site Emergency Coordinator is established to be activated immediately on declaration of an emergency. To that individual is delegated the immediate and unilateral authority to act on behalf of the Company to manage and direct all emergency operations involving the facility. Upon activation of the EOF, the Emergency Response Manager assumes responsibility of overall emergency response and performs those requirements for all off-site related activities. The Site Emergency Coordinator maintains overall on-site emergency response responsibilities and reports to the Emergency Response Manager. Initially the Site Emergency Coordinator would be the Operations Shift Superintendent who would act in that capacity until formally relieved by the designated On-Call Site Emergency Coordinator or alternate (qualified SECs are listed in EPL-001) in the Technical Support Center. In this manner, the individual usually in charge of activities in the Control Room is responsible for initiating the necessary emergency response, but the emergency response organization On-Call SEC is expected to assume management of the emergency response as soon as available to do so-in anticipation of the possible wide-ranging responsibilities associated with managing a major emergency. This section of the plan delineates the various emergency actions and separates them into groups of related functions. These functions are then assigned to designated emergency response personnel who are responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator for the performance of the activities required to fulfill those functions. Upon the declaration of an emergency, specified on-shift personnel assume the responsibility for performing the required emergency response actions until properly relieved by another emergency response organization member qualified for the position. All emergency response organization members are trained as described in Section 6.1.1. If necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator will allocate available resources based on existing plant conditions. Where necessary, additional personnel will be notified and requested to augment on-site personnel. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 3-2
A current call list of emergency response organization members is maintained in the Control Room and procedures are available to make this notification. Since many of the Brunswick plant management staff and substantial numbers of its support personnel live in the site vicinity (i.e., Southport and surrounding areas) additional assistance can be quickly provided. 3.1 NORMAL OPERATING ORGANIZATION The greatest number of people on site occurs during day shift operations. The plant crew available to respond to an emergency provides a broad spectrum of specialties including operations, maintenance, engineering, radiochemistry, health physics, fire protection and security. The Plan, as will be discussed, utilizes the basic plant organizational structure and cadre of available manpower as the principal means of responding to an emergency condition. This is accomplished by assigning the management of various emergency response functions to individuals in accordance with their routine operational responsibilities. To illustrate, Radiological Emergency Teams will be directed by Environmental & Radiation Control, management personnel, who are the individuals responsible for directing day-to-day radiation control programs. In the event of an emergency, they report directly to the Site Emergency Coordinator and continue to be responsible for radiological matters. There are, of course, times when the full complement of staff is unavailable, just as there are times when one or a few key supervisory officials are away from the plant. Therefore, the shift organization as described in the Administrative Controls section of the BNP Technical Specifications must be prepared to provide the initial response to an emergency. The following on-shift expertise will be maintained 24 hours per day: Each operating shift will normally consist of a Shift Superintendent, two Senior Control Operators, four Control Operators, seven Auxiliary Operators, three Health Physics Technicians, one Chemistry Technician, and one Shift Technical Advisor (STA). Deviation from the normal shift complement is allowed as long as the minimum shift complement, as described in Technical Specification 5.2.2.c and UFSAR Table 13.1.2-1, is maintained and appropriate action is taken (see Figure 3.1-1). I OERP I Rev. 62 1 3-3
As will be described below, the general approach is to assign all necessary emergency response functions to the individuals on site. Each individual, on declaration of an emergency, would be responsible for carrying out one or more emergency actions until additional personnel arrive on site. It should be noted that they are initially responsible under all circumstances, and remain so until relieved. This arrangement provides for a clear and uniform assignment of responsibility and provides a mechanism to assure that all important emergency response functions are dealt with from the very beginning of the accident. 3.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION The minimum on-site emergency organization for non-normal working hours, backshifts, and holidays for the Brunswick Plant is described above in Section 3.1. Compliance with the requirements of NUREG 0654 Table B-1 has been assured. Guidance for augmenting the emergency organization is found in the notification checklists of the plant emergency procedures. Individuals' names and roles in the emergency organization, phone numbers, and alternates are also described in the plant emergency procedures. EPL-001 lists the individuals and alternates qualified to fill the positions described for the TSC, OSC, and EOF. The Company is committed to provide staffing to effectively contain any emergency which might occur at its nuclear facilities. Depending on the emergency at hand, personnel will be contacted with required expertise on a priority basis. Since a large portion of the Brunswick staff lives in the vicinity of the plant, additional personnel will be available for communications, on-site and off-site Radiological assessment, repair and corrective actions and technical support within a short period of time. Depending on weather conditions, 30-45 minutes should provide enough time to make the appropriate staff available to augment the on-site organization. The on-site organization will continue to be augmented such that within 60-75 minutes after notification, additional personnel will be added to provide the necessary support and will meet the intent of Table B-1 of NUREG 0654. Additional personnel will continue to supplement the plant emergency organization as necessary to meet the requirements of this Plan. Periodic drills will be conducted to determine that this augmentation schedule can be maintained. I OERP I Rev. 62 3-4
As an aid toward assuring that critical emergency actions are given proper attention, the plant's emergency procedures provide for emergency response personnel established to carry out specific types of functions such as accident assessment and off-site notification. As discussed below, emergency response organization personnel have been selected with an aim toward making a smooth and rapid transition to the emergency mode of operation. The Emergency Response Organization is shown in Figures 3.2-1, 3.4-1, and 3.6-1. The functions specifically assigned to each element of the Emergency Response Organization are intended to encompass all critical response functions, from command and control to communications. One function assigned to each is that of record keeping. Typical of the records to be maintained are the emergency communications, the radiation records, (i.e., surveys, projected dose calculations, personnel/population-at-risk evacuations, etc.), the sequence of events (i.e., the managerial decisions and essential occurrences that evolve throughout the emergency), and the security/accountability records (i.e., who is presently on each team or at each center and any security threats). The following sections describe the specific emergency assignments, which are in the Plan's implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization personnel telephone numbers are available in the Control Room. In all emergencies, the on-duty Shift Superintendent is authorized and qualified to implement the Plan and to classify the emergency condition. 3.2.1 Site Emergency Coordinator As discussed in Section 3. 1, direction and coordination of emergency actions on-site (and off-site until relieved by the Emergency Response Manager) are prime responsibilities of the Site Emergency Coordinator. The initial determination that an emergency exists will be made in the Control Room, based on measured plant parameters. Therefore, the Shift Superintendent is initially the Site Emergency Coordinator. If the Shift Superintendent becomes incapacitated for any reason, the Senior Control Operator of the unaffected unit will assume the responsibilities of the SEC. He will be in command of the on-site emergency organization until relieved by the designated On-Call Site Emergency Coordinator. The Shift Superintendent will be relieved by the first qualified SEC to arrive on site so that he may devote his attention to plant operations. The Shift Superintendent remains responsible for the decision making of Severe Accident Management Guidelines strategies. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-5
Names and phone numbers of qualified Site Emergency Coordinators are available in EPL-001. He will also appoint an Emergency Communicator who will relay messages and maintain notification records throughout the emergency. Any individual who may be required to serve, even temporarily, in the capacity of a Site Emergency Coordinator must be qualified and trained in accordance with the training program described in Section 6.1.1. The primary responsibilities of the Site Emergency Coordinator include the following:
- 1. Coordinating and directing the combined activities of Brunswick personnel in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and elsewhere on the site.
- 2. Classifying the emergency.
- 3. Notifying off-site plant, corporate, and local agency personnel, as well as on-site personnel, as delineated in the procedures which implement the Plan. (Upon activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, the Emergency Response Manager provides liaison between the Site Emergency Coordinator and all off-site agencies.)
- 4. Issuing instructions to emergency response personnel and assuring that the appropriate procedures are being followed.
- 5. Initiating protective actions to be taken on site, if required.
- 6. Determining the advisability of re-entry operations during or immediately following an emergency situation.
- 7. Directing health physics activities until the arrival at the site of the Radiological Control Director.
- 8. Assuring continuity of on-site resources.
- 9. Declaring the emergency over.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-6
Until relieved by the Emergency Response Manager, the Site Emergency Coordinator may not delegate the responsibility to make the decision to notify and make recommendations to authorities responsible for off-site emergency measures. Further, while he may consult with others, he may not delegate the responsibility to upgrade or downgrade the emergency classification or to declare that the emergency has been terminated. He may delegate the responsibility to announce that the emergency has been terminated. He may delegate the responsibility and authority for mobilization of recovery efforts while that emergency still exists provided that such efforts in no way interfere with or detract from the response to the emergency. (Responsibility for mobilization of recovery efforts transfers to the Emergency Response Manager upon activation of the EOF.) Other responsibilities may be delegated to other emergency organizational units as necessary for expeditiously carrying out the requirements of the Plan and procedures which implement the Plan. 3.2.2 Plant Operators During an emergency, the Plant Operators (including the Shift Superintendent) are the nucleus of the initial effort to control the plant and take steps to protect the public. The Plant Operators' primary responsibility is to carry out assigned actions necessary during an emergency to provide initial emergency response per established emergency instructions and perform initial calculations of projected off-site consequences. The Operators are responsible for implementing actions (including Severe Accident Management Guidelines) as directed by the Shift Superintendent. Specific emergency response duties of the Plant Operators are found in the Plant Emergency Procedures which implement the Plan and in other Operations procedures. OERP Rev. 62 3-7
3.3 Technical Support Center The Site Emergency Coordinator, as discussed above, is responsible for managing a wide range of activities at the plant. To assist the Site Emergency Coordinator in this effort and to implement his directives, a Technical Support Center has been established. The Technical Support Center consists of management-level personnel. Upon declaration of an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency, the Technical Support Center will be notified to immediately assemble. The SEC and other TSC staff members perform monitoring and evaluations required for Severe Accident Management Guidelines, and provide advice and recommendations to the Shift Superintendent and Control Room Operators. The various technical and administrative functions to be performed at the plant have been grouped into five categories similar to the organization for routine operations. These are as follows: Plant Operations NRC Communications Radiological Control Technical Assessment Security Directors are assigned to be responsible for activities within each category. The Directors within the Technical Support Center may be relieved by designated qualified plant personnel (phone numbers are listed in EPL-001). 3.3.1 Plant Operations Director The Plant Operations Director is responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator for providing liaison with the Control Operators, Shift Superintendent, and Technical Support Center. He is responsible for providing technical and administrative assistance to the Control Operators. This position also performs monitoring and evaluations required for Severe Accident Management Guidelines. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. OERP Rev. 62 3-8
3.3.2 Radiological Control Director The Radiological Control Director is responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator for managing the radiological monitoring and assessment aspects of the plant during an emergency; managing activities to control radiation exposure; providing technical and administrative direction to the Radiological Emergency Teams; and providing liaison with the Emergency Operations Facility and with the Radiological Control Manager. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. 3.3.3 Technical Assessment Director The Technical Assessment Director is responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator for providing technical and administrative direction to the Accident Assessment Team and for providing liaison with the Technical Analysis Manager after the EOF is activated. The Technical Assessment Director is responsible for performing the monitoring and evaluations required for Severe Accident Management Guidelines. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. 3.3.4 Security Director The Security Force is composed of personnel qualified in security, personnel accountability, and evacuation procedures and practices. The Security Director is responsible to the SEC for providing direction to the Security Force during a declared emergency and providing liaison with the state and local law enforcement agencies. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. I OERP Rev. 62 l 3-9
3.3.5 Communications Director The Communications Director in the TSC reports to the Site Emergency Coordinator. He is responsible to make plant-wide announcements over the Public Address System, ensure NRC notifications are performed, and supervise the administrative staff. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center and OPEP-02.6.21, Emergency Communicator. 3.3.6 Radiological Control Communicator The Radiological Control Communicator is responsible to the Radiological Control Director for expediting communications between the director and the Radiological Emergency Teams. The responsibilities and objectives of the Radiological Control Communicator are contained in OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center. 3.3.7 Accident Assessment Team Leader One of the principal groups housed within the Technical Support Center is the Accident Assessment Team. The specific responsibilities of the Accident Assessment Team are as follows: A. Analyze mechanical, electrical, instrument and control problems and determine alternate solutions. B. Analyze thermohydraulic and thermohydrodynamic problems and develop alternate courses of action to resolve them. C. Analyze and evaluate accident conditions and develop guidance for the Site Emergency Coordinator and Operations personnel on protection of the core. D. Perform monitoring and evaluations to support Severe Accident Management Guidelines. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-10
The Accident Assessment Team Leader is responsible to the Technical Assessment Director and provides technical and administrative direction to the Accident Assessment Team. 3.4 Operational Support Center 3.4.1 Emergency Repair Director The Emergency Repair Director is responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator for the management of efforts to repair and maintain equipment during an emergency, install emergency structures, systems and components, and perform mitigation and cleanup activities during an emergency. These responsibilities include providing technical and administrative direction to any emergency repair team that may be formed during the emergency and to the Operational Support Center Mission Coordinator. Responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.12, Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center. 3A.2 Operational Support Center Mission Coordinator Upon the decision of the Site Emergency Coordinator to activate the Operational Support Center, an OSC Mission Coordinator will report to the Emergency Repair Director. This individual will direct the activities of the mechanical, electrical, and l&C personnel requested to report to the OSC. His responsibilities and objectives are contained in OPEP-02.6.12, Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center. He will coordinate OSC response activities with the E&RC and Operations Coordinators. 3A.3 Operations Coordinator Upon the decision of the Site Emergency Coordinator to activate the Operational Support Center, an Operations Coordinator will report to the Emergency Repair Director. This individual will coordinate the activities of operations and Fire Brigade personnel with the OSC Mission Coordinator and E&RC Coordinator. His responsibilities and objectives are contained in OPEP-02.6.12, Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center. OERP Rev. 62 3-11
3A.44 Environmental & Radiological Control (E&RC) Coordinator Upon the decision of the Site Emergency Coordinator to activate the Operational Support Center, an E&RC Coordinator will report to the Emergency Repair Director. This individual will direct the activities of the radiological controls (HPs) and chemistry personnel requested to report to the OSC. He will coordinate OSC response activities with OSC Mission Coordinator and Operations Coordinator. His responsibilities and objectives are contained in OPEP-02.6.12, Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center. 3.4.5 Radiological Emergency Teams The Radiological Emergency Teams consist of members of the Environmental & Radiation Control organization and of other plant or off-site personnel who have received necessary training. Members of the teams who have not completed such training may be assigned to tasks in which they assist a qualified team member under his direct guidance. The general functions of the various Radiological Emergency Teams include:
- 1. Determine and report on-site radiological conditions.
- 2. Determine and report off-site radiological conditions.
- 3. Establish areas to which access should be controlled for the purpose of minimizing personnel exposures.
- 4. Issue protective equipment and personnel gear.
- 5. Personnel decontamination services.
- 6. Determine and maintain records of personnel exposure.
Radiological emergency teams are formed from the pool of available personnel who assemble in the Operational Support Center. These teams are in addition to the emergency repair teams that are formed from the pool of mechanics, electricians, and instrument technicians to perform repair missions in the plant. OERP Rev. 62 3-12
The radiological emergency teams formed are determined by the radiological conditions that require their services. The following teams may be necessary:
- 1. Plant Monitoring - responsible for conducting in-plant and inside the protected area monitoring to include air sampling, direct radiation monitoring, and smear surveys to determine radiological conditions.
- 2. Post Accident Sample - responsible for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive gas and/or liquid samples necessary for source term determination and core damage assessment.
- 3. Personnel Protection and Decontamination -
responsible for monitoring and verifying that personnel and vehicles exiting the protected area and the site are free of radioactive contamination. 3.4.6 Fire Brigade When conditions require activation of the emergency facilities, the on-shift Fire Brigade is incorporated into the Operational Support Center. The Fire Brigade consists of a Shift Incident Commander and a minimum of four fire brigade members who provide fire brigade, first aid, search and rescue, chemical/hazardous materials response, and confined space entry services. Fire Brigade members will be the on-shift operators, or other personnel qualified as Fire Brigade members. The Fire Brigade, when incorporated into the OSC, functions as a team under the direction of the Operations Coordinator. The Fire Brigade is staffed on a 24-hour basis. 3.5 Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility is activated by the On-Call Emergency Response Manager when he is notified by the Site Emergency Coordinator that an Alert or higher emergency condition exists at Brunswick. Guidance for activation and operation of the EOF is contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. I OERP l Rev. 62 3-13
3.5.1 Emergency Response Manager The Emergency Response Manager is responsible for providing liaison between the Site Emergency Coordinator and off-site support personnel (Corporate Headquarters, Joint Information Center, state and federal agencies) and marshalling off-site support as required to support the Site Emergency Coordinator. The responsibilities and objectives of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. 3.5.2 Administrative and Logistics Manager The Administrative and Logistics Manager is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for providing assistance to the Emergency Response Manager and site personnel in administrative, logistics, communications, and personnel support, as requested. The responsibilities and objectives of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. 3.5.3 Technical Analysis Manager The Technical Analysis Manager is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for coordinating technical information coming from the Technical Support Center, supplying the Emergency Response Manager with an assessment of the emergency, and providing interface for the Emergency Response Manager to consultants, regulatory agencies, architect-engineers, and General Electric. The responsibilities and objectives of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. OERP Rev. 62 3-14
3.5.4 Radiological Control Manager The Radiological Control Manager is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for coordinating off-site radiological and environmental assessment and recommending to the Emergency Response Manager protective actions necessary to protect the public health and safety. The responsibilities and objectives of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. 3.5.5 Environmental Monitoring Team Leader The Environmental Monitoring Team Leader is responsible to the Radiological Control Manager when the EOF is activated, for providing technical and administrative direction to the Environmental Monitoring Team. Two Environmental Monitoring Teams will be made available for deployment. If additional monitoring teams are needed, they may be requested from the Shearon Harris Plant or the H. B. Robinson Plant. The responsibilities and objectives of the environmental monitoring team are contained in OPEP-02.6.6, Environmental Monitoring Team Leader. 3.5.6 Dose Projection Coordinator The Dose Projection Coordinator is responsible to the Radiological Control Manager and provides technical and administrative direction to the Dose Projection Team when the EOF is activated. Responsibilities of the Dose Projection Team include radiological dose projections and source term determination, contained in OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Off-Site Dose Projection Procedures, and acquisition and distribution of meteorological data for dose assessment and environmental monitoring purposes. The responsibilities and objectives of the Dose Projection Team are contained in OPEP-02.6.20, Dose Projection Coordinator. OERP Rev. 62 3-15
3.5.7 Communications Managers The Communications Managers report to the Emergency Response Manager. They function as liaison between the off-site organizations and agencies and the on-site emergency organization. Specifically, they relay messages between the ERM in the EOF, Technical Support Center, and the State Emergency Response Team, using the communication equipment discussed in Appendix A of this plan. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.21, Emergency Communicator. 3.5.8 Assistant to the Emergency Response Manager (AERM) The Assistant to the Emergency Response Manager is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for coordination of information within the Emergency Operations Facility. Reporting to the Assistant AERM are County EOC Representatives (utility representative) that respond to the New Hanover and Brunswick County EOCs. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility. 3.6 Joint Information Center The Joint Information Center is activated by the Emergency Response Manager when he is notified that a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency condition exists at Brunswick. Activation is discretionary for lesser emergency classifications. (Fig. 3.6-1) 3.6.1 Company Spokesperson The Company Spokesperson is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for the coordination of plant information with County, State, and Federal representatives for dissemination to the news media and general public. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). IOERP I Rev. 62 l 3-16
3.6.2 JIC Director The JIC Director is responsible to the Company Spokesperson as the primary interface with State, County, and Federal Public Information Coordinators and for the preparation and coordination of all news releases. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). 3.6.3 Company Technical Spokesperson The Company Technical Spokesperson is responsible to the JIC Director for the acquisition, coordination, and interpretation of plant technical information disseminated to the news media and general public. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). 3.6.4 Administrative Coordinator Administrative Coordinators are responsible to the JIC Director for initial JIC facility setup, and the coordination of logistical, security, and administrative duties. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). 3.6.5 Public Information Director Public Information Directors are responsible to the JIC Director for monitoring and coordinating the flow of media and general public information in the Joint Information Center. The responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). l OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-17
3.7 OFFSITE ORGANIZATION ASSISTANCE Should conditions at the plant degrade to the extent that further on-site assistance is needed, assistance is available from Corporate personnel, contracted services, and certain locally available service groups, as described in the following subsections. 3.7.1 Contracted Services A number of active outside contracts are maintained in order to ensure continuing access to qualified personnel when and if they are needed to supplement Progress Energy resources. These contracts provide the capability of obtaining, on an expedited basis, additional maintenance support personnel (such as mechanics, electricians, and l&C Technicians), other technical personnel (such as E&RC Technicians), and engineering and consulting services. For example, contracts are maintained with General Electric (the NSSS vendor and architect-engineer for the Brunswick plant). General Electric will form a Technical Support Team upon request. The team will be composed of personnel with the appropriate technical disciplines, that can be dispatched to the plant site. General Electric will also establish dedicated telephone communications for data transmission until the arrival of the team. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) serves as a clearinghouse for industry wide support during an emergency. When notified of an emergency situation at a nuclear plant, INPO will provide emergency response as requested. INPO will be able to provide the following emergency support functions:
- a. Assistance to the affected utility in locating sources of emergency manpower and equipment.
- b. Analysis of the operational aspects of the incident.
- c. Dissemination to member utilities of information concerning the incident.
- d. Organization of industry experts who could advise on technical matters.
If requested, one or more suitably qualified members of the INPO staff will report to the Emergency Response Manager and will assist in coordinating INPO's response to the emergency. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-18
3.7.2 Local Services Support The Brunswick Plant is equipped and staffed to cope with many types of emergency situations. However, if a fire or other type of incident occurs that requires outside assistance, such assistance is available as described in the following subsections. 3.7.2.1 Medical Assistance Dosher Memorial Hospital has medical facilities immediately available for the treatment of contaminated and non-contaminated injured personnel. New Hanover Regional Medical Center will serve as a backup for Dosher Memorial if necessary. Inaddition, medical assistance is available on or off site from physicians in the Southport area, all of whom are on the staff of Dosher Memorial Hospital and who have agreed to provide medical assistance to contaminated patients. (See Appendix E, Medical Treatment and Assistance, for more details.) 3.7.2.2 Ambulance Service The City of Southport Volunteer Rescue Squad has agreed to respond to all emergency calls from the plant, just as they respond to other calls from the Southport area. A copy of the response agreement with the City of Southport Rescue Squad is included in Appendix B. OERP Rev. 62 3-19
3.7.2.3 Fire Assistance Agencies with fire protection resources in the vicinity of Brunswick are as follows: Southport Fire Department Boiling Spring Lakes Fire Department Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department Oak Island Emergency Services Sunny Point Fire Department The Southport Fire Department is the primary fire protection response agency for the Brunswick Plant and will coordinate assistance activities, if required, of the other above agencies. Copies of agreements with local fire departments are contained in Appendix B. In addition, the North Carolina Fire Protection Law makes provisions for volunteer fire departments to furnish fire protection in rural areas. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-20l
3.8 COORDINATION WITH PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES A summary of each governmental organization having major responsibilities for the planning and response to Brunswick Plant radiological emergencies is described below; comprehensive summary tables of emergency response organizations are included in Appendix C; and a detailed description of the authority, responsibilities, and duties of each organization is presented in their respective emergency plans. Each of these organizations having response duties is capable of providing such on a 24-hour-per-day basis. 3.8.1 State of North Carolina 3.8.1.1 Govemor's Office The Governor has the authority to direct and control the State Emergency Management Program. During a declared State of Disaster, he has the authority to utilize all available state resources reasonably necessary to cope with emergencies. His representatives coordinate as necessary with Progress Energy, the Governor of South Carolina, and with local government officials. 3.8.1.2 Department of Crime Control and Public Safety The Department of Crime Control and Public Safety functions as the State of North Carolina Emergency Planning Coordinator. In that capacity the Department has overall management responsibility for North Carolina's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of North Carolina's emergency response plan, and coordination with Progress Energy. The Department coordinates emergency response activities for the State of North Carolina and other government response agencies. OERP Rev. 62 l 3-21
3.8.1.3 Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources, Division of Radiation Protection The Radiation Protection Division, performs radiological field monitoring and laboratory analysis of field samples. This section is responsible for dose assessments and projections and personnel radiological monitoring outside the Brunswick site, and other functions as described in the State Emergency Plan. 3.8.2 Brunswick County 3.8.2.1 Emergency Management Agency The Brunswick County Emergency Management Agency has overall responsibility for Brunswick County's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of Brunswick County's emergency response plan, and coordination between the county and Progress Energy and other local government response agencies. It functions as the lead county agency for radiological monitoring and decontamination activities as directed by the State of North Carolina's Division of Radiation Protection. 3.8.2.2 Brunswick County Sheriffs Department The Sheriff's Department emergency response functions are: A. Coordinate all local law enforcement and traffic control. B. Operate the county warning point on a 24-hour basis. C. Provide immediate assistance to facility management and local authorities during initial onset of the emergency. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-22
D. Provide traffic control in support of evacuation. E. Establish road blocks, re-route traffic around contaminated areas and report traffic problems to the County Emergency Operations Center. F. Provide traffic control in the vicinity of shelter areas. G. Provide assistance to municipal law enforcement agencies in warning and evacuating persons in designated zones. H. Provide security for county property. 3.8.3 New Hanover County 3.8.3.1 Emergency Management Agency The New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency has overall responsibility for New Hanover County's radiological emergency response planning, development, and updating of New Hanover County's emergency response plan, and coordination between the County, Progress Energy, and other local government response agencies. It functions as the lead county radiological response agency and provides any required radiological monitoring and decontamination activities as directed by the State of North Carolina's Division of Radiation Protection. 3.8.3.2 New Hanover County Sheriff's Department The Sheriff's Department emergency response functions are: A. Coordinate all local law enforcement and traffic control. B. Operate the county warning point on a 24-hour basis. C. Provide immediate assistance to facility management and local authorities during initial onset of the emergency. I OERP l Rev. 62 3-23
D. Provide traffic control in support of evacuation. E. Establish road blocks, re-route traffic around contaminated areas, and report traffic problems to the County Emergency Operations Center. F. Provide traffic control in the vicinity of shelter areas. G. Provide assistance to municipal law enforcement agencies in warning and evacuating persons in designated zones. H. Provide security for county property. 3.8.4 Federal Agencies 3.8.4.1 Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office The Savannah River Operations Office coordinates, under the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP), federal resources as required to: minimize accidental radiation exposure; minimize the spread of radioactive materials into the environment; and carry out countermeasures to control and eliminate radiation hazards. Upon request of the State of North Carolina, Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources, Division of Radiation Protection, or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Department of Energy will: provide equipment, supplies, and personnel to evaluate radiological hazards and to minimize radiation exposures; assist in carrying out emergency response operations and implementing protective actions; and provide an aerial radiological measuring system for mapping radioactive plumes. The Site Emergency Coordinator or. Emergency Response Manager after activation of the Emergency Operations Facility may request this assistance via the NRC or the State. Resources available in the area to facilitate federal assistance include the New Hanover International Airport, IOERP I Rev. 62 l 3-24
located approximately twenty miles from the Brunswick Plant near Wilmington, North Carolina, which has two runways capable of supporting large commercial aircraft. Also located at the New Hanover International Airport is a National Guard Armory. This area could be used as a Federal Command Post meeting the requirements of IRAP. 3.8.4.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) The Federal Emergency Management Agency coordinates, through the Atlanta, Georgia Regional IV Office, federal response as required to supplement that provided by IRAP. A representative from FEMA Region IV will be present at the SERT to coordinate any federal response requested by the state. 3.8.4.3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides resident inspectors at Brunswick. At the request of Progress Energy, NRC provides additional technical advice, technical assistance, and personnel during and following a radiological emergency. The Director of Regulatory Operations will be notified of radiation incidents in accordance with 10CFR20.2202 and will conduct appropriate investigative activities. 3.8.4.4 U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) The Coast Guard controls access of navigable waterways in the vicinity of the Brunswick Plant and provides public warning and notification as described in the State Emergency Plan. 3.8.4.5 Meteorological Service Meteorological Services are under contract with Progress Energy to provide meteorological services during day to day and/or emergency operations. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-25
3.8.4.6 Weather Service The National Weather Service in Wilmington, North Carolina will provide meteorological information during emergency situations, if required. Data available will include existing and forecasted surface wind directions, wind speed with azimuth variability, and ambient surface air temperature. 3.8.5 Agreements Appendix B presents copies of letters of agreement with agencies that would not normally be available for assistance through existing state or federal plans but will make certain services available. 3.9 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION Notification and activation of the on-site and off-site emergency response organizations is dependent upon the emergency classification and is listed in Table 3.5-1. Details of notification responsibilities, communications systems utilized to make the notifications, information required to be transferred to off-site agencies, and notification verification techniques are specifically described in the Plant Emergency Procedures (PEPs) and Appendix A of this Plan. Additional individuals and organizations who might be required to activate are contained in EPL-001. Any time that an emergency is reclassified, the initial notification scheme will apply. The State of North Carolina and the Counties of Brunswick and New Hanover are responsible for the process of notification of the public. The initial instructions to the public will consist of preestablished emergency messages which will be tailored to reflect whether the event is a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency classification. The following information is typical of that which would be provided in the initial message:
- 1. Identification of the agency issuing the information.
- 2. A statement that an emergency condition exists at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-26
- 3. Brief description of the type of emergency and the nature of the hazard.
- 4. Identification of the communities or geographical areas affected by the emergency.
- 5. Recommendations with regard to specific protective measures to be taken by residents of the affected areas. .
- 6. A statement concerning how the public will receive further.
emergency information. Prewritten emergency messages to be used for public notification are contained in the procedures of the State of North Carolina, and Brunswick and New Hanover Counties. OERP Rev. 62 3-27
FSMI~anL_ I l ~~~~~~~CONTROL
~~~~~~~OPERATOR (SRO I R IE FCHEMISTRY B ISHEifT i Figure 3.1-1 Brunswick Shift Organization OERP Rev. 62 3-28
Figure 3.2-1 Brunswick Emergency Organization IOERP I Rev. 62 l 3-29
OSC POOL
- MechaNcs
- Electidans
- I&C Techs
- Aux Operators
- HPs
- Chemists
- REPORTS TO ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT TEAM LEADER IN TSC.
Figure 3.4-1 Operational Support Center (OSC) OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-30
BRUNSWICK TABLE 3.5-1 NOTIFICATION AND ACTIVATION OF PRINCIPAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS Unusual Site General Aqency Event Alert Emergency Emergency On site: Progress Energy Plant Operators Activate Activate Activate Activate Radiological Emergency Teams (a),(c) (a) Activate Activate Technical Support Center (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Operational Support Center (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Emergency Operations Facility (a),(c) Activate Activate Activate Corporate Headquarters Notify(a) Notify(a) Activate Activate Fire Brigade (a) (a) (a) (a) Off site: Joint Information Center (a),(c) (a),(c) Activate Activate State of North Carolina Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate Brunswick County Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate New Hanover County Notify Notify(a) Activate Activate USNRC Notify Notify Activate Activate American Nudear Insurers Notify Notify(a) Activate U. S. Coast Guard (c) (c) Notify(a) Activate Dosher Memorial Hospital (b) (b) (b) (b) Southport Volunteer Fire Department (b) (b) (b) (b) Southport Volunteer Rescue Squad (b) (b) (b) (b) General Electric (c) Notify(a) Activate Activate INPO (c) Notify Notify Notify (a)Mobilize, if deemed necessary. (b)Request assistance, if required. (c)Notify if deemed necessary. I OERP I Rev. 62 3-31
Figure 3.6-1 Joint Information Center (JIC) l OERP I Rev. 62 l 3-32
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 4.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES This section identifies the measures to be taken for each class of emergency described in Section 2. The measures presented in this section are used as the basis for the detailed Plant Emergency Procedures which define the specific actions to be taken for each emergency class. Emergency measures begin with the recognition and declaration of an emergency class, notification of the applicable agencies for that emergency class, and mobilization of the appropriate portions of the emergency organization. Subsequent measures include damage assessment, corrective actions, protective actions, and aid to affected personnel. Recovery activities are discussed in Section 7. 4.1 ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY ORGANIZATIONS 4.1.1 General The Plant Operating Manual contains Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs). These are intended to aid the plant operators in responding to an accident. The EOPs identify actions which should automatically occur to safely terminate the accident and manual actions which should be taken to verify that the automatic actions have produced the desired results. The EOPs also provide, for the operator's use, guidelines which alert the operators to conditions where inadequate cooling of the core exists or where radioactivity releases may occur. Accordingly, if it should appear that any of the Emergency Action Levels are exceeded, as described in OPEP-02. 1,Initial Emergency Actions, the operators are instructed to activate the Emergency Plan. The Shift Superintendent activates the Plan, assumes the Site Emergency Coordinator's responsibilities, initially classifies the emergency, and ensures that the required notifications are made. The Site Emergency Coordinator will activate portions of, or the entire emergency organization, as warranted for the emergency situation. A more detailed discussion of the methodology that is used in activating the emergency organizations during each dass of emergency is provided below and in the Plant Emergency Procedures. Additional detail of the communications networks to be used for notification OERP Rev. 62 4-1
requirements, for information reporting, and for decision-making with respect to taking protective action on site and for the general public is contained in Appendix A of this plan and OPEP-03.1.3, Use of Communication Equipment. 4.1.2 Unusual Event The Shift Superintendent, when informed of conditions that meet emergencies that are classified as an Unusual Event, confirms that an Emergency Action Level has been exceeded and implements OPEP-02. 1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. He then is responsible for assuming the role of the Site Emergency Coordinator and for notifying and activating those portions of the emergency organization as appropriate to the emergency class which then exists. The Site Emergency Coordinator can augment the on-site shift personnel by activating additional emergency personnel described in Section 3. Typical of the personnel that may be notified are E&RC, the Fire Brigade, and the Security Force. 4.1.3 Alert Section 2 and OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions, describe the types of emergencies that are classified as an Alert. Since the conditions in this emergency class indicate an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant and has the potential for limited releases of radioactive material to the environment, off-site groups will be notified to standby so that if the emergency level is escalated, the essential off-site emergency organizational groups can be notified and readily mobilized to augment the on-site emergency groups. Upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification the Shift Superintendent assumes the role of the Site Emergency Coordinator until relieved by a designated, qualified emergency response organization member. The transfer of Site Emergency Coordinator responsibilities from the Shift Superintendent occurs simultaneously with the activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Site Emergency Coordinator implements OPEP-02. 1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, and notifies the appropriate individuals or groups. OERP Rev. 62 4-2
The Site Emergency Coordinator initiates the activation of the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The radiological emergency teams will be activated, as appropriate. The appropriate county and state emergency group leaders will be requested to remain in a readiness condition in case additional augmentation of support personnel is needed and alerting the population-at-risk is warranted. A decision to go beyond the initial response associated with an Alert class would be based on further degradation of plant parameters, operational experience, or radiation releases that are projected to escalate beyond the Emergency Action Levels for an Alert. 4.1.4 Site Area Emergency Section 2 and OPEP-02. 1,Initial Emergency Actions, describe the types of emergencies classified as a Site Area Emergency. The Site Emergency Coordinator, when classifying the emergency, takes appropriate predefined steps to correct the situation as described in OPEP-02.1. 1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. If not done earlier, the Shift Superintendent assumes the role of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) until formally relieved. The SEC activates the necessary emergency organizations and directs that the essential emergency personnel be notified. If they have not been previously requested to do so, the off-site groups will be mobilized as soon as possible; the Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility will be activated. Radiation monitoring teams may be augmented to permit an expanded on-site and near site monitoring program. The Joint Information Center will be activated for the purpose of providing information to the public. If the plant parameters indicate possible further degradation of plant safety or projected radiation levels which exceed the recommended values, the emergency will be escalated to the General Emergency level. IOERP I Rev. 62 1 4-3
4.1 .5 General Emergency Section 2 and OPEP-02.1, Initial Emergency Actions, describe the types of emergencies classified as a General Emergency. The Site Emergency Coordinator upon classifying the situation as a General Emergency takes appropriate, predefined steps to respond to and correct the situation as described OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. This includes arranging for personnel to be available, both on site and off site, to perform actions up to and including evacuation of the affected sectors of the 10-mile EPZ. If not done earlier, the Shift Superintendent assumes the role of the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) until formally relieved. The SEC activates the necessary emergency organizations and directs that the essential emergency personnel be notified. The activation and notification process should have begun well before a General Emergency is declared. Recommendations will be made for sheltering and/or evacuation in accordance with the guidelines in OPEP-02.6.28, Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations. 4.2 ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT ACTIONS 4.2.1 General Effective coordination and direction of all elements of the emergency organization require continuing accident assessment throughout an emergency situation. The process of accident assessment involves several different types of activities, in-plant and off-site, depending on the nature and severity of the emergency. I OERP I Rev. 62 4-4
The magnitude of releases of radioactive material can be determined using effluent and process monitors, meteorological data and other sources of information. Additionally, an independent confirmation of the magnitude of the release can be obtained based on the measured dose rates in the environment. Given these measured releases or environmental levels and estimates of the amount of dispersion between the plant and the various points of interest, projected doses can be estimated for other locations. These doses can then be compared to Protective Action Guides. The various steps in this process are discussed in the following sections and in the Plant Emergency Procedures. In the absence of measurable off-site dose rates, protective action recommendations will be made based on the guidelines OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency. 4.2.2 Source Term Assessment Source terms for assessment of off-site dose consequences to the public can be determined by using effluent and radiation monitor readings, evaluating plant conditions against predetermined scenarios, using analysis results of plant effluent samples, and by manually estimating curie inventories. A thorough discussion of source term development is provided in Appendix F. 4.2.2.1 Effluent and Radiation Readings The most direct indication of a radiological emergency is a high reading in the effluent radiation monitors. The radiation monitoring system monitors the airborne gaseous and particulate activity released from the Reactor Building and Turbine Building. Additional channels of the radiation monitoring system also monitor the gaseous activity in the air ejectors, primary containment (drywell atmosphere) ventilation system, and main steam line monitors. These channels indicate, record, and alarm in the main control room. The radiation monitoring system gives early warning of a plant malfunction and warns plant personnel of increasing radiation activity which might result in a radiation health hazard. (See OPEP-03.6.3 for procedures on source term assessments and estimates of core damage.) OERP Rev. 62 4-5
These monitors are also the primary means of determining that an emergency exists for accidents involving spills or leaks of contaminated liquids or gases from systems housing radioactive materials. Such leaks could lead to a release to the environment. In such instances, the following types of emergency actions would take place:
- 1. The Shift Superintendent on duty would be notified.
- 2. Personnel from the affected plant area would be evacuated, if required.
- 3. Access to the plant area involved would be restricted.
- 4. All plant personnel directly involved would be monitored for contamination.
- 5. A determination would be made of the potential for an off-site release.
- 6. The Plant Emergency Procedures would be activated if an emergency is declared.
4.2.2.2 Potential Consequences Based on In-Plant Conditions The source term can be estimated by evaluating the plant condition against a number of preselected scenarios that best describes the effectiveness of containment, cleanup systems, subcooled, or saturated conditions in the torus, and other relevant parameters. A more thorough discussion of the determination of source terms from plant conditions is described in Appendix F. I OERP I Rev. 62 1 4-6
4.2.2.3 Post Accident Sampling and Analysis of Reactor and Containment To aid in the assessment of core damage, area-type monitors utilizing ion chamber detectors are available to monitor radiation levels in the drywell. These monitors have a range of up to 107 Rem/hr. The range of monitoring equipment in various locations of the plant has also been extended (e.g., high range noble gas vent monitor and improved procedures for iodine analyses). This information can be used, together with the analyses of primary coolant system contamination levels, to develop an assessment of the types and quantities of various materials that have been released. Additionally, capabilities have been provided to permit sampling for chemical and radioanalysis under a wide range of accident conditions. Samples can be taken from effluent streams such as the plant stack to determine total release quantity and radionuclide mix, or they can be taken from the RCS, drywell, and torus to determine radionuclide mix. The collection and analysis of samples can be performed without incurring radiation exposures to individuals in excess of 10CFR20.1201 limits. The procedures for obtaining samples of gases and liquids during normal operation (such as a sample of primary coolant) can also be safely used during a wide spectrum of accident conditions. However, there are situations involving gross damage to the core where access to the sampling stations and handling of samples may be limited due to high radiation levels. Procedures have been developed and equipment has been installed at the sample panels to minimize the time required to obtain samples and to reduce the radiation levels during transport and analysis of samples. Beyond these measures, post accident sampling stations are located in the breezeway on the 20-foot level. This permits the collection of samples even if access to the Reactor Building is lost. This station can be used to safely withdraw samples of reactor coolant from the recirculation instrument racks in parallel with the jet pump flow indicator and to withdraw samples of water in the torus. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-7
4.2.3 Dose Projection and Meteorological Systems Once the source term is estimated, exposures to on-site and off-site individuals can be estimated as described in OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Off-Site Dose Projection Procedures. The technical basis for the methodology for performing dose projection is described in Appendix F. Prior to receipt of information from the emergency radiation monitoring teams, exposure rates at various locations on site and off site will be estimated from the airborne concentrations of radioactive material as calculated from plant radiation monitors and the atmospheric dispersion characteristics. Meteorological measurements, specifically the change in temperature with height and wind velocity, are used to determine the atmospheric dispersion conditions. Normally, the plant computer will provide a readout of the stability condition, but alternate methods are available. Rapid evaluation of potential radiation levels of any downwind area can be made through the use of calculated dispersion factors and the calculated release rate of airborne radioactive material from the plant. The Brunswick Nuclear Plant has an on-site meteorological station with a backup source of additional meteorological data to provide sufficient information for utilization in a dose assessment capability. This system is further described in Section 5.7.2. Currently, the BNP staff has an automated dose projection capability as described in OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Dose Projection Procedures. By entering critical plant data and meteorological information obtained from the on-site meteorological station, dose projections can be made for various locations using the dose assessment program. This function has been designed and implemented to allow for the rapid determination of centerline doses for immediate use by plant personnel. Additionally, contract meteorologists are to be contacted by plant personnel. Meteorological data display is available for remote interrogation as part of the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS). This satisfies the NUREG 0654, Rev. 1 criteria for meteorological evaluation and remote interrogation. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-8
4.2.4 Emergency Environmental Monitoring The Site Emergency Coordinator is responsible for quickly evaluating meteorological conditions existing at the time of the incident and, where releases are or soon will be occurring, for dispatching monitoring teams to specified, predetermined downwind locations. The prime objective of the initial emergency off-site monitoring is to confirm or modify the initial projections of the consequences of any release of radioactive material into the environment. The Environmental Monitoring Teams collect samples and survey data and transmit informabon to and/or receive instructions from the Radiological Control Manager of the EOF staff (or Radiological Control Director, if the EOF is not activated). Calculational aids, site maps, and actual radiation survey data collected by off-site survey teams define affected areas and assess the extent and significance of the release. Information is required for decision making with as little delay as possible; therefore, the initial environmental surveys involve simple-to-perform measurements so that the dose assessments based on plant parameters can be quickly confirmed or modified. Subsequent environmental monitoring efforts will be aimed at further defining the off-site consequences including estimates of total population exposure and instituting an expanded program to enable prompt assessments of any subsequent releases from the plant. Progress Energy Environmental Monitoring Teams will coordinate expanded environmental monitoring efforts to assist the agencies identified in Section 3.8. Field monitoring equipment will have at least the capability to detect and measure radioiodine in the vicinity of the plant site as low as 5 x 104 11Ci/cm 3 . The collected air sample can easily be measured by hand held survey meters, a simple test that can serve as an initial check of projected releases based on plant data and can confirm that significant quantities of elemental iodine have been released (the chemical form that would pose a health hazard). More detailed measurements (e.g., Sodium Iodide scintillation counters) can be quickly brought into service to provide the longer term higher capabilities to detect and measure very low levels of contamination in the environment, as would be planned for subsequent radiation monitoring efforts. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-91
At least two environmental monitoring teams will initially be activated from the plant staff upon activation of the EOF by the Emergency Response Manager, if conditions warrant their deployment. Additional teams from the Harris Nuclear Plant and the Robinson Nuclear Plant may be requested, if needed. 4.2.5 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) The Emergency Response Data System will supply the NRC with selected ERFIS data points on a near real time basis. This function will be activated by the Control Room staff within an hour of the declaration of an Alert. The selected data points are transmitted via modem to the NRC at approximately 1-minute intervals. If the primary ERFIS system fails (failover) the backup ERFIS system will re-establish the ERDS link automatically through the communication port for ERDS. 4.3 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions that may be taken to mitigate the circumstances of various levels and types of emergencies identified in this plan are given in the Plant Operating Manual. Generally, corrective actions include any actions that are taken to repair damaged equipment, to install emergency structures, systems, and components, or to reduce the releases of radioactivity. In order to maintain proficiency in implementing the various procedures and plans, there are training and retraining programs which in some cases are augmented by periodic drills and exercises. A description of this specialized training is given in Section 6.1.1. 4.4 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Protective actions are defined for each emergency class. Protective actions must take into consideration the potential risks of implementing such measures versus the reduction of the radiological risk achieved by their use. Analyses of the spectrum of emergencies show that only those in the General Emergency class are expected to have consequences in excess of one Rem whole body (TEDE). OERP Rev. 62 l 4-10
Protective action recommendation guidelines for the general public are described in OPEP-02.6.28, Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations. Protective actions planned for on-site personnel are described in Section 4.4.2. Protective actions for the off-site population-at-risk are the responsibility of state and local agencies; however, representative actions at various dose levels are described in Section 4.4.7. The evaluation of Protective Action Guidelines for the intermediate phase and for ingestion pathways are the responsibility of the state. 4.4.1 Protective Action - Off Site Notification of off-site agencies will take place when EALs are exceeded (see Section 3.9). Any incident that is projected to result in radiation doses to the general public in excess of the Protective Action Guidelines listed in OPEP-02.6.28, Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations, requires the Site Emergency Coordinator to declare a General Emergency. The Emergency Response Manager will recommend to the state and counties protective measures for the public. 4.4.2 Protective Action - On Site 4.4.2.1 Warning and Notification The on-site PA system and appropriate alarms will be used to alert/warn and notify on-site personnel of an emergency and necessary protective actions as described in OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. In addition to the alarms, PEPs and security instructions provide guidance for on-site warning and notification. Such warning and notification will include persons at the Visitors Center and the recreation area. Outside the plant protected area, warning will be accomplished as described in Section 4.4.6 for the public. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-11
4.4.2.2 Evacuation & Personnel Accountability For emergencies requiring protective actions in accordance with OPEP-03.8.2, Personnel Accountability and Evacuation, personnel will proceed by the safest, most direct route to the designated assembly locations or as directed by the Site Emergency Coordinator.
- a. Shift operating personnel will assemble in the Control Room.
- b. All personnel not specifically involved in responding to the emergency (non-essential) will assemble as directed.
- c. All visitors will report to the Security Office at the protected area central access control point.
A personnel accountability check will be carried out in accordance with OPEP-03.8.2, Personnel Accountability and Evacuation, and all personnel will return dosimeters and be checked for radioactive contamination. Contaminated and/or injured individuals will be directed to an area set aside for decontamination and/or medical aid as described in OPEP-03.9.2, First Aid and Medical Care, and OPEP-03.9.3, Transport of Contaminated Injured Personnel. Search for missing persons and rescue will be performed as described in OPEP-03.9.6, Search and Rescue. On-site personnel will evacuate the area when directed using transportation that was employed to arrive at the site. Personnel without transportation will be identified during the assembly phase and provided transportation. The secondary access road and the main plant access road will be used to depart from the site as advised, and evacuation from the 10-mile EPZ will be by way of evacuation routes identified in Figures 1.1-1, 1.1-2, and 4.4-1. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-12
4.4.3 Control of Personnel Radiation Exposures Although an emergency situation transcends the normal requirements for limiting exposures to ionizing radiation, guideline levels are established in OPEP-03.7.7, Onsite Radiological Controls, for exposures that may be acceptable in emergencies. The maximum whole body (TEDE) dose received by any worker should not exceed established regulatory limits. Every reasonable effort will be used to ensure that an emergency is handled in such a manner that no worker exceeds these limits. The administration of radioprotective drugs such as potassium iodide (KI) to Progress Energy personnel may also be useful in mitigating the consequences of inhalation of radioactive materials such as radioiodines during an emergency. Procedures for the administration of radioprotective drugs to Progress Energy and vendor employees are described in OPEP-03.7.6, Emergency Exposure Controls. Decision making is based on conditions at the time of an emergency and should always consider the probable effects of an exposure prior to allowing any individual to be exposed to radiation levels exceeding the established occupational limits. The probable high radiation exposure effects are:
- 1. UP to 50 Rem EDE in 1 day - no physiological changes are likely to be observed.
- 2. 50 to 100 Rem EDE - no impairment likely but some physiological changes, induding possible temporary blood changes, may occur. Medical observations would be required after exposure.
- 3. 100 to 300 Rem EDE - some physical impairment possible. Some lethal exposures possible.
OERP Rev. 62 4-13
The following subsections describe the criteria to be considered for life-saving and facility protection actions. 4.4.3.1 Exposure Control Under Emergency Conditions Dose limit guidelines for workers in an emergency are taken from EPA 400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Actions and Protective Action Guidelines for Nuclear Incidents, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 1992. Much of the discussion in this section is taken in whole from that document In emergency situations, workers may receive exposure under a variety of circumstances in order to assure protection of others and of valuable property. These exposures will be justified if the maximum risks or costs to others that are avoided by their actions outweigh the risks to which the workers are subjected. The Emergency Worker Dose Limit Guidelines are as follows: Dose Limit (Rem TEDE)' Activt Condition 5 Ail 10 Protecting valuable Lower dose not practicable property 25 Lifesaving or protection of Lower dose not practicable large populations
>25 Lifesaving or protection of Only on a voluntary basis to large populations persons fully aware of the risks involved Routine dose limits shall not be extended to emergency dose limits for declared pregnant individuals. As in the case of normal occupational exposure, doses received under emergency conditions should be maintained as low as reasonably achievable.
'Doses to the lens of the eye should be limited to three times the stated TEDE value and doses to any other organ (including skin and body extremities) should be limited to ten times the stated TEDE value. OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-14
In the context of these guidelines, exposure of workers that is incurred for the protection of large populations may be considered justified for situations in which the collective dose avoided by the emergency operation is significantly larger than that incurred by the workers involved. Persons undertaking any emergency operation in which the dose will exceed 25 Rem TEDE should do so only on a voluntary basis and with full awareness of the risks involved, including the numerical levels of dose at which acute effects of radiation will be incurred and numerical estimates of the risk of delayed effect. 4A.3.2 Exposures During Repair/Reentry Efforts Each emergency worker entering a high radiation area shall wear dosimetry capable of measuring the expected exposure to be received. Emergency teams that must enter areas where they might be expected to receive higher than normal doses will be fully briefed regarding their duties and actions and what they are to do while in the area. They will also be fully briefed as to expected dose rates, stay time, and other hazards. All such entries will include one Health Physics Technician, or other person adequately trained in health physics. All team members will use protective devices as specified by the Radiological Control Director. The team members will be instructed not to deviate from the planned route unless required by unanticipated conditions, such as rescue or performance of an operation that would minimize the emergency condition. If the monitored dose rates or stay times encountered during the entry exceed the limits set for the operation, the team will communicate with the OSC Mission Coordinator or will return to the area from where they were dispatched. Once their operation has been completed, the team personnel will follow established monitoring and personnel decontamination procedures as specified by the Radiological Control Director. OERP Rev. 62 4-15
4A.44 Radioactive Contamination 4.4.4.1 On-Site Personnel Radiation safety controls are established to contain the spread of loose surface radioactive contamination. Personnel leaving the contaminated areas are monitored to ensure that they or their clothing are not radioactively contaminated. Additionally, in the event of a site evacuation, no personnel will be allowed to leave the plant site until they have been checked for contamination. In addition to the decontamination area of the Service Building, additional areas can be set up inside the entrance to the TSC/EOF Building. Contaminated clothing or personal articles will be decontaminated. Drinking water and food supplies will be monitored and, during an emergency, permitted only in specified clean areas. Contamination on personnel will be removed in accordance with established E&RC procedures. If normal decontamination procedures do not reduce contamination to acceptable levels, the case will be referred to a competent medical authority. 4AA.2 Equipment and Vehicles Equipment and tools will be released for use outside of the contaminated areas only if loose surface radioactive contamination is within acceptable limits. All tools and items of equipment must be checked for contamination before being taken from a known contaminated area. If the item is found to be contaminated and decontamination is not practical, the item must remain in that area. In the event of a site evacuation, vehicles will be surveyed for contamination before they are allowed to leave the plant site. Contaminated vehicles will be decontaminated before being released. If the Low Level Radwaste Warehouse is not a suitable decontamination site due to radiological concerns, vehicles will be directed to an alternate area for decontamination. Brunswick County Emergency Management may provide assistance in this area. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-161
4A.5 Treatment of Injured and Contaminated Persons Personnel showers and chemical decontamination agents are available on site and, except in cases of life-threatening/serious injury, established decontamination procedures will be employed on site prior to medical treatment. Decontamination showers and supplies are provided inthe Service Building. Shower and sink drains in the Service Building are routed to the miscellaneous waste processing system where the liquid is processed and monitored prior to discharge. Arrangements and facilities for medical treatment of injured plant personnel are described in detail in Appendix E - Medical Treatment and Assistance and in OPEP-03.9.2, First Aid and Medical Care. Depending on the nature and severity of injury, injured personnel may be treated in-plant by individuals trained in first aid, treated in-plant by a physician, or transported to the hospital for treatment (see OPEP-03.9.3, Transport of Contaminated Injured Personnel). In cases of severe injury, lifesaving first aid or medical treatment will take precedence over personnel decontamination. Ingeneral, the order of medical treatment will be:
- 1. Care of severe physical injuries.
- 2. Personnel decontamination.
- 3. First aid to other injuries.
- 4. Definitive medical treatment and subsequent therapy as required.
Definitive medical treatment, therapy, and evaluation may include radioprotective drugs, urinary bio-assays or whole body counts on persons suspected of inhaling or ingesting a significant amount of radioactive material or may include surveillance and therapy for persons receiving a large whole body dose. OERP Rev. 62 4-17
4A.6 Public Warning and Notification Inthe event of an emergency, the plant will notify designated emergency officials in Brunswick and New Hanover counties as well as state and federal officials in accordance with OPEP-02.6.21, Emergency Communicator. During the ALERT phase of an emergency, the appropriate county and state emergency group leaders will be requested to remain in a readiness condition to alert the population at risk if needed. The plant will recommend protective actions for the public upon declaration of a General Emergency. Public warning when deemed necessary will be accomplished as described in the North Carolina Emergency Response Plan In Support of the BNP. Waming will be given by such methods as sirens supplemented by radio, television, sound trucks, bullhoms, and knocking on doors. The Coast Guard will be used in notifying people along the coast and other large bodies of water where appropriate and necessary. Sirens mounted on utility poles have been installed by Progress Energy at 36 locations within a 10-mile radius of the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. Since the average ambient noise level throughout the EPZ is about 49dBA, the siren system is planned to provide a 59dBA minimum signal. The warning signal will be a 3-to-5-minute steady tone on the sirens. Sirens will not be sited in the Sunny Point Army Terminal. Brunswick County will notify the terminal which will alert its personnel using on-site warning methods. Sirens will not be sited in areas of no population. Large areas of Brunswick County consist of swamps and forests with no population. These areas include such tracks as the Orton Plantation, the western section of Boiling Springs Lakes, and some areas south of Route 211. These tracts are often owned by a few local individuals or lumber companies. Based on land use history, they show little promise of development. However, the warning system will be reviewed annually and upgraded when conditions warrant. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-18l
Activation of the sirens will be accomplished from the Brunswick and New Hanover Counties Emergency Operation Centers. The sirens in each county are independently controlled, but may be activated by Progress Energy with permission from the counties. A feedback system immediately alerts Progress Energy and both counties of any siren failure. The U.S. Coast Guard will perform the warning of people on bodies of water under their jurisdiction. The population at risk in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is subdivided into three general categories: resident (permanent) population, transient population, and special facility population as described in Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Time Estimates For The Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, prepared by PBS&J, November 2002. The total resident population affected within the 10-mile EPZ is approximately 26,724. During the summer months, June through August, the daytime population of the EPZ is approximately 147,054 (see Figure 1.1 -6). The population is concentrated along the coast and a relatively few inland roads. 4A.7 Protective Actions - Off Site/Public 4A.7.1 Public Education and Information Occupants in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be provided information prepared by Progress Energy in conjunction with the state and county agencies. This public education and information program is intended to ensure that members of the public are: (a) aware of the potential for an occurrence of a radiological emergency; (b) able to recognize a radiological emergency notification; and (c) knowledgeable of the proper, immediate actions to be taken upon notification. This will be accomplished by (1)distribution of the annual safety information calendar which contains educational information on emergency preparedness, sheltering, sirens, radiation, and telephone numbers of agencies to contact for more information; (2)availability of qualified personnel to address civic, religious, social and occupational organizations; and (3)distribution of news material to the media and numerous community and business newsletters. OERP Rev. 62 4-19
Emergency information will be made available to transient populations through the distribution of safety information map brochures to commercial establishments in the 10-mile EPZ. During an actual emergency, provisions will be established through the Joint Information Center to make available and distribute information to the news media. The Joint Information Center will also implement provisions for a number of telephones which members of the public, who hear rumors, can call for factual information. The public education and information program is further described in Section 6.1.4. 4A.7.2 General For emergencies requiring protective actions for the general public in designated off-site areas, state agencies will determine the advisability of any necessary evacuation or sheltering. Local agencies will conduct the protective actions as warranted. Assembly points would vary depending on the severity of the incident and on the prevailing weather conditions. To assist in this effort, Progress Energy will provide up-to-date assessments of the condition of the plant and of the quantity and rate of release of radioactivity. Progress Energy will also assist by performing dose assessments which will be compared to the protective action guidelines. The protective actions that Progress Energy recommends to the state will be based upon current meteorological data such as wind direction, speed and stability class, and other factors. Releases affecting off-site areas may not be of the magnitude requiring evacuation, areas within the 10-mile EPZ that do not evacuate will be recommended to shelter. Detailed procedures for public protective actions are contained in the North Carolina Emeraency Response Plan in Support of BNP. l OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-20
4A.7.3 Evacuation In the event that evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ is required, the evacuation routes shown in Figure 1.1-2 and Figure 4.4-1 will be used by on-site and off-site personnel. The time required to evacuate personnel from the 10-mile EPZ varies depending on whether a part of the EPZ is to be evacuated or all of it, on the time of year such as winter or summer, etc., as illustrated in Figure 4.4-1 and on other factors as shown in Table 4.4-1. It should be noted that the evacuation process in itself involves risk to the public. Risks resulting from evacuation are discussed in US EPA Report, EPA 400-R-92-00, Appendix C. 4.4.7.4 Shelter All sectors that are not recommended to evacuate will be recommended to shelter. The state may consider sheltering for special populations or hazardous environmental conditions. Special populations may include institutionalized or infirm persons. Hazardous environmental conditions may include the presence of severe weather or competing disasters. The local housing consists primarily of wood framed dwellings, 1 and 2 stories, that are over 10 years old. Very few houses have basements. There are a number of brick veneer dwellings of later construction and a fairly small even distribution of house trailers. The term Protection Factor (PF) refers to a number used to express the relationship between the amount of gamma radiation that would be received by an unprotected person and the amount that would be received by a person in shelter. An occupant of a shelter with a PF of 40 would be exposed to V40 (2.5 percent) of the dose or dose rate to which he would be exposed if his location were unprotected (Sheltered Dose = Unsheltered Dose + PF). l OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-21
Protection factors for various shielding materials are given in Figure 4.4-3 and for various structures and vehicles in Tables 4.4-2,4.4-3, and 4.4-4. 4.4.7.5 Respiratory Protection It is unlikely that effective public respiratory protection can be provided by improvised devices. This problem will be studied and provisions incorporated in this plan in the event satisfactory systems are found. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 4-22
TABLE 4.4-1 FACTORS RELATED TO WARNINGIEVACUATION TIME 1- Facility to Off-site Agencies Alert Phase a' Decision-making time
- b. Physical actions/calling time
- 2. Governmental Agencies to Public Alert Phase
- a. Decision-making time
- b. Physical actions/calling-alerting time
- 3. Public Alert and Notification Phase
- a. Hear signal
- b. Recognize signal
- c. Seek confirmation of signal meaning and validity
- d. Find confirmation of signal meaning
- e. Relate signal meaning to self
- f. Decide to act.
- 4. Movement PreDaration Phase
- a. Time between deciding to act and departing location I
- b. Shutting off utilities I
- c. Packing bags I
- d. Deciding on destination and routes I
- e. Taking care of livestock, etc. I
- f. Collecting other family members I
- 9. Loading the automobile and departing I
- 5. Movement/Travel Phase
- a. Movement time is a function of road distance to the boundary of the evacuation area, vehicle used for evacuation, and auto traffic conditions (traffic volumes, road capacity, weather conditions, etc.).
- b. Road capacity under emergency conditions per FEMA CPG-2-8-C are assumed to be 850 vehicles per hour (vph) per lane; under foul weather conditions 450-500 vph.
- c. Traffic volume is determined by: (1) dividing the EPZ population by the average number of persons per dwelling unit; or (2) obtaining statistical data on number of vehicles registered in the EPZ, or, (3) other.
- 6. Evacuation Verification Phase
- a. Marker Technique (NRC NUREG-0654)
Auto check - Total road distances + Ave. 15 mph Aircraft check
- b. Telephone poll: 0.5 min. per residence I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-23
TABLE 4.4-2 REPRESENTATIVE SHIELDING FACTORS FOR SURFACE DEPOSITED RADIONUCLIDES* Representative Representative Structure or Location Shielding Factora) Ranae 1 m above ordinary ground 0.70 0.47-0.85 Cars on 50-ft. road: Road fully contaminated 0.5 0.4-0.7 Road 50% decontaminated 0.5 0.4-0.6 Road fully decontaminated 0.25 0.2-0.5 Trains 0.40 0.3-0.5 One- and two-story wood-frame house 0.4°(b 0.2-0.5 (no basement) One- and two-story block and brick 0.2(b) 0.04-0.40 house (no basement) House basement, one or two walls 0. 1 0.03-0.15 fully exposed: One story, less than 2 ft of 0.05°) 0.03-0.07 basement, walls exposed Two stories, less than 2 ft. 0.03°' 0.02-0.05 of basement, walls exposed Three- or four-story structures, 5000 to 10,000 ft2 per floor First and second floors 0.05° 0.01-0.08 Basement 0.01°(b 0.001-0.07 Multistory structures, > 10,000 ft2 per floor Upper floors 0.01°b 0.001-0.02 Basement 0.005(b) 0.001-0.015 (a) The ratio of dose received inside the structure to the dose that would be received outside the structure. (b) Away from doors and windows. (c) Shielding Factor = Shielded Dose Rate / Unshielded Dose Rate
*From: SAND 77-1725, Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Accidents, Sandia Laboratory I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-24
TABLE 4.4-3 REPRESENTATIVE SHIELDING FACTORS FROM GAMMA CLOUD SOURCE Shielding Representative Structure or Location Shielding Factor(a) Range Outside 1.0 Vehicles 1.0 Wood-frame house(b) 0.9 (no basement) Basement of wood house 0.6 0.1 to 0.7(c) Masonry house (no basement) 0.6 0.4 to 0.7(c) Basement of masonry house 0.4 0.1 to 0.5(c) Large office or industrial 0.2 0.1 to 0 .3(c d) building (a) The ratio of the dose received inside the structure to the dose that would be received outside the structure. (b) A wood frame house with brick or stone veneer is approximately equivalent to a masonry house for shielding purposes. (c) This range is mainly due to different wall materials and different geometries. (c) The shielding factor depends on where the personnel are located within the building (e.g., the basement or an inside room). (d) Shielding Factor = Shielded Dose Rate / Unshielded Dose Rate
- From: SAND 77-1725, Public Protection Strategies For Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents, Sandia Laboratory OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-25
TABLE 4.4-4 PF OF VARIOUS VEHICLES AND STRUCTURES Ave-rage PF Airraf Light (Cessna - 172 type) ............................................................................ ....... 1.25 Bus - Scenic Cruiser................,, .
" -Commercial Type . 1 1.7
- School1 1.6 Car - Passenger . 1.6 Foxhole (3 ft. diameter x 4 ft. deep) . 10.0 If an area 3 or 4 feet wide around the foxhole is kept free of fallout material, a protection factor of 100 or more is possible.
House, Wood Frame (Cape Cod/Colonial Types) First Floor Center of House . 0.0 Basement ....................................................... 10.0 Corner of Basement, Under Table with 8" 1 100.0 Concrete on top ................................. .. 100.0 House, Brick (Cape Cod/Colonial Type) First Floor Center of House . 10.0 Basement . Locomotive, Heavy, Engineers Seat . L3. Normal Living, Home and Work as Usual . Trucks
/4 Ton 11.3 314 Ton 1.4 2 1/2 Ton 11.7 4 to 7 Ton 2.0 Fire Truck, Drivers Side 22.9 Fire Truck, Standing Area in Back ........................ ,,,,..................................... 11.7 Roadway Underpass ............................................................................................. 2 2to 5 91tamAreas (In Open) .1 1.4 Woods.1 1.25 NOTE: Protection Factor (PF) = Unshielded Dose Rate + Shielded Dose Rate. Above data pertains to deposited particulate radioactive material with gamma energy approx. 0.7 mev.
l OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-26
( ( ( BNP EVACUATION SCHEDULE AND WARNING EVACUATION SCHEDULE POPULATION Zone Waning Responsiblity Evacation Routes Evacuation Shelter Waming Permanent Peak time Transient hrs/mins Seasonal A Fiportre/Rescue NC 87 north, US 17 north, SR 1438 (Lanvae) north, right on Leland Middle School 0 +39 1,542 932 unset Harbor Fire 1437 B Fre/Rescue iport NC 87 north, US 17 north, SR 1438 LawNale) north, right on North Brunswick High School 0 +18 16,387 SR 1437 Leland Middle School C portFire/Rescue NC 133 north, SR 1472 (old US 74176) west, SR 1455 nth Linooln Primary School 0 + 19 787 1,335 Oak Island Fire/Rescue/Police NC 211 west, US 17 south, NC 130 north West Brunswick High School 0+32 9,297 32,422 Yaupon Beach Fire E Bolivia Fire NC 87 north, US 17 north, SR 1438 (Lanvale) north, right on North Brunswick High School 0+29 2,077 745 SR 1437 SR 1500 north, US 17 north, SR 1438 (Lanvale) north, right on R 1437 F Boiling Sprngs Fire/Rescue NC 87 north, US 17 north, SR 1438 (Lanvale) north, right on North Brunswick High School + F41 3,193 1,204 Polivia Fire R 1437 G iling Springs Fire/Rescue NC 133 north, SR 1437 RFoth Brunswick High School *+ 64 Tn Creek Rescue H Southport Fire/Rescue NC 133 north, SR 1472 (old US 74176) west, SR 1455 north Lincoln Primary School 0 +30 -818 1073 Carolina Beach Fire/Rescue Dow Road, US 421 north, NC 132 north Coiseum, UNC-W 00r3as0
+39TT- 55,517 ure Beach Fire bland Grise Jr. High School.
ederal Point Fire H Hh School ew Hanover County Sheriff Alderran Elementary School
- 1. Bald Head Island authorities will warn the population in the Bald Head Island development
- 2. If time is critical, after zones using NC 87 and NC 133 have cleared, two traffic lanes would be directed out of Zone D with one lane using NC 87 or NC 133 north.
- 3. Sunny Point Army Terminal, Orton Plantation, and Old Brunswick Town/Fort Anderson authorities will warn the population within their jurisdiction.
- 4. If time is critical, three lanes of traffic could be directed out of Zone K on US 421 north from the point where Dow Road intersects US 421.
- 5. These shelters are available only on days when school is not in session.
See also Figure 1.1-2, 10 Mile Plume Exposure EPZ. Figure 4.4-1 Evacuation Schedule and Waiiing OERP Rev. 62 l 4-27
EVACUATION TIMES - BRUNSWICK EPZ Analysis Local Planning Evacuation Time Area Zones Evacuated (minutes)ab 1 B 115-314 2 A,B,C 160-381 3 A,B,C,D 290-662 4 A,B,C,D,E 296-670 5 A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H 340-695 6 A,B,C,E,F,G,H,K 235-749 7 A,B,C,G,H,K 235-749 8 A,B,C,H,K 235-749 9 A,B,C,K 340-749 10 A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,K 340-749 a This range of evacuation times covers four conditions: Fair Weather - winter weekday, winter weeknight, summer weekday and summer weekend; and Adverse Weather - winter weekday and summer weekend. b Evacuation time includes public alerting and notification (15 minutes), preparation for movement (15 minutes), and time to travel out of the local planning zone(s) being evacuated. Figure 4.4-2 Evacuation Times I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-28 l
PRiOTECTION FACTOR 100,00 20.000 10.000 7.000 zaco 1.000 700 400 Ion 100 70 10~ ~ ~ 0I 40 20 10 7 A 2 1 a1 0.2 aA a.7 1.0 2 4 7 D 20 40 70 100 THICKNESS (INCHES) GAMMA RADIATION -0.7 MEV SHELTERED DOSE = UNSHELTERED DOSE + PF Fig. 4.4-3 Protection Factors of Shielding Materials I OERP I Rev. 62 l 4-29
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 5.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT To facilitate efficient and effective control and coordination of the numerous actions required during emergency situations, several facilities have been designated as emergency centers for Brunswick. These facilities are linked by a comprehensive communications network to allow accurate and timely communications between the facilities, outside agencies, and the public. The communications network uses Bell systems, fiber optic, Progress Energy microwave net, data links, and radio to provide: (a)voice communication through normal telephone use, automatic ringdown between selected facilities, conference call capability, speaker phones and operator assistance where required; (b)radio communications between selected Progress Energy vehicles and appropriate fixed locations, as well as with state mobile units and fixed locations; (c)facsimile and computer local and wide area networks. (A detailed listing of the Brunswick emergency communications systems is presented as Appendix A.) The purpose of emergency response facilities is to provide centralized locations for organized coordination and control of on-site and off-site activities during an emergency. Each emergency response organization must assure that a location is provided from where they may direct the activities for which they are responsible, while providing for coordination of activities with other organizations. Facilities are needed to function as a center for the licensee's command and control functions of on-site operations, including coordination of all licensee activities, on site and off site. Also needed is a center for the analysis of plant effluent monitors, meteorological conditions, and off-site radiation measurements, and for off-site dose projections. As discussed in Section 3 additional facilities are needed where information regarding current and projected plant status needed by federal, state, and local authorities for implementation of off-site emergency plans can be transmitted, where key representatives of the agencies can meet and where the press can operate. The above functions are carried out by the interaction of the Control Room, the Operational Support Center, the Technical Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility, the Joint Information Center, and the State and Local Emergency Operations Centers. These centers are connected with a comprehensive, redundant communications network. OERP Rev. 62 5-1
In the emergency facilities, decisions and responses are based upon approved procedures and controlled drawings. Uncontrolled drawings and other documents may be used for reference if identified with "FOR INFORMATION ONLY' or "FOR TRAINING USE ONLY." Material identified as "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" or "FOR TRAINING USE ONLY' will not be used in place of approved procedures or controlled drawings. The functional capabilities of the Brunswick emergency facilities are presented in Table 5.0-2, and the physical locations of on-site emergency facilities are shown on Figure 1.1-3. Specific information about the facilities and equipment available for dealing with emergencies at Brunswick is presented in the following sections. 5.1 CONTROL ROOM The function of the Control Room is plant control. All plant-related operations are directed from the Control Room. The Control Room is designed to meet habitability standards as described in the Brunswick UFSAR. Nuclear plant instrumentation, including area and process radiation monitoring system instrumentation, is provided in the Control Room to give early warning of a potential emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the emergency situation. The Control Room contains the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactors and turbine generators under normal and emergency situations. Additional equipment such as portable radiation survey instruments, readout of meteorological instrumentation and communication equipment is available in the Control Room. A supply of protective clothing, respiratory equipment, and self-contained breathing apparatus will also be maintained in the Control Room. 5.2 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER The Technical Support Center (TSC) provides a location to house personnel who are responsible for management and technical support of plant operations during emergency conditions. The TSC also functions to relieve the Control Operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations and preventing congestion in the Control Room. In the event of a loss of power, an auxiliary diesel generator is located near the building to supply an alternate source of power. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 5-2
The TSC will be activated for an alert or higher classification. Activation for an unusual event is optional. If it should become necessary to expedite travel between the TSC and Control Room, Security has provisions in place to provide direct access between the TSC and the protected area. The TSC and EOF share a common building which has been designed to have the same habitability as the Control Room. The north wall is 18 inches thick and the other walls and roof are 14 inches thick. The ventilation system is described in Section 5.2.1. 5.2.1 TSC/EOF EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM The EOF/TSC Building Ventilation System is equipped with two (2) filter systems (containing both HEPA and charcoal filters), one for each of the two ventilation intake locations (Mechanical Rooms 134 and 165). The TSC/EOF Building Ventilation System is equipped with two intake air monitors which are Eberline SRM-100 monitors with SPA-8 probes. The probes are installed in the intake air ducts where detection of a high level of radiation can automatically trigger the HVAC system to actuate emergency fans to direct intake air through the filter trains. The intake air radiation monitors are provided with an audible local alarm that is located on the radiation monitor. When the alarm setpoint is reached, the monitor will energize its associated radiation monitor relay, which will automatically activate an emergency fan to redirect the intake air through the associated filtering system. 5.2.2 TSC/EOF EMERGENCY CONTAMINATED DRAIN SYSTEM During an emergency, contaminated drainage could occur at the decontamination shower. An emergency drain system is provided to isolate potential contaminated drainage which can be collected in a 1,000 gallon holding tank. For normal operating conditions, all drainage would be collected by the sanitary drain lines. The holding tank is located underground on the west side of the building. Manually operated valves allow the rerouting of potentially contaminated liquid to the 1,000 gallon holding tank. I OERP Rev. 62 l 5-3
5.3 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER The purpose of the Operational Support Center (OSC) is to minimize congestion in the Control Room during emergencies by providing a location, separate from the Control Room, where plant maintenance, operations, E&RC, and other plant emergency support personnel will assemble and stand by to assist as needed. The Operational Support Center is located in the O&M Building. When the OSC is activated, dosimetry, respiratory protection, radiation survey equipment, and RWPs will be provided. In the event of a personnel contamination, decontamination will be performed in the area normally designated for this purpose. Inthe event the OSC is evacuated, a backup can also be provided in the Simulator. The Simulator is within the habitability envelope of the TSCIEOF. 5.4 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), located on site provides space for management of overall emergency response including coordination with federal, state, and local officials, coordination of off-site radiological and environmental assessment, and determination of recommended public protective actions. The EOF is activated at an alert or higher level. The EOF is in the same habitability envelope as the TSC. If radiological conditions prevent EOF personnel from traveling to the EOF for activation, the Brunswick County Complex in Bolivia, N.C. will serve as a meeting place for personnel until radiological conditions permit travel to the facility. The Brunswick County Complex may also be used as an alternate reporting location for TSC, OSC, and EOF personnel in the event of a security threat, and function as an alternate EOF, until safe movement of personnel to the plant is assured. OERP Rev. 62 5-4
5.5 JOINT INFORMATION CENTER The Joint Information Center (JIC), located in the Brunswick Community College Complex near Bolivia, N.C., will serve as the primary location for the accumulation of accurate and current information regarding emergency conditions, and dissemination of information to news media and the general public. The JIC Communications Network has back-up capability for telephone and radio functions. Work stations are provided for Company personnel and a media briefing room is available. Telephones are provided for use by news media personnel. The center also contains work space and phones for public information personnel from the state, counties, NRC and industry-related organizations. Additional information can be found in OPEP-02.6.29, Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC). 5.6 OFF-SITE EMERGENCY FACILITIES 5.6.1 North Carolina Emergency Operations Center The North Carolina Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is located in Raleigh, North Carolina. When necessary, it will be activated and staffed to assist in coordinating emergency operations in support of the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. 5.6.2 Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center The Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center is located in the Brunswick County Administration Complex in Bolivia, North Carolina, about fifteen miles from the Brunswick site. It provides a location where Brunswick County authorities can direct off-site activities in Brunswick County. If radiological conditions prevent EOF personnel from traveling to the EOF for activation, the Brunswick County Complex in Bolivia, N.C. will serve as a meeting place for personnel until radiological conditions permit travel to the facility. This facility presently has direct communications links with the Brunswick Nuclear Plant TSC and EOF, and will allow free interchange of information between government officials and those persons located in the TSC and EOF responsible for dose projection and management decision making. The Brunswick County Complex may also be used as an alternate reporting location for TSC, OSC, and EOF personnel in the event of a security threat, and function as an alternate EOF, until safe movement of personnel to the plant is assured. OERP Rev. 62 5-5
5.6.3 New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center The New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center is located in the New Hanover County Law Enforcement Center in Wilmington, North Carolina, about 20 miles from the Brunswick site. It provides a location where New Hanover County authorities can direct off-site activities in New Hanover County. This facility presently has direct communications links with the Brunswick Nuclear Plant TSC and EOF, and will allow free interchange of information between government officials and those persons located in the TSC and EOF responsible for dose projection and management decision making. 5.7 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITIES 5.7.1 General The instrumentation and control systems monitor, provide indication and recording, and automatically regulate the variables necessary for safe and orderly operation of the plant. These systems provide the operators with the information and controls needed to start up, operate at power, and shut down the plant. They further provide means to cope with all abnormal operating conditions. Plant control and display of information from these various systems are centralized inthe Control Room at locations convenient to the operator. This instrumentation, in conjunction with projected off-site doses, provides the basis for initiation of protective actions. 5.7.2 Meteorological Instrumentation and Procedures The Brunswick Nuclear Plant has a permanent meteorological monitoring station located on-site for display and recording of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature differences for use in making off-site dose projections, etc. Meteorological information is presented in the Control Room by means of the plant computer system. The meteorological parameters measured on the tower at the 10-meter and 100-meter levels above ground are listed in Table 5.7-1. In addition, barometric pressure, solar radiation, precipitation and dew point temperature data are recorded at the station to provide supplemental information on local meteorological conditions. This information is remotely interrogatable using a computer or other data access terminal. OERP I Rev. 62 5-6
The meteorological sensors used at the BNP meteorological monitoring station are calibrated at least twice during an annual calendar year (approximately six months between calibrations). Meteorological sensors which are removed from service are replaced with a recalibrated unit having met original equipment manufacturer specifications. Between calibrations, an electronic verification of system performance will be made and, if necessary, adjustments to the system will be performed. This electronic verification shall be performed at least once between calibrations. BNP personnel will make periodic visits to the monitoring station to assure that components are functioning as anticipated. Further checks of the data are made by remote interrogation of the monitoring station by a meteorological service provider, where the data is reviewed by the meteorological staff to determine system performance and the acceptability of the reported information. Historical records and data will be maintained with the Environmental Unit for effluent reporting. The meteorological instrumentation which Progress Energy uses at the BNP meteorological monitoring station meets the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.23 (Rev. 0) and provides the meteorological parameters to the locations specified within NRC Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Rev. 2), Table I and Table 2. As specified within Section 8.2 of the Supplement Number 1 to NUREG-0737, Progress Energy maintains telephone numbers for voice communications to the nearest National Weather Service, first order observation station (Wilmington, NC) for twenty-four hour per day access to this backup meteorological information should the on-site system fail. This backup source of meteorological data is the closest location which can provide reliable representative meteorological information for the BNP site. Should the on-site meteorological data collection system exhibit suspect information, loss of data due to computer or instrument failure, or plant personnel require additional technical assistance, meteorologists are available to provide needed expertise. Meteorologists can independently access on-site meteorological data, contact the National Weather Service to obtain additional synoptic scale weather data and compile a site specific atmospheric diffusion assessment for BNP site. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 5-7
5.7.3 Seismic Monitoring The Brunswick Seismic Monitoring System senses and records earthquake ground motion received in two areas of the Reactor Building. The system is comprised of the following components:
- 1. Two peak shock recorders - remote sensing devices.
- 2. One multichannel accelograph - Model SMA-3.
- 3. One magnetic tape play-back unit - Model SMP-1.
The peak shock recorders measure and record the acceleration of the structure, primarily the concrete floors adjacent to the Reactor Building equipment drain tank and at the refueling elevation. Earthquakes produce low frequency accelerations which, when detected by the remote sensing devices, will be recorded at the remote location as well as by the accelograph located in the electronic equipment room. The Seismic Monitoring System remains in a standby condition until an earthquake causes the remote unit(s) to activate the recording circuits and tape transports. The peak shock recorder senses and permanently records the information defining a response spectrum. It also provides signals for immediate remote indication that specific preset response accelerations have been exceeded. A considerable array of seismometers is located in the region. A central point of contact to obtain information about a seismic event is the National Earthquake Information Center in Golden, Colorado. OERP Rev. 62 5-8
5.7.4 Radiological Monitors The radiation monitoring system is available to give early warning of a possible emergency and provides for a continuing evaluation of the emergency situation in the Control Room. Radiation monitoring instruments are located at selected areas within the facility to detect, measure, and record radiation levels. Inthe event the radiation level should increase above a preset level, an alarm is initiated in the Control Room. Certain radiation monitoring instruments also alarm locally in selected areas of the facility. The radiation monitoring system is divided into four subsystems:
- 1. Process radiation monitoring system monitors various fluid streams in operating systems.
- 2. Area radiation monitors that monitor radiation levels at various locations within the operating area that can be read in the Control Room.
- 3. Continuous air monitors measure airborne particulate and/or airborne iodine activities at various locations within the operating areas.
- 4. Radiation monitoring equipment with readouts in various plant locations and the HP office.
The types, ranges, and locations of monitors are listed in Tables 5.7-2 to 5.7-4. Typical portable radiation monitors are listed in Table 5.7-4. The radiation monitors are designed to permit monitoring of activity releases during a broad spectrum of postulated emergency situations. The locations of the off-site and on-site environmental monitoring stations, and the location of the emergency TLD monitoring stations are contained in plant Environmental and Radiation Control Procedures. OERP I Rev. 62 5-9
5.7.5 Process Monitors Instrumentation used to monitor vital plant parameters is described in Section 7 of the Brunswick FSAR. This instrumentation is continuously monitored in the Control Room. Essential process monitoring (Critical Plant Variables) will also be available in the Technical Support Center. 5.7.6 Laboratory Facilities Support of the radiation monitoring and analysis effort is provided by an on-site laboratory. The on-site laboratory includes equipment for chemical analyses and for analysis of radioactivity. The wet chemistry equipment is used to perform a variety of analyses (pH, conductivity, boron content of reactor coolant, etc.). It is also used to perform radiochemical analyses (preparation of samples to permit analysis of the radioactivity content). Equipment used to analyze the type and amount of radioactivity in filters, smears, etc., is located adjacent to the chemistry lab. This includes a multichannel analyzer (Ge-Li) used to determine the isotopic content in a sample, a liquid scintillation counter for tritium analyses, and gas proportional counter for gross alpha, and gross beta activity. Much of this equipment is rack mounted; some is readily portable. Additional facilities for counting and analyses of Brunswick samples can be provided by laboratory facilities at the Harris Nuclear Plant, including the Harris Energy and Environmental Center (HEEC) located near New Hill, North Carolina, and by the Robinson Nuclear Plant located in Hartsville, South Carolina. As described in the State of North Carolina Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the Division of Radiation Protection maintains a mobile radiological laboratory. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 5-10
The NRC mobile laboratory may be made available for site and general emergencies. Parking space for the mobile laboratory is reserved on the southeast corner of the fabrication shop (old firehouse). The building is located on the north side of the plant, west of the Rad Material Container Storage Building. A 120 VAC receptacle box is mounted on the east exterior wall and is reserved for the mobile laboratory. The Radiological Control Director shall coordinate setting up of the mobile laboratory. 5.7.7 Dose Projection The magnitude of releases of radioactive material can be determined from effluent and process monitors based on OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Off-Site Dose Projection Procedures. Additionally, an independent confirmation of the magnitude of a release can be obtained by environmental monitoring as described in OPEP-02.6.6, Environmental Monitoring Team Leader and OPEP-03.5.5, Environmental Monitoring and Plume Tracking. Given a source term, or the duration and rate of release to the environment, and meteorological data previously described, the Control Room can make the initial dose projections and is capable of performing this function on a 24-hour-per-day basis. After activation of the EOF, the Radiological Control Manager described in Section 3.5.4 is responsible to the Emergency Response Manager for determining dose projections from readily available data. OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Dose Projection Procedures, describe computer programs which automate dose projection calculations when used in conjunction with the BNP meteorological systems. 5.8 FIRE DETECTION The Fire Detection System is designed to quickly detect visible or invisible smoke (or other products of combustion) and/or heat in designated areas of the plant The Fire Detection System consists primarily of fire detectors, control panel units, and annunciator panels. A fire signal initiated by a detector flows through a control panel unit to an annunciator panel. The control panel unit is located in the same building as the detector. The annunciator panel is located in the Control Room. OERP I Rev. 62 5-11
The types and number of detectors have been selected in accordance with the combustible materials and electrical equipment present in the area and the physical surroundings of each area. Ionization detectors sense the presence of products of combustion before they are visible in the form of smoke. Thermal detectors are sensitive to both temperature and the rate of rise of increasing temperature. SD-41 provides a description of detector types, numbers, and locations. 5.9 PROTECTIVE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT OPEP-04.6, Radiological Emergency Kit Inventories, lists emergency equipment that is available for the various Brunswick emergency facilities. Complete personnel decontamination facilities are included in the Service Building. These facilities include two decontamination showers. Alternate means for decontamination are also available. 5.10 FIRSTAID AND MEDICAL FACILITIES First Aid is located on the first floor of the O&M Building. First aid kits and supplies are also placed at various locations throughout the plant. Off-site medical facilities which have agreed to accept personnel are described in Appendix E, Medical Treatment and Assistance. 5.11 DAMAGE CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES In the event of an emergency, certain immediate repairs may be necessary to minimize the further release of radioactivity and also insure the protection of plant equipment. Damage control equipment and supplies that would be used to effect repair would depend on the nature of the repairs to be performed. Damage control equipment and supplies are located in the stockroom and the maintenance shops. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 5-12
5.12 OFF-SITE ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES Inthe event of an emergency, the plant has the capability to deploy two off-site environmental monitoring teams as described in OPEP-02.6.6, Environmental Monitoring Team Leader. Two environmental monitoring kits with the necessary equipment and supplies for off-site radiological monitoring are designated for use in the event of an emergency. Transportation for off-site environmental monitoring teams will be supplied by plant vehicles and other Company trucks as available or private autos at the site. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 5-131
( ( TABLE 5.0-2 FUNCTIONAL OBJECTIVES OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES Facit Name Location Funct2nalft-r~fl Technical Support Brunswick TSC/EOFITraining 1) Assembly location for technical personnel to Center (TSC) Building provide engineering and management support of plant operations following an accident
- 2) Direction and coordination of overall plant emergency activities.
Operational Brunswick Operations and 1) Reporting place for emergency support personnel. Support Center (OSC) Maintenance Building 2) Dispatching location of personnel to support actions as directed by the Site Emergency Coordinator. Joint Information Located in Brunswick Community 1) Provide immediate access to accurate emergency Center College Complex, Bolivia, NC related information generated by all involved agencies by media representatives.
- 2) Provide equipment for document reproduction, telecopying, communications, and television electrical connections.
Emergency Operations Brunswick TSC/EOF/Training Building 1) Provide working space and communication links Facility (EOF) for the Emergency Response Manager and his staff.
- 2) Provide primary interface point for Progress Energy and off-site support personnel (Federal and State).
- 3) Provide point of coordination for off-site radiological and environmental assessment New Hanover County Wilmington, North Carolina 1) Direction and coordination of New Hanover County Emergency Operations emergency and protective response actions.
Center (EOC) Brunswick County Bolivia, North Carolina 1) Direction and coordination of Brunswick Emergency Operations County emergency and protective response Center (EOC) actions. North Carolina State Raleigh, North Carolina 1) Direction and coordination of Brunswick and New Hanover Emergency Operations County emergency and protective response Center (EOC) actions. lOERP I Rev. 62 l 5-14
TABLE 5.7-1 ON-SITE METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION Approximate Height Recorded Above Tower Base (ft) Parameter Instrument 344 Windspeed, direction Threshold less than and direction variance 1 mph. 35 Windspeed, direction, Threshold less than and direction variance 1 mph. 344 Temperature difference Resistance thermobulb relative to 35 ft in aspirated radiation elevation shield at 344 and 35 ft elevation. 35 Ambient temperature Resistance thermobulb in aspirated radiation shield at 35 ft elevation. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 5-15
TABLE 5.7-2 AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL IDENTIFICATION & METER RANGES Range Detector Channel (mRem/hr) Designation Location (Bldg.) 1-1 0.01 -100 Control Room Operating Area Control 1-2 0.01 - 100 U-2 Electronic Equipment Room
- Control 1-3 0.01 - 100 U-1 Electronic Equipment Room
- Control 1-4 0.01 - 100 Stack Filter House Stack 1-5 0.01 - 100 Service Bldg. Radiochemical Lab. Service 1-6 0.01 - 100 Service Bldg. Personnel Decon Service Equipment Room 1-7 0.1 - 103 Hot Machine Shop Service 1-8 0.01 - 100 Service Bldg. Equipment Room Service East/West Corridor 1-9 0.01 -100 U-1 Turb. Hall Control Access Turbine Corridor 1-10 0.01 - 100 U-1 FW Heater Bay Access Corridor Turbine 1-11 0.01 - 100 U-1 Turb. Bldg. Sampling Station Turbine 1-12 0.1 - 103 U-1 Turb. W Moist Sep. Drain Tanks Turbine 1-13 0.1 - 103 U-1 Turb. E Moist Sep. Drain Tanks Turbine 1-14 0.1 - 103 U-1 Turb. Rotor Washdown Area Turbine 1-15 0.1 - 103 1A Core Spray Pump Room ESS I Reactor 1-16 0.1 - 10 3 1B Core Spray Pump Room ESS II Reactor
- Detectors are located in mechanical equipment room (Control Building ventilation air intake plenum)
OERP Rev. 62 5-16
TABLE 5.7-2 (Cont'd) AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL IDENTIFICATION & METER RANGES Range Detector Channel (mRem/hr) Designation Location (Bldg.) 1-17 0.1 - 10 3 1A RHR System Hx and Pump Room Reactor ESS I 1-18 0.1 - 103 1B RHR System HX and Pump Room Reactor ESS II 1-19 0.01 - 100 U-1 Rx Bldg. Airlock Area EL 20 ft. Reactor 1-20 0.01 - 100 U-1 Drywell Entrance Reactor 1-21 1.0 - 104 U-1 TIP Room Reactor 1-22 0.01 - 100 U-1 Decontam. Room EL 20 ft. Reactor 1-23 0.01 - 100 U-1 Equipment Entry EL 20 ft. Reactor 1-24 0.01 - 100 U-1 Rx Bldg. Sampling Station Reactor 1-25 0.01 - 100 U-1 Rx Bldg. Air Lock EL 50', 8" Reactor 1-26 0.01 - 100 U-1 New Fuel Vault EL 98', 9" Reactor 1-27 0.01- 100 U-1 North of Fuel Storage Pool Reactor 1-28 102 _106 U-1 Between Rx and Fuel Pool Reactor EL 117 ft., 4 in. 1-29 0.01 - 100 U-1 Cask Wash Area Refuel Floor Reactor 1-30 0.01 - 100 U-1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Reactor System IOERP I Rev. 62 5-17
TABLE 5.7-2 (Cont'd) AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL IDENTIFICATION & METER RANGES Range Detector Channel (mRem/hr) Designation Location (Bldg.) 0.1 -lo 3 Radwaste Bldg. EL 3 ft. Radwaste 2-1 N MCC and Sump Area 2-2 0.1 - 10 3 Radwaste Bldg. EL 3 ft. Radwaste S MCC and Sump Area 2-3 0.1 - 103 U-2 Cond Filter - Demin Aisle Radwaste 2-4 0.1 - 103 U-1 Cond Filter - Demin Aisle Radwaste 2-5 0.01 - 100 Radwaste Control Room Radwaste 2-6 0.01 - 100 Radwaste Sampling Station Radwaste 2-7 0.01 - 100 Radwaste Drum Capping Station Radwaste 2-8 1.0 - 104 Radwaste Drum Storage Radwaste 2-9 0.01 - 100 U-2 Turb. Hall Access Corridor Turbine 2-10 0.01 - 100 U-2 FW Heater Bay Access Corridor Turbine 2-11 0.01 - 100 U-2 Turb. Bldg. Sampling Station Turbine 2-12 0.1 - 103 U-2 Turb. W Moist Sep Drain Tanks Turbine 2-13 0.1 - 103 U-2 Turb. E Moist Sep Drain Tanks Turbine 2-14 0.1 - 103 U-2 Turb. Rotor Washdown Area Turbine 2-15 0.1 - 103 2A Core Spray Pump Room ESS I Reactor 2-16 0.1 - 103 2B Core Spray Pump Room ESS II Reactor OERP I Rev. 62 5-18
TABLE 5.7-2 (Contd) AREA RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL IDENTIFICATION & METER RANGES Range Detector Channel (mRem/hr) Designation Location (Bldc.) 2-17 0.1 - 103 2A RHR System Hx and Pump Room Reactor ESS I 2-18 0.1 - 103 2B RHR System Hx and Pump Room Reactor ESS II 2-19 0.01 - 100 U-2 Rx Bldg. Airlock Area EL 20 ft. Reactor 2-20 0.01 - 100 U-2 Drywell Entrance Reactor 2-21 1.0 - 104 U-2 TIP Room Reactor 2-22 0.01 - 100 U-2 Decontam. Room EL 20 ft. Reactor 2-23 0.01 - 100 U-2 Equipment Entry EL 20 ft. Reactor 2-24 0.01 - 100 U-2 Rx Bldg. Sampling Station Reactor 2-25 0.01 - 100 U-2 Rx Bldg. Airlock EL 50 ft. Reactor 2-26 0.01 - 100 U-2 Inside New Fuel Vault Reactor EL 98 ft. 8 in. 2-27 0.01 - 100 U-2 North of Fuel Storage Pool Reactor 102 106 2-28 U-2 Between Rx and Fuel Pool Reactor EL 117 ft. 4 in. 2-29 0.01 - 100 U-2 Cask Wash Area Refuel Floor Reactor 2-30 0.01 - 100 U-2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Reactor OERP Rev. 62 5-19
TABLE 5.7-3 PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHANNEL IDENTIFICATION & METER RANGES Channel Supplier Range Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors GE 1_106 mRemlhr Channel A (D12-RM-K603A) Channel B (D12-RM-K603B) Channel C (D12-RM-K603C) Channel D (D12-RM-K603D) Condenser Off-Gas Radiation Monitors GE Log Channel A (D1 2-RM-K601A) 1-106 mRem/hr Log Channel B (D12-RM-K601 B) Linear Channel (D12-RM-K602) Main Stack Radiation Monitors General 1 0-7_1 05 Ci/CC Atomics (Xe equivalent) Liquid Process Radiation Monitors GE Radwaste Effluent (D12-RM-K604) 10-1_106 cps Service Water Discharge (D12-RM-K605) Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water (D12-RM-K606) Storm Drain Collector Basin (2-DST-RM-5361) General Atomics 101_107 cpm Reactor Bldg Ventilation Radiation Monitors Channel A (D12-RM-K609A) GE 0.01-100 mRem/hr Channel B (D12-RM-K609B) GE Gaseous Analyzer Radiation Monitors Reactor Building Roof Vent (CAC-AQH-1264) NMC _1-06 cpm Turbine Building Vent General (D12-RM-23) Atomics 1 0-71 05 ACi/cc (Xe equivalent) Drywell Primary Containment Atmosphere (CAC-AQH-1260, 1262) NMC lOERP I Rev. 62 l 5-20
TABLE 5.7-3 (Cont'd) AOG Charcoal Adsorber System Effluent General (AOG-R1 -103) Atomics 101_1 07 CPM Hardened Wetwell Vent General 10 4 -10 5 pCi/cc Atomics (Sorrento) OERP Rev. 62 5-21
TABLE 5.7-4 TYPICAL PORTABLE SURVEYEQUIPMENT Type Of Radiation Type Range Measured Teletector 0.1 mRemnhr-1000 Rem/hr Y Eberline RM-14 Radiation 0 - 50,000 cpm Py Monitor Ludlurn Model 177 0 - 500,000 cpm Py R07 1 mr/hr - 20,000 R/hr P~,y AMP-100 1 mr/hr- 1OOOR/hr y AMP-200 100 mr/hr - 18K R/hr Y R02 0 - 5000 mr/hr O3,y R02A 0 mr/hr- 50 R/hr R020 0 mr/hr- 50 R/hr P~,y
.Y BICRON Micro Rem 0 - 200,000 pr/hr y ASP-1 With Neutron Ball 0- 100 Rem/hr n Ludlum Model 12 With Neutron Ball 0- 10 Rem/hr n E530N 0 mrem/hr- 20 R/hr Y OERP Rev. 62 5-22
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 6.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Emergency preparedness at Brunswick will be maintained by (a) preparing the emergency organization members and the public for proper emergency response actions through training, drills and exercises, and public education programs (Section 6.1); (b) periodic review and update of the Brunswick Radiological Emergency Plan and its implementation procedures (Section 6.2); (c) periodic inventory and calibration of emergency equipment and instrumentation (Section 6.3); and (d) cognizance of the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee over safety-related issues (Section 6.4). The Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness is the Emergency Planning Coordinator and is responsible for maintaining Emergency Preparedness at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant, as outlined in Section 6.1.3. Each periodic requirement in this section and elsewhere in the plan and plant emergency procedures shall be performed within the specified time below:
- a. Annually - At least once per 366 days
- b. Monthly - At least once per 31 days
- c. Quarterly - At least once per 92 days
- d. Semiannually - At least once per 184 days For the above intervals, a maximum allowable extension is permitted subject to the following restrictions:
- The maximum allowable extension shall not exceed 25% of the specified interval.
- The combined time interval for any three consecutive intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified interval.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-1
This definition for periodic requirements applies to all intervals in the emergency plan and plant emergency procedures except for the evaluated exercise which is conducted once every two calendar years, and off-site training which is conducted once per calendar year. 6.1 ORGANIZATIONAL PREPAREDNESS Organizational preparedness is maintained through an integrated training program that includes general orientation of all persons at the site and detailed training of individuals and groups required to perform specific functions and actions during an emergency condition. The training program provides initial training and annual retraining of the emergency response organization. Significant changes in the content of this Plan and procedures which implement this Plan are distributed by memorandum to the appropriate plant groups. 6.1.1 Training The primary objectives of the training program are to:
- 1. Familiarize appropriate individuals with the Plan and the procedures that implement the Plan.
- 2. Instruct assigned individuals and their alternates in their duties and responsibilities.
- 3. When appropriate, train on significant changes in the scope or contents of the Plan or procedures which implement the Plan.
- 4. Provide annual refresher training and retesting to ensure that Emergency Plan personnel are familiar with their duties and responsibilities assigned by the Plan and procedures which implement the Plan.
Each individual, other than escorted personnel, is provided with initial orientation training on the notification and instruction methods used at the Brunswick plant in the event of an emergency. Each badged individual, other than escorted personnel, also receives initial orientation on the basic principles of radiological safety including the effects of radiation and the theory and use of radiation detection devices. Appropriate actions for escorted individuals shall be the responsibility of the escort. I OERP I Rev. 62 l-2
The Emergency Plan Training Program described in OPEP-04.3 assures training of those individuals who may be called to respond to an emergency at the Brunswick plant by providing initial training and annual refresher training and retesting on the scope and content of the Plan and procedures which implement the Plan. The Emergency Plan Training Program provides training for the following groups of personnel to perform the specific tasks assigned to them in the emergency organization. Site Emergency Coordinator TSC Staff Personnel Security Personnel Fire Brigade Personnel Dose Projection Personnel Radiological Emergency Teams Emergency Communicators EOF Personnel OSC Personnel JIC Personnel Plant Operators Off-site groups who may be requested to assist in an emergency. Training of off-site organizations is described in their radiological emergency plans. Training by Progress Energy for hospital, ambulance, rescue, police, and fire personnel will include the procedures for notification, basic radiation protection, and their expected roles. For those local services support organizations who may enter the site, training by Progress Energy will also include site access procedures and the identity (by position and title) of the individual in the Brunswick organization who will control the organization's support activities. Progress Energy will assist these off-site organizations in performing their radiological emergency response training as related to the Brunswick plant. Progress Energy, and the public information officials from the state and local governments will jointly make available an annual program to acquaint the news media with the company, state and county emergency plans and procedures. The program also includes information concerning radiation, nuclear plant operations and official points of contact for release of public information. Severe Accident Management training and drills will be conducted in accordance with Severe Accident Management Program and Training Procedures. I OERP I Rev. 62 1 6-3
6.1 .2 Drills and Exercises This section describes provisions for conducting periodic drills and exercises to test the adequacy of the Plan and implementing procedures, emergency equipment, and the preparation and training of emergency personnel. Each exercise scenario will include the following:
- 1. The basic objective(s) of the exercise.
- 2. The date(s), time period, place(s), and participating organizations.
- 3. The simulated events.
- 4. A time schedule of real and simulated initiating events.
- 5. A narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercises to include such things as simulated casualties, off-site fire or police department assistance, rescue of personnel, use of protective clothing, deployment of radiological monitoring teams, and public information activities.
- 6. Arrangements for qualified observers.
6.1.2.1 Drills Emergency drills are supervised instruction periods aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills, and to ensure that adequate emergency response capabilities are maintained during the interval between evaluated exercises. Periodic drills will be conducted, in addition to the evaluated exercise as follows:
- 1. Generat At least one drill shall be conducted during the interval between evaluated exercises involving a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the organization's onsite emergency response capabilities. The principal functional areas of emergency response include activities such as OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-4
management and coordination of emergency response, accident assessment, protective action decision making, and plant system repair and corrective actions. During these drills, activation of all of the emergency response facilities (Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)) is not necessary. Participants have the opportunity to consider accident management strategies, supervised instruction is permitted, and participants have the opportunity to resolve problems (success paths) rather than have controllers intervene. The drills focus on onsite training objectives.
- 2. Communications Drills: A system to test the readiness of the communications network between the plant and state and county governments within the ten-mile EPZ and the NRC will be conducted monthl.
Communications between the plant, federal emergency response organizations, and states within the 50-mile EPZ will be tested quarterly. Communications between the plant and state and local emergency operation centers and field assessment teams shall be conducted annually.
- 3. Fire Drills: Fire drills will be conducted in accordance with the Fire Protection Program.
- 4. Medical Emergency Drills: Medical emergency drills involving a simulated contaminated individual will be conducted annually. The actual off-site portions of these drills may be conducted once per calendar year.
- 5. Radiological Monitoring Drills: Radiological monitoring drills will be conducted annually. These drills will include collection of the appropriate sample media both on site and off site as the drill scenario requires.
OERP Rev. 62 6-5
- 6. h-Plant Radiation Protection Drills: Radiation protection drills, including response to and analysis of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements will be conducted semiannually. This may be held in conjunction with the Radiological Monitoring Drills.
- 7. Augmentation drills: Augmentation drills requiring travel to the site shall be conducted once every 24 months.
- 8. SAMG drills: Severe Accident Management Guideline table-top and/or inter-facility mini-drills will be conducted periodically and will involve a combination of some of the principal functional areas of the organization's onsite emergency response capabilities similar to that described in General drills (6.1.2.1.1) above.
The above drills will be evaluated by a drill observer (communication drills will not require an observer). The degree of participation by outside agencies in conducting these drills may vary and their action may actually be simulated. Any state or local government located within the plume exposure pathway EPZ will be allowed to participate in the drills when requested by such State or local government. 6.1.2.2 Exercises An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capability of major response organizations. An emergency exercise will be conducted once every two calendar years and will be based on a scenario which is ultimately declared at least as a Site Area Emergency. The scenario will be varied from exercise to exercise such that all elements of the plant, county, and state plans and emergency organizations are tested within a 6-year period. Each organization should make provisions to start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. Every sixth year, the exercise will be expanded to allow involvement of the federal response organizations in addition to the state and local organizations. Advance knowledge of the scenarios and the times of the exercises will be kept to a minimum to ensure a realistic participation by those involved. IOERP I Rev. 62 l 6-6
Each exercise scenario will include a list of performance objectives and a description of the expected responses. Specific tasks to be evaluated are:
- 1. Condition recognition and reporting
- 2. Assessment
- 3. Off-site notification, including Progress Energy off-site personne
- 4. Off-site response
- 5. Site response coordination, including logistics, center manning, information gathering and analysis, and coordination with off-site agencies
- 6. Corrective actions
- 7. Protective actions
- 8. Record keeping
- 9. Monitoring
- 10. Plant operation Qualified observers from Progress Energy, federal, state, or local governments will observe and critique each exercise. A critique will be scheduled at the conclusion of each exercise to evaluate the ability of all participating organizations to respond. The critique will be held as soon as possible after the exercise. A formal written evaluation of the exercise will be prepared by the Emergency Planning Coordinator, or his designee, following the critique.
Exercise controllers, observers, and participants (if appropriate) will prepare written descriptions of the actions they observed and will comment as to how the part of the exercise they observed matched the performance criteria. The Emergency Planning Coordinator or his designee will determine the corrective actions necessary and the schedules for performing them and will evaluate the corrective actions taken. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-7
Remedial exercises will be required if the emergency plan is not satisfactorily tested during the biennial exercise, such that NRC, in consultation with FEMA, cannot find reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises must be sufficient to show that appropriate corrective measures have been taken regarding the elements of the plan not properly tested in the previous exercises. 6.1.3 Emergency Planning Coordinator The Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness is the Brunswick Emergency Planning Coordinator. He is responsible for coordinating on-site and off-site radiological emergency response planning. Specific responsibilities include the following:
- 1. Interfacing with federal, state, county, and local planners.
- 2. Revising and updating the Plan in response to new federal regulations, modifications identified during exercises and drills, and changes in hardware and personnel.
- 3. Coordinating the evaluated exercise and the periodic drills.
- 4. Identifying off-site training needs of state and local emergency support personnel and arranging for training to meet the identified needs.
- 5. Identifying corrective actions needed following an exercise, assigning responsibility for implementing these actions, specifying a schedule for completion of these actions, and evaluating the adequacy of the actions taken. These corrective actions can be tracked by means of the Corrective Action Program.
- 6. Maintaining and negotiating agreements with state and county response agencies, federal assistance agencies, and medical and fire support agencies.
OERP Rev. 62 6-8
6.1 .4 Public Education The North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety has overall responsibility for maintaining a continuing disaster preparedness public education program. Such a program, prepared by the State of North Carolina, with the cooperation of local governments and Progress Energy, is intended to ensure that members of the public are: (1) Aware of the potential threat of a radiological emergency; (2) Able to recognize radiological emergency notification; and (3) Knowledgeable of the proper, immediate actions (e.g., return to home, close windows, and tune to an Emergency Alert System station) to be taken. A program of this type includes education on protective actions to be taken if shelter is prescribed, and the general procedures to follow if an evacuation is required. It also includes general educational information on radiation and how to learn more about emergency preparedness. Additional information concerning public education can be found in Section 4.4.7. 6.2 REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES The Plan and its implementation procedures are intended to provide for continuous emergency preparedness. Inaddition to the training, drills, and exercises, regular reviews and audits are performed. The reviews and audits are described in the following sections. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-9
6.2.1 Plan Updates The Emergency Planning Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the updating of the Plan and implementing procedures. He schedules an annual review of the Plan by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (see Section 6.4). Any proposed changes to the Plan due to regulatory revisions, experiences of drills and exercises, or other requirements are approved by the Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness. Approved changes to the Plan will be distributed to organizations and individuals with responsibility for implementation of the Plan. Phone listings in emergency procedures shall be updated quarterly, if required. 6.2.2 Independent Review In addition to the reviews conducted at the plant, the Nuclear Assessment Section will conduct an independent review of the Plan either. At intervals not to exceed 12 months or, As necessary, based on an assessment by the licensee against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the emergency preparedness program must be reviewed at least once every 24 months. The review will include an evaluation for adequacy of interfaces with State and local governments and of drills, exercises, capabilities, and procedures. The results of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, will be documented, reported to the Corporate office and plant management, and retained for a period of five years. The part of the review involving the evaluation for adequacy of interface with the State and local governments will be available to the appropriate State and local governments. Corrective actions deemed necessary from the review will be implemented similar to the description in Section 6.1.3.5 of this Plan and the site Corrective Action Program. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-10
6.2.3 Off-Site Agreements and Plans Emergency response plans and agreements with supporting organizations will be reviewed and certified to be current on an annual basis and updated, if necessary. Changes will be incorporated in the annual revision of the Plan. 6.3 MAINTENANCE AND INVENTORY OF EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES To ensure that equipment and supplies are maintained in a readiness state, periodic maintenance and inventories are performed as described in the following sections. 6.3.1 Emergency Equipment and Supplies A listing of emergency equipment and supplies to be inventoried is included in OPEP-04.6. This listing provides information on location and availability of emergency equipment and supplies. An inventory of emergency equipment and supplies is held in accordance with OPEP-04.6. During this inventory, radiation monitoring equipment is checked to verify that required calibration and location are in accordance with the inventory lists. Respiratory protection equipment, maintained for emergency purposes, is also inspected and inventoried. 6.3.2 Medical Equipment and Supplies At least twice each year and after use in an emergency, the contents of emergency medical equipment and supplies located in the First Aid Office is to be inventoried, inspected, replaced, replenished and/or resterilized as necessary. Company personnel inspect and inventory emergency medical supplies required to support a medical emergency at the plant. I OERP I Rev. 62 l 6-11
6.4 PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE The Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) is a standing committee comprised of Brunswick plant personnel that provides timely and continuing review of plant operations to assist the Plant General Manager in maintaining cognizance of plant activities, with particular emphasis on safety-related matters. The PNSC reviews all changes to the plant, or its documentation, that involve unreviewed safety questions. In addition, the PNSC reviews plant operations to detect any potential safety hazards. Each plant supervisor will monitor the activities within his areas of responsibility to detect unsafe practices, trends, or hazards. Also, the PNSC investigates and reports on Technical Specification violations or other situations involving safety. OERP Rev. 62 6-12
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN 7.0 RECOVERY 7.1 GENERAL Once the Site Emergency Coordinator has declared that the emergency condition has passed, steps will be taken to recover from the incident. The Emergency Response Manager will advise appropriate organizations that recovery activities are initiated and that the Recovery Organization as shown in Figure 7.2.1 will be assembled in the EOF. All recovery actions will be preplanned in order to minimize radiation exposure or other hazards to recovery personnel. Recovery activities are classified as described in Section 7.3. The overall goals of the recovery effort are to assess the radiological consequences of the emergency and perform cleanup and repair operations necessary to restore normal access to the affected areas or identify and restrict access to those areas that must be controlled. This effort includes marshaling of the Corporate resources and interfacing with outside agencies. 7.2 RECOVERY ORGANIZATION The recovery organization consists of the Recovery Manager, managers of support functions who are responsible to the Recovery Manager, and supporting personnel. This organization may be modified during the recovery process to better respond to the conditions at the plant Recovery activities will be directed from the Recovery Center. The Recovery Center at Brunswick will be established in the existing TSC/EOFlTraining Building. Provisions have been made for expansion into the BNP Technical and Administration Center (TAC Building), if required to support an extensive recovery effort. OERP Rev. 62 7-1
Activation of the recovery organization will be initiated by the Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Plant (or his alternate) after consultation with the Plant General Manager (or his alternate). The recovery organization will then be established at Brunswick to provide for recovery of the facility. The recovery organization may begin to develop plans for recovery of the facility while the emergency is still in progress. However, these efforts will not be permitted to interfere with or detract from the efforts to control the emergency situation. During the emergency phases of the incident, the recovery organization resources will be available to assist and provide support for the Site Emergency Coordinator. A block diagram of the typical recovery organization is presented in Figure 7.2-1. Table 7.2-1 indicates the personnel designated to assume responsibility of each of the activities shown in the block diagram. 7.2.1 Recovery Manager The Recovery Manager is the senior position responsible for all on-site activities during the recovery phase following a radiological emergency. He is also responsible for providing the primary interface with State, local and Federal agencies including the coordination of Progress Energy resources during off-site recovery efforts. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. 7.2.2 Plant General Manager The Plant General Manager is responsible to the Recovery Manager for implementation of in-plant activities during the Recovery phase with the objective of maintaining a safe shutdown condition and controlling sources of radioactivity inthe plant. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. 7.2.3 Technical Analysis Manager The Technical Analysis Manager, is responsible to the Recovery Manager for technical support, specifically in the analysis and development of plans and procedures to support recovery activities and to maintain the affected unit in a safe shutdown condition in a manner which minimizes the effect on the health and safety of the public. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. OERP Rev. 62 7-2
7.2.4 Engineering Manager The Engineering Manager, is responsible to the Recovery Manager for directing and administratively controlling the Progress Energy recovery organization engineering staff while providing engineering, including civil, and design support to meet requirements of the recovery activities. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. 7.2.5 Administrative and Logistics Manager The Administrative and Logistics Manager, is responsible to the Recovery Manager for providing administrative, logistic, communications, and personnel support for recovery activities. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. 7.2.6 Radiological Control Manager The Radiological Control Manager, is responsible to the Recovery Manager for providing radiation protection and waste disposal plans to support recovery activities. The specific responsibilities of this position are contained in OPEP-02.7, Recovery. 7.3 RECOVERY PLANNING For convenience in planning, the recovery activities can be classified as follows:
- 1. On-site recovery
- 2. Off-site recovery 7.4 ON-SITE RECOVERY ACTIVITIES On-site recovery activities are performed in accordance with existing plant procedures. Radiation and contamination levels for determining the need for decontamination and for returning areas or items to normal use are included in these procedures. Additional procedures will be developed as appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 7-3
7.5 OFF-SITE RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 7.5.1 General The Progress Energy Recovery Manager will coordinate with and assist off-site agencies in the recovery activities. The State will be the lead organization for off-site recovery activities and put emergency regulations into effect to ensure that no food items in the contaminated area are consumed or put on the market without the required health physics monitoring, and to control access into contaminated areas. Authorization for reentry to off-site areas will be made by the senior elected official of the area concerned after consultation with the North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection. 7.5.2 Emergency Cleanup Operations The most urgent tasks will be to clear (i.e., partially decontaminate) emergency paths to allow access to critical facilities and inhabited areas. These clearing operations will be necessary particularly to:
- a. Allow health physics teams to survey the contaminated areas,
- b. Allow farmers to provide emergency care for livestock that had to be left in contaminated areas or to assist them in moving the stock to uncontaminated areas.
- c. Allow emergency operations of utilities and services (power, water, telephone, sewage treatment, etc.) during the cleanup operation, and
- d. Allow decontamination teams to perform the emergency and priority decontamination tasks (these emergency tasks will consist primarily of fire-hosing pavements, plowing or scraping unpaved areas adjacent to roads, and spraying paint or asphalt to fix loose contamination in place).
I OERP I Rev. 62 7-4
- e. Stabilize the contaminated areas so that the radioactive materials are not spread to other areas or leached into streams. In particular, if public roads run through the area, cleanup of the road will be required, and cleanup of the area to some distance from the road will be needed to minimize exposure to travelers.
After the main roads and utilities have been put back into service, the urgency of the cleanup tasks will drop. However, the population that was evacuated will be eager to return, and industrial operations that had to be shut down need to start up as soon as possible, and business operations need to be resumed. Some farmland may have to be removed from use, which would cause hardship primarily to the occupants. Thus, it may be feasible to permanently evacuate such areas and pay the owner the market value. Such a step would probably occur at contamination levels where future crops would not be marketable due to the uptake of long-lived isotopes (primarily strontium). Some of the buildings and houses may be contaminated to such a high level that it is more economical to demolish them than to decontaminate them. Areas where this occurs can be kept vacated; in such cases, demolition and burial can be a routine task, and the work can be scheduled over a longer period of time. Decontamination of the agricultural land may or may not be feasible. Where it is feasible, the changes in agricultural operations that are required can be made on a routine basis. 7.5.3 Countermeasures Countermeasures will have serious impact on the economy of contaminated areas, so they must be applied judiciously. They must be no more restrictive than necessary; however, once determined, they will be applied quickly and equitably, and may consist of:
- a. Reducing contamination on the surface of any fruits and vegetables that were in the field at the time of the accident by ensuring that the surfaces are washed, that the outer leaves of leafy vegetables are removed, and that more than normal preference is given to peeling.
J. A. Auxier and R. 0. Chester, eds., Report of the Clinch Valley Study, ORNL-4835 (January 1973). OERP Rev. 62 7-5
- b. Altering production, processing, or distribution practices that affect the movement of radioactive contamination through food chain and into the human body. This will include storage of some food (primarily milk products) and animal feed supplies to allow radioactive decay-particularly of Iodine 131.
- c. Diverting affected products to uses other than human consumption.
- d. Condemning food.
- e. Decontaminating farmland where practical.
- f. Converting farmland to other uses for extended periods of time when decontamination is not practical.
- g. Decontaminating industrial buildings, stores and shops, and residences and removing milk-producing cattle from the contaminated pastures should be priority items. The longer these activities are delayed, the greater will be the costs and consequently the claims.
7.5.4 Monitoring and Dose Assessment The North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection (DRP), Department of Environment Health and Natural Resources, will be the lead agency in the collection and analysis of radiation monitoring reports and of environmental air, foliage, food, and water samples. The DRP will be assisted by qualified personnel from the BNP, and the General Electric Company Wilmington Manufacturing Division. Total population exposure will be periodically determined through a variety of procedures including:
- a. Examination of prepositioned TLDs.
- b. Bioassy.
- c. Estimates based on release rates and meteorology.
- d. Estimates based on environmental monitoring of food, water, and ambient dose rates.
I OERP Rev. 62 7-6
TABLE 7.2-1 DESIGNATION OF KEY RECOVERY ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL Recovery Manager:
- 1. Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Plant
- 2. Director - Site Operations Plant General Manager:
- 1. Brunswick Plant General Manager Technical Analysis Manager.
- 1. Manager - Regulatory Affairs Engineering Manager:
- 1. Manager - Brunswick Engineering Support Manager - Administrative and Logistics:
- 1. Manager - Site Support Services Radiological Control Manager:
- 1. Manager- E&RC l OERP I Rev. 62 l 7-7
REGULATORY AGENCIES I
*,--I CORPORATE SPOKESMAN I
Il I 4 II STATE PROGRESS II ENERGY II II II JOINT II INFORMATION I---------- CENTER ADINISTRATIVE RADIO WOICAL ANDLOGISTICS CONTROL: MANAGER MANAGER_ FIGURE 7.2.1 Progress Energy Recovery Organization I OERP I Rev. 62 l 7-8
BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN
8.0 REFERENCES
- 1. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Operating Manual, Carolina Power & Light Company, (date varies by volume and by entry).
- 2. NGGM-PM-0002, Progress Energy Radiation Control and Protection Manual.
- 3. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Progress Energy, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2.
- 4. Environmental and Fallout Gamma Radiation Protection Factors Provided By Vehicles, Health Physics, 26, Pg. 41-44, 1974.
- 5. EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, May 1992.
- 6. Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Time Estimates Update For The Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone, November 2002.
PBS&J.
- 7. North Carolina Emergency Response Plan in support of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.
- 8. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 9. 1990 Census data as reported by the State of North Carolina, Office of State Planning, Center for Geographic Information and Analysis.
- 10. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.
- 11. NUREG/CR-1433, Examination of the Use of Potassium Iodide (KI) as an Emergency Protective Measure for Nuclear Reactor Accidents, March 1990.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 8-1
- 12. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations.
- a. Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation
- b. Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities
- c. Part 50, Appendix E, Emergency Plans for Production and Utilization Facilities
- d. Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria
- 13. NEI 91-04, Rev. 1,Severe Accident Issue Closure Guidelines
- 14. Memo, Warren Dorman to PNSC, dated August 11, 1999 Subject Operations Shift Staffing
- 15. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments No. 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post Accident Sampling System (Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324), February 11,2003.
- 16. SOER 02-1, Severe Weather Rec. 3 (12/03/02)
I OERP I Rev. 62 l 8-2
APPENDIX A BRUNSWICK COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM A.0 INTRODUCTION Communications systems are designed to facilitate emergency communications within the Brunswick Plant and between Brunswick and emergency facilities. Redundant means of communication are provided to locations which provide a vital emergency response role. A.1 PLANT COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS A.1.1 Public Address System The Brunswick Plant public address system provides paging and party line communications between stations located throughout the plant. Inside and outside type wall and desk-mounted stations are used to communicate between roaming personnel and fixed work locations. Plant-wide instructions are issued using the paging feature. This system is powered from the plant uninterruptible power supply which employs battery reserve as well as diesel generator emergency supply. A. 1.2 PBX Telephone System The Brunswick Site PBX telephone system provides communication capability between telephone stations located within the plant by dialing the four-digit telephone station code. The PBX telephone system also provides for outside communications as discussed in Sections A.2.1 and A.2.2. A.1.3 Sound Powered Telephone System The sound powered telephone system is a communications system which uses the mechanical energy in the human voice to generate electrical pulses to power the system. It requires no outside source of power and is therefore very reliable. The system consists of phone jacks, wiring, and the sound-powered handsets. There is no separation in the circuits. A handset plugged into a jack is connected to all other handsets plugged into that circuit. Additional temporary circuits may be easily set up by attaching phone jacks to any unused cable between any points requiring sound-powered communications. Sound powered phone jacks are provided on selected instrument racks. Switch panels are provided in the control room to cross-tie any circuit with any other circuit providing sound-powered phone communications between several plant areas. OERP I Rev. 62 l A-1
A.1.4 Radio Transceivers for Brunswick and Vicinity VHF transceivers are used for point-to-point communications in the plant vicinity using state frequencies. Control stations are located in the TSC and EOF to talk with mobile and portable units. A primary and secondary source of power is provided for fixed base radio, with portable and mobile units powered by battery. A.1.5 Brunswick Emergency Telephone and Radio System The Brunswick Site emergency telephone system consists of dedicated telephone lines between emergency facilities at the Brunswick Plant through a switch which is provided with a primary and secondary source of power (ROLM 4000 series). Radio communications with mobile and portable units reserved for an emergency is possible through a repeater on a Progress Energy-assigned frequency as well as a local (UHF) short-distance frequency. A primary and secondary source of power is provided for fixed radio equipment, with mobiles and portables powered by battery. A.1.6 Plant Security Communications A portable radio communication system for plant use is available. Specific channel assignments are designated for security force use. A. 1.7 Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) During an emergency, this system provides information on a Video Display Terminal simultaneously in the control room, the Technical Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. The data may also be printed out in hard- copy form. Primary and secondary power sources are supplied to this system. A. 1.8 Satellite Telephone Communications This system consists of a briefcase enclosed portable, AC, DC, or battery powered satellite link telephone. This telephone has the capability to be connected with a fixed remote antenna or use the briefcase portable antenna with access to either of two geosynchronous communication satellites. A.2 OFF-SITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS A.2.1 Corporate Telephone Communications System (Voicenet) Interconnected through the site PBX and the emergency telephone system, the corporate telephone system provides a means to communicate with other corporate locations with which the plant has a need to communicate. Corporate transmission facilities provide fiber optic, copper-wire, and microwave radio to ensure a high degree of system reliability. In addition to the redundancy provided by the three system options, backup power is provided for the systems. OERP I Rev. 62 l A-2
A.2.2 Commercial Phone Lines Commercial telephone lines, which supply public telephone communications, are employed by Progress Energy in three ways: (1)tie-ins through the PBX to any other plant location, (2) lines to plant emergency facilities, and (3) lines to the Joint Information Center for public information purposes. Bell South provides primary and secondary power for their lines at the Central Office. A.2.3 Dedicated Telephone System to Load Dispatcher This system provides direct links between the Control Room and the load dispatcher. Transmission facilities are microwave radio. These lines appear on several phones in the Control Room and are selected by pushing the appropriate button on a multibutton phone. The lines are automatically rung at the load dispatcher identifying Brunswick as the caller. Primary and secondary power is supplied at both ends. A.2.4 Emergency Communications Network The Emergency Communications Network is a system, separate from other communications systems, which provides back-up dedicated telephone and radio facilities between emergency response centers. The purpose of these facilities is to ensure priority communications at any time from Brunswick Plant to emergency response personnel at the federal, state, local governments, and other Progress Energy facilities, and General Electric Company. A.2.5 Plant Security A plant security radio control station provides for radio communications to local law enforcement agencies (LLEA). Primary and secondary power is supplied. A.2.6 Corporate Informational Data Communications Large central computers are located at the Corporate headquarters. Smaller special purpose computers are located at other Corporate facilities, including the Brunswick Plant. The communications link between the Brunswick Plant and Corporate headquarters allows the interchange, storage, and processing of information. A.2.7 NRC Emergency Telecommunications System The NRC uses a Progress Energy dedicated telephone line which allows direct telephone communications from the plant to NRC regional and national offices. The Progress Energy communications line provides a link independent of the local public telephone network. Telephones connected to this network are located in the Brunswick Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. There are also telephones connected to this system for use by Health Physics personnel. Primary and secondary sources of power are supplied. OERP Rev. 62 A-3
Appendix B AGREEMENTS NOTE: Existing agreements are included for this submittal. These agreements will be revised as required to be consistent with this revision of the Plan. OERP Rev. 62 B-1
City of Southport 201 East Moore Street Southport, North Carolina 28461 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the City of Southport and Southport Fire Department's (hereafter identified as Fire Department) understanding and agreement to provide assistance in the event of an accident or emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we agree to be familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that:
- 1. This agreement shall take effect on July 1, 1987. Either party may terminate this agreement at any time upon six months written notice to the other party.
- 2. The Fire Department shall be available to fight fires at the Brunswick Plant upon request by Progress Energy, including fires where radioactivity may be present. However, in any situation where radioactivity may be present, the BNP Shift Incident Commander shall first consult with the Chief Officer of the Southport Fire Department concerning the situation before sending any of the Fire Department into an area where radioactivity may be present. After consultation the Chief Officer of the Fire Department will comply with the Brunswick Shift Incident Commander's request and shall issue the command to his personnel with respect to his department's safety.
- 3. In the event that the Fire Department is unavailable to respond to Progress Energy's request due to other calls or fire fighting activities, it will incur no liability to Progress Energy for failure to respond to said call.
- 4. The Fire Department will be under the direction of the BNP Shift Incident Commander who shall issue commands to the personnel of the Fire Department through its Chief Officer. Should it be necessary for more than one fire company to assist in the fighting of a fire at BNP, the Fire Department will assume responsibility as the lead fire company.
- 5. In the event of possible radioactive contamination of the Fire Department personnel and/or equipment, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Fire Department personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices prior to engaging said personnel in a radioactive situation to ensure that the radiation level is not unreasonably dangerous.
- 6. In the event of a chemical fire at BNP, proper clothing will be provided by Progress Energy to Fire Department personnel prior to engagement in fire fighting.
OERP Rev. 62 l B-2
- 7. Progress Energy shall provide the Fire Department personnel with all necessary instructions and training to enable the Fire Department personnel to engage in fire fighting at BNP. Fire Department personnel agree to participate in said training and in all training exercises and drills. In addition, Progress Energy shall not request Fire Department personnel to engage in fighting of a chemical fire or in a fire where radioactivity may be present prior to any additional instruction or training of Fire Department personnel necessary to qualify them to engage in such activities. Both Progress Energy and the Fire Department personnel shall cooperate with each other in arranging for the instruction and training of the Fire Department personnel necessary to qualify them to engage in such activities. Both Progress Energy and the Fire Department personnel shall cooperate with each other in arranging for instruction and training exercises.
- 8. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Fire Department or its personnel, including fire trucks, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy at its own expense as expeditiously as possible.
- 9. Progress Energy shall be liable to the Fire Department personnel for any radiation injury sustained by said personnel at BNP and shall provide nuclear insurance to cover the Fire Department personnel while engaged in fire fighting at BNP.
- 10. Progress Energy shall retain the right to periodically inspect, calibrate, and ensure operability of any equipment that may be furnished the Fire Department in order to enhance the performance of the support functions.
- 11. The Fire Department shall furnish and make available to the Fire Department personnel a procedure manual for assisting the BNP Fire Brigade.
- 12. As compensation for services provided herein by the Fire Department, Progress Energy shall pay to the City of Southport the sum of $12,000 per year payable on or before December 31, 1987, and each year thereafter.
Sincerely, (Signature on File) (Signature on File) Norman Holden Gregg Cumbee City of Southport City of Southport Mayor Fire Chief TG / TG SPFD LOA OERP Rev. 62 B-3
James R. Forstner, M.D. 4654 Long Beach Road Southport, North Carolina 28461 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges that 1, James R. Forstner, M.D., understand and agree to provide medical supervision and care for employees of the Brunswick Nuclear Plant as requested by responsible plant management personnel. I am familiar with. the Brunswick Emergency Plan and appropriate implementing procedures and understand that injuries might involve ionizing radiation. I will provide said medical supervision and treatment within the limitations of my training. Sincerely, (Signature on File! James R. Forstner, M.D. TG/TG JR Forstner MD LOA OERP Rev. 62 B4
Peter D Almirall, M.D. 307 Yaupon Drive Yaupon Beach, North Carolina 28465 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges that 1, Peter D. Almirall, M.D., understand and agree to provide medical supervision and care for employees of the Brunswick Nuclear Plant as requested by responsible plant management personnel. I am familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and appropriate implementing procedures and understand that injuries might involve ionizing radiation. I will provide said medical supervision and treatment within the limitations of my training. Sincerely, (Sipnature on File) Peter D. Almirall, M.D. TG / TG PD Almirall MD LOA OERP I Rev. 62 B-5
J.Arthur Dosher Memorial Hospital 924 Howe Street Southport, North Carolina 28461 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Project PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the J. Arthur Dosher Memorial Hospital's understanding of, and agreement with, actions to be taken in the event of an accident or emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Project (BNP). Specifically, we are familiar with the BNP Emergency Plan and understand that:
- 1. A specially designed radiological emergency area will be maintained in state of readiness for use in the event that an accident or injury complicated by possible radiation exposure occurs to your employees. The Dosher Memorial Hospital will admit a patient from the specially designated area for further care if recommended by the supervising physician.
- 2. In the event of a serious radiation accident, the Hospital will assist in the transfer of patients to the New Hanover Regional Medical Center in Wilmington for further treatment.
- 3. A Progress Energy representative will be responsible for decontamination of the equipment that is used in treating/decontaminating the person(s) and will replace all hospital equipment that cannot be decontaminated.
- 4. Adequate instruction of the Medical staff to maintain familiarity with the procedure will be provided by Progress Energy.
- 5. Disposable articles, such as hats, mask, gowns, and floor coverings, will be provided by and disposed ofby Progress Energy.
Copies ofthe Hospital's Plan and Procedures for the care and treatment of radiologically injured or contaminated patients are kept readily available for use by Hospital employees who will direct the necessary actions. Sincerely, (Signature on File) Edgar Haywood Administrator J. Arthur Dosher Memorial Hospital TGITG JADMH LOA OERP I Rev. 62 l B-6
City of Southport Rescue Squad Southport, North Carolina 28461 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Southport Rescue Squad understands and agrees to provide medical assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we are familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that: I. We may be required to transport a patient who is radioactively contaminated.
- 2. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Southport Rescue Squad personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices.
- 3. Adequate instructions will be provided by Progress Energy to the Southport Rescue Squad staff to maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures.
- 4. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Southport Rescue Squad, including the ambulance, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Copies of the Southport Rescue Squad's procedures for assisting Progress Energy personnel are kept readily available for use by the Southport Rescue Squad personnel. Sincerely, (Signature on File) (Signature on File) Douglas A. Ledgett Rob Gandy Chief City Manager Southport Rescue Squad City of Southport TG / TG SRS LOA I OERP I Rev. 62 l B-7
Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department 518 Yaupon Drive Oak Island, North Carolina 28461-0429 February 6, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 2846-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department's understanding and agreement to provide assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we agree to be familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that: I. Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire department will be available to fight fires where radioactivity may be present.
- 2. Should it be necessary for more than one fire department to assist in the fighting of a fire at Brunswick, the Southport Fire department will assume responsibility as lead fire company under the direction of the Brunswick Site Incident Commander.
- 3. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire department personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices
- 4. Adequate instruction of the Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department staff to maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures will be provided by Progress Energy.
- 5. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department. including the fire truck, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely, (Signature on File) James C. Criscoe Fire Chief Yaupon Beach Volunteer Fire Department TG/TG YBVFD LOA OERP I Rev. 62 B-8
Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department Boiling Springs Lakes Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department's understanding and agreement to provide assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we agree to be familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that: I. Members of the Boiling Springs Lakes Volunteer Fire Department may be requested to fight fires where radioactivity may be present.
- 2. Should it be necessary for more than one fire department to assist in the fighting of a fire at Brunswick, the Southport Fire department will assume responsibility as lead fire company under the direction of the Brunswick Site Incident Commander.
- 3. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices.
- 4. Adequate instruction of the Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department staffto maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures will be provided by Progress Energy.
- 5. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department, including fire apparatus, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely, (Signature on File) Gary Bullard Fire Chief Boiling Springs Lakes Fire Department TG / TG BS[FD LOA OERP Rev. 62 l B-9
January 14,2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461
Dear Mr. Atkinson:
This letter is to renew the agreement between Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) and the New Hanover Regional Medical Center and New Hanover Regional Emergency Medical Services. We agree that:
- 1. J. Arthur Dosher Memorial Hospital is the primary hospital to assist BNP in the event of an accident or medical emergency causing injury/illness to your employees. This letter acknowledges that New Hanover Regional Medical Center (NHRMC) and Cape Fear Hospital (CFH) are available to treat your employees who may become injured and/or contaminated with radioactive and/or other hazardous materials and are transported to the hospital(s). It is requested the New Hanover Regional Medical Center, main campus on 17IhStreet, be utilized as the primary hospital treatment site. A specifically designated radiological decontamination area will be maintained in a state of readiness. NHRMC will hospitalize persons for further care if recommended by the physician in attendance.
- 2. A Progress Energy trained representative will be responsible for the decontamination of equipment that is used in treating/decontaminating the person(s) and will expeditiously replace all hospital equipment that cannot be decontaminated.
Copies of your emergency response plan are maintained in the Safety Office at New Hanover Regional Medical Center. As previously agreed, please send all updates to these plans to the Safety Office. If you have questions or need further assistance, please contact Barbara Bissett, the Director of Emergency Response, Safety Management, and Special Police Services at 343-7084. Sincerely, (Signature on File! Kathleen Gormley Executive Vice PresidentlCFO cc: Ed Woodard, Vice President/Chief Emergency Medical Services Barbara Bissett, Director of Emergency Response, Safety Mgmt & Special Police Services Ann Marie Tyrell, Director of Emergency Services Fiscal Services - Contract File New Hanover Regional Medical Center P.O. Box 9000 / 2131 S. 17" Street / Wilmington, NC 28402-9000 910-343-7000 / Fax 910-343-7220 OERP I Rev. 62 l B-10
Oak Island Fire/EMS 4601 East Oak Island Drive Oak Island, North Carolina 28465 February 6, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Oak Island Fire/EMS's understanding and agreement to provide assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we agree to be familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that:
- 1. Oak Island Fire/EMS will be available to fight fires where radioactivity may be present.
- 2. Should it be necessary for more than one fire department to assist in the fighting of a fire at Brunswick, the Southport Fire Department will assume responsibility as lead fire company under the direction of the Brunswick Site Incident Commander.
- 3. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Oak Island Fire/EMS personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices.
- 4. Adequate instruction of the Oak Island Fire/EMS staff to maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures will be provided by Progress Energy.
- 5. Any contaminated articles belonging to Oak Island Fire/EMS, including the fire truck, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely, (Signature on File) Al Essey Chief Oak Island Fire/EMS TG / TG OIFEMS LOA OERP Rev. 62 B-1I1
Brunswick County EMS P. O. Box 249 Boliva, North Carolina 28422 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Brunswick County Emergency Medical Service understands and agrees to provide medical assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we are familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that: I. We may be required to transport a patient who is radioactively contaminated.
- 2. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Brunswick County EMS personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices.
- 3. Adequate instructions will be provided by Progress Energy to the Brunswick County EMS staff to maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures.
- 4. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Brunswick County EMS, including the ambulance, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Copies of the Brunswick County EMS procedures for assisting Progress Energy personnel are kept readily available for use by the Brunswick County EMS personnel. Sincerely, (Signature on File) B.A.Watts EMS Division Head Director Brunswick County Emergency Services TG/TG BCEMS LOA OERP I Rev. 62 l B-1 2
Sunny Point Fire Department Military Ocean Terminal - Sunny Point Southport, North Carolina 28461 February 4, 2003 Mr. Gene Atkinson Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Brunswick Nuclear Plant PO Box 10429 Southport, North Carolina 28461-0429
Dear Mr. Atkinson,
This letter acknowledges the Sunny Point Fire Department/EMS's understanding and agreement to provide assistance in the event of an emergency at the Brunswick Nuclear Plant. Specifically, we agree to be familiar with the Brunswick Emergency Plan and understand that:
- 1. Sunny Point Fire Department will be available to fight fires where radioactivity may be present as requested by the Southport Fire Department for assistance.
- 2. Should it be necessary for more than one fire department to assist in the fighting of a fire at Brunswick, the Southport Fire Department will assume responsibility as lead fire company under the direction of the Brunswick Site Incident Commander.
- 3. We may be required to transport a patient who is radioactively contaminated.
- 4. In the event of possible radioactive contamination, qualified Progress Energy personnel will provide Sunny Point Fire Department/EMS personnel with appropriate monitoring or protective devices.
- 5. Adequate instruction of the Sunny Point Fire Department/EMS staff to maintain familiarity with the necessary procedures will be provided by Progress Energy.
- 6. Any contaminated articles belonging to the Sunny Point Fire Department/EMS, including the fire truck and ambulance, will be adequately decontaminated or replaced by Progress Energy as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely, (Signature on File) Scott Brown Chief Sunny Point Fire Department TG/TG SPEMS LOA OERP Rev. 62 B-13
APPENDIX C BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT (BNP) OFF-SITE AGENCY SUPPORT
SUMMARY
Function (NUREG-0654. II.A) Primary Responsibility Support Responsibility
- 1. Command and Control
- a. Onsite BNP NRC
- b. Offsite State, County FEMA Progress Energy Corp
- 2. Accident Classification
- a. Onsite BNP NRC
- b. Offsite N/A N/A
- 3. Warning
- a. Onsite BNP Local
- b. Offsite County State, USCG
- 4. Notification
- a. Onsite BNP Local
- b. Offsite BNP State, Local, Media
- 5. Communications
- a. Onsite BNP NRC Progress Energy Corp.
- b. Offsite State, County Commercial Phone Co.,
Progress Energy
- 6. Transportation
- a. Onsite BNP/Employees Local
- b. Offsite Local/Residents FEMA, State, County
- 7. Traffic Control Securit
- a. Onsite BNP Security County
- b. Offsite County State
- 8. Accident Assessment
- a. Onsite BNP HEEC, HNP, RNP,
- b. Offsite State NRC, GE, County, Progress Energy Corp.,
FEMA, EPA, DOE, CAP l OERP I Rev. 62 l C-1
APPENDIX C BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT (BNP) OFF-SITE AGENCY SUPPORT
SUMMARY
Function (NUREG-0654. ll.A) Primary Responsibilitv Support Responsibility
- 9. Public Information Education
- a. Onsite BNP, Corp, Comm. NRC, County,
- b. Offsite State Progress Energy Corp.,
Media, FEMA
- 10. Protective Response
- a. Onsite BNP County Progress Energy Corp.
- b. Offsite County, State Progress Energy Corp.,
FEMA, EPA, USDA
- 11. Radiological Exposure Control
- a. Onsite BNP Progress Energy Corp.
- b. Offsite State County, FEMA, EPA, Progress Energy Corp.
- 12. Fire and Rescue
- a. Onsite BNP County/Local Organ.
- b. Offsite County State
- 13. Medical
- a. Onsite BNP County/Local Organ.
- b. Offsite Local State, U.S. DHHS
- 14. Public Health & Sanitation
- a. Onsite BNP State, Local, Progress Energy Corp.
- b. Offsite County State, FEMA, U.S. DHHS
- 15. Social Services
- a. Onsite N/A N/A
- b. Offsite State County, Red Cross, Salvation Army
- 16. Training
- a. Onsite BNP NRC,
- b. Offsite County State, Progress Energy Corp., BNP OERP Rev. 62 C-2
APPENDIX C BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT (BNP) OFF-SITE AGENCY SUPPORT
SUMMARY
- 17. Exercises
- a. Onsite BNP Progress Energy Corp.,
NRC
- b. Offsite State State, County, Progress Energy Corp., BNP
- 18. Recovery/Reentry
- a. Onsite BNP BNP, RNP, HNP, Progress Energy Corp.,
NRC, GE, FEMA,
- b. Offsite State Local, Progress Energy, DOE, EPA, U.S. DHHS, USDA Note:
BSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant CAP Civil Air Patrol DOE U.S. Department of Energy EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency GE General Electric RNP Robinson Nuclear Plant HEEC Harris Energy & Environmental Center NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission USCG United States Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture US DHHS U.S. Department of Health & Human Services HNP Harris Nuclear Plant I OERP I Rev. 62 l C-3
APPENDIX D This Appendix has been superseded by the BNP Emergency Procedures. IOERP I Rev. 62 l D-1
APPENDIX E MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ASSISTANCE E.1. INTRODUCTION The Medical Treatment and Assistance Plan provides for several levels of treatment based on the severity of injury and degree of radioactive contamination involved, if any. The first level of assistance will be given on site in the plant First Aid Office, if possible. Inthis facility, initial evaluation of the severity of the injury will be made by first-aid and medical personnel, and emergency treatment started. In many cases, it may be possible to provide complete treatment at this location. Concurrently the degree of radiation exposure and/or contamination will be assessed by radiation safety personnel and decontamination begun. All injuries occurring in a contaminated area will be considered as contaminated until monitored and cleared. If the severity of the injury requires more extensive or prolonged treatment, the patient can be transported to the second level of assistance located at the Dosher Memorial Hospital where special facilities for treatment of contaminated patients have been provided (see Section E.2.2). Transfer from any level of assistance to the next higher level will be effected only after medical evaluation (unless the urgency of the patient's condition requires immediate action) and will be under the control of the attending physician or his alternate senior physician. E.2. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES E.2.1 ON-SITE FIRST AID FACILITIES It is anticipated that contaminated personnel will not leave the facility for medical treatment except for cases thought to require immediate hospitalization. Emergency medical treatment of contaminated personnel will be handled at the Plant First Aid Office located in the O&M Building (if possible) by site medical personnel. This includes all injuries thought not to require immediate hospitalization. OERP Rev. 62 l E-1 I
E.2.2 HOSPITALIZATION If emergency medical treatment can best be given at Dosher Memorial Hospital in Southport (or another facility as may be advised by a competent medical authority), the injured person may be transported to Dosher Memorial Hospital. Dosher Memorial Hospital is the primary hospital for treating medical emergencies occurring at the Brunswick Plant, with New Hanover Regional Medical Center being the backup. OPEP-03.9.3, Transport of Contaminated Injured Personnel, will be followed to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination to off-site areas and facilities. If possible, contaminated clothing and equipment should be removed from the patient, or he should be wrapped in clean sheets or clothing to prevent contamination of the transporting personnel and vehicle. Medical assistance is immediately available at the Southport area from two general practitioners, both of whom are on the staff of Dosher Memorial Hospital, and who have agreed to provide medical assistance for contaminated patients. Also, the U.S. Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Team will provide medical assistance, if required. E.2.3 TREATMENT FACILITY A specially designated emergency area is maintained in readiness at Dosher Memorial Hospital for Progress Energy's use for the treatment of contaminated patients. Although this area will be utilized by the hospital when not required by Progress Energy, it will be made immediately available to Progress Energy when required. Equipment is available in the hospital for the emergency treatment of patients. With the facilities and equipment available, extensive decontamination and treatment of an injured patient could be performed, including surgical treatment that may be required. E.2.4 ON-SITE MEDICAL SERVICES Agreement has been reached with doctors in Southport who will provide medical services at the plant site when required. Personnel who are contaminated and who require medical treatment may be treated by a doctor in the Plant's First Aid Office. I OERP _ Rev. 62 l E-2
E.2.5 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT An emergency kit is maintained at Dosher Memorial Hospital containing supplies and equipment for personnel monitoring and the control of radioactive contamination. This kit contains the following:
- a. Radiation monitoring instruments, one low-level instrument for determining contamination levels, and one intermediate-range instrument for determining dose rates.
- b. Personnel monitoring equipment such as TLDs and self-reading dosimeters.
- c. Decontamination equipment and supplies for both personnel and facility.
- d. Contamination control equipment and supplies such as protective clothing, signs, ropes, tags, plastic bags, etc.
E.2.6 AMBULANCE SERVICE The City of Southport Rescue Squad has agreed to respond to all emergency calls from the plant, just as they respond to other calls from the Southport area. l OERP Rev. 62 l E-3
APPENDIX F TECHNICAL BASIS FOR SOURCE TERM MIXES
Background
Since 1962, source term mixes for nuclear power plants have been derived from IID-14844 (Reference 1), as referenced in Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4 (Reference 2). This report established what was believed to be a bounding case for release of radionuclides in a severe core damage accident. The release consisted of 100% of the core inventory of noble gases, 50% of the core inventory of iodines, and 1% of the core inventory of particulates. Since that time the use of probabilistic risk assessments in examining accident consequences has been developed and documented in the NRC Report NUREG-1465, Accident Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 3). Inthis document, new source terms were proposed that utilized the risk assessments of five typical PWRs and five BWRs to develop a mean in-containment isotopic release fraction for various core damage events. In any risk assessment study, a large number of accident sequences and their probabilities of occurrence are analyzed. A separate isotopic release fraction is developed for each accident sequence. The major isotopic release fractions are those fractions of core inventory that are released either through failure of the fuel cladding, melting of the core within the reactor vessel, or release of melted core materials through a breach of the reactor vessel. These fractions are values that when multiplied by the core inventory in curies of the particular isotopes, give curie amounts of isotopes immediately available for release from the containment. The effects of cleanup and engineered safety features are taken into account to the extent consistent with the failures that led to the particular accident sequence. To make the results manageable, the accident sequence and the accident isotopic release are grouped. NUREG-1465 then uses the accident sequence probabilities as a means to weigh the release fractions for that sequence category. The weighted release fractions are added up to determine a "mean" in-containment release fraction. Source Term Categories The traditional source term categories used in the industry were based on TID-14844 and utilized the major accidents analyzed in the FSAR, i.e., LOCA, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, etc. The source term based on TID-1 4844 was in fact a default mix of isotopes that was acted upon by the available engineering safety features and natural phenomena associated with each analyzed accident. OERP I Rev. 62 l F-1
The new source terms are based upon the core melt sequences developed by the methodologies used by NUREG-1465. These sequences look at four categories of core damage: 1) fuel clad failure, 2) in-vessel melting, 3) ex-vessel release through a breach of the vessel by melted fuel, and 4) a late in-vessel melting category. These categories have an associated release duration based upon the length of time that the core is uncovered. As a result, it is possible to construct a source term mix matrix that is dependent on two parameters, whether or not the fuel is uncovered, and the length of time that the fuel is uncovered. Inorder to have a dose assessment capability that can be utilized under many circumstances, the vast majority of which are less consequential than a total melt of the core with no removal mechanisms, the effect of engineered safety features and removal phenomena must be included in the source term mix. A review of all the removal effects as listed in RTM-92 (Reference 4) was performed and the results are summarized in Table 1 below. The column, "Fraction Used" is the removal fraction used in developing the source term categories that account for removal process. The fraction used was selected to be the highest value of all of the accident categories regardless of how many mitigating processes are in effect. This was done to develop a single removal fraction to cover all cases where removal processes are in effect. The "default" condition for selecting a source term mix is to use a mix that takes into account removal mechanisms for particulates and iodines. Only if no removal process, e.g., sprays, filtration, partitioning, is available will the unmitigated source terms be used. In order to select the proper mix, the release pathway and estimated time duration of core uncovery will have to be determined. The release pathway questions should be very specific, with the user allowed to view all possible choices and then select the one that best fits the plant conditions. The response to the release pathway questions and core uncovery time should result in the selection of one of eight possible accident source term mixes as shown in Table 2. The late in-vessel melt release fractions in NUREG-1465 are approximately one order of magnitude below the early in-vessel values, so no separate category of source terms were developed for that cause. There remain two special cases of accident mixes which can be handled separately in the dose assessment process. Aged spent fuel involved in shipments and storage from the Brunswick plant have a single isotopic inventory for the gap which consists of long lived isotopes. This inventory will be used as a single case (without consideration for decay when determining detector sensitivities) for determination of a source term for dose assessment purposes. Similarly, the maximum expected inventory of waste gas decay tank will be used as a single mix category (with no decay) for the PWRs. OERP I Rev. 62 l F-2
Radioisotope Inventories The radionuclides included in the mixes were taken from RTM-92. Additional radioisotopes were taken from the plant's core damage assessment procedure if not already included. Isotopes that had no in-containment release fractions given in the reference documents were removed from the list. The core inventories for Brunswick were developed using the ORIGEN code assuming an average end of life bumup and enrichment. The spent fuel assembly source term was developed by taking the values for KfB5 and 1129 from the ORIGEN code runs, decaying the values for 5 years, and then taking release fractions as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (30%). References
- 1. Technical Information Document (TID)14844, Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites, J. J. DiNunno et al, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 1962
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.3, Revision 2, Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1974
- 3. NUREG-1465, Accident Source Terms for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, Draft Report for Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., June 1992
- 4. RTM-92, Response Technical Manual, Vol. 1, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., October 1992
- 5. CP&L Design Calculation 0B21-0556, ORIGEN2 Execution for Use in Specifying CPLDOSE Inputs for B1C12 and B2C14
- 6. ESR 98-00345, Revision 0 OERP I Rev. 62 l F-3
Table 1 Brunswick Source Term Removal Groupings Fraction No Not Total Fraction Accident Category Sprays Sprays Filtered Filtered Fraction Used Drywell Release .03 .01 .0003 .01
.75 1 .75 .75 Torus Release' .01 .01 .01
.75 .75 .75 Cont. Bypass .01 .01 .01
.75 .75 .75
'The effects of torus scrubbing are not fully induded, which would multiply the result by another 0.01 to 0.05. to make the categories consistent, the unfiltered release fraction was very conservatively taken to be 0.75.
I OERP I Rev. 62 l F-4
Table 2 Brunswick Source Term Categories Source Term Category Description Normal RCS Accidents that do not result in core uncovery. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective. Gap Release w/f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery <60 minutes, or mechanical fuel damage has occurred. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective. Gap Release No f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery <60 minutes or mechanical fuel damage has occurred. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective. Early IVw/f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery from 1 to 2.5 hours. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective. Early IV No f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery from 1 to 2.5 hours. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective. Ex-Vessel w/f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery >2.5 hours. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be effective. Ex-Vessel No f-s Any accident sequence that results in core uncovery >2.5 hours. Filtration and/or containment sprays are considered to be NOT effective. Spent Fuel An accident involving the damage of a freshly unloaded spent fuel assembly. Filtration is considered to be effective. For spent fuel assembly accidents with no filtration, use "Gap Release No f-s." l OERP I Rev. 62 l F-5
APPENDIX G MINIMUM PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE SECTIONS OF THE PLAN PLAN PROCEDURES Section 1: Introduction N/A Section 2: Emergency OPEP-02.1 Initial Emergency Actions Classifications OPEP-02.1.1 Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency Section 3: Emergency OPEP-02.6.6 Environmental Monitoring Response Team Leader Organization OPEP-02.6.12 Activation and Operation of the Operational Support Center OPEP-04.7 Brunswick Emergency Notification (Automated Telephone) System OPEP-02.6.26 Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) OPEP-02.6.27 Activation and Operation of Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) OPEP-02.6.28 Off-Site Protective Action Recommendations OPEP-02.6.20 Dose Projection Coordinator OPEP-02.6.21 Emergency Communicator OPEP-02.1.1 Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency OPEP-02.6.29 Activation and Operation of the Joint Information Center (JIC) IOERP Rev. 62 G-1
APPENDIX G (cont'd) PLAN PROCEDURES Section 4: Emergency OPEP-02.1 Initial Emergency Actions Measures OPEP-02.1 .1 Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency OPEP-03.1 .3 Use of Communication Equipment OPEP-03.4.7 Automation of Off-Site Dose Projection Procedure OPEP-03.8.2 Personnel Accountability and Evacuation OPEP-03.9.2 First Aid and Medical Care OPEP-03.9.3 Transport of Contaminated Injured Personnel OPEP-03.9.6 Search and Rescue OPEP-04.5 Public Education and Information OPEP-03.7.6 Emergency Exposure Controls OPEP-03.7.7 Onsite Radiological Controls I OERP I Rev. 62 l G-2
APPENDIX G (cont'd) PLAN PROCEDURES Section 5: Emergency OPEP-03.4.7 Automation of Off-site Dose Facilities and Projection Procedure Equipment OPEP-03.5.5 Environmental Monitoring and Plume Tracking OPEP-04.7 Brunswick Emergency Notification (Automated Telephone) System OPEP-04.2 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Section 6: Maintaining OPEP-04.1 Record Keeping and Documentation Emergency Preparedness OPEP-04.2 Emergency Facilities and Equipment OPEP-04.3 Performance of Training, Exercises, and Drills OPEP-04.5 Public Education and Information OPEP-04.6 Radiological Emergency Kit Inventories Section 7: Recovery OPEP-02.7 Recovery lOERP I Rev. 62 lG3
APPENDIX H CROSS-REFERENCE BETWEEN NUREG-0654 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND BRUNSWICK RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) A.1.a 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 Appendix C A.1.b 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 A.1.c Figures 3.1-1, 3.2-1, 3.4-1 A.1 .d 3.0, 3.2.1 A.1.e 3.2, 3.9 A.2.a N/A A.2.b N/A A.3 Appendix B A.4 3.0, 3.2, 3.3,3.4, 3.5 B.1 3.0, 3.1, 3.2 B.2 3.0, 3.2.1 B.3 3.0, 3.2.1 B.4 3.0, 3.2.1 B.5 3.2, 3.3, 3.4,3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 B.6 Section 3 Appendices A, B, C, E Figure 3.2-1 I OERP I Rev. 62 l H-1
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) B.7 Section 3 B.7.a 3.3.5, 3.5.2 B.7.b 3.3.1, 3.3.3, Section 7.0 B.7.c 3.2.1, 3.5 B.7.d 3.6 B.8 3.7.1, Table 3.5-1 B.9 3.7.2, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix E C.1.a 3.8.4.1 C.1.b 3.8.4 C.1.c 3.8 C.2.a NIA C.2.b 3.3.1.1, 3.5.8, Figure 3.2-1 C.3 5.7.6, 3.7.1, 3.8 C.4 3.7, 3.8, Appendix B, Appendix C, Table 3.5-1 D.1 Section 2.0 D.2 Section 2.0 D.3 N/A D.4 N/A OERP I Rev. 62 l H-2
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) E.1 3.9,4.1,4.4.1 E.2 3.2, 3.5,3.9 E.3 3.9 E.4.a-n OPEP-02.6.21 E.5 N/A E.6 3.9,4.4.6, OPEP-02.6.21 E.7 3.9,4.4.7 F.1.a 3.9, OPEP-02.6.21 F.1.b 3.9, EPL-001, OPEP-02.6.21 F.1.c 3.9, EPL-001, OPEP-02.6.21 F.1.d 3.9, EPL-001, OPEP-02.6.21, OPEP-03.1.3 F.1.e 3.2, 3.9, EPL-001 OPEP-02.6.21, OPEP-04.7 F.J.f 3.9, EPL-001, OPEP-02.6.21 F.2 EPL-001, Table 3.5-1 F.3 6.1.2.1 I OERP I Rev. 62 l H-3
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) G.1 4.4.7.1,6.1.4 G.2 4.4.7.1,6.1.4 G.3.a 3.6, 5.5 G.3.b 5.4,5.5 G.4.a 3.6 G.4.b 3.6 G.4.c 3.6,4.4.7.1 G.5 6.1.4 H.1 5.2, 5.3 H.2 5.4 H.3 N/A H.4 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3,3.4, 3.5,3.6, 3.9 Table 3.5-1 H.5 5.7 H.5.a 5.7 H.5.b 5.7.4 H.5.c 5.7.5 H.5.d 5.8 OERP Rev. 62 l H-4
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) H.6.a 5.7 H.6.b 5.7 H.6.c 5.7.6 H.7 5.7.4,5.12 H.8 5.7.2 H.9 5.3, Table 5.0-2 H.10 Procedure OPEP-04.6 H.11 Procedure OPEP-04.6 EPL-001 H.12 5.0, 5.7.6 1.1 Section 2, OPEP-02.1, Section 5.0 1.2 4.2, Section 5.0 1.3.a 4.2.2, PEP-03.6.1, PEP 03.6.3, Appendix F 1.3.b 4.2.2,4.2.3, OPEP-03.4.7, PEP-03.5.5 14 4.2.2, OPEP-03.4.7, OPEP-03.6.1 1.5 5.7.2 1.6 4.2.2.3 l OERP I Rev. 62 l H-5
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) 1.7 4.2.4 1.8 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 1.9 4.2 1.10 4.2 J.1.a 4.4.2, 6.1.1, EPL-001 J.1.b 4.4.2, 6.1.1, EPL-001 J.1.c 4.4.2,6.1.1 J.1.d 4.4.2,4.4.6 J.2 4.4.2 J.3 4.4.2.2, 4.4.4.1, 4.4.4.2 J.4 4.4.2.2 J.5 4.4.2.2 J.6.a 4.4.3,5.9 J.6.b 4.4.3,5.9 J.6.c 4.4.3 J.7 4.1.5,4.4.7 J.8 4.4.7.3 J.9 N/A I OERP I Rev. 62 l H-6
APPENDIX H (Conrd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) J.10.a 4.4.7.3, Figures 1.1-1, 4.4-1, Figure 1.1-2 J.10.b Figures 1.1-1, 1.1-2, 1.1-6 J.10.c 3.9,4.4.6 J.10.d N/A J.10.e N/A J.10.f N/A J.10.g N/A J.10.h N/A J.10.i N/A J.10.j N/A J.10.k N/A J.10.1 N/A J.10.m See item J.7 J.11 N/A J.12 N/A K.1.a-g 4.4.3 K.2 4.4.3 K.3.a 4.4 K.3.b 4.4 K.4 N/A IOERP I Rev. 62 l H-7
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) K.5.a 4.4.4 K.5.b 4.4.4.1, 4.4.4.2, 4.4.5 K.6.a 4.4.4 K.6.b 4.4.4 K.6.c 4.4.4 K.7 4.4.4,4.4.5 L.1 Appendix B, Appendix E, 5.10 L.2 4.4.5, 5.10, Appendix B, Appendix E L.3 N/A LA 3.7.2.1, 3.7.2.2, 4.4.5, Appendix B, Appendix E M.1 OPEP-02.7, Section 7.0 M.2 7.2, Figure 7.2.1, Table 7.2-1, OPEP-02.7 M.3 7.2, OPEP-02.7 M.4 Figure 1.1-6 N.1.a 6.1.2.2 N.1.b 6.1.2.2 N.2.a 6.1.2.1 N.2.b 6.1.2.1 I OERP I Rev. 62 l H-z
APPENDIX H (Cont'd) NUREG0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) N.2.c 6.1.2.1 N.2.d 6.1.2.1 N.2.e 6.1.2.1 N.3.a-f 6.1.2 N.4 6.1.2.2 N.5 6.1.2.2 0.1 6.1.1 0.1.a 6.1.1 0.1.b N/A 0.2 6.1.1 0.3 6.1.1 0.4.a-j 6.1.1 0.5 6.0,6.1,6.1.1 P.1 6.1.3 P.2 6.1.3 P.3 6.1.3 P.4 6.2.1 P.5 6.2.1 P.6 6.2.3 l OERP I Rev. 62 l H-9
APPENDIX H (Confd) NUREG-0654 Brunswick Criterion Section(s) P.7 Appendix G P.8 Table of Contents P.9 6.2, 6.2.1,6.2.2 P.106 6.2.1 l OERP I Rev. 62 l H-10
9 :4Progress Energy BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT Information Use PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME XIII PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURE OPEP-02.6.28 OFF-SITE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDA TIONS REVISION 8 OPEP-02.6.28 I Rev. 8 l Page 1 of 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE ........................ 3
2.0 REFERENCES
........................ 3 3.0 GENERAL ........................ 3 4.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS ........................ 3 5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ........................ 4 6.0 PROCEDURE ........................ 5 ATTACHMENTS 1 PAR Flowchart.....................................................................................................7 2 Evacuation Zones and Time Estimates/10 Mile EPZ Map .8 OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 Page 2 of 9
1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to describe the process for making Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) to off-site agencies.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 OPEP-02.1.1, Emergency Control - Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency 2.2 OPEP-02.6.26, Activation and Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) 2.3 OPEP-02.6.27, Activation and Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 2.4 OPEP-02.6.21, Emergency Communicator 2.5 OPEP-03.4.7, Automation of Off-Site Dose Projection 2.6 NUREG-0654 Rev. 1 Supp. 3, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents 3.0 GENERAL 3.1 Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) shall be made by the Emergency Response Manager in the EOF. 3.2 The Site Emergency Coordinator shall make Protective Action Recommendations, if necessary, prior to EOF activation. 3.3 This procedure provides the process for making Protective Action Recommendations within 15 minutes of a General Emergency declaration. PARs shall be transmitted to the decision makers on an approved Emergency Notification Form. 3.4 The Protective Action Recommendation is subject to acceptance or modification by state or county decision makers. 3.5 The State/Counties shall assume the responsibility for implementing protective actions taken to protect the health and safety of the general public. 4.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS None OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 Page 3 of 9
5.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 5.1 The Emergency Response Manager shall: 5.1.1 Use the guidance in this procedure to ensure Protective Action Recommendations are made within 15 minutes of the declaration of a General Emergency. 5.1.2 Verbally communicate this information to off-site decision makers. 5.1.3 Approve the Emergency Notification Form. 5.1.4 Maintain an awareness of the state/county acceptance or modification of the Protective Action Recommendations. 5.2 The Site Emergency Coordinator shall: 5.2.1 Prior to EOF activation:
- 1. Use the guidance in this procedure to ensure Protective Action Recommendations are made within 15 minutes of the declaration of a General Emergency.
- 2. Verbally communicate this information to off-site decision makers.
- 3. Approve the Emergency Notification Form.
- 4. Maintain an awareness of the statelcounty acceptance or modification of the Protective Action Recommendations.
5.3 The Radiological Control Manager shall: 5.3.1 Recommend PARs to the Emergency Response Manager. 5.3.2 Continually assess Dose Assessment results on radiological conditions and advise the Emergency Response Manager if the initial PAR should be modified. 5.3.3 Immediately provide radiological and meteorological information to the Communications Manager for inclusion on the Emergency Notification Form. I OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 l Page 4 of 9l
5.4 The Communications Managers, Communications Director, and Emergency Communicator (as applicable) shall:
- 1. Ensure an Emergency Notification which includes the PAR is made to off-site agencies within 15 minutes of the declaration of a General Emergency.
6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 Perform the following actions for making predetermined initial and modified Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) when a General Emergency has been declared. 6.1.1 Initial PAR implementation will be recommended by the Radiation Control Manager (RCM) and approved by the Emergency Response Manager (ERM). 6.1.2 The RCM should obtain the current wind direction from the Dose Projection Coordinator or use the EOF Meteorology Status Board. 6.1.3 Using Attachment 2 of this procedure the RCM should select the appropriate wind sector from the column labeled Wind From. The wind sector is defined by a range of wind directions. 6.1.4 After identifying the appropriate wind sector, using Attachment 2, the RCM should select the corresponding Local Planning Zones from the Evacuation Zones column and recommend evacuating these Zones. 6.1.5 After identifying the appropriate Local Planning Zones for evacuation, using Attachment 2, the RCM should select the corresponding Local Planning Zones from the Shelter Zones column and recommend sheltering these Zones. 6.1.6 The RCM should communicate the Local Planning Zones being recommended for evacuation and Local Planning Zones being recommended for sheltering to the Emergency Response Manger, Communications Managers, and State Liaison. 6.1.7 The Communication Managers should ensure Protective Action Recommendations are included on the Emergency Notification Form and issued within 15 minutes from the General Emergency declaration or Modified PAR development. 6.1.8 The Communications Managers and Emergency Response Manager will ensure off-site decision makers are contacted verbally. Phone talkers will normally make this contact.
- 1. Brunswick County OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 l Page 5 Of 9
- 2. New Hanover County
- 3. State 6.1.9 The RCM should ensure PARs are posted on the status board in the EOF.
6.1.10 The RCM and ERM should continually work with the EOF State Representatives to ensure an understanding of off-site recommendations. 6.1.11 The RCM should continually monitor changes in meteorological and radiological conditions and compare to EPA Protective Action Guides. The Dose Projection Coordinator normally provides updates to the RCM on this action. 6.2 The RCM should review and recommend a modified Protective Action Recommendation, as necessary, using Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 for guidance.
- 1. Protective Action Recommendations should be extended to the point (beyond the 10 mile EPZ, as necessary) where protective action guideline doses (i.e., 2 1 Rem TEDE or 2 5 Rem CDE child thyroid)
WILL NOT be exceeded.
- 2. A Protective Action Recommendation should not be reduced from the initial recommendation for any Local Planning Zones until the release is terminated and the decision is coordinated with the State and County decisions makers.
- 3. The following guides apply prior to reducing the initial Protective Action Recommendations:
- a. Long term weather forecast conditions are obtained with a high degree of confidence in the forecast.
- b. Radiological environmental conditions are defined.
- c. Plant conditions are stabilized and no additional release as a result of the initiating accident is anticipated.
- d. Population dose savings is quantifiable as a result of the modified PAR and the decision is ALARA.
l OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 l Page 6 of 9
ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 Of 1 PAR Flowchart General NO Emergency Decared YES Evacuate Zones A, B, C, and 10 Miles Downwind per Attachment 2. Shelter Zones per Attachment 2. (See Notes 1. 2, & 3) Continue assessment based on all available plant and field monitoring information. (See Notes 3 & 4) } i Modify protective actions recommendation as necessary. (See Note 4) l
- 1. Shelter remaining zones 4. A protective action recommendation to have population indoors should not be reduced from the to monitor EAS broadcasts. initial recommendation for any zone until the release is terminated,
- 2. Shelter may be the and the decision is coordinated appropriate action for with the state and counties. The controlled releases of following guides should be radioactive material from considered prior to reducing a containment If there is protective action recommendation:
assurance that the release a) Long term weather forecast is short term (puff release) conditions are obtained with and the area near the plant a high degree of confidence in cannot be evacuated before the forecast No sea-breeze in the plume arnives. effect. b) Radiological environmental
- 3. For actual or projected conditions are defined.
doses > I Rem TEDE or c) Plant conditions are stabilized.
> 5 Rem CDE (Thyroid), d) Population dose savings are declare a General Emergency quantifiable as a result of the PAR and recommend evacuation of change, and the decision is ALARA.
the general public from the affected areas. OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 Page 7 of 9
ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of I Evacuation Zones and Time Estimates/l10 Mile EPZ Map WIND FROM EVACUATE SHELTER EVACUATION ZONES ZONES TIMES (MINS) WINTER/SUMMER NORTH (338 - 022) A.B.C.D E.F.GHK 290 TO 662 NORTHEAST (023 - 067) A.B.C.D E.FGHK 290 TO 662 EAST (068 - 112) ..-ABCD.E F.GH.K 296 TO 670 SOUTHEAST (113 - 157) A.BC.D.E.FG.H K 340 TO 695 SOUTH (158 - 202) A.BC.E.F.G.HK D 235 TO 749 SOUTHWEST (203 - 247) A.B.C.G.H.K DEF 235 TO 749 WEST (248 - 292) A.B.C.H.K D.E.F.G 235 TO 749 NORTHWEST (293 - 337) A.B.C.K D.EFG.H 340 TO 749 ALL ZONES IN 10 MILE AB.CD EF.G,H.K 340 TO 749 OPEP-02.6.28 I Rev. 8 l Page 8 of 9
REVISION
SUMMARY
Revision 8 of OPEP-02.6.28 consists of:
- Changed "CP&L" to "Progress Energy" and deleted "Carolina Power & Light Company' on cover page to reflect company name change.
- Changed reference from "Communications Manager" to "Communications Managers' throughout procedure to reflect NUREG-0654, Table B-1 required minimum staffing levels for EOF.
- Added information in Section 5.4.1 to clarify the time limit for notifying offsite agencies with a Protective Action Recommendation at a General Emergency classification.
- Updated Attachment 2, Evacuation Zones and Time Estimates / 10 Mile EPZ Map, to reflect revised evacuation time estimates for I 0-Mile EPZ.
- Added guidance for establishing initial Protective Action Recommendations in Section 6.1.
- Added guidance to modify a Protective Action Recommendation in Section 6.2.
- Added guidance in Attachment 1, PAR Flowchart, for protective action recommendation decision-making as an enhancement.
OPEP-02.6.28 Rev. 8 l Page 9 of 9
I Information 62 Progress Energy BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT Use PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME XIII PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURE UNIT 0 OPEP-03.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND PLUME TRACKING REVISION 5 OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 1 of 24
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPOSE 4 2.0 REFERENCE ..................... 4 3.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS .4 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES .4 5.0 INSTRUCTIONS 5 5.1 Activation. 5 5.2 General Activity Guidelines. 5 5.3 Plume Tracking. 6 5.4 Monitoring and Sample Collection. 7 5.4.1 Sample Labels 7 5.4.2 Area Radiation Surveys. 8 5.4.3 Airborne Monitoring. 9 5.4.4 Collection of Soil Samples ......................................................... ' 11 5.4.5 Collection of Potable Water Samples. 11 5.4.6 Collection of Surface Water Samples. 12 5.4.7 Collection of Vegetation and Crop Samples. 13 5.4.8 Expanded Environmental Monitoring ...................................................... 13 5.5 Deactivation 14 6.0 DIAGRAMS/ATTACHMENTS 14 ATTACHMENTS 1 Personnel Dose Tracking Form ........................... 15 2 Dose Rate Survey Data ........................... 16 3 Airborne Monitoring Data ........................... 17 4 Particulate Activity With a Frisker ........................... 18 OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 l Page 2 of 24
TABLE OF CONTENTS ATTACHMENTS PAGE 5 Iodine Activity With a Frisker ........................................................................................., 19 6 Collection of Environmental Samples ............................ 20 7 Environmental Sample Data ............................ 22 8 Sample Labels .23 OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 3 of 24
1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this procedure is to define the duties and responsibilities of the Environmental Monitoring Teams and provide guidelines for activities associated with the confirmation of offsite dose projections, plume tracking, and expanded environmental monitoring. 2.0 REFERENCE 2.1 OPEP-02.6.6, Environmental Monitoring Team Leader 2.2 OPEP-03.1.3, Use of Communication Equipment 2.3 OPEP-03.7.6, Emergency Exposure Controls 2.4 OPEP-03.7.7, Onsite Radiological Controls 2.5 OPEP-04.6, Radiological Emergency Kit Inventories 2.6 OE&RC-3101, Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program 2.7 EPA-400-R-92-001, Manual of Protective Action Guidelines and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, USEPA, May 1992 2.8 AR-00022147, Assignment: 08-01, EMT Procedural Improvements ER9 2.9 Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments No. 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System (Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324), February 11, 2003. 3.0 DEFINITIONSIABBREVIATIONS EMT(L) - Environmental Monitoring Team (Leader) CCPM - Calculated counts per minute (Sample Activity) 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 The Radiological Controls Manager is responsible for providing up-to-date assessments of the areas affected by radioactivity release into the environment. 4.2 The Environmental Monitoring Team Leader shall provide administrative and technical direction to Environmental Monitoring Teams during environmental monitoring activities. 4.3 Environmental Monitoring Teams shall perform environmental monitoring activities in accordance with direction provided by the Environmental Monitoring Team Leader. I OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 l Page 4 of 24
5.0 INSTRUCTIONS 5.1 Activation 5.1.1 When properly notified the Environmental Monitoring Team shall:
- 1. Report to the EOF for accountability unless otherwise directed by the Environmental Monitoring Team Leader (EMTL).
- 2. Obtain a vehicle and assemble at the environmental kit location.
- 3. Obtain one Environmental Monitoring Emergency Kit and perform the following:
- Kit inventory check (Verifying Seal intact, if not complete inventory necessary for dispatch)
- Instrument operability and source response checks
- Report deficiencies to the EMTL.
- 4. Document dosimeter and TLD information on Attachment 1, Personal Dose Tracking Form, and inform the EMTL.
- 5. Establish communications with the EMTL, report readiness status, and obtain briefings to include:
- Priorities (plume tracking, dose projection confirmation, expanded monitoring, etc.)
- Sample types
- Locations
- Frequency
- Location to deliver samples for analysis
- Radiological and meteorological conditions 5.2 General ActivityGuidelines 5.2.1 A personal TLD and dosimeter SHALL be worn at all times. The dosimeter is to be read at a frequency determined by the EMTL and dependent on radiation intensities.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 l Page 5 of 24
5.3 Plume Tracking NOTE: Plume tracking is a dynamic activity with conditions constantly changing. Meteorological and radiological conditions must be constantly evaluated to anticipate and track a plume's path.
- 1. Radiation readings should always be taken while in transit to desired sample locations and during plume tracking activities by placing a radiation survey instrument near the vehicle windshield or window.
Readings of 2 0.2 mr/hr should be documented, with location and time, and reported to the EMTL.
- 2. Attempt to identify the edges and centerline of a plume by traversing the plume at right angles to the direction of plume travel. Specific direction will be provided by the EMTL.
- Survey instrument readings of Ž 1 mr/hr should establish the criteria necessary to define the edges of the plume.
- Maximum survey readings should be the criteria used to identify the centerline of the plume.
- Document times and specific locations of acquired data in the logbook.
CAUTION Minimize time, to the extent possible, in the defined plume to reduce exposure (i.e., move to lower dose areas to read cartridges and filters)
- Notify the EMTL of plume tracking results.
- 3. At the discretion of the EMTL, return to the locations of maximum readings for air samples to determine centerline airborne activity.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 6 of 24
5.4 Monitoring and Sample Collection CAUTION Assume all emergency environmental samples collected are contaminated and exercise necessary precautions to prevent cross-contamination and personal contamination. CAUTION Exercise care when operating electric samplers and portable generators in or around substations, water or damp areas. 5.4.1 Sample Labels
- 1. Each field sample taken shall be documented with sample labels completed and attached to the sample.
- 2. Complete a sample label for each sample with the following information (See Attachment 8).
0 Sample Control # 0 Sample Type 0 Origin/Location of the sample 0 Radiation reading and time of collection Person taking sample OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 7 of 24
5.4.1 Sample Labels
- 3. Air sample iodine cartridges and particulate filter sample labels should also include:
- Sample duration (start, stop, total)
- Sample volume
- 1-131 activity estimation NOTE: The primary radiological monitoring process used for dose projection confirmation and plume tracking is a combination of area radiation surveys and air samples.
5A.2 Area Radiation Surveys
- 1. Area radiation surveys shall be taken initially at waist level (1 meter) to determine the presence of radioactive materials.
- 2. If the presence of radioactive material is indicated; open and closed window readings shall be taken at two distances from the surface:
- Waist level (= 1 meter); and,
- 3" - 6" from the surface NOTE: Open window measurements must be taken with the probe facing downward.
- 3. A minimum of two area radiation measurements shall be taken during the time air samples are being collected with the area sufficiently surveyed to ensure the measurement is representative for the location.
- 4. Document the survey results on Attachment 2, Dose Rate Survey Data.
OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 l Page 8 of 24
5.4.3 Airborne Monitoring CAUTION Precautions should be taken to ensure a representative air sample is attained. Improper air sampler placement may interfere with accurate sample analysis. The sampler should be placed so as to prevent loose surface contamination from becoming airborne due to sampler exhaust or liquids coming into contact with the filter.
- 1. Air samples shall be collected to determine the presence and concentration of radioactive particulate and radioiodines.
- 2. Air samples should be taken using a 47 mm glass fiber particulate filter and a charcoal or silver zeolite cartridge.
NOTE: Silver zeolite cartridges should be used in place of charcoal cartridges when sampling in the presence of high noble gas concentrations. NOTE: In the absence of silver zeolite cartridges, a charcoal cartridge may be used with the following caution; noble gases will be retained on the cartridge and slowly off-gas providing some indication based primarily on Rb-88. NOTE: A ten minute sample provides sufficient volume to meet the 10-7g Ci/cc minimum detectable limit for 1-131.
- 3. Collect a 30 ft3 air sample +/- 10 %. (Any deviation in sample duration or volume must be directed by the EMTL.)
- 4. Record air sampler and collection information on a separate Airborne Monitoring Data (Attachment 3) sheet for each air sample collected.
- 5. Remove the particulate filter and iodine cartridge from the air sampler and place in separate, clean plastic bags.
- Use forceps and/or gloves to prevent personnel or cross-contamination.
OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 Page 9 of 24
5.4.3 Airborne Monitoring
- 6. Conduct a field estimate of airborne 1-131 and particulate activity by performing the following:
NOTE: Record all data on Attachment 3, Airborne Monitoring Data
- Locate, measure, and record background radiation levels for an area of relatively low background (using RM-14).
- Measure the initial activity (on contact readings) of the iodine cartridge (in the plastic bag) with an RM-14 by placing the probe against one flat surface of the cartridge and note the highest reading.
- Calculate the net (sample) activity by subtracting the measured background radiation from the highest measurement taken on the iodine cartridge and record data.
NOTE: If the activity at the second reading is within 25% of the initial measurement, it should be presumed that iodine is present, pending isotopic analysis. If the reading is not within 25% contact the EMTL.
- Obtain a second set of readings after 5 minutes of initial measurement and calculate the net (sample) activity for the filter and cartridge.
- Repeat the activity measurement process with the particulate filter.
- Plot the highest calculated sample activity (ccpm) against the calculated sample volume on Attachment 5, Iodine Activity with a Frisker, to determine the airborne concentration of radioiodines (pCi/cc) and record results.
- Plot the highest calculated sample activity (ccpm) against the calculated sample volume on Attachment 4, Particulate Activity with a Frisker, to determine the airborne concentration ([tCi/cc) and record results.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 10 of 24
5.4.3 Airborne Monitoring
- 7. Report all results to the Environmental Monitoring Team Leader.
- 8. Complete and attach a sample label to each of the particulate filter and iodine cartridge samples. (See Attachment 8, Sample Labels) 5A.4 Collection of Soil Samples NOTE: Refer to Attachment 6, Collection of Environmental Samples, for precautions, methods, and guidelines to use during sample collection.
- 1. Soil samples should be obtained from an open noncultivated level area.
- 2. Outline a one square foot (1 ft2) area and clear away vegetation, rocks, litter, and other non-soil material.
- 3. Remove soil from the outlined area to a depth of two (2) inches.
- 4. Place the soil in a new clean container and leave open for at least five minutes to allow the sample to off-gas.
- 5. Obtain a radiation measurement using a survey instrument and record the data on the sample label.
- 6. Complete a sample label and attach to the sample.
- 7. Document the sample on Attachment 7, Environmental Sample Data, and report results to the EMTL.
5A.5 Collection of Potable Water Samples NOTE: Refer to Attachment 6, Collection of Environmental Samples, for precautions, methods, and guidelines to use during sample collection.
- 1. Potable water samples should consist of at least a one-gallon sample of drinking water.
OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 Page 11 of 24
5.4.5 Collection of Potable Water Samples
- 2. Flush all sample lines and rinse the sample container thoroughly.
- 3. Fill the sample container to overflowing and cap securely.
- 4. Obtain a radiation measurement of the sample using a survey instrument.
- 5. Complete a sample label and attach to the sample container.
- 6. Document sample data on Attachment 7, Environmental Sample Data, and report results to the EMTL.
5A.6 Collection of Surface Water Samples NOTE: Refer to Attachment 6, Collection of Environmental Samples, for precautions, methods, and guidelines to use during sample collection.
- 1. Surface water samples may be collected from the plant cooling water intake and discharge canal stationary automatic composite samplers.
Locations are provided in E&RC-3101.
- 2. If the automatic composite samplers are operating, remove the collection container and fill a one-gallon sample container to overflowing and cap securely.
- 3. If the automatic composite samplers are not operating or a different body of water requires sampling, grab samples may be obtained by dipping a clean container into the water. A 1000 ml Tn-pour beaker with string is recommended.
NOTE: For snow and ice samples, to obtain an equivalent liquid sample of at l' least 500 mIs, a 4-liter sample of snow, ice, etc. is needed.
- 4. Fill a one-gallon sample container with the dip samples to overflowing and cap securely.
- 5. Obtain a radiation measurement of the sample using a survey instrument.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 12 of 24
5.4.6 Collection of Surface Water Samples
- 6. Complete a sample label and attach to the sample container.
- 7. Document the sample data on Attachment 7, Environmental Sample Data, and report results to the EMTL.
5A.7 Collection of Vegetation and Crop Samples NOTE: Refer to Attachment 6, Collection of Environmental Samples, for [I precautions, methods, and guidelines to use during sample collection.
- 1. Gather a 12" x 12" bag packed full of leafy vegetables or other vegetation (no stems) as directed by the EMTL. The samples should be obtained from the top most portion of the vegetation and from an open area.
- 2. Place the sample in a sample container and obtain a radiation measurement with a survey instrument.
- 3. Do not seal the sample container for at least five minutes to allow the sample to off-gas.
- 4. Complete a sample label and attach to the sample container.
- 5. Document the sample data on Attachment 7, Environmental Sample Data, and report results to the EMTL.
5.4.8 Expanded Environmental Monitoring
- 1. Additional evaluation of offsite conditions is available via the collection of previously installed TLDs and stationary air sampler filters and cartridges.
- 2. Collect, replace, and supplement environmental TLDs as directed by the EMTL and in accordance with OE&RC-3101, which also contains the locations of the TLDs.
- 3. Collect filters/cartridges from the stationary air samplers as directed by the EMTL in accordance with E&RC-3101.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 13 of 24
5.5 Deactivation 5.5.1 When properly notified the Environmental Monitoring Team shall:
- 1. Return instruments to proper storage.
- 2. Inventory and reseal the Environmental Monitoring Emergency Kit(s) used during this activity per OPEP-04.6.
- 3. Return vehicle to designated area.
6.0 DIAGRAMS/ATTACHMENTS 6.1 Diagrams None 6.2 Attachments 6.2.1 Attachment 1, Personnel Dose Tracking Form 6.2.2 Attachment 2, Dose Rate Survey Data 6.2.3 Attachment 3, Airborne Monitoring Data 6.2.4 Attachment 4, Particulate Activity with a Frisker 6.2.5 Attachment 5, Iodine Activity With a Frisker 6.2.6 Attachment 6, Collection of Environmental Samples 6.2.7 Attachment 7, Environmental Sample Data 6.2.8 Attachment 8, Sample Labels I OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 l Page 14 of 24
( ( ( ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 Personnel Dose Tracking Form NAME EMT# TLD # DOSIMETER # INITIAL DOSIMETER FINAL DOSIMETER NET READING READING DOSE I _ _ I __ _ I I _ 4
+ ~~~~i I
+ 4 4 J 4" 4 4 4 J
- 4. 4 4 4 4
________________________ I & A l OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev.55 Page 15of24
( ( ATACHMENT2 Page 1 of 1 Dose Rate Survey Data DATE Page _ of _ LOCATION/TIME 1 METER READING OPEN WINDOW (mr/hr) 1 METER READING CLOSED WINDOW (mr/hr) 6" READING OPEN WINDOW (mr/hr) 6" READING CLOSED WINDOW (mr/hr) INSTRUMENT TYPE/ SERIAL # TECHNICIAN I OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 Page 16of24
ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 Airborne Monitoring Data Air Sample Collection Date: Air Sample Location: Air Sampler Serial Number: Cal Du e Date: Air Sample Flow Rate (ft3 /min.): Air Sample Start/Stop Time: I Air Sample Volume (ft 3): (flow rate x time) Air Particulate Filter Air Cartridge Sample Control #: Sample Control #_ _ Background (cpm) Background (cpm) Initial Reading (cpm) Initial Reading (cpm) 1* l 5-min Reading (cpm)/ 5-min Reading (cpm)l Time:_ Time:_ I-Net Activity (iiCi/cc) Net Activity/1-131 Est. (IiCilcc) (Attach. 4) (Attach. 5) 1 Survey Meter No.:_ Survey Meter No.:_ Serial No.: Serial No.: Cal Due Date: Cal Due Date: Technician: Technician: Sample Control #: AA-BB-CC-DD AA - Environmental Monitoring Team # (01, 02, 03, etc.) BB - Sample Type CC - Sequential sample number DD - Lab number Sample Types AP Air Particulate AC Air Cartridge OPEP-03.5.5 l Rev. 5 l Page 17 of 24
( ( ( ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 1 Particulate Activity With a Frisker 1 1 1 0 U C-) 1 I 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 I ccpm l OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 l Page 18 of 24
( ( R9 ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 of 1 Iodine Activity With a Frisker 1.000E-04 ft
. . . .i . . i i i . . . i i .. i -j ---
1.OOOE-05 10 20
-- -- t ;: P. $0 1.OOOE-06 U - l l t--t l l l U
,-k1 a) 1.OOOE-07 1.OOOE-08 -I I I 1 1 I
1.OOOE-09 I I . . . I I I 1.OOOE-10 I - HT 10 100 1000 10000 100000 l ccpm OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 Page 19 of 24
ATTACHMENT 6 Page 1 of 2 Collection of Environmental Samples SAMPLE TYPE PRECAUTIONS METHODS AND GUIDELINES A. SOIL 1. Assume ALL samples are 1. When possible, select an open, contaminated and handle level area for sampling. using techniques to 2. Clear = 1 ft.2 area of vegetation, prevent rocks, litter, and other nonsoil cross-contamination. items.
- 2. Do Not Seal container of 3. Mark out =1 ft.2 and remove soil soil for at least five within area to a depth of 2" minutes. This will permit (= 5 cm).
radon gases to off-gas. 4. Place soil in container. B. POTABLE 1. Assume ALL samples are 1. Collect at least 1-gallon sample of WATER contaminated and handle drinking water. using techniques to 2. Flush sample lines and rinse prevent sample container before filling. cross-contamination.
- 3. Fill container to overflowing and cap securely.
C. SURFACE 1. Assume ALL samples 1. Surface water samples from the WATER are contaminated and plant cooling water and handle using techniques discharge structures may be to prevent collected from the automatic cross-contamination. samplers.
- 2. If samples are out-of-service, obtain a grab sample from boat, bridge, or shore.
NOTE: More specific sampling instructions will be provided by the EMT Leader.
- 3. Collect 1-gallon sample to overflowing and secure tightly.
D. SNOW 1. Assume ALL samples are 1. OBJECTIVE - Obtain the
& contaminated and handle equivalent of at least 500 mIs. of ICE using techniques to liquid for analysis. This will prevent require a 4-liter sample of snow, cross-contamination. ice, etc.
OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 20 of 24
ATTACHMENT 6 Page 2 of 2 Collection of Environmental Samples SAMPLE TYPE PRECAUTIONS METHODS AND GUIDELINES E. VEGETATION 1. Assume ALL samples are 1. Obtain a 12" x 12" bag packed full
& contaminated and handle of leafy vegetables and/or other CROPS using techniques to vegetation (no stems) as directed prevent by the EMT Leader.
cross-contamination. 2. If milk is to be collected, collect
- 2. Do Not Close or Seal samples of pasture grass as Container for at least five close to the roots as possible minutes to allow the without including dirt in the sample to off-gas. sample.
- 3. If possible, tree leaves should be sampled from topmost part of tree.
- 4. Large, leafy vegetation is better than small.
- 5. Ground covers should be selected from open areas.
R9 F. MILK 1. Assume ALL samples 1. Sampling should begin the day are contaminated and after an atmospheric release of handle using techniques radioactive material and every 2 to prevent days thereafter until levels of 1-131 cross-contamination. return to normal. NOTE: Peak Iodine (I1-31) activity is expected on Day 3 following the release.
- 2. If available, collect at least 1-gallon sample from a thoroughly mixed tank or from a single milk cow when available.
- 3. Collect approximately 1000 grams of pasture grass and/or feed whenever milk samples are collected.
l OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev.5 l Page 21 of 241
( ( ( ATTACHMENT 7 Page 1 of 1 Environmental Sample Data DATE Page _ of _ SAMPLE ID INSTRUMENT INSTRUMENT TIME TYPE VOLUMEIWT SURVEY (mr/hr) LOCATION TYPE SERIAL #
- 4. 4. + 4 4. 4
+ 4 4 + 4 I
+ 4. I 4. I I
- 4. 4. 4. 1 4. 1 1
- 4. 4. 1 1 t
- 4. 4. 4. 4. 4.
S 4. 4. 4. 4 I OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev. 5 Page 22 of 24
ATTACHMENT 8 Page 1 of 1 Sample Labels ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE LABEL SAMPLE CONTROL # SAMPLE TYPE ORIGIN/LOCATION TAKEN BY DATE/TIME RADIATION LEVEL UPON COLLECTION TIME RECEIVED IN LAB/INITIAL COMMENTS AIR SAMPLE LABEL SAMPLE CONTROL NUMBER AIR SAMPLER TAKEN BY ORIGIN/LOCATION SAMPLE ON (DATE/TIME/INITIAL) I I SAMPLE OFF (DATE/TIME/INITIAL) / I TOTAL SAMPLE TIME (MIN) FLOW (ft 3 min) FINAL VOLUME ftJ INITIAL RADIATION LEVEL mR/HR TOTAL VOLUME 3 1-131 ACTIVITY ESTIMATE "PCl/cc TIME RECEIVED IN LAB/INITIAL / COMMENTS Sample Control # AA-BB-CC-DD AA - Environmental Monitoring Team # (01, 02, 03, etc.) BB - Sample Type CC - Sequential sample number DD - Lab number Sample Tvpes AC Air Cartridge AP Air Particulate AV Aquatic Vegetation BO Benthic Organisms FC Food Crops FH Fish FO Fodder or Feed GW Groundwater MK Milk OY Oysters SD Bottom Sediment SH Shrimp SS Soil SW Surface Water TL TLD TV Terrestrial Vegetation ZO Zooplankton
- Sample types must be very specific I OPEP-03.5.5 I Rev.5 l Page 23of24
REVISION
SUMMARY
Revision 5 of OPEP-03.5.5 consists of the following changes:
- Changed "CP&L' to 'Progress Energy" and deleted reference to Carolina Power &
Light Company on Cover Page to reflect company name change.
- Added Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments No.
226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System as new reference 2.9, and added reference commitments in procedure, as appropriate. This change follows approval of Amendments 226 and 253 which deleted PASS from the Brunswick Technical Specifications. OPEP-03.5.5 Rev. 5 Page 24 of 24
a, Progressnergy BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR PLANT I Information Use PLANT OPERATING MANUAL VOLUME XIII PLANT EMERGENCY PROCEDURE 1]1111111]11111111011111011111111 I111111 lii111111 DII III1 OPEP 03.6.3 ESTIMATE OF THE EXTENT OF CORE DAMAGE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS REVISION 13 I OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 1 of 37
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION AGE 1.0 PURPOSE ... 3.......................3
2.0 REFERENCES
........................... 3 3.0 RESPONSIBILITES ... 3.......................3 4.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS .......................... 4 5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .......................... 4 6.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT ........................... 5 7.0 PROCEDURE .5 WORK SHEET 1 .. 10 WORK SHEET 2 .. 11 FIGURE 1 ..............................................................................................................
12 FIGURE 2 .............................................................................................................. 13 FIGURE 3 .............................................................................................................. 14 Appendix .............................................................................................................. 15 OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 1 Page 2 of 37
1.0 PURPOSE To estimate the general extent of core damage resulting from loss of adequate cooling under severe accident conditions by using containment radiation monitor readings, containment hydrogen values, or measured fission concentrations in either the reactor water or containment gas samples. Refinement of core damage estimates can be achieved by a Ba, Sr, La, and Ru analysis.
2.0 REFERENCES
2.1 NEDC-33045P, Revision 0, July 2001, Methods of Estimating Core Damage in BWRs 2.2 OEOP-WS-10, RPV Limits 2.3 Lin, C. C., Procedure for the Determination of the Extent of Core Damage Under Accident Conditions, NEDO-22215, 1982. 2.4 Letter and Attachment from Mr. D. K. Smith, Service Supervisor - Nuclear, General Electric to Mr. A. C. Tollison, Jr., General Manager, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, dated November 9, 1979,
Subject:
Radiation Source Term Information. 2.5 Letter and Attachments from Mr. T. J. Dente, Chairman - BWR Owners Group to Mr. D. G. Eisenhut, Licensing Director - USNRC, dated June 17, 1983,
Subject:
Transmittal of Generic Procedures for Estimation of Core Damage Using Postaccident Sampling System. R6 2.6 Amendments No. 226 and 253, Elimination of Requirements for Post-Accident Sampling System (Dockets 50-325 and 50-324), 11 February 2003. 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES The Radiological Control Director (RCD) is responsible to the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) for determining the magnitude of potential radioactive releases to the environment. The Technical Assessment Director (TAD) and the Accident Assessment Team Leader (AATL) are responsible to ensure that results of this procedure are provided to the RCD and SEC. The Technical Assessment Director and the Accident Assessment Team Leader should be familiar with this procedure and be available for consultation. IOPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 3 of 37
4.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS 4.1 Core Damage - Degradation of the fuel pellet or cladding fission product barriers due to inadequate core cooling. 4.2 Cladding Damage - Degradation of the fuel rod cladding permitting the release of gaseous and volatile fission products from the space between the fuel pellets and the fuel cladding. 4.3 Overheating Damage - Release of gaseous and volatile fission products from the fuel pellets at high fuel temperatures. Temperatures are not sufficient to melt the core. 5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Radiation level measurements may underestimate core damage if: 5.1.1 The primary containment or RPV has been vented 5.1.2 Primary system isolations have been defeated to permit continued use of the main condenser under failure-to-scram conditions. 5.1.3 Primary containment integrity has been lost. 5.2 Radiation level measurements may underestimate core damage if: 5.2.1 The suppression pool has been bypassed. 5.2.2 Suppression pool water level is low. 5.3 Hydrogen concentration measurements may underestimate core damage if: 5.3.1 The primary containment has been vented. 5.3.2 Primary containment integrity has been lost. 5.3.3 Significant amounts of hydrogen remain trapped in the RPV. 5.4 Hydrogen concentration measurements may overestimate core damage if: 5.4.1 Significant amounts of hydrogen have been generated by radiolysis. 5.5 Steam is present in the drywell but the drywell atmosphere is not at saturation conditions. I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 4 of 37
6.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT None R6 7.0 PROCEDURE 7.1 Check for indications of possible core damage using Table 1. 7.2 If core damage is suspected, evaluate the type and amount of damage using Table 2. 7.2.1 Evaluate drywell radiation levels. 7.2.2 If cladding damage is possible or likely, estimate the amount of cladding damage using Section 7.5. 7.2.3 If overheating damage is possible or likely, estimate the amount of overheating damage using Section 7.6. 7.3 Interpret the results using Section 7.7. 7.4 IF PASS sample is available, perform Appendix. Table I Indications of Possible Core Damage Condition Indications Loss of adequate core cooling See Figure 1 Maximum Steam Cooling RPV Level (MSCRWL) = -33 in High primary containment radiation Drywell radiation level above 1 R/hr Hydrogen generation Drywell or suppression chamber hydrogen concentration above 0.5% I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 5 of 37
Table 2 Preliminary Core Damage Assessment Containment Radiation Possible Core Damage States Acton Drywell Below 1%cladding damage Core damage unlikely None radiation level: 103 R/hr 1 hour after shutdown 102 R/hr 24 hours after shutdown Between 1%cladding Limited cladding damage Estimate the amount of damage radiation level and cladding damage using 1%overheating damage Overheating damage unlikely Section 7.5. radiation level: 10 3 R/hr to 104 1 hour after shutdown 102 R/hr to 103 R/hr 24 hours after shutdown Between 1% overheating Widespread cladding damage Estimate the amount of damage radiation level and cladding damage using 100% cladding damage Possible overheating damage Section 7.5. radiation level: Estimate the amount of 10 4 R/hr to 1051 hour after overheating damage usi shutdown Section 7.6. 103 R/hr to 104 R/hr 24 hours after shutdown Above 100% cladding Widespread cladding damage Verify the amount of damage radiation level: cladding damage using Widespread overheating Section 7.5. damage 105 R/hr 1 hour after shutdown Estimate the amount of 4 overheating damage usi 104 R/hr 24 hours after shutdown Section 7.6. Note: Subtract 0.5 x 10' from damage values In table If spray is on OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 6 of 37
7.5 Estimating Cladding Damage 7.5.1 Indications
- 1. Drywell radiation level above 1%cladding damage radiation level.
- 2. Drywell or suppression chamber hydrogen concentration above 0.5%.
- 3. RPV water level below Maximum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL), -33 in, and Core Spray flow less than design.
7.5.2 Cladding Damage Steps
- 1. Determine the drywell radiation levels corresponding to 100% cladding damage from Figure 2.
- 2. Estimate the amount of cladding damage using the equation below.
% Cladding Damage = (Indicated Radiation Level/100% Cladding Damage Radiation Level) X 100
- 3. IF hydrogen concentration is available complete Worksheet 1 to calculate the volume weighed average hydrogen concentration. This average hydrogen concentration will be used to estimate the amount of zirconium that has oxidized.
- 4. Estimate the amount of zirconium oxidation using Figure 3 or Worksheet 2. Use Worksheet 2 if a more accurate estimate is needed.
- 5. Refer to Section 7.6 for guidance on interpreting the damage assessment results.
- 0-10% damage = Limited Damage
* >10% damage = Widespread Damage I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page7of37
7.6 Estimating Overheating Damage 7.6.1 Indications
- 1. Drywell radiation level above 1%overheating damage radiation level.
- 2. Drywell or suppression chamber hydrogen concentration above overheating damage hydrogen threshold.
- 3. RPV water level below Maximum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL), -33 in, and Core Spray flow less than design for more than 30 min.
7.6.2 Overheating Damage Steps
- 1. Determine the drywell radiation levels corresponding to 100%
overheating damage from Figures 2.
- 2. Estimate the amount of cladding damage using the equation below.
% Overheating Damage = (Indicated Radiation Level/I 00% Overheating Damage Radiation Level) X 100
- 3. IF hydrogen concentration is available complete Worksheet 1 to calculate the volume weighed average hydrogen concentration. This average hydrogen concentration will be used to estimate the amount of zirconium that has oxidized.
- 4. Estimate the amount of zirconium oxidation using Figure 3 or Worksheet 2. Use Worksheet 2 if a more accurate estimate is needed.
- 5. Refer to Section 7.6 for guidance on interpreting the damage assessment results.
- 0-10% damage = Limited Damage
* >10% damage = Widespread Damage I OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page8of37
7.7 Discussion 7.7.1 General
- 1. This procedure provides a general evaluation of the status of the core.
The accuracy of the results is governed by source term uncertainties, instrumentation characteristics, and event-specific variations.
- 2. Use appropriate engineering judgment to reconcile any differences between assessment results and obtain a best estimate of core damage.
- 3. Due to the flux distribution in the core, core damage is expected to occur at different rates in different parts of the core. Overheating damage may exist in the hottest regions of the core while fuel in lower power regions remains undamaged.
7.7.2 Radiation Levels
- 1. A radiation level above the 1%cladding damage value is positive indication of cladding damage.
- 2. The cladding damage and overheating damage radiation ranges overlap. Within the overlap range, the relative amounts of each type of damage cannot be distinguished. Calculating separate values for each type of damage tends to overestimate both amounts.
- 3. A radiation level above the I % overheating damage value is not a positive indication of overheating damage since the same radiation level could be reached with only cladding damage. However, it is unlikely that widespread cladding damage would exist without at least some overheating damage. Above the 50% cladding damage radiation level, it may be assumed that overheating damage also exists.
- 4. The values of drywell radiation levels are event-dependent. If a primary system break exists and steam is discharged into the drywell, drywell radiation levels will probably increase first. If no primary system break exists and steam is discharged through the SRVs, suppression chamber radiation level will probably increase first.
- 5. Rapid hydrogen production begins at temperatures above the threshold for cladding damage but below the onset of significant overheating damage.
- 6. Detectable hydrogen is an indication of possible cladding damage.
- 7. If no hydrogen is detected, it is unlikely that overheating damage exists.
OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 9 of 37
Worksheet I Volume-Weighted Average Hydrogen Concentration Use this worksheet to calculate the volume-weighted average primary containment hydrogen concentration for use with Figure 3. Drywell hydrogen concentration (%): Hdw = % Suppression chamber hydrogen concentration (%): Hsc =% Drywell airspace free volume (ft3): Vdw =______ (ft3) Suppression chamber airspace free volume (3): Vsc = (ft3) Volume-weighted average hydrogen concentration: H avg = (Hdw Vdw + Hsc Vsc)I (Vdw + Vsc) Drywell free volume airspace = 164,100 ft3 (Vdw) Suppression Pool free volume airspace = 122,270 3 (Vsc) OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 10 of 37
Worksheet 2 Zirconium Oxidation Fraction Use this worksheet to verify estimates obtained from Figure 3.
- 1. Calculate the mass of oxidized zirconium based on the drywell hydrogen concentration:
Drywell hydrogen concentration (%): Hdw = % Drywell airspace free volume (ft3): Vdw = ft3 Drywell pressure (psig): Pdw = psig Drywell temperature (0F): Tdw = OF Saturation pressure for Tdw (psia) Pdw sat= psia Mass of oxidized zirconium in the drywell: mdw Zr = 0.04242 X Hdw Vdw ( Pdw + 14.7 - Pdw sat )/( 460 + Tdw) __________Ibm
- 2. Calculate the mass of oxidized zirconium based on the suppression chamber hydrogen concentration:
Suppression chamber hydrogen concentration (%): Hsc % Suppression chamber airspace free volume (ft3): Vsc = ft3 Suppression chamber pressure (psig): Psc = psig Suppression chamber temperature (°F): Tsc =F Saturation pressure for Tdw (psia) Psc sat = psia Mass of oxidized zirconium in the suppression chamber: msc Zr = 0.04242 X Hsc Vsc ( Psc + 14.7 - Psc sat )/( 460 + Tsc) __________Ibm 3.Calculate the total zirconium oxidation fraction: Fzr = ((mdw Zr + msc Zr) / 72439 ) X 100 OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 11 of 37
Figure 1 Core Cooling Assessment No Core Damage Possible OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 I Page 12 of 37
( ( Figure 2 I I hr after shutdown 24 hr after shutdown 107 107
/~~~~~~~~~~~10 106 i0 l 106
} _
IC, b sx~~~~~~~~~~~~~% 110
.2 106 1X%
M!l 11 Wih 104 prysWhot pry Wih pay WhtSrays 100 103 102 102 10 10 I 1 J Limited cladding damage Widespread cladding damage Limited overheating damage E Widespread overheating damage OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 Page 13 of 37
Figure 3 Zirconium Oxidation Fraction 100 0 E 0 E I.. N 0 10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 Average Primary Containment Hydrogen Concentration C/*) (From Worksheet #1) I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 14 of 37
Appendix R6 Core Damage Evaluation Using PASS sample 1.1 Summary of Method Liquid and gaseous samples can be obtained from the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) -Liquid from the reactor coolant and/or suppression pool and gaseous samples from the primary and/or secondary containment. The samples will be quantitatively analyzed on the appropriate equipment. The results of the above analysis, in addition to containment radiation level, and the core water level history, will be used in the estimation. 1.2 General Discussion 1.2.1 Analysis of PASS samples for concentrations of Ba, Sr, La, and Ru and consideration of the relative amounts of fission products would indicate if any fuel melt has occurred. 1.2.2 The selection of a sample location should account for the type of event which will determine where the fission products will concentrate. 1.2.3 The recommended sampling locations are as follows: Gaseous Event Tvye Sample Location Nonbreaks Suppression pool (e.g., MSIV) atmosphere Small breaks Drywell (before depressurization ; suppression pool atmosphere (after depressurization) Large breaks (liquid or steam) in Drywell primary containment Large breaks outside primary Suppression pool containment atmosphere IOPEP-03.6.3 l Rev. 13 l Page 15 of 37
Appendix (Cont'd) Core Damage Evaluation Using PASS sample 1.2.4 The recommended sampling location for liquid for all events is the jet pumps as long as there is sufficient reactor pressure (normally
> 50 psig) to provide a sample from that location. If there is not sufficient reactor pressure to allow a sample to be taken from the jet pumps, the sample should be taken from the sample points on the RHR System.
1.2.5 If a jet pump liquid sample is requested at low (< 1%) power conditions for a small break or nonbreak event, recommend to Operations that the reactor water level be raised to the level of the moisture separators. This will fully flood the moisture separators and will provide a thermally induced recirculation flow path for mixing. 2.0 PROCEDURE STEPS 2.1 Evaluations of Liquid and Gaseous Samples NOTE: An estimate of the extent of core damage can be determined by comparing the measured concentrations of major fission products in either the gas or water samples, after appropriate normalization, with the reference plant data. 2.1.1 The Radiological Controls Director should request samples from the PASS. NOTE: Steps 2.1.2 through 2.1.6 can be accomplished using the PASS Program, a computer program on the Accident Assessment Team (AAT) computer. To use the program, a member of the AAT verifies proper operation of the program by running the test cases in Exhibit 1, Verification of PASS. These tests cases should be used to demonstrate the validity of the PASS Program each time the program is initially used. On successful completion of test cases, Attachment A, Computer Inputs for the PASS Program, is completed and the data is inputted to the PASS Program. The results are provided to the Technical Assessment Director or the Accident Assessment Team Leader. 2.,1.2 Obtain the samples from the PASS and determine the concentration of the fission product i (Cwi in water or Cg, in gas) as determined in Attachment A for computer method or Worksheet Al for manual method. I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 16 of 37
Appendix (Cont'd) Core Damage Evaluation Using PASS sample NOTE: Ensure that the measured gaseous activity concentration has been corrected for temperature and pressure difference in the sample vial and the containment (torus) gas phase. This is normally included in the quantitative analysis results. 2.1.3 Correct the measured concentration on Worksheet Al for decay to the time of reactor shutdown. 2.1.4 Calculate the fission product inventory correction factor Fli per Attachment B and record on Worksheet A2. 2.1.5 Using the results from Worksheet Al and A2 and the correction factors, listed on Attachments C, Calculate the normalized concentration, CwiRef or CgiRe, and record on Worksheet A3. 2.1.6 Use best estimate data from Exhibit 2 to estimate the extent of fuel or cladding damage using CwiRef for Cs-i 37 and 1-131 and CgiRef for Xe-i 33 and Kr-85. Record data on Worksheet A4. OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 17 of 37
3.0 DIAGRAMS AND ATTACHMENTS 3.1 List of Exhibits 1 Verification of PASS 2 Relationships between Isotopic Concentration in the Primary Coolant and the Extent of Core Damage in Reference Plant 3 BNP to Reference Plant Parameters 4 Core Inventory of Major Fission Products in a Reference Plant 3.2 List of Attachments Attachment A Computer Inputs for the PASS Program Attachment B Inventory Correction Factor Attachment C Plant Parameter Correction Factors 3.3 List of Worksheets Worksheet Al Calculation of Isotopic Concentrations Worksheet A2 Calculation of Inventory Correction Factor Worksheet A3 Calculation of Normalized Isotopic Concentrations Worksheet A4 Estimate of Fuel/Cladding Damage OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 18 of 37
EXHIBIT 1 Page 1 of 4 Verification of PASS (A Computer program for estimating core damage based on Post accident Sampling System results) This exhibit is intended to provide a means to ensure that PASS, a core damage estimate program designed for the IBM Personal Computer, is working properly. This is demonstrated by duplicating expected results of known computer inputs. These results can be validated by comparison to manual calculations for the same input. Two different test cases are presented so that a number of alternate paths within the program can be tested. The test cases with their expected results follow. TEST CASE 1 Computer Prompt Expected IhIput Enter The Concentration of the Fission Products Concentration of 1-131 in Reactor Water (pCifml) 1.72E: +3 Concentration of 1-131 in Suppression Pool (pCimI) 1.49E: +2 Concentration of Cs-1 37 in Reactor Water (pCi/ml) 6.55E: +2 Concentration of Cs-137 in Suppression Pool (pCi/mI) 5.70E Concentration of Xe-133 in Drywell (pCi/cc) 1.82E Concentration of Xe-133 in Torus (pCi/cc) 2.41 E:4 2 Concentration of Kr-85 in Drywell (pCi/cc) 1.43E:4+0 Concentration of Kr-85 in Torus (pCi/cc) 1.90E: +0 For the inventory correction factor do you want to use the conservative default values which are bases upon BNP's operations under the same operational constraints (YES or NO)? YES Enter time between the reactor shutdown and the Sample Time (Days) 2 The results should resemble the printout on the following page. If they do not, carefully check your inputs and try the test again. If the results still are not similar, try a backup copy of the program. If that fails, then seek programming help. OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 Page 19 of 37
EXHIBIT 1 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 Estimate the Extent of Core Damage Under Accident Conditions DATE: 03-281984 TIME: 13:21:27 The concentration of the fission products are: 1-131 in Reactor Water 1.72E + 3 pCiml 1-131 in Suppression Pool 1.49E + 2 pCi/ml Cs-1 37 in Reactor Water 6.55E + 2 pCiml Cs-1 37 in Suppression Pool 5.70E + 1 pCVml Xe-1 33 in Drywell Air 1.82E + 2 pCi/cc Xe-133 InTorus Air 2.41E + 2 pCi/cc Kr-85 in Drywell Air 1.43E + 0 pCi/cc Kr-85 in Torus Air 1.90E + 0 pCi/cc Time between the reactor shutdown and the sample time is: 2 days The Conservative Default values of the Inventory Correction Factors were used. Estimate of FueVCladding Damage Primary Coolant Analysis Nuclide CwREF (pCVml) % Cladding % Fuel Failure Meltdown 1-131 3.OOE + 02 69.00 1.35 Cs-1 37 1.OOE + 02 64.54 4.27 Containment Gas Analysis Nuclide CwREF (1,CrIml) % Cladding % Fuel Failure Meltdown Xe-1 33 7.99E + 01 53.26 1.84 Kr-85 5.OOE - 01 56.35 1.92 OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 20 of 37
EXHIBIT 1 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 TEST CASE 2 Expected Input Computer Prompt Enter The Concentration of the Fission Products Concentration of 1-131 in Reactor Water (pCi/ml) 1.35E + 3 Concentration of 1-131 in Suppression Pool (LCiml) 1.18E + 2 Concentration of Cs-1 37 in Reactor Water (VCiml) 1.17E + 2 Concentration of Cs-137 in Suppression Pool (pCi/ml) 1.02E + 1 Concentration of Xe-133 In Drywell (pCi/cc) 1.84E + 2 Concentration of Xe-1 33 in Torus (pCi/cc) 2.45E + 2 Concentration of Kr-85 in Drywell (pCi/cc) 2.91E - 1 Concentration of Kr-85 in Torus (pCi/cc) 3.86E - 1 For the inventory correction factor do you want to use the conservative default values which are bases upon BNP's operations under the same operational constraints (YES or NO)? NO Enter time between the reactor shutdown and the Sample Time (Days)? 2 Enter number of Operating Periods from the unit operating history? 3 For period number (1) enter: Average steady reactor power operated in this period (MWT)? 1000 Duration of this operating period (days)? 60 Time between the end of this operating period and the time of the most recent reactor shutdown (days)? 254 For period number (2) enter: Average steady reactor power operated in this period (MWT)? 2000 Duration of this operating period (days)? 200 Time between the end of this operating period and the time of the most recent reactor shutdown (days)? 44 For period number (3) enter: Average steady reactor power operated in this period (MWT)? 3000 Duration of this operating period (days)? 14 Time between the end of this operating period and the time of the most recent reactor shutdown (days)? 0 The results should resemble the printout on the following page. If they do not, carefully check your inputs and try the test again. If the results still are not similar, try a backup copy of the program. If that fails, then seek programming help. OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 21 of 37
EXHIBIT 1 (Cont'd) Page 4of 4 Estimate the Extent of Core Damage Under Accident Conditions DATE: 03-28-1984 TIME: 13:27:17 The concentration of the fission products are: 1-131 in Reactor Water 1.35E + 3 gCiml 1-131 in Suppression Pool 1.18E + 2 pCi/ml Cs-1 37 in Reactor Water 1.17E + 2 pCi/ml Cs-1 37 in Suppression Pool 1.02E + 1 pCi/ml Xe-133 in Drywell Air 1.84E + 2 pCi/cc Xe-133 in Torus Air 2.45E + 2 pCi/cc Kr-85 in Drywell Air 2.91E - 1 pCi/cc Kr-85 in Torus Air 3.86E - I iCilcc Time between the reactor shutdown and the sample time is: 2 days The Inventory Correction Factors were calculated from the following: Period No. Operation Time Time Between Period & Last Average Power (MWt) (days) Shutdown (days) I 60 254 1000 2 200 44 2000 3 14 0 3000 Estimate of Fuel/Cladding Damage Primary Coolant Analysis Containment Gas Analysis Nuclide CwREF (pCi/ml) % Cladding % Fuel Meltdown Failure Xe-133 8.OOE + 01 53.30 1.84 Kr-85 I 5.OOE - 01 56.40 J 1.92 I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 22 of 37
ATTACHMENT A Page 1 of 1 Computer Inputs for the PASS Program Concentration of 1-131 in Reactor Water (.Ci/ml) Concentration of 1-131 in Suppression Pool (pCi/rl)* Concentration of Cs-1 37 in Reactor Water (pCiml) Concentration of Cs-137 in Suppression Pool (pCi/ml)* Concentration of Xe-133 in Drywell (1Ci/cc) Concentration of Xe-133 in Torus (pC/cc)** Concentration of Kr-85 in Drywell (pCi/cc) Concentration of Kr-85 in Torus (VlCicc)** Time between Reactor Shutdown and Sample Time (days) If time and availability permits, attach information necessary for the calculation of Inventory Correction Factors (see Attachment B); otherwise, conservative default correction factors will be used. Accident Assessment Team Member: Enter data into PASS computer program and provide results to the Technical Assessment Director or the Accident Assessment Team Leader. If unavailable, assume suppression pool activity = 0 lCi/ml.
- If unavailable, assume torus concentration equal to drywell in pCi/cc.
OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 23 of 37l
EXHIBIT 2 Page 1 of 4 105 FUEL MELTDOWN UPPER RELEASE LIMIT BEST ESTIMATE it LOWER RELEASE LIMITa 104 C._ , /X le , I- I 40.0 103 z O 103 0 0
/
A F: 10 z 0 CLADDING FAILURE z ,A UPPER RELEASE LIMIT 0 \ BEST ESTIMATE 0 r LOWER RELEASE LIMIT 1.0 NORMAL SHUTDOWN CONCENTRATION IN REACTOR WATER UPPER LIMIT 29.0 pCVg NOMINAL 0.7 pCi/g 0.1 L a I I a a I I Ia A a aI I I .I I 1 I l aa I IlI I a a la I
- 0. 1 1.0 10 100 l-0 %CLADDING FAILURE *1
. 1n 1.0 IV 100 i- %FUEL MELTDOWN 1 Relationship between 1-131 Concentration in the Primary Coolant (Reactor Water + Pool Water) and the extent of Core Damage in Reference Plant.
I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 24 of 37
EXHIBIT 2 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 4 1O4 FUEL MELTDOWN UPPER RELEASE LIMIT N BEST ESTIMATE LOWER RELEASE LIMIT 1o3
'N I-z o 102 0
C), 0 10 z 0 Ilo z / CLADDING FAILURE w cj 1.0 z L/ UPPER RELEASE LIMIT 0 \ BEST ESTIMATE 0 LOWER RELEASE LIMIT U, I 0.1 NORMAL SHUTDOWN CONCENTRATION IN REACTOR WATER UPPER LIMIT 0.3 ItCilg NOMINAL 0.03 pCig 1 .- 2 I I I " "..1 I II I I,Iiu I , Ii I I I 11 I
,1* I I I*
0.1 1.0 10 100 l-4 %CLADDING FAILURE b l 1.0 10 100 i4 # FUEL MELTDOWN
- l Relationship between Cs-137 Concentration in the Primary Coolant (Reactor Water + Pool Water) and the extent of Core Damage In Reference Plant.
I OPEP-03.6.3 l Rev. 13 l Page 25 of 37
EXHIBIT 2 (Cont'd) Page 3 of 4 104 FUEL MELTDOWN UPPER RELEASE LIMIT , BEST ESTIMATE LOWER RELEASE LIMIT . 1o3 I. XC0 7. 0 l'- z 5 102 4/ 0 0 0 2 I a- 10 z 2 0 o p-CLADDING FAILURE O 1.0 UPPER RELEASE LIMIT 0 KBEST ESTIMATE X LOWER RELEASE LIMIT 0.1 NORMAL OPERATION 7 CONCENTRATION IN DRYWELL UPPER LIMIT 104 pCiVcc NOMINAL 105 pCVcc 10 I
- I I I Iurn
- I I ,.I Irn1; Ia. 1 I I I I IIll I I I I I I 0.1 1.0 10 100 No %CLAWDING FAILURE
- l 1.0 10 100 i< %FUEL MELTDOWN - o Relationship between Xe-133 Concentration in the Containment Gas (Drywell + Torus Gas) and the extent of Core Damage in Reference Plant.
I OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 26 of 37
EXHIBIT 2 (Cont'd) Page 4 of 4 102 FUEL MELTDOWN UPPER RELEASE LIMIT BEST ESTIMATE LOWER RELEASE LIMIT . 10
/ ,
4- 4 I-z ffi 1.0 0 / 0 Q r.3 S. a- 10-1 4-z 4-4- 4-z 4-0 4-4- K CLADDING FAILURE w 10-2 I 0 W UPPER RELEASE LIMIT z BEST ESTIMATE 0 C3 LOWER RELEASE LIMIT It) 4-10o-3 NORMAL OPE _RATION CONCENTRA TION IN DRYWELL 5 UPPER LIMIT 4xl1O pCVcc NOMINAL 4 x 106 pCVcc 104 1 1 1 Hill I I I I l Ilgu I I tiI ul I I I I iiiii II I I lo ll 0.1 1.0 10 10( ) l4 %CLADDING FAILURE O4 1.0 10 100 i< %FUEL MELTDOWN - 1l Relationship between Kr-85 Concentration in the Containment Gas (Drywell + Torus Gas) and the extent of Core Damage in Reference Plant. OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 27 of 37
EXHIBIT 3 Page 1 of 2 BNP TO REFERENCE PLANT PARAMETERS Comparison With Reference Plant Data The extent of core damage can be estimated from the measured fission product concentrations in either the gas or water samples, as described for the reference plant. However, the measured concentration must be corrected for the differences in operation power level, time of operation, primary coolant mass, and containment gas volume. Ref -i t Cwi cwi e x Fri x F, OR Ref - Ai t 2 Co Cgi e x Fr i x Fg Ref Cwj = Concentration of isotope i in the reference plant coolant (jLCi/g). Ref Cga = Concentration of isotope i in the reference plant containment gas (pCi/cc). CwI = Measured concentration of isotope i in BNP's coolant (llCi/g) See Worksheet Al. Cgi = Measured concentration of isotope i in BNP's containment gas (pICi/cc). See Worksheet Al. Xite = Decay correction to the time of reactor shutdown. xi = Decay constant of isotope i (day'). t Time between the reactor shutdown and the sample time (days). Fli = Inventory correction factor for isotope i. See Attachment B. Fg = Containment gas volume correction factor. See Attachment C. Fw = Primary coolant mass correction factor. See Attachment C. I OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 28 of 37
EXHIBIT 3 (Cont'd) Page 2 of 2 BNP to Reference Plant Parameters Reference Plant BNP Reactor Thermal Power 3651 MWt 2923 MWt Number of Fuel Bundles 748 bundles 560 bundles Total Primary Coolant Mass 3.92 x109 g 2.69 x 10 9 g (reactor water plus suppression pool water) Total Drywell and Torus Gas Space 4.0 x 1010 cc 8.11 x 109 cc Volume Reactor Water 2.46 x 108 9 2.14x 108 9 Suppression Pool 3.67x10 9 g 2.48 x 10 9 g Drywell Gas Volume 7.77 x 109 cc 4.65 x 109 cc Torus Gas Volume 3.25 x 10'0 cc 3.46 x 109 cc I OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 l Page 29 of 37
EXHIBIT 4 Core Inventory of Major Fission Products in a Reference Plant Operated at 3651 MWt for Three Years Chemical Group Isotope Half-Life* Inventory 6 Major Gamma Ray Energy 10 Ci -Intensitv - kePV('. MI Noble Gases Kr-85m 4A8 h 24.6 151 (0.753) Kr-85 10.72 y 1.1 514 (0.0044) Kr-87 76.00 m 47.1 403 (0.495) Kr-88 2.84 h 66.8 196 (0.26), 1530 (0.109) Xe-133 5.25 d 202.0 81 (0.365) Xe-135 9.11 h 26.1 250 (0.899) Halogens 1-131 8.04 d 96.0 364 (0.812) 1-132 2.30 h 140.0 668 (0.99), 773 (0.762) 1-133 20.80 h 201.0 530 (0.86) 1-134 52.60 m 221.0 847 (0.954), 884 (0.653) 1-135 6.59 h 189.0 1132 (0.225),1260 (0.286) Alkali Metals Cs-134 2.06 y 19.6 605 (0.98), 796 (0.85) 3 12.1 662 (0.85) Cs-137 0.17 y Cs-138 32.20 m 178.0 463 (0.307),1436 (0.76) Tellurium Group Te-132 78.00 h 138.0 228 (0.88) Noble Metals Mo-99 66.02 h 183.0 740 (0.128) Ru-103 39.40 d 155.0 497 (0.89) Alkaline Earths Sr-91 9.52 h 115.0 750 (0.23),1024 (0.325) Sr-92 2.71 h 123.0 1384 (0.9) Ba-140 12.80 d 173.0 537 (0.254) Rare Earth Y-92 3.54 h 124.0 934 (0.139) La-140 40.20 h 184.0 487 (0.455),1597 (0.955) Ce-141 32.50 d 161.0 145 (OA8) Ce-144 284.40 d 129.0 134 (0.108) Refractories Zr-95 64.00 d 161.0 724 (OA37), 757 (05.53) Zr-97 16.90 h 166.0 743 (0.928)
- h hour d day m month y year OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 30 of 37
ATTACHMENT B Page 1 of 1 Inventory Correction Factor inventory of nuclide i in reference plant 3 Fii = inventory of nuclide i in operation plant 36S1 Q(- e-10AI) II 4 Y-j [ pj (I - e -4 'J-) (e - "' 'JO )] where: Pi = average steady reactor power operated in period j (MWt). T1 = duration of operating period j (day). T' = time between the end of operating period j and the time of the last reactor shutdown (day). 3651 = reference plant MWt. If the unit operating history is not readily available, use the following F,values (based upon Brunswick plant operations under the same operational constraints): Nuclide Conservative F. V (day ') 1-131 1.34 0.0862 Cs-137 1.39 6.29 x 10-5 Xe-133 1.46 0.1320 Kr-85 1.51 1.77 x 104 OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 31 of 37
ATTACHMENT C Page 1 of I Plant Parameter Correction Factors Fw BNP total coolant mass (2.69 x 109 g) reference plant coolant mass (3.92 x 109 g)
= 0.68622 Fg - BNP total containment gas volume (8.11 x 109 cc) reference plant containment gas volume (4 x 1010 cc) = 0.20275 OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 32 of 37
WORKSHEET Al Page 1 of 1 Calculation of Isotopic Concentrations in Primary Water and Suppression Pool Water (Cw1) and Drywell Gas and Torus Gas (Cgj) References Section 2.1.2, 2.1.3 Attachment A Exhibit 3 Date and Time of Reactor Shutdown Date and Time _ of Sample Time between reactor shutdown and sample time (days) Cw1 tvCiml) = [(Concentration Rx H20)1 (0.08) + (Concentration Suppression (Cs' ) Pool H20) (0.92)] (decay correction factor) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ + __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )(__ _ 13 1IC~mICS 137
=~~~~~~~~~______
CW 1(1iCi/mI) = [(Concentration Rx H20), (0.08)] + (Concentration Suppression Pool H20) (0.92)] (decay correction factor)
+
____________ ____POW_ 131 Cg1 qCi/cc) = [(Concentration Drywell), (0.57) + (Concentration Torus)1 (Xe') (0.43)] (decay correction factor) ___________ Ci/CCxe 133 cgi-pcvcc) = [(Concentration DrywelI)h (0.57) + (Concentration Torusy, (0.43)] (decay correction factor) _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ i licc. e 8!. OPEP-03.6.3 Rev. 13 Page 33 of 37
WORKSHEET A2 Page 1 of 1 Calculation of Inventory Correction Factor (Fi) References Section 2.1.4 Attachment B Exhibit 4 pi = D MW__ T1a0 __ _ __ Days Ti = Days 7= __ _ _ _ Days 1 Fli = 3651 (I -e-095-,)
-ij [ Pj (l-e-Ar ) (e ~io)
(Cs 137 ) (0131) (Xe133) 85 (Kr ) l OPEP-03.6.3 l Rev. 13 l Page 34 of 37l
WORKSHEET A3 Page 1 of I Calculation of Normalized Isotopic concentrations in Primary Water and Suppression Pool Water (CwIR ) and Drywell Gas and Torus Gas (Cg1Re) References Section 2.1.5 NOTE: For BNP, Attachment C Fw = 0.68622 Worksheet Al (Cwj and Cgi) Fg = 0.20275 Worksheet A2 (Flj) CwRe' = Cwi eS x Fli x Fw (Cs,37)
= _ _ _ _ _ _ x x 37
=_____________________________ pCi/mic,'
Cw, Ref =Cw e)'xFl xFw (1131)
- _ __ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _ x _ _
C~gj~f= Cg e' xFl1,xFg (Xe 133 )
-_ __ _ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _
______ ______ __ ia /cc Xe I33 CgiRef = Cg1 ell x Fli x Fg (Kr" 5)
-_ __ _ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _
_ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ LC icc K r 85 l OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 35 of 37
WORKSHEET A4 Page 1 of 1 Estimate of FuellCladding Damage References Section 2.1.6 Exhibft 2 Worksheet A3 Primary Coolant Analysis Isotope Cw1Ref(,+/-Ci/ml) % Cladding % Fuel Failure Meltdown 0131 Cs 13 7 Containment Gas Analysis Isotope CgRR(pCVml) % Cladding % Fuel Failure Meltdown Xe 133 Kr 85 _ l OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 36 of 37
REVISION
SUMMARY
Revision 13 - Revision incorporates PASS Technical Specification change. Procedure places primary focus on radiation levels in the containment as initial indicators of core damage. Use of the PASS is maintained in the procedure to permit more precise determination of core damage from gas and liquid samples. Revision 12 - Changes to reflect power uprate on Unit 2 from 2558 to 2923 MWt, including:
- Deletion of Unit 2 specific information in Exhibit 3, BNP to Reference Plant Parameters; and
- Deletion of separate calculation for Unit 2 on Worksheet B1, Determination of Fuel Inventory Release Based on Containment Radiation Monitoring Reading.
OPEP-03.6.3 I Rev. 13 l Page 37 of 37}}