ML20052E605

Forwards LER 82-009/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20052E605
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/03/1982
From:	Mroczka E NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20052E607	List: ML20052E605 ML20052E614
References
MP-2-5147, NUDOCS 8205110276
Download: ML20052E605 (2)

Text

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s NOltTHEA!TF trrII.rFIES t., u wo am r n ..<#w a n4=w P.O. BOX 270 UsI[ YE[N$Nds. , HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101 L L A Sh'bb5'5bbbllll f kflg,A982 f h MP-2-5137 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes -

N o Regional Adainistrc.tnr, Region I Of fice of Inscection and Enforcement

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissior D r '

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Reference:

Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 Docket No. 50-336 Reportable Occurrence R0-50-336/82-09/lT-0

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 82-09/lT/0, required to be submitted within 14 days pursuant to Millstone Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.b, concerning operation of the unit with a limiting condition for operation in a less conservative condition than is established in the Technical Specifications. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

/ AM 3W E J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station l EJM/RWB:mo

Attachment:

LER 82-09/lT-0 cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (40)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, 3. C. 20555 8205110276 820503 PDR ADOCK 05000336 PDR 16LU S s/

If/

I ATTACitiENT TO LER 82-09/01-T NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET N0. 50-336 Event Description and Probable Consequences Section 3.5.2 of the Technical Specificati1ons requires two separate and independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 (with Pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia). One of the Boric Acid flowpaths listed in Section 3.5.2.d became inoperable when the motor operator failed on the common discharge valve 2-CH-514 for the Boric Acid pumps. Following this motor failure a plant trip occurred due to unrelated problems and the sub-sequent recovery and plant startup was made without the realization that Action Statement "a" under Section 3.5.2.d applied. Approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> after the motor failure and during the plant startup, a review of the two sections which address boric acid fow paths, revealed differences between the two sections that were not obvious on the initial reviews at the time of the motor failure. The two sections are 3.1.2.2.a (Reactivity Control Systems) and 3.5.2.d (ECCS Subsystems).

Both subsections require an operable charging pump with a flow path from a Boric Acid Storage Tank via either an operable boric acid pump or a gravity feed connection. However Section 3.5.2 required two ECCS subsystems to be operable, while Section 3.1.2.2 provided for operation with any two of three possible boron injection flow paths operable. The latter condition was met even with the failure of the motor operator, so that with the similarity in wording it appeared that both sections were satisfied and a startup was commenced. When further reviews showed the differences a plant operator was immediately stationed near the valve to provide manual opening capability if required. This operator was retained until the motor was replaced and the valve returned to normal operable status. As a result there were no probable consequences.

Cause Description and Corrective Action The mode changes while operating under an action statement were made because of a misinterpretation of differences between two different sectiens of the Technical Specifications. To prevent a recurrence personnel have been briefed on the differences between the two sections and a technical specification change will be submitted to reduce possible confusion.

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