ML20028B986

Revised Contentions.Ols Should Be Denied

ML20028B986
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	03/10/1980
From:	Cherry M CHERRY, M.M./CHERRY, FLYNN & KANTER, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ROCKFORD, IL
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8301050103
Download: ML20028B986 (113)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _

NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!E1ISSION In the Matter of )

_ )

1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.,~ ) Docket Nos. STN

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Byron Station -

) 50-454 and 50-455

)

(Units No. 1 and No. 2) ) Operating License REVISED CONTENTIONS OF INTERVENOR ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS 9

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[ Offi;c tithS St:te'.af 'Ei D;d;" hit. ;4&Etim os &

C Myron M. Cherry CIIERRY , FLYNN & KANTER

. One IBM Plaza Suite 4501 Chicago, Illinois 60611 i (312) 565-1177 Attorney For Rockford League of Women Voters DATED: MARCH 10, 1980

)

8301050103 800310 PDR ADOCK 05000454 G PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ADDITIONAL MATTERS AND RESERVATIONS....................

REVISED CONTENTIONS OF ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS.............................. 6 i CONCLUSION............................................. 113 i

s EXHIBIT A.............................................. Following Conclusion 4

! PROOF OF SERVICE....................................... ,Following Exhibit A l

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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) .

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO., ) Docket Nos. STN i

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Byron Station ) 50-454 and 50-455

. )

(Units No. 1 and No. 2) ) Operating License REVISED CONTENTIONS OF--INTERVENOR ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS Pursuant to earlier stipulation of the parties (see Exhibit A hereto), the Rockford League of Women Voters (hereafter sometimes "Intervenor") respectfully submits the following Revised Contentions for litigation in this matter.

The Rockford League of Women Voters has already been granted Intervenor status herein; and thus allegations with respect to standing, interest, or other t'echnicalities are not set forth herein. See Tr. 36, Conference Re Byron, Tuesday, August 21, 1979, Rockford, Illinois.,

ADDITIONAL MATTERS AND RESERVATIONS

1. Notwithstanding any reference herein to statutes and regulations, Intervenor reserves the right,_under appropriate circumstances, to challenge the application of any

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such statute or regulation and assert the illegality of any rule, procedure or convention of the Nuclear Begulatory Commission ( "N RC " ) which improperly or illegally denies Inter-venor rights and privileJes belonging to them pursuant to other statutes and the United States Constitution.

2. By the filing of these Revised Contentions, Intervenor does not admit the legality of this proceeding and does not admit the legality of the statutes, rules and practices which the NRC requires be followed.

3. To the extent that any _ issue or revised conten-tion raised herein is considered by any party as being an issue or revised contention which has or might be raised or considered,

- in whole or in part, at the hearings concerning the construction permits for the Byron Station (Units No. 1 and No. 2), Inter-A venor states both that the' construction permit hearing was a sham and is not otherwise applicable to bar the raising of any such issue or revised contention herein at the operating stage, and in any event, Intervenor further asserts with respect to any such issue or revised contention that new facts or matters

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subsequent to the construction permit hearings justify the.

litigation of each such issue or revised contention at the operating stage herein.

4. A reference in these Revised Contentions to any statute, regulation, regulatory guide, design criteria, or .

references shall include not only any such references madb'in connection with each revised contention, but also shall include

I an implicit reference to all applicable statutes, regulations, regulatory guides, and design criteria, whether or not specifi-cally set forth.

5. Each revised contention set forth herein is specifically to be considered as directed to the Byron Station

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(Units No. 1 and No. 2), whether or not a reference to Byron is specifically set forth in each revised contention.

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6. Intervenor submits these Revised Contentions subject to the following reservations:

(a) Intervenor intends to _ seek from the NRC attorneys' fees, costs, and other assistance (both financial and non-financial) in connection with its -

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participation in this proceeding, and a failure to grant such fees, costs and assistance in connection with Intervenor's val'uable contribution may affect .

its ability to participate; (b) Intervenor intends to revise its Revised Contentions, from time to time, to accommodate further issues which Intervenor believes ought to be raised within a reasonable time after each or any of the .

following:

(i) An Advisory Committee on Reactor l

Safeguards ("ACRS") meeting or letter; (ii) Discussions or negotiations with other parties hereto; (iii) Environmental Submissions or issuan' des by Applicant or Staff and comments thereon;

(iv) Regulatory Staff questions; (v) Applicant's. answers to Regulatory Staff questions; (vi) Amendments by the Applicant to any part of the application; (vii) Inspections by the Division of Compliance; (viii) Reports of accidents or malfunctions by any construction permit holder or operating license holder; (ix) New and applicable information from any source whatsoever; (x) Information submitted to the Illinois Commerce Commissi,on; (xi) Information generated by State agencies which have jurisdiction over the applica-tion in connection with matters which may affect this proceeding, such a5 the Illinois E.P.A.;

(xii) Information submitted to the United States Environmental Protection Agency or regula-tioni issued by that, Agency, including but not limited to radiation release standards; and (xiii) Matters obtained in discovery of informa-tion from anyone.

( (c) Intervenor intends to move for a free copy or free use of a copy of a transcript of these proceedings upon the grounds that it will be unable meaningfully to participate without such a transcript and presently cannot afford to purchase one; (d) Intervenor also reserves the right to participate by offering evidence and cross-examining and seeking" dis-covery in connection with contentions raised or placed into issue by other parties to the proceeding in accord-ance with well-established principles of law and announced by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in ALAB-244, RAI-74-11 857 (1974) and ALAB-252, RAI-75-1 (1975);

(e) Intervenor reserves the right to file these Revised Contentionsjwithout prejudice to its right to present legal arguments on the basis of a full evidentiary record in this proceeding concerning the commingling of promotional and regulatory responsibilities in the NRC, the constitution-ality of the Price Anderson Act, and the constitutionality and validity of any NRC regulation' governing this proceeding;

- and (f) Assuming arguendo, any of these Revised Conten-tions are deemed to constitute an attack on any rule or regulation of the NRC, each such Contention shall be considered as a petition pursuant to 10 C.F.R., S 2.758 (and/or a request for certification to the NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 2.718(i)) that the application of such rule or regulation be waived or an exception made,for this proceed-ing on the ground that the special and unprecedented policy and other circumstances with respect to the site operation and regulation of Byron are such that the application of the rule or regulation would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted.

7. Intervenor hereby notifies the Licensing Board and

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parties of its willingness to enter into meaningful negotiations with the other parties herein, as set forth on page 2 of Exhibit A hereto. .

REVISED CONTENTIONS OF ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF, WOMEN VOTERS_

1. Particularly at the operating l'icense stage of a nuclear power plant proceeding, see Consolidated Edison Co.

(Indian Point, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190,

! 192 (1976), the NRC Staf f -(hereaf ter sometimes "Staf f") bears a heavy responsibility for insuring that the continued construc-tion, maintenance, quality assurance and quality control, and operating activities of the units in connection with which the operating license ir sought, comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and applicable NRC regulations and guide-lines. There can be no assurance that the Staff will adequately perform those vital technical and managerial ta6ks in this case.

The Staff's failure adequately to perform these tasks has been detailed in (among other sources) L. V. Gossick, et al.,

Atomic Energy Commission Task Force Report: Study of the Reactor Licensing Process (October, 1973), the General Account-ing Office Report No. EMD-78-80, "The NRC Needs to AIggressively Monitor and Independently Evaluate Nuclear Plant Construction" (September 197 8) , Report of the President's Commission on The Accident at Three Mile Island, and Rogovin, e't al., Three Mile Island, A Report to the Commissioners and the Public. These reports and the myriad of events they describe and relate to bespeak of a gross negligence, if not dishonesty, in regulation over many years. At a minimum these facts do not justify the confidence in the Regulatory Staff demanded by the system. While regulation could be better, it is not--and to_ license Byron on the assumption it will exist is incompatible with reason, let alone documented history. As a result of the inadequacy of the Staff's performance of these tasks, no finding can be made pur-suant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.5h (a) (2) and 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (3) (i) that the proposed Byron plhnt can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety, or in accordance with applica-ble NRC rules and regulations. This is even more so because, among other things, the record of the_ construction permit phase of Byron (" Byron" refers to both units unless otherwise indi-cated), the proceedings in other of Applicant's plants, and the violations of AEC-NRC rules and regulations documented over and i

over again in inspection reports of, and citations issued to, Commonwealth Edison Co. ("C.E." or "applic, ant") in each of its nuclear facilities, conclusively demonstrates that the applicant can not and will not comply with MRC rules and regulations absent constant monitoring and prodding by the, NRC Staff.

2. Based upon the performance of C.E. at each of its other nuclear facilities, documented in the files of C..E.

and the inspection and other files of the AEC'-NRC relating to each of C.E.'s other nuclear facilities, the findings required by the applicable portions of 10 C.F.R. cannot be made for Byron.

3. The conclusions reached in Gossich, et al.,

supra, were based in part on a review of the inspection ~ ~pYac-tices of the Staff and the conclusion that those practices consist principally of reviewing the applicant's inspection program rather than dirbetly revidwing safety-related activi-ties. The GAO Report No. EMC 78-80, as well as Kemeny and Rogovin, cited supra, confirm over a long period of time the continued lack of an effective direct inspection program. As

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a result of this inadequacy of Staff inspection practices, and

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in light of C.E.'s consistently poor compliance record, no finding can be made pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (2) and 10 C.F.R. 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) , that Byron can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety or in accordance with NRC rules and regulations.

4. It is documented fact that despite NRC Staff safety reviews and inspections, commercial nuclear power, plants, some of them operated by C.E., have actually operated in the United States with serious design defects,- including blatant flaws ranging from such things as direct contact between local drinking water supplies and a radioactive waste tank to steam generator failures. In addition, the licensing and operation of' commercial nuclear power plants continues unimpeded notwith-standing the failure to resolve any significant number of the 133 unresolved " generic" issues, many with enormous safety implications, reported to Congress by the NRC in 1978, more than two years ago. See NRC Program for the Resolution of Generic Issues Related to Muclear Power Plants, NUREG-0410, Januar's 1, 1975. In fact, theoverwhelmingmajcritycEt$cse issues (including safety issues) continue to be unresolved;

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Task Action Plans have not yet been approved for any of the category B, C, and D unresolved items identified in NUREG-0410, even though the Commission Staff now regards some of those issues as falling within a high-risk category; and the Staff has not completed and implemented a revised Task Action Plan for even the important ATUS Task identified in NUREG-0410.

All of this appears in the- testimony of Messrs. M. B. Aycock, L. P. Crocker, and C. O. Thomas, Jr., in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, et al., (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2) , Dkts.

STN 50-556, STN 50-557 (hereafter sometimes " Black Fox testimony").

These serious deficiencies, and the attitude of " business as usual" rather than alert and independent regulation which they suggest, mean that the operating license for Byron must be denied because the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50. 57 (1) ,

50.57(2), and 50.57 (3) (ii)'cannot be made. .

5. Both the Applicant and its architect-engineer have had, and continue to*have, a poor record in constructing and operating nuclear power plants and in overseeing the

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quality assurance and quality control ("QA-QC") of subcontrac-As specifically set forth in Contention 1 above, this tors.

poor record has been repeatedly evidenced, and is still being evidenced, with regard to Byron in particular." For these reasons, Intervenor contends that the QA-QC performance level with regard to Byron will continue to be far below the minimum acceptable level, and the findings required by 10 C.F.R. *-

s SS 50. 57 (a) (1) , 50. 57 (a) (3) , and 50.57 (a) (4) , therefore, cannot be made.

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6. The NRC Staff and Applicant do not understand, or choose to ignore, the cryptic references by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS") in its report regard-ing Byron to "other [ design] problems" which the ACRS said should be " resolved during construction" in order to provide the essential " reasonable assurance" that the proposed Byron facility could be operated"without undue risk. But these unresolved safety issues, as well as those set forth in the AC RS ' 1978 Report to Congress, must be considered in this proceeding (Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-57, 6 NRC 482, 497-88 (1977)), and "ther merits of the ACRS' ' unresolved safety issues' [must] be explored further," and "must be done whether or not the parties are themselves or otherwise interested in pursuing these matters."

• Consumers Power Co., (Midland Plant, Units.1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 177 n. 87 (1978). As a result of the incomprehen-sible ACRS report and the inability of either the Staff or C.E. to determine what the ACRS meant, and in.the absence of meaningful resolution prior to conclusion of construction, the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) , and 50.57 (a) (6) , among others, cannot be made. .

7. Since the execution of the initial contracts for Byron, the cost of that project has soared, and continues to soar. At the same time, C.E.'s demand projections (on whic'r i t .e n eed- f er-power argume.nt is based) have droppe'd""

drastically and continue to drop drastically. As a result, l

the proposed Byron facility can not be justified economically and cannot survive the cost-benefi-t analysis required by 10 C.F.R. SS 51.20(b) and 51.21.

8. Neither C.E. nor the Staff has presented a meaningful assessment of the risks associated with the opera-tion of the proposed Byron nuclear facility; contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S 51. 2 0 (a) and S 51.20 (d) . Studies t carried out by the NRC have identified accident mechanisms, considered credible, which would lead to uncontrolable accidents and release to the environment of appreciable fractions of a reactor's inventory of radioactive materials. Traditionally, these accident potentials have been downplayed or ignored on the basis of the Rasmussen Report. However, the Lewis Committee has now called into serious question the entire methodology, as well as the findings and conclusions, of the Rasmussen Report, which led the NRC to withdraw official reliance on the Rasmussen Report, yet the Staff still regulates upon the valid-ity of the basic conclusions therein. In addi, tion, NRC Staff studies, which are not common public knowledge, have cast doubt upon numerous of the specific conclusions of the Rasmussen.

Report. For example, in one secret NRC study',, estimates of the " killing distance" were made, referring to the range over which lethal injuries would be received under varying weather conditions from the release of radioactive material in a nuclear power plant accident. Depending upon prevailing weather ~Eondi-tions, this " killing distance" was estinated to be up to i

several dozen miles from the accident-damaged reactor. Un-published document from,Brookhaven, National Laboratory, USAEC.

In addition, the Liquid Pathways Study, NUREG-0440 (February, 1978), highlights the incomplete safety assessment currently j performed by the NRC, particularly with respect to incomplete review of all credible ac$ident sequences. A General Account-i1~J Office report pertaining to that study criticizes the NRC's failure to consider core-melt accidents in assessments of relative differences in Class 9 risks. The March 7, 1978 letter from the NRC's Mr. Case to the Commissioners (Secy-7 8-137) also urges the inclusion of core-melt considerations in site comparisons in the case of sites involving high popula-

, tion density, such as Byron and the surrounding area in which live now (or at time of proposed operation) upwards of 500,000 persons. Moreover7 neither C.E. nor the NRC Staff has presented an accurate assessment of the risks posed by opera-tion of Byron, contrary to the requirements of 10 C.F.R.

S 51.20(a) and S 51.20(d). The decision to issue the Byron

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construction permit did not, and the present'y filed analysis of C.E. and the Staff do not, consider the consequences of,so-called Class 9 accidents, particularly core meltdown with breach of containment. These accidents were deemed to have a low probability of occurrence. The Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, was an attempt to demonstrate that the actual risk from Class 9 accidents is very low. However, the Commission has stated that it "does not regard as reliable the Reactor l

Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident." (NRC Statement of Risk Assessment _and the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-14GC) in Light of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report, January 18, 1979.) The withdrawal of NRC's endorsement of the Reactor Safety Study and its findings leaves no technical basis for c5ncluding that the actual risk is low enough to justify operation of Byron.

9. No finding can be made that C.E. has or will have the financial ability to complete or operate the Byron project, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (4) . The general financial difficulties obtaining upon all utilities and C.E.

in particular has caused C.E. to canral and halt certain power projects for lack of financing. This financial crunch will affect Byron, particularly since C.E. will, as it has at other plants, place eco'homic necessity over required safety. ,

10. C.E. lacks the managerial qualifications necessary to complete and operate the proposed Byron facility.

This is demonstrated by C.E.'s history of inadequate and slip- ,

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shod quality assurance and quality control practices in this and other of its facilities and by the Region III Complian,ce determination that C.E. consistently attempts'to evade or be excused from compliance with NRC requirements", rather than As a result, genuinely attempting to meet those requirements.

the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (1) , 50. 57 (a) (2) ,

50. 57 (a) (3) , 50. 57 (a) (4) , and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made. -

11. C.E. has totally failed to demonstrate that there is a present genuine "need"-for the power to be produced by the proposed Byron facility, particularly given the egre-giously high cost of that power and C.E.'s historical and long-standing tendency to overestimate its demand projections. At the same time that the estimated cost of the Byron facility has greatly increased, the demand projections on which C.E.

bases its "need for power" argument have dropped drastically, and there is a short and long term over-capacity on C.E.'s system (and systems with which it is r_eliably interconnected) all to the point where it now appears that the proposed Byron nuclear facility is not needed, for at least the next 20 years. Construction and operation of a nuclear (or other) power plant under such circumstances is grossly wasteful of resources, damaging to the environment, ecpnomically burden-

- some to C.E.'s ratepayers, and utterly unjustifiable in terms of the cost-benefit analysis required by NEPA.

12. The inability of the proposed , Byron facility to survive a proper NEPA cost-benefit analysis, and the com-plete insufficiency of C.E.'s "need for power" claims in light of the skyrocketing. cost of the facility and C E.'s plummeting demand projections, are erphasized and made even worse by C.E.'s (and the NRC's) stubborn refusal to consider fairly and evenhandedly the possibility that energy conservation--

both tha' chich results from censumption cutbacks caused ~b'y

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increased energy prices and other affirmative and mandatory efforts and that which results from other factors, including public awareness of the energy crisis and the National Energy Policy--will even further reduce any alleged "need" (or market) for the expensive power to be produced by Byron. Moreover,

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C.E. has demonstrated its insensitivity to effective energy conservation by successfully petitioning the Illinois Commerce Commission in 1980 to relieve C.E. of any obligations to foster energy conservation. Regardless of whether an intervenor raises energy conservation issues or not, the NRC is affirma- _,

tively required to take the lead in exploring and raising such issues, as a matter of its NEPA responsibility, and it (and C.E.) have totally failed to do so.

13. C.E. itself admitted to the NRC and the public that its demand projection 3 were proving to be seriously exag-gerated "because of energy conservation". That has continued

! to be true. Large components of C.E.'s--for example, residen-tial space heating demand--have actually declined during

! recent years, and many of C.E.'s largest customers have gone l

! on record as committed to a policy of energy conservation and reduced energy consumption. C.E.'s "need for' power" argument and its demand projections fail to take account of any of these facts, or of any facts concerning energy conservation, l

including among other things price elasticity, the Federal l ,

Government's programs to increase the ef ficiency of home '-

appliances, the demand-reducing effect of the change in the I

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relationship between average annual residential electric cus-tomers' bills and average annual disposable income per house-hold, the continued emphasis on conservation as a result of higher energy costs, the recognition of a continuing energy supply problem, the lack of large new appliances, fewer and smaller homes being added as a result of high construction costs, and the continued low birth rate.

14. Environmental submissions by C.E. and Staff l have failed completely to discuss or analyze the absolute and incremental effects upon the environmen,t (including cost-benefit and risk-benefit considerations) of the entire uranium

. fuel cycle, including the production of uranium by means and methods not presently developed, such as, for example, the

Liquid Fast Metal Breeder Reactor. This is especially serious

'. with regard to the Byron project, due to, among other things, (a) the possible need to use plutonium, thorium, or other fissionable isotopes; (b) the lack of any long-term contract for fuel or waste disposal; and (c) the inadequacy of storage t -

facilities in light of compaction problems and high density rack problems. Neither the original nor the revised fuel cycle rule or Table S-3 promulgated by the Commission remedies this critical defect, because among other things th'ey were and are t

illegally and invalidly developed and prcmulgated, they are not adequately supported by the record developed in connection with their promulgation, they are inaccurate and incorrect, and they fail completely to consider multiple and extremely

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important issues. For example, it is now known that nuclear waste will be stored onathe site of the planned Byron nuclear facility--thus highlighting all of the problems referred to earlier in this Contention--rather than shipped somewhere else.

(No alternative storage site has been found acceptable, con-trary to one of the funda$ ental premises on which the NRC's fuel cycle rule is based.)- In particular, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, the complete failure of C.E.

and the Staff properly to consider and evaluate the absolute and incremental effects upon the enviro,nment of the uranium fuel cycle means that there is no valid Environmental Report in the proceeding, pursuant to NEPA or 10 C.F.R. SS 51.20 and 51.21, and that no valid cost-benefit analysis has been made or can be made for the proposed facility. Among other things and apart from the invalidity and inaccura,cy of the NRC's fuel cycle rule, even if the rule were valid, it has never been applied in this proceeding other than on an improper and ex parte basis.

15. Uot only have C.E. and the NRC completely failed to discuss the serious adverse environmental impact,of storing nuclear fuel wastes at the site of th'e proposed facility, including all of the prob 1 cms identified in the previous Contention, but also even if those wastes will be stored somewhere else, the NEPA review is fatally deficient for at no point is there any discussion at all of where -(ether than on-site) such radioactive wastes will be store.1 and what

burden, absolute and incremental, will be placed upon the stor-age facilities and the surrounding environment as a result of such wastes. The NRC does not even have a site selected for the disposal of such high-level wastes. Therefore, and as a matter of law, there has been no valid cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis of the storage and disposition of such wastes.

16. Environmental submissions by C.E. and the Staff admit that low-level solid and liquid radioactive wastes will be generated by operation of the proposed plant, and discuss in a cursory fashion the fact that the plant itself must ultbmately be considered to be radioactive waste for decommissioning purposes. There is an inadequate discussion of the character and environmental effect of such radioactive wastes and (in the sense that separate radionuclides are not listed either quantitatively or qualitatively) there is no discussion of the incremental burden on the environment which will be created by such wastes.

17. C.E.'s Environmental Report is, grossly inade-quate, not only for the reasons stated above but also because it omits even t":e minimum necessary information to permit an independent evaluation of the environmental impact of the proposed plant. Among the information omitted, for example, are responses to the scores of questions the Staff directed to C.E.--many of which questions indicate that the proposed f 3:ilit vill ne' be operated in accordance with the AtohYc Energy Act, as amended , IIRC Regulations , or C.E. 's own application.

18. C.E. is building the Byron f acility primarily for sale of electricity.to wholesale users (other utilities) outside of its service area and even outside of Illinois where C.E. has no authority to operate. This reason is an insufficient and illegal reason to permit licensing. Moreover, these arrange-ments, as a matter of fact and law, make such other utilities, in effect, undivided ownert in the Byron facility. However, none of these buyers or potential buyers has been listed as an applicant in any application or amended application for a construction permit or operating licen_s,e with regard to Byron.

As a result:

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(a) C.E.'s proposed sales are illegal; (b) Because none of these buyers or potential buyers is or has been a party to the proceedings in these Dockets, the findings required by 10 C.F.R.

S 50.57 (a) (4) cannot Ee made; and ,

(c) The finding required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (2) cannot be made.

19. Recently discovered information indicates that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards conditioned the acceptability of the present Byron site for the project ,

i on the existence of an effective evacuation system.

However, no adequate evacuation plans exist, and since the Three Mile Island Accident ("TMI"), it has been acknowledged that neither Illinois nor C.E. have effective evacuation plans regarding Byron or even C.E.'s operating plants,.such as, for example, Zion. Information gathered by C.E. during t

construction, during shift changes, and generally provided by

- Illinois' emergency preparedness officials show that evacuation regarding Byron in an acceptable time cannot be accomplished.

! Moreover, the events at TMI-2 showed the inadecuacy of NRC emergency planning requirements. Emergency planning beyond I

the LPZ is a recognition-$f the residual risk associated with major reactor accidents whose consequences could exceed those associated with so-called design basis events. Such planning j

should be based on a worst case analysis of the potential accident consequences of a core melt with breach of contain-ment. The public health and safety requires that there be in

<  ; place prior to operation of Byron an effective well publicized and tested plan to evacuate the public in the event of such an accident. The Byron emergency plan is inadequate because it i e is not based on a weather-Hependent worst case analysis of the l

. potential consequences of a core melt with breach of contain-ment. The public health and safety also requires that there i .

be in place prior to operation of Byron an effective plan to evacuate the public in the event of such an accident and to

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take other emergency measures because evacuation is or wil,1 be impractical in many affected areas. No such plans are, however, seriously planned or practically available. is a result, the findings required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and S 50.57 (a)

(6) cannot be made.

20. There exists a serious water hammer problem regarding pressurized water reactors of the Byron type and involving a variety of components, some of which are critical safety items. These safety related problems have been identi-fied by the NRC Staff as high priority matters, both in NUREG-0410, "NRC Program For The Resolution Of General 13 sues Related To Nuclear Power Plants" (January, 1978), and the-testimony of Staff witnesses M. B. Aycock, L. P. Crocker, and C. O. Thomas, Jr., recently presented in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, et al. (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), Dkts. STN 50-556, STN 50-557. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made. _,

21. There exists a serious problem regarding pressurized w6ter reactors, including the Byron project, due to the failure of the design for the reactors to consider the effect of an asymmetric loading on the reactor vessel supports resulting from a postulated reactor coolant pipe rupture at specific locations. This is a serious safety problem with regard to reactors of the Byron type, and it is one of priority l

importance, as is stated in both NUREG-0410 an,d the Black Fox testimony cited above. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem, the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

22. An extremely serious problem occurring at other plants such as Consumers' Palisades plant and C.E.'s Zion plant, and likely to occur at C.E.'s Byron plant, is presented by degradation of stean generating tube integriEy due to corrosion induced wastage, cracking, reduction in tube diameter, and vibration induced fatigue cracks. This affects, and may destroy, the capability of- the degraded tubes to main-tain their integrity, both during normal operation and under accident conditions, such as a LOCA or a main stream line break. The Commission Staff has correctly regarded this problem

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as a safety problem of a serious nature, as' evidenced both by NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony cited above. As a-result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50-57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) can-not be made. _,

23. With regard to anticipated transients without scram there exists serious and continuing uncertainty as to

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how to resolve the problem, to the point where (as appears at

p. 10, note 2 of the Black Fox testimony cited above) , a Revised Task Action Plan covering the ATUS, issue is still not resolved satisfactorily. This matter is a safety issue of high priority, as is apparent from NUREG-0410. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

24. There is no assurance that suitable safety.

margins will be maintained throughout the design life of the Byron facility with the materials used for reactor vessel fabrication. As is evidenced from the inclusion of this problem in NUREG-0410 as a " Category A" item and from the

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plack re:- tertimony cited above, this problen presents"a sub-stantial safety issue. The NRC Staff cannot ignore the

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• 1 problem on the basis of an unverified " assumption" that the ongoing evaluation will not lead to any change in previous conclusions. As a result of this serious and unresolved pro-blem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and

, 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

25. As stated ~in both MUREG-0410 and in the Balck Fox testimony cited above,."it is...necessary to reassess the fracture toughness of the steam generator and reactor coolant pump support materials for all operating PWR plants and those in CP and OL review," as a result of the potential for lamellar tearing and low fracture toughness of those materials. The i Staf f has identified this as a high-priority safety item. Yet this problem has not been adequately resolved in connection with Byron. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

I l 26. There has been inadequate examination of the methodology employed to determine the necessity for using snubbers as component supports, and there has been isadequate

consideration of actual and potential snubber malfunction. ,

This is a safety-related problem to which the Staff has attached a high priority, as evidenced by NUREG-0410 ahd the Black Fox testimony cited above. But despite the existence and importance of the problem, adequate technical specifications and regulatory guides to assure a high level of snubber operability f.or_ nuclear plants in general, and Byron in particular, have not yet been

devised. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R._ SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and

50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

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27. Although "the ability to detect and adequately i size flaws is essential in assuring continued integrity of the reactor coolant presE$re boundary and in assessing the i margin against failure under various plant conditions through-out the full life of the plant," as stated in Task No. A-14 in NUREG-0410, "significant uncertainties" exist in this regard. This means that, contrary to present practice, the failure probability of a reactor pressure vessel cannot be

considered sufficiently low to ex..lude it from consideration as a design basis accident. The Staff has recognized this problem as one of high priority, and it has obvious safety implications for Byron. AE a result of this serious and

[ unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

28. There does not now exist a systematic process

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to review different nuclear power plant systems (such as containment systems, reactor systems, and the like) to detpr-mine their safety-related impact on various other plant systems.

! Nonetheless, the Staff has recognized that "ac'tions or conse-quences in one system" might " adversely affect the redundancy l or independence of safety systems in another system or systems."

Because of the f ailure adequately to examine the safety-related interrelationships between and among the various nuclear power 1

l

l plant systems, there can be no assurance that interaction will not, in fact, produce s.erious safety-related adverse conse-quences. Yet no systematic process of review has been established to meet this need--even though the Staff has identified the problem (which applies to Byron) as a priority matter, both in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox testimony cited above. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings re-quired by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

l 29. The current design criteria for the postula-tion of pipe breaks and protection therefrom are inconsistent, and have not been justified. In fact, there are pre,sently in

! process " Staff efforts toward documentation of the rational and engineering justification for the existing pipe break l criteria," as set forth in'the Black Fox t,estimony cited above.

Thus, new criteria have not been developed and existing cri-teria have not been fully justified. As shown by its inclusion in " Category A" in both NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony referred to above, this problem has safety implications. It is unjustifiable, and there can be no assurance that it is.

safe, to license nuclear reactors for operatib,n in the absence of adequate design criteria for the postulation of pipe breaks and protection therefrom. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

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30. Existing main steam line break. analyses, both inside and 'tside, containment, are seriously inadequate; with regard to a break inside containment, there is a concern i

j regarding the capability of the equipment to survive such an event to assure safe plant shutdown. The Staff has recognized the seriousness of these problems, both in NUREG-1040 and in -

the Black Fox testimony referred to above, and the problem is applicable to pressurized water reactors like Byron. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot I

be made.

,; 31. 10 C.F.R. S 50.54 (o) provides that "primar-j reactor containments for water cooled power reactors shall be j subject to the requirements set forth in Appendix J". But those requirements are, in'the language of the Staff in NUREG-i 0410 and the Black Fox testimony cited above, " conflicting, impractical for implementation or subject to a variety of i interpretations by the NSSS vendors, architect-engineers,

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utilities and the Staff." As a result--again, in the words of the Staff as set forth in the above sources--it is "diffi-cul'. to determine if applicants and licensees'have developed uniformly acceptable containment leak testing' programs and for field inspectors to judge the acceptability of a licensees containment leak testing practices." This means that a safety issue sufficiently important to warrant independent treatment i by regulation is, in fact, an open and unresolved problem. W 4

1

As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. 59 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 53.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

32. There have not yet been developed adequate qualification methods with which to satisfy the objective of

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the requirement that al1 safety-related equipment conform to the requirements establish ~ed in IEEE Standard 323-1974, "IEEE Standard For Qualifying Class IE Equipment For Nuclear Power Generating Stations." Thus a major safety issue, treated by the Staff as one of high priority in both NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony cited above, remains unresolved for want of adequate equipment qualification methodology and acceptance criteria. This problem is directly applicable to Byron. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 5'0.57 (a) (3) (1) an,d 50. 57 (a) (6) can-not be made.

33. Present practice with regard to Byron permits the connection of nonsafety loads in addition ,to the required safety loads to Class IE power sources, with some restrictions.

l Those power sources are part of the essential emergency power I

l system, without which significant release of ' radioactive l

material to the environment in the event of an accident may occur. But is unknown whether the connection of nonsafety loads to these power sources significantly affects the reliabil-ity of those power sources. As a result of this serious 'and and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R.

SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be m_ade.

34. Since 1972, as the Staff has noted in both NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony previously cited, "there have been over 30 reported incidents of pressure transients in pressurized water reactors which have exceeded the pressure temperature limits of the reactor vessels involved." TMI in-volved yet another and more recent such incident. These transients have been initiated by a variety of causes including, among other things, component failure,_,p rocedural deficiencies, personnel error, and spurious valve actuation. This is a safety d problem of potentially serious dimensions, applicable to Byron.

Yet there is no assurance that adequate overpressure protection

- will be provided by Byron. As a result of this serious and un-

. resolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57(a) c_ (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

35. At the time the construction permit for Byron was issued, reduction of the vunerability of the Byron reactors to industrial (or other) sabotage was treated as a plant physi-

! cal security function, and not as a plant design requirement.

i Thus, there is no assurance that the reactors'or other critical plant systems are in fact adequately protected against sabotage, including sabotage by terrorist groups. There also does not i

exist any coherent basis for evaluating plant design features with regard to protection against sabotage, although the'$taff has correctly identified this as a potentially serious problem l ~

i

t having safety implications, both in NUREG-0410.and in the Black Fox testimony cited above. As a result _of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R.

l S9 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

36. The Staff has recognized, both in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox test mony previously cited, that the design requirements for D.C. power systems set forth in NUREG-0305 re-quire reexamination, because of several serious safety-related concerns. Although the Staff has concluded that the failure

, of D.C. power supplies is only a "small, contribution" to core melt probability, this conclusion was based on " preliminary studies utilizing the results and methods of WASH-1400." It is common knowledge that the methodology of WASH-1400 has been extensively criticized, and virtually discarded as worthless, by the Lewis Committee. Thus, there is no, assurance that D.C.

power systems will not, in fact, fail, and there is also no assurance that such a failure will not present an unacceptable safety hazard. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57(a) (6) cannot be made. .

37. There is no assurance that the offsite power system for Byron meets the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 and possesses sufficient reliability to insure the j

maintenance of vital safety functions during accident conditions.

Also, there is no assurance that existing criteria (and 1E particular GDC-17) are adequate in relation to the suscepti-y .-- - - _ -

,-.__y _ , - . . . - - , , - - - _ . - . _ - _ _ _

._ , . _ ry_ _ . - ~ .- - . . - - , ~ . , , _ _ . - _ _ _ - - - , - - _

bility of safety-related electric equipment to the conditions described by the Staff in Task A-}5 in the Black Fox testimony cited above. In fact, until completion and practical verifi-cation of the work identified in Task A-35, "the adequacy of the offsite power source and its interface with the onsite power system" cannot be properly determined. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R.

SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

38. There do not presently exist demonstrably adequate procedures for the movement and handling of heavy loads in the vicinity of spent fuel at Byron. Both in NUREG-0410 and

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in the Black Fox testimony previously cited, the Staff recog-nized the need for a systenatic review of this subject "to assess safety margins and to improve those margins where war-

'- ranted." In the absence ol acceptable sta,dards n and criteria governing the control and management of heavy loads near spent fuel, there can be no assurance that either the design of Byron or the procedures used at that f acility are ad, equate in this regard--particularly in light of the long standing and well documented lackadaisical approach of C.E. to quality assurance, quality control, and other safety-related mat'ters as set forth above in these Contentions. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

?o. There is not presently available a radionuclide/

sediment transport model which has been field-verified, for use e

-30"

I I

in determining the effect of sediment and aquifer materials on radionuclide transport through-the hydrosphere. In conse-quence, no proper NEPA analysis of this important subject can be made. In addition, as a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and

50. 57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

40. There is not presently available an adequate analysis and justification for the approach taken by the NRC Staff to design basis floods, as the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has indicated and a_s, is recognized in both NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony previously cited. This is a.potentially serious safety problem, and is applicable tc Byron, which is situated in close proximity to Rock River. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 53.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

41. There is no assurance that the design and operation of safety-related water supplies wil1 insure adequate operation of the systems in the event of extreme cold weather and ice buildup, of the kind which has occurred during each of the past two winters. This is a potentially serious safety-related problem, which could impact the proper operation of safety-related systems and impair the operator's ability to shut down the' plant and provide adequate core cooling. The Staff has recognized, in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox"t~esti-many previously cited, that this problem will affect, among

others, Byron. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. S S_ 50. 57 (a) ( 3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

42. As the Staff has recognized in'NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox testimony previously cited, occupational radiation exposure to station and contractor personnel has generally been increasing in recent years, and violation of the limits of 10 C.F.R. Part 20 has been avoided by C.E., as by other licensees, by obtaining the temporary services of transient workmen rather than by devoting adequate effort to reducing exposures. Among other things, this practice results

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in using larger numbers of people and thereby increasing the risk of sabotage, operator error and similar safety-related hazards. Furthermore, new information on low-level radiation

effects indicates that the' Byron design basis will not provide .

safe operation. Accordingly, both because of the lack of assurance that proper exposure levels will be maintained and because of the practice of using transient workers, as a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (8) and 50.57 (a) (b) cannot be made.

43. In addition to the problems dsscribed in Contention 14 above, there is no assurance that existing geo-I metry can adequately satisfy the functional design criteria for the behavior of fuel element assemblies during accident conditions. The integrity of this assembly is critical f6r plant safety. As a result of this serious and unresolved l

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problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot,be made. -

44. As the NRC Staff has recognized both in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox testimony previously cited, the emergency onsite diesel generators at opcrating p'lants are

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not adequately reliable.~ The design of Byron's onsite genera-tors is similar to those systems considered unreliable by the Staff. The causes of the numerous reported failures in emergency diesel generators have not been determined; as a result, all that is known is that this important component of safety systems is not sufficiently reliable. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made.

45. There do not presently exist adequate safety and environmental acceptante criteria for the replacement of major pieces of equipment, or " mini-decommissionings." In addition, the anticipated costs and funding alternatives for equipment and total facility decommissioning have not been C *ined, as the NRC Staff has recognized, both in NUREG-0410 i and 'n the Black Fox testimony cited above. This is a serious problem with regard to Byron in view of the gsnerally poor financial condition of C.E. and other utilities, as more fully set forth above. As a result of this financial situation and the inability of the Staff (or anyone else) to adequately I

assess the expected costs of a total decommissioning, the" requirement of 10 C.F.R. S 50.33(f) cannot be met.

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46. Unacceptable damage to essential systems of the Byron nuclear units due to turbine missiles cannot be ruled out, particularly in view of the fact that there are two, rather than one, units at the Byron site. No adequate methods presently exist to estimate the probability of damage by turbine missiles, nor does there-Exist reasonable assurance that the -

overall damage probability-is sufficiently low with regard to the Byron units. The Staff has recognized this problem as one of high priority, both in NUREG-0410 and in the Black Fox i

! testimony cited above. As a result of this serious and un-resolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 ta) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made. .

47. As recognized by the NRC Staff in connection 1

with Tasks A-40, A-41, and B-24, both in NUREG-Oa10 and in the Black Fox testimony cited above, there does not presently exist adequate assurance that the seismic design sequence is adequately conservative for all plant sizes, including the Byron site. As a result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings required by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be made. .

48. It is not presently known what safety-related 1 .

consequences would accrue from a total loss of all AC power for a limited period of time, nor is it presently known (as the

! Staff has recognized in both NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony previously cited) whether ability to cope with-this problem should be a factor in plant design. What is known is

I that the present generation of plants, including Byron, are not designed to accommodate a total loss of all AC power. As a

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result of this serious and unresolved problem the findings re-quired by 10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) cannot be

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made.

49. A careful-review of NUREG-0410, and of the Black Fox testimony previously cited, shows that over 100 of the generic problems identified therein--many of which consti-tute high-priority safety items--are applicable to the Byron units and continue to be unresolved. Under such circumstances,

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there can be no assurance whatever that the Byron facility can be operated without undue risk to the public health and safety.

50. Under date of February 15, 1980, NRC Is J. P.

I Knight wrote to S. A. Varga acknowledging the failure of the Yankee-Rowe nuclear power plant's turbine, a Westinghouse i

reactor which has designs similar to Byron. Under date of February 19, 1980, Mr. Varga notified all boards of the serious-i ness of this accident, neither the details nor the causes of which are presently known. On March 10, 1980,'the NRC acknow-ledged that the problem exists in additional Westinghouse plants, including C.E.'s Zion. The existence,of this incident cannot be ruled out as occurring at Byron and-as such the i

necessary safety findings cannot be made.

51. The accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI) demonstrated that reliance, as is contemplated at Byron, o,n .

i natural circulation to remove decay heat is inadequate. During the TMI accident, it was necessary to operate at least one reactor i

coolant pump to provide forced cooling of the fuel. However, neither the short nor long term measures would provide a reliable method for forced cooling of the reactor in the event of a small loss-of-coolant accident ("LOCA"). This is a threat to health and safety and a violation of both General Design Criterion 34 and GDC 35 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A.

52. Using existing equipment at Byron, there are only three ways of providing forced cooling of the reactor:

(1) the reactor coolant pumps; (2) the residual heat removal system; and (3) the emergency core cool.ing system in a " bleed and feed" mode. None of these methods meets the NRC's regula-i -

tions applicable to systems important to safety or in suffi-

ciently reliable to protect public he'alth and safety

(a) The reactor coolant pumps do not have an y on-site power supply [GDC 17), their controls do not

. meet IEEE 279 (10 C.F.R. 50.55a(h)) and they are not seismically and environmentally qualified (GDC 2 and 4). .

(b) The residual heat removal system is incapable of being utilized at the design pressure -

of the primary system.

(c) The emergency core cooling system cannot be operated in the bleed and feed mode for the nec-essary period of time because of inadequate capacity and radiation shielding for the storage of the radlo "

active water bled from the primary coolant system.

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53. The Staff recognizes that pressurizer heaters and associated controls.are necessary to maintain natural circu-lation at hot stand-by conditions. Therefore, this equipment i

at Byron should be classified as " components important to safety" and required to meet all applicable safety-grade design criteria, including but nbt limited to diversity (GDC 2 and 4),

automatic initiation (GDC 20) , separation and independence (GDC 3 and 22), quality assurance (GDC 1), adequate, reliable on-site power supplies (GDC 17) and the single failure criterion.

I The Staff's resolution, however, for B.y,ron does not provide an equivalent or acceptable level of protection.

54. Proper operation of power operated relief valves, associated block valves and the instruments and controls for these valves is essential to mitigate the consequences of accidents. In addition, their failure can.cause or aggravate a LOCA. Therefore, these valves must be classified as compo-nents important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria. They do not at Byron. .

55. Reactor coolant system relief and safety valves form part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary..

Appropriate qualification testing has not been.done to verify the capability of these valves at Byron to function during normal, transient and accident conditions. In the absence of such testing and verification, compliance with GDC 1, 14, 15, and 30 cannot be found and public health and safety is"ehdangered.

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56. NRC regulations require instrumentation to monitor variables as appropriate to ensure adequate safety (GDC

13) and that the instrumentation shall directly measure the desired variable. IEEE 279, S 4.8, as incorporated in 10 C.F.R. 50.55a(h), states that:

To the extent feasible and practical protection system inputs shall be derived from signals which are direct measures of the desired variables.

Byron has no capability to directly measure the water level in the fuel assemblies. The absence of su'ch instrumentation delayed recognition of a low water level condition in the TMI reactor for a long period of time. The absence of such instrumentation poses a threat to public health and safety.

57. 10 C.F.R. 50.46 requires analysis of ECCS performance "for a number of postulated lo'ss-of-coolant accidents of different sizes, locations, and other properties sufficient to provide assurance that the entire spectrum of postulated loss-

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of-coolant accidents is covered." For the spectrum of LOCA's specific parameters are not to be exceeded. During the T!!I

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accident certain of these were exceeded. For example, the peak cladding temperature exceeded 2200* f ahrenheit' ( 50. 4 6 (b) (1) ) ,

and more than 1% of the cladding reacted with water or steam to produce hydrogen (50.4 6 (b) (3) ) . The post-TMI measures pro-posed by the Staf f address primarily the very specific case of ,,

a stucn-open power operated relief valve and noth ng satisfactorily regarding the basic problem at Byron has been accomplished.

However, any other small LOCA could lead to the same conse-quences. Additional analyses to show that there is adequate protection for the entire spectrum of small break locations have not been performed. None of the corrective actions to date have fully addressed the demonstrated inadequacy of protectionagainstsmallbOCA's.

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Therefore, there is no basis for finding compliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.46 and GDC 35.

58. The accident at TMI-2 was substantially aggravated by the fact that the plant was operated with a safety system inoperable, to wit: two auxiliary feedwater system valves were closed which should have been open. The principal reason why this condition existed was that TMI did r.Ot have an adequate system to inform the operator that a safety system has been deliberately disabled. To adequately protect the health and safety of the public, a system meeting the Regulatory Position of Reg. Guide 1.47 or providing equiv-alent protection is required. Byron does not have such a system which is either acceptable or adequate." .

59. The design of the safety systems at Byron is such that the operator can prevent the completion of a safe'ty function which is initiated automatically, to wit: the operator can (and did) shut off the emergency core cooling system prematurely. This violates S 4.16 of IEEE 279 as incorporated in 10 C.F.R. 50. 55 (a) (h) which states:

The protection system shall be so designed that, once initiated, a protec-tion system action shall go to completion.

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The Byron design must be modified so that no operator action can i

prevent the completion of a safety-function once initiated.

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60. The design of the hydrogen control system at i

Byron is based upon the assumption that the amount of fuel clad-i ding that could react chemically to produce hydrogen will, under all circumstances, be nominal. The accident at TMI demonstrated l both that this assumption is not justified and that it is not I

conservative to assume anything less than the worst case. There-fore, the hydrogen control systems should be designed on the assumption that 100% of the cladding reacts to produce hydrogen.

l 61. The TMI accident demonstrated that the severity of the environment in which equipment important to safety must operate was underestimated and that equipment previously deemed to be environmentally qualified failed. This new information

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raises, therefore, serious safety implications. The environ-l l- mental qualification of safety-related equipment at Byron is deficient in three respects: (1) the parameters of the relevant accident environment have not been identified;.(2) the length of time the equipment must operate in the environment has been underestimated; and (3) the methods used to qualify the equip-ment are not adequate to give reasonable assurances that the equipment will remain operable. Byron should not be permitted to operate until all safety-related equipment has been demon- 1 strated to be qualified to operate as required by GDC 4. The criteria for determining qualification should be those"seE fort). n Regulatory Guide 1.89 or equivalent.

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62. The design of Byron does not provide protec-tion against so-called '! Class 9" accidents. There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not credible. Indeed, j

the staff has conceded that the accident at TMI falls within that classification. Therefore, there is not reasonable assurance that Byron can be operated without endangering the

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health and safety of the pcblic. See also Contention 8, supra.

63. The TMI accident demonstrated that there are systems and components presently classified as non-safety-related which can have an adverse effec,t on the integrity of the core because they can directly or indirectly affect temperature, pressure, flew and/or reactivity. This, issue is discussed at length in Section 3.2, " System Design Require-ments," of MUREG-0573, the TMI-2 Lessons Learn Task Force Report (Short Term) at page 18 which problem applies to Byron.

The Staff proposes to study the problem further. This is not a sufficient answer. All systems and components which can either cause or aggravate an accident or can be called upon to mitigate an accident must be identified and classified as components important to safety and required to meet all safety-grade design criteria. The Byron plant cannot operate until this is resolved.

64. The measures identified by the Staff in NUREG-0578 and the Commission's Order of August 9, 1979, include many which will not be implemented until after the Byron-plant is scheduled to operate and some which will not even be identi-

i fied until some unspecified time in the future. No justifi-cation has been provided for concluding that Byron can safely operate in the period while these corrective actions are being identified and prior to their implementation. The public health and safety demands that all safety problems identified by the TMIaccidentandnotaff[rmativelyfoundtobeinapplicable to Byron, be corrected prior to operation of Byron.

65. The accident at TMI-2 was caused or aggravated by factors which are under study as so-called " generic unresolved safety issues." For exarapl_e,, interaction between non-safety and safety systems created demands on the safety systems that exceeded the latter's design basis. Thi,s problem is listed as A-17 in NUREG-0410 and is more fully described therein as well as in Appendix A-17/1 of testimony dated

September 27, 1978 of Staff members Aycock f Crocker and Thomas in Docket Nos. STM 50-556, 50-557, Public Service Co. of Oklahoraa , et al., (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2). At TMI, the failures of the pressurizer power operated, relief valve and the condensate system, both nonsafety systems,were prin-ciple contributors to the accident. Another example of an.

unresolved safety problem directly involved ai,TMI-2 is A-24,

" Qualification of Class IE Safety-Related Equipment," found at Appendix A-24/1 of the Black Fox testimony.

The pressurizer level instruments which failed at THI-2 were previously deemed .

to be cualified to function in the accident environment.-"The Appeal Board in Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Ar.na l

Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978) ruled that, as a. requirement for the issuance of an operating license, the record must demonstrate either that each applicable generic safety issue has been resolved for the particular reactor or the existence of measures employed at the plant to compensate for the lack of a solution to the problem.

There is a clear need for this procedure to be undertaken prior to operation of Byron. The public health and safety requires a finding that each unresolved safety problem applicable to Byron has been addressed. The generic _, issues relevant to Byron are those in NUREG-0410 which are designated by the Staff in

the Black Fox testimony as applicable to either all LWR's, all 2 PWR's or all Babcock & Wilcox reactors, and those generic issues referred to elsewhere herein, as well as those set forth

. in various of the ACRS letters to the AEC-NRC since 1962 deal-ing with unresolved safety issues whether specifically set forth herein or not. Intervenor incorporates herein by reference each such safety issue in each such aforementioned reference l .

applicable to Byron and which has not been resolved by reliable, i adequate, meaningful and HONEST data. .

66. The accident at TMI-2 was caused or aggravated by f actors which are the subject of Regulatory Guides not used in the design of Byron. For example, the absence of an auto-matic indication system as regaired by Regulatory Guide 1.47 l contributed to operation of the plant with the auxiliary'fbed-water system completely disabled. The public health and. safety , ' N}'

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\ .,s' N. )

N ,

- - - __c

requires that this record demonstrate conformance with each Regulatory Guide presently applicable to ByroD.

67. The design of Byron does not comply with the Commission's regulations concerning fire protection, including GDC 3. The NRC Staff has concluded that safety system modifi-cations to implement an [lternate shutdown system are required.

The modifications are required because of a few specific plant locations where the Staff does not have reasonable assurance that a postulated fire will not damage both redundant divisions of shutdown systems. Therefore, unles_s,these modifications are Dnplemented and found to comply with all applicable Commission regulations, operation of Byron will endanger public, health and safety.

68. The Byron design fails to adequately account for the ef fect of asymmetric loading resul,ing t from a pipe break in the area between the reactor vessel and the shield wall. A pipe break in certain locations between the vessel and the shield wall would cause instantaneous extreme pressure differ-entials, causing forces which could tip the vessel, shearing the pipes and preventing cooling. .In addition, these forces could damage the fuel spacer grids and distor't the fuel geo-metry. The f ailure of present PWR designs (and Byron) to adequately consider the effects of asymmetric loading was not identified in the Westinghouse design. A detailed description of the problem can be found in Appendix A, Task A-2 of thb' s

Staff testimony in the Black Fox proceeding entitled "Testi-5l- x -

_44_

[

l Laurence P. Crocker,and Cecil O.

l many of Michael B. Aycoch Thomas, Jr. Relating to, the Statut of NRC Sta_f f Activities It is acknowledged by the Regarding Generic Safety Issues."

Staf f in botl. NUREG-0410 and NUREG-0510 to f all within

" Category A" which is defined to include:

Those ge5$ric technical activities judged by the Staff to warrant priority attention in terms of manpower aad/or funds to attain early resolution. These matters include those the resolution of which could (1) provide a significant increase in assurance of the health and safety of the pubile, or (2) have a sig-nificant impact upon the reactor licensing process.

As a result the required findings See also Contention 21, supra. '

for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made herein.

69.

NRC Staff review is inadequate to identify and correct modes of interaction between reactor systems in the Byron design which can adversely affect the redundance or independence of safety systems. As discussed in Task A-17 of the Black Fox testim:ny, the present system for Staff review divides respon-such as sibility among staff units organized by plant systems, electrical systems, mechanical systems, etc. There is no systematic method for review of the unintentional interaction between such systems, although such interactions can be very dangerous. Systems interaction is listed as Category A in both MUREG-0410 and NUREG-0510 and is also classified in Apoentix C Perhaps the of NUREG-0510 as a " Potential High Risk Item."

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- ~ .-- ..

classic example of systems interaction, and one which applies almost uniquely to the Westinghous.e design was revealed in an incident at C.E.'s Zion plant in July, 1977. The Westinghouse design is characterized by the large number and type of inter-action between reactor control systems and protection, or safety i

systems. At Zion, a series of dummy signals,used for testing, i

disabled shared sensors for both protection and control. As a

- result, the water level in the core was lowered, and at the 1

same time the protection against the accident was disabled. In other words, the same sequence of events both " caused the .

transient and paralyzed the safety provided for that very transient." See, e.g., URC Memorandum, Stephen H. Hanauer to E.G. Case, " Interaction Between Control System and Protection System," August 18, 1977. As an additional example, in the

^

recent TMI accident, poorly understood interaction between non-safety and safety systems led or contributed to the releases

! of radioactive water from the containment to the auxiliary building, from which it reached the public. See also conten-

~

tions 28 and 65, supra. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently i

be made herein.

70. Byron is not in compliance with the require-ments of General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases." Specifi-cally, neither the Staf f nor the Applicant has a reliable -

method for evaluating or ensuring that Class IE safety-related

equipment is qualified to withstand and operate in the environ-

mental conditions of the most severe postulated accident. CDC 4 requires generally that. equipment required to_ operate in the event of an accident (Class IE safety-related equipment or components) be qualified to withstand the environment of the accident. Regulatory Guide 1.89 provides that compliance with IEEE Standard 323-1974 will be one acceptable method of demon-strating compliance with GDC 4. Neither the nuclear industry nor the NRC Staff has yet established methods in many areas to demonstrate equipment qualification. Such areas include testing margins, aging effects on materials and equipment and the adequacy of testing procedures to simulate the worse case environment for the equipment. In other words, neither C.E.

nor the Staff adequately understands either the environment which the equipment will be exposed to or its ability to with-t stand that environment. This problem is discussed as Task A-24 in the Black Fox testimony and is still classified in NUREG-0510 as a Class A unresolved safety issue and a potential high risk item and is applicable to Byron. See als,o Contentions 3e and 33, supra. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made herein.

71. Byron is not in compliance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 2 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, l

" Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena." Speci- 1

- fically, neither the Staff nor C.E. has reliable methods' Tor evaluating and ensuring that structures, systems and components

l 1

i

)

important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of the appropriately severe earthquake without lgsing its capabi-lity to perform its safety functions.

The seismic design process used by the Staff requires, in trief, identification of the magnitude of the safe shutdown earthquake,determinatio[oftheresultantgroundmotion, building motion and plant equipment motion, and comparison of the resultant loads on safety equipment with the allowable loads.

The NRC Staff admits that it cannot presently assure that the methods it allows to be used 'for analyz,ing seismic design result in adequately conservative plant design. (See Black Fox testimony, Task A-4 0) This unresolved safety problem is also still Category A and a potential high risk item, as class-ified in NUREG-0510.

For example, the effects of aging and cumulative a

radiation on the ability of electrical equipment to withstand seismic stresses is not considered. Batteries are particularly vulnerable since old plates crumble and get we,ak and spongy.

Yet no tests have been done to determine whether batteries in use for a period of time would still be able to withstand an earthquake. Nor is the effect of aftershocks' considered in the seismic analysis, although such aftershock, even though of less severity than the original quake, could result in addi-tional damage to structures already deformed from the first shock. Finally, the March 1979 NRC Order requiring the shtt-down of five operating plants because of a gross error in

seismic load calculations clearly illuminated a grave failure in the system for verifying the adequacy of seismic design. A large number of complex, proprietary computer codes are used by the Architect-Engineers to compute seismic stresses, yet the ,

NRC Staff makes no effort to systematically review the &ccuracy or validity of the codes:

" Stone and Webster said we will use this code, we said fine, that sounds like an accred-ited kind of code. We did not look behind it . . . . " Quote , H. Denton, NRC (Meeting NRC, 1

March 13, 1979).

This issue is applicable to Byron. See also Contention 47, supra.

As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made herein.

72. Byron does,not comply with the requirements of

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General Design Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50,

" Fire Protection." Specifically, present fire protection requirements are not adequate to prevent a fire from disabling

- the electrical cables for all redundant safety systems. In the fire at the Browns Ferry plant in Alabama in 1975, a fire in the cable spreading room destroyed at once the cables for both sets of redundant safety systems. Since that -time , the Staff has made some improvements in such areas of administrative controls and control of ignition sources. However, tests con-ducted as part of the Fire Protection Research Program have disclosed that the 5-foot physical separation requirement of Regulatory Guide 1.75 is still inadequate to prevent the spread e

e

of fire from one set of cables to the other. In addition, tests on mineral wool blankets proposed for fire retardants have shown them to act as wicks in some cases, sprinkler systems have failed, and at least some " fire-retardant" cable coatings have burned. The fact is that present regulatory f practice does not provide the protection against fires for safety systems required by-GDC 3. See also Contention 67, supra. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R.

SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made herein.

73. The D.C. power system for the Byron plant i fails to meet the single failure criterion as defined in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix A. Present practice permits -a D.C.

power supply with two separate divisions which supply power for control and actuation of safety-related systems. Failure of one D.C. division of a two-division redundant system causes the plant to shut down and creates the need for the other i

division to cool off the reactor, destroying the redundancy required by the single failure criterion. This unresolved safety problem is discussed as Task A-30 in the Black Fox testimony and UUREG-0410. See Cover Memo (NRC Form 232)

Bender to Gossick re " Reliability of Power Supplies" (Control No. 01676) , Mm .15,1977 and attached notes thereto; and Contention 36, supra. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made

. .s.

, . : r t. i r l

i

74. The Byron design does not provide adequate reliable instrumentation to monitor variables _and systems affecting.the integrity of the reactor core, the pressure boundary or the containment after an accident, in violation of General Design Criterion 13 of Appendix A of 10 C.F.R. Part 50.

The accident at TMI demon'~strated graphically'the inadequacy of i

post-accident monitoring, in terms of the parameters monitored, the range and accuracy of the instrumentation, and the qualifi-cation of the instrumentation for the accident and post-accident environment. For example, there is no _ acceptable way gelerally (or at Byron) to directly measure the water level or temperature in the core after an accident. The only temperature mea,surements at TMI were from non-safety grade equipment, some of which

" luckily" survived the accident. It is also possible that failure to believe the instrumentation whic,h was available after the TMI accident exacerbated conditions there. Even before Three Mile Island, the lack of criteria or guidances to imple-ment the Regulatory Guide on this subject, 1.97,, was listed as a Category A unresolved safety problem in NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox case (Task A-3 4) . In January, 1979 in NUREG-0510, it was classified as "Not Directly Relevant to' , Risk . " This assessment has changed in the aftermath of TMI and now must be resolved. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R.

SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) cannot presently be made herein.

75. The Byron design does not adequately accou"dt j

for failure of passive components in fluid systems important t

i

to safety. The single fa. lure criterion is a benchmark of nuclear power regulation. It is defined in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A. Basically, it holds that, in assessing whether a system important to safety is adequately redund' ant, one assumes first the occurrence of an accident and all of the failures caused by the accident. '[ hen, one assumes an additional, unrelated failure--the single failure--and the system must still be able to perform its safety function.

The NRC has always recognized that the single fail-ure could occur either in an active or passive component.

(An active component is one which requires motion to perform its

- safety function. A passive component does not, such as a valve which is supposed to be open both during normal and emergency 4

situations). However, the Staff has not yet devised a way to apply the single failure criterion to passive components either generally or for Byron. Thus, " consideration of the need to design against single failures of passive components in system important to safety" is listed as one of those matters

~

which, although the design requirements are not yet suitably defined, must still be considered by C.E. (Introduction, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A) However, the fact is that this has not been adequately considered either by C.E. or Staff.

In addition, certain components of Byron are thus incorrectly classified as passive. Any component which is l

capable of mechanical motion should be classified as an-active l

i l

l

component, rather than only components which must move in order to perform their safety' function. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b))

cannot presently be made herein. .

76. The Byron design does not provide adequate equipment outside of the control room to promptly put the reactor in hot shutdown and so maintain it until attaining cold shutdown, also from outside the control room, as required by General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. GDC 19 requires that equipment be provided outside the control room, such that if an accident caused the opera-

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tors to evacuate the control room, the plant could be brought to safe shutdown from the outside. However, in designing and evaluating the plant, both C.E. and the Staff have used the unreasonable assumption that whatever event caused evacuation

- from the control room did not damage any of the equipment in the control room. The result of this is that if the event, such as a fire for example, did damage equipment in the control room, the plant could well lose shutdown capability. Present data do not support such assumptions. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C.F.R. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) can-i not presently be made herein.

77. Neither C.E. nor the Staff have adequately considered the ef fects of aging and cumulative radiation on

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safety-related equipment which must be seismically and" e

environmentally qualified. Structures, systems and components important to safety must be qualified to demonstrate their ability to withstand natural forces such as earthquakes and the accident environment and still perform their safety func- ,

tions. In analyzing the ability of equipment to survive,

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insufficient account is taken of the effect'of aging, which can progressively weaken components. Brand new equipment is tested and no systematic effort made to determine for how long the results are valid. Thus, although a plant (here Byron) is deemed certified to be safe for its lifetime at the time of i

issuance of an operating license, neither C.E. nor the NRC find or can find with reasonable assurance that sufficient. margins exist to maintain equipment qualification over 30-40 years. See also Contentions 41 and 61, supra. As a result the required findings for Byron (10 C. FIR. SS 50.57 (a) (2) (3) and (b)) can-not presently be made herein.

78. The Byron site in not acceptable. The popula-tion density in the vicinity of the proposed site is such that the lives and property of large numbers of people are placed in jeopardy by the Byron units and their inability to safely operate, given accident, safety and evacuation. parameters dis-cussed hereinabove. In addition, since the units are within 100 miles from the City of Chicago, applicant has not given any consideration to the possibility of evacuating all or large

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portions of the City of Chicago, as well as the numerons'small towns and municipalities between Chicago and the plant site.

j While the issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was.a sham and.in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision (See generally, supra). As a result the applicable findings required by the Atomic Energy Act, as amended (here-inafter "Act"), the Nati55al Environmental Policy Act (here-after "NEPA") and/or their-implementing Regulations (hereafter "Regs") cannot be made herein.

79. C.E. has also selected the wrong site from the standpoint of load forecasting. T_h,e largest load which C.E. has now or in the future is in the Chicago area. Placing a power plant closer to that area would result in req..ced trans-mission lines and an ability to use waste heat for industrial purposes. There is no analysis in this connection and the Byron site is therefore improper in comparison with the load needs of C.E. It would be cheaper thus to halt rather than finich. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious ques-tion that decision. As a result the applicable findings .

required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

30. The inability to detect flaws in reactor pressure vessels, especially small or incipient cracks, must be acknowledged. The generally limited understanding of crack g

growth and crack arrest must also be acknowledged. The vsry large uncertainties relating to irradiation effects on pressure vessels must be acknowledged. Yet C.E. has failed to consider these critical issues in its safety analysis for the units.

l As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. .

81. One important mode of disruptive pressure vessel 1 -

failure that must also be considered is the' thermal shock to the

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reactor pressure vessel as a result of emergency core cooling injection. This question has not been resolved and a crash i

program at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory has completely

! failed to resolve it. Adequate assurance of safety with regard to the effects of thermal shock due to emergency core cooling injection has not been provided as to Byron. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein, f 82. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards i

has compiled a catalogue of serious, unresolved safety pro-blems applicable to the units. See ACR3 letter to former Chairman James Schlesinger, December 18, 1972; ACRS Testimony before _

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, September, 1973, and February 24, 1977, and the ACRS letters herein, and advice to Congress. These problems have remained unresolved for several years.

Neither C.E. nor the Staff has set forth a research and development program reasonably designed to resolve all such safety issues prior to operation of Byron. See also Contentions 6, 8, 49 and 64, supra. As a result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, UEPA, and the Regs, can-not be made herein.

83. Throughout the Uranium Fuel Cycle, including up through decommissioning of Byron, accidents may occur in the transporting and handling of radioactive material.

l Accidents may result from negligence or intentional acts, such as sabotage. There exists no meaningful discussion by either C.E. or the Staff as to the character of such accidents, ways in which they will be prevbnted, adverse or beneficial conse-quences from such accidents, and the economic and other environmental costs associated therewith. To the extent that such accidents incresse the total amount of radioactivity emitted to the environment, they represent a consideration for additional costs and risks which must be judged against the l

alleged or asserted benefits from Byron. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the con-struction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. .

84. C.E. has not provided sufficient missile protection to safeguard engineered safeguard systems in the event of a fracture of a primary coolant pump' flywheel.

Present precautions would not prevent such a missile from dis-abling or severely crippling the emergency core cooling system and containment heat removal system. As a result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs',cEn-not be made herein.

i"

85. C.E.'s safety analysis fails to consider a loss-of-flow accident where the renetor coolant pumps cavitate and the reactor does not scram. Such an accident is highly credible in view of the documentation which the JUU: has made of such separate malfunctions in other light water reactors,

~

and their combination wou1d result in a seri'ous transient lead-ing to a rupture of the reictor coolant pressure boundary and a subsequent major accident with serious radiological conse-quences for the public. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs., cannot be made herein.

86. If a single failure has occurred to one of the emergency core cooling systems during the injection phase, and either a single active or single passive failure occurs in addition during the recirculation phase, Byron's ECCS will not accomplish its objectives, and the radiation exposure to the public will exceed Part 100 limits. As a result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. .

87. The design of Byron's core is defective in that it does not contain any sufficient preventative measures to guard against fuel densification or fuel mdgration. As a result of this design defect, the fuel pellets will densify and shrink down within the fuel cladding, leaving an empty space at the top of the fuel rod. This will effect a change in the moderation so that the local power generation will" increase significantly in the region of the densified fuel.

This will lead to rod burnup during steady-state operation, and power oscillations thatewould adversely effect the units, and affect heat transfer during blowdown after a loss-of-coolant accident. Furthermore, the fuel densification and increased local power generation will significantly increase 9

the stress on the cladding and probably embrittle it such that the clad would not be able~to withstand blowdown forces. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

88. In many cases the indiy,idual assigned the responsibility for inspecting work at the Byron construction site will be or has been the same person dArectly responsible for supervising the specific construction or fabrication activity. This violates the Regs' quality assurance criterion and is not a sound engineering practice. As a result of this duality of responsibility, many systems and pieces of equip-ment of a vital safety nature will not be correctly inspected by an independent party, and there is no assur,ance that such equipment will operate as designed or that such systems, particularly engineered safeguard systems required in the .

event of an accident, will function when called upon. As a

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I result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and i

the Regs, cannot be made herein.

89. C.E. was dilatory in establishing a quality assurance program, and a large percentage of the Byron +s

I components have been fabricated and ordered before a functioning i

t i

and viable quality assurance program had been implemented.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by

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the Act, UEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

90. Westinghouse and Sargent and Lundy, and their subcontractors, have failed to meet the Regs.' quality assur-ance criteria in that the verifying or checking process with respect to the adequacy of design of nuclear safety equipment has been done by the same persons who performed the original l decign. C.E. has and will fail to keep documentary evidence of conformance with procurement requirements at the Byron site, and will not maintain orderly records sufficient to allow the NRC compliance inspectors Eo ascertain whether or not the equipment arriving on site does in fact meet the specifications set forth in the procurement documents. As a result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

91. Based upon the history of the nuclear industry i

and its inability to resolve outstanding problems as noted by the ACRS and others, from time to time, C.E. will not be able to meet each of the general and specific design criteria set forth in Appendix A to Part 50. C.E.'s experiences at other nuclear plants indicate that they have not kept its representa-tions to provide resolutions of outstanding problems between l

l

i e

the time of construction and operation and there is no reason to believe that similar. patterns will not control in connection with Byron. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious ques-

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tion that decision. As a result the applicable findings required I

by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. .

92. There is no reasonable assurance that the safety questions raised herein will be satisfactorily resolved in accord-ance with and/or at or before the latest date staEed in the application for completion of construction of the proposed facility; and taking into consideration the site criteria con-tained in 10 C.F.R., Part 100, the proposed facility thus cannot be constructed and operated at the proposed location without 4

undue risk to the health and safety of the public. As a result,

. the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

93. C.E. has not complied with and will not after hearing be able to comply with 10 C.F.R. Part 51, at least for the reasons outlined throughout herein. .

94. One low-level radioactive waste burial site l

l l is located in West Valley, New York. This site, operated by i

I Nuclear Fuel Services, has a history of operating problems and has failed during its lifetime to achieve contairnent of storaged low-level radioactive wastes. In March 197 5,- the N.Y. State Department of Environmental Conservation discovered l

that water containing radionuclides had seeped.through two of the trench caps, contaminated the adjacent surface area and entered a nearby stream. The seepage was caused by infiltra-tion of water into the trenches and erosion. Burial operations were temminated by Nuclear Fuel Services shortly after this seepage was detected. Still, a report by the Federal Environ-mental Agency termed the bhrial site "a failure" because of the radioactive seepage from trenches and predicted that serious containment of area rivers could occur unless action is taken to correct erosion and other problems _at the site. The formal summary attached to this report concluded:

If the goals of low-level nuclear waste dis-posal are confinement and containment of the waste for the duration of its hazardous life -

time then, the low level waste buried at West Valley may require containment on the order.

of several hundred to several thousand years.

Based on available hydrogeological data, the following primary conclusions have been drawn:

In the fourteen years of operation, the north

' trenches at the West Valley site have not met these goals. ,

At present, radioactive material that has ,

seeped or been pumped from the burial area does not appear to have significant health .

implications in terms of offsite dose levels.

The West Valley site does not meet.3 of 9 recommendations used for evaluating low-level radioactive waste disposal sites.

The West Valley does not meet 3 of 13 rec-ommendations for evaluating a secure hazard-l ous waste landfill. ,.

l i More data may be needed to determine how the site can be made to meet its basic purpose which is retention of the waste for its hazard-ous lifetime,

i Unless remedial measures are taken,. erosion and trench water infiltration may increase the rate of movement of radioactive material.

The uncertainty surrounding the identification of an acceptable method for the disposition of nuclear waste products was confirmed in a report-to Congress prepared by the General Accounting Office:

Each of the existing disposal sites has differ-ent hydrogeological and other characteristics.

Some appear more suitable than others for retain-ing radioactivity. It is not presently known what mix of hydrogeological_, characteristics and engineering features offers the greatest assur-ance that radioactivity, once buried, will not migrate to create a public health hazard and require extraordinary and mostly efforts to correct. G.A.C. " Improvements Needed In The Land Disposal Of Radioactive Wastes--A Problem of Centuries", at 17 (1976).

And most recently the Pres-ident of the United States announced that the waste storage problem, if at all, will not be resolved for a decade or more. To the extent that these uncertainties thrusts upon the Byron site a possible burden of storaging and managing its wastes on-site, this is a site dependent issue, which has not been sufficiently evaluated. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the con-struction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. . . , -

95. There is an insufficient safety evaluation of the structural integrity of the rehctor pedestal concrete. A loss of coolant accident in even the small or intermediate range can result in a temperature transient insi,de the contain-ment of such magnitude that the thermal shock received by the concrete pedestal could result in cracking o'f the foundation to the point where its strength would be seriously affected, l particularly for future seismic of LOCA transients, thus jeo-pardizing future public safety. The minimum result would be an extensive shutdown and multimillion-dollar repair expendi-tures. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. -

96. The development of probabilistic evaluation techniques has led the industry to propose designs based on probabilistic assessments of the reliability of and need for certain systems. Numerical reliability goals and methods of analysis have not yet been established by the NRC, which con-tinues to rely on the single failure criterion.and other design ,

rules pending further development of the new methods. The existing methods in the Byron analysis are inadequate for the task.*

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

97. Under date of July 18, 1979, Dr. Roger J.

Mattson submitted to Harold R. Denton "Short Term Lessons Loarned," as a result of the TMI accident. This document has been known thereafter as NUREG-0578. Elsewhere throughout

these Contentions reference has been made to NUREG and the matters, in part, set fQrth therein. Intervenor here sets forth and raises as an issue the applicability to Byron of each of the "Short Tern Recommendations" includ'ed in NUREG-0578,and they are asserted herein as an issue directed to Byron as if they were specifically set forth.

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As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, MEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

98. The NRC Staff also set forth in NUREG-0578 (beginning at page 16 thereof) unresolved safety problems applicable to Byron (and generally admitted subsequent to the TMI accident), but place them in a category of " future work",

rather than short term recommendations. There is no basis (and was none when NUREG-0578 was completed) to leave as

" future work" the matters Bisclosed therein and not have such safety issues resolved prior to the operation of Byron.

On the basis of NUREG-0578 Intervenor. raises' each of the safety issues set forth therein, identified as "left for future work", as items which are applicable to Byron and must be resolved prior to operation. As a result the appl,i-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and'the Regs, cannot be made herein.

99. To the extent not already raised in these Contentions, Intervenor raises as an issue the resolution at Byron of each of the general issues related to nuclear'-

power plants indicated as an unresolved issue and set forth l

in NUREG-0410. Each such problem is incorporated herein by reference as if specifically set forth. As a_ result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. .

100. The Byron containment units are being

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constructed near or close to the normal and' emergency flight paths of the City of Rockford's Airport. This Airport is in the process of being expanded to permit the landings of jumbo jets such as 747s, and such jets are already landing and taking off in practice runs at the Rockford Airport. Moreover, because of frequent weather problems at Chicago's O' Hare Airport and

- the airport ror the City of Milwaukee, the Rockford A.irport is a frequent alternate airport for regularly scheduled jumbo jet flights into Chicago and Milwaukee. Despite these facts, how-ever, the Byron containments have not been, designed or constructed sufficiently strong enough to withstand crashes by such jumbo jets, notwithstanding the fact that other designs of nuclear power plants which are similarly situated near, airports (e.g.,

Three Mile Island) have been required to design and construct containments more substantial than that of the Byron units.

The Staff, in meetings with C.E. on December i8 and 19, 1979, has also recognized this defect. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, MEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

101. Notwithstanding the fact that the Staff has made numerous suggestions for consideration of design alternatives to accommodate new safety problems for Byron including Class 1 systems, including but not limited.to the containment and auxil-iary buildings, both C.E., Sargent and Lundy, and Westinghouse i refuse to accommodate the Staff's inquiries with respect to such design changes asserting that because the structure is partially complete there should be no ma]or changes. This is in violation of the Staff's obligations, and impermissible both under the Commission's regulatory policies as well as specifically under the principles applied in 10 C.F.R. S 50.100. It is, moreover, also an indication that C.E., Sargent and Lundy, Westinghouse, and the Regulatory Staff do not intend to deal with either

, unresolved safety issues or necessary design changes in a fair ,

and honest way but rather will make " political" decisions and

" economic" decisions which amount to " illegal grandfathering"

, all in violation of the obligations and duties imposed upon

, each of them. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

i 102. As indicated in questions frca the Regulatory

[ .

! Staff as well as the Staff's meetings with C.E. on December 18 and 19, 1979,not all of the structures in Category 1 and 2 equipment have sufficient foundation in the soil sufficient to provide safety under normal operating and accident conditions.

This has been a major problem in recent years in many reactors built (e.g., Midland reactors) because the Staff does not take

! adequate precautions to ensure that the underlying subsurface soil is sufficiently adequate to provide the strength necessary

in normal and accident conditions. As e result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA., and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

103. The Staff has raised questions both in its written submissions and at the meetings of December 18 and 19,

, 1979 with C.E. that the fesign of the structure of walls for t

[

the Byron units, and particularly the stresses on nonload bearing internal walls, are insufficient from a safety stand-point. This design problem is categorized by the Staff as I safety related and represents a deviation from applicable i regulations as well as a deviation from the requirements of the construction permit. As a result the applicable , findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

104. The post tension wires in the Byron contain-ment buildings are breaking and have broken from their attachments. No steps have been taken by C.E., Sargent and Lundy, or Westinghouse to evaluate this phenomena or to replace all post tension wires. This is a violation not only of appli-cable regulations but of the commitments made by C.E. in connection with the construction permit. As a result the .

applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, rannot be made herein.

105. Under date of December 21, 1979, NRC's Steven A. Varga wrote to all operating license applicants with respect to revisions in Regulatory Guide 4.8 dealing with environmental monitoring for direct radiation. These new regulations, revised

-6G-

twice since 1975, are directly applicable to Byron whose radiation monitoring program is deficient in many respects (see other radiation monitoring Contentions herein), and in particular in violation of the principles set forth in the aforesaid Varga Memorandum which is, by reference, incorporated herein. While radiation-donitoring must be. improved in l

accordance with the other radiation Contentions set forth herein, the modifications suggested in the aforesaid Varga l

Memorandum are at a minimum necessary for safe operation of Byron. Yet C.E. has taken inadequate steps to comply. As a resulttheapplicablefindingsrequirebbytheAct, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

106. In addition to the other seismic Contentions herein, serious seismic related site problems discovered 'subse-quent to the construction permits herein indicate that the seismic design sequence for Byron is not such that there exists

(

assurance that these problems are adequately resolved i

in accordance with applicable regulationo including but not limited to 10 C.F.R. 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) and 50.57 (a) (6) . ' Speci-fically, without limiting the foregoing, there has been .

insufficient (or no) seismic analysis with respect to possible earthquakes and faults in the Byron area with respect to each of the East West Faults across Northern Illinois, and parti-l cularly the Sandwich and Plum River Faults. Recent information indicates that the Plum River Fault should be consider.ed.a.

capable fault in accordance with Appendix A, III(g) of 10 C.F.R.

l Moreover, these problems raise the design question relating 1

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l l

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l l

. i I

i to seismology and ground acceleration and their effects of j grouting upon the construction of large areas of Byron's found-ation all below the water table. This is a serious design problem since C.E. has also failed to use stain gauge testing i

(or suitable alternatives) to predict the future movement of I

faults applicable or found during excavation'and construction of the Byron site. C.E. did not, without objection from the Staff, do a particularized seismic and seismology study for the design of the Byron plant, but rather applied information taken from an inapplicable and faulty analysis with respect to C.E.'s Braidwood plant. This in turn severely chils into question C.E. 's improper commitment to apply values (or safe shutdown in the event of earthquakes due to maximum ground acceleration other than permitted by 10 C.F.R, Part 100,

{ Appendix A; and the problems and issues raised herein are further exacerbated by the potential release of radiation without safe monitoring in the absence of decommission plans.

l There is also an absence of adequate seismic instrumenta-l tion for earthquake detection and particularly is this significant and important in light of the NRC's recent Orders i

to shut down plants because of inadequate designs to control potential seismic problems. This is also one of the reasons why the Regulatory Staff has in its meetings with C.E. on December 18 and 19, 1979, required an extensive review of Byron's overall design, and in particular the equipmenE'~"

components categorized as Category 1. While this issue may i

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have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing '

-4 . k was a sham and in any event new facts since tbe constructi'on

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.s phase call into serious question that decision. As a result. -

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. , s the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Rsgs,. A s

cannot be made herein. .

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s : x-107. C.E. is planning to store more spent fuel in

, / ..

• h the spent fuel storage pool than was proposed in the construction l '

permit application by utilizing high density storage racks. Use of these racks was not considered at the construct' ion permit' C'

-i stage.

(1) Applicant should be required to establish i, (

y that the geometric vonfiguration of the high density \

~

racks will be adequate to prevent criticality in the fuel storage system. (See 10 C.F.R. Part.'50, Appendix A, Criterion 62). ,

(2) Applicant should be required io establish t that the spent fuel storage system, as midified, is

. w designed against the following postulated,accideneg .

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xs conditions to assure adequate safety to the public, 'N ,

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', x from the operation of the spent fuel storage systemi'. s 4

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(a) spent fuel pool cooling'sater 2  % s-malfunctions; .',

C's (b) drop of a spent fuel shippisg cask '

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into the spent fuel pool; 1 (c) abandonment of the spent fuel pool -

area because of severe reactor ,, -' -

accidents; s .

4 (d) earthquakes, sabotage,'large airplane ' I ' ki !

crashes and tornado missiles; 1

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i g (e) tu$bine missiles and other accident ind'uced missiles; 5 -

(f) other accidents which could result in criticality in the fuel storing system.

Such assurance is necessary because loss of water ,

s Dcaccidents in the spent fuel pool may lead to zirconimm cladding

"{ fire and/or zirconium steam reaction.

t (3) C.E. should be required to establish that it 4 ,

will not exceed the radioactive emission limits set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 20 and 1,0 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix I, as a

, result of normal and uccident operations involving the modified

s. spent fuel pool.

108. In addition to the other Contentions herein L '

'O dealing with emergency preparedness, C.E.'s (as well as local, s

s.

State, and applicable National authorities) emergency plans

~

s j- are inadequate in violation of applicable regulations, including but not limited to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, as implemented p in part in NUREG-0396, for at least the following reasons:

(a) The agencies and C.E. have not made ade-quate plans for all of the areas which could potentially be at risk in a nuclear accident. Since studies of the AEC-URC (including WASH-740) indicate that radiation releases could impact as far as 100 miles, and in light s

s of the fact that radiation releases, both airborne and L through ground water, from the accident of Three Mile ..

i Island impacted far beyond the LPZ, Byron emergency plans must account for an area including a radius of 100 miles i

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from the plant site. Within this 100 miles include many substantial population centers (e.g., Chicago) within and without the State of Illinois (e.g., Rock County, Wisconsin).

(b) Applicant's plans do not at all take into account the social E$d economic costs as a result of evacuation as are set- forth in the Illinois Emergency Plan revised as of 1979.

(c) Since there are no actual plans in operation they cannot be tested for verification or public responses. ,

(d) Emergency facilities (including both personnel and physical facilities) are noc situated far enough from the Byron site so as to be free from any impact which could neutralize the effectiveness of such personnel and facilities in the eveHt of an accident.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious' question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

109. While portions of the analysis of hydrology impacts on the Rock River as a result of Byron's operation were considered at the construction permit stage, recent events indicate that C.E. has not complied with its commitments therein and has not, in any event, completed an adequate analysis in accordance with 10 C.F.R. SS 50.34 (b) (4) , 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) ,

i l 1

50. 57 (a) (6) and the requirements of NEPA. See'also NUREG-0440 1

(NRC Liquid Pathways Study) . Thes~e violations and deficiencies

include, but are not limited to, inadequacies and deficiencies in at least the following areas

,

l I

(a) Studies and assessment of effects of radio-active contaminants in the sediment of the river bottom and their contribution to long term radioactivity in hydrology of the area.

(b) Long term effects of withdrawal of 30 million gallons of water a day from the Rock River, especially as related to rate of river flow needed to dilute radio-nuclides released from the plant in routine operation and design base or Class 9 accidents.

(c) Infiltration of groundwater and wells with radionuclides through the permeable sand and gravel deposits in the Rock River Valley, and effects on both use and supply of water for the area.

(d) The intended omissions of any groundwater ,

models.

(e) Blockage of the flow of contaminants into

• the Rock River 'in case of serious accident. This is

~

particularly serious in view of the quake potential of the site recently heightened by the Plum River applica-bility.

(f) 1:f f ects of hydrology of the Rock River of potential long term radioactivity at the plant site

. 1 4

_74_

1

caused by failure to find off-site storage of spent fuel and other wastes and lack of -firm plans for decommissioning of the plant.

(g) Effects of chemical discharges to the Rock River.

(h) Analysis of long term effects of thermal plume discharge on biota of the Rock River, including but not limited to (i) effect's on fish eggs and larval develop-ment, and (ii) development of pathogenic organisms such as those that cause amebic meningoenoephalitis.

1 -

While this issue nay have been consider'ed at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new f acts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made hgrein.

i 110. C.E. has not met the requirements of UEPA and 10 C.F.R. 50 because it is not using available technology for f containment of Krypton-85 to keep radiation as. low as practicable, although the technology for a 99% containment is available. This is so for at least the following reasons: -

(a) It is important that Krypton 85 be contained I because it is a gamma and beta emitter with a half life of 10.6 years. When released into the atmosphere, it has worldwide distribution and build-up with no means of l ,

removal except by decay.

1 I

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(b) Kr-85 adversely effects living tissue in two ways. Build up in eatmosphere- increases external (cloud) radiation gamma and beta rays. Inhalation distributes it throughout the body along with non-radioactive inert Krypton, where it participates in ionic or covalent bonding, forming clothrates, and is highly soluble in non-polar solvents including body lipids. Ordinary value and estimated doses are based on external dose received, which does not take into account the more dangerous internal i absorption or concentration. _.

(c) According to certain studies, Kr-85 may cause weather modification by build up of atmospheric, ions at rates comparable to the present ion production rate near 4 the tropical ocean surface, which could cause more electrical thunderstorms of greater intensity, different i

patterns of rainfall and an increase in the formation of .

sulfate aerosol particles.

(d) Available methods to remove Kr-85 from stacks which are not being used by C.E. include a low-cost solvent extraction process; absorption onto activated charcoal at cryogenic temperatures; condensation in liquid nitrogen followed by fractural distillation; and selective permeating through cellulose acetate or silican rubber membrane. -

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

4

111. C.E. has not met the requirements of NEPA

! and the Regs, including,but not limited to 10_C.F.R. SS 50.34(a) and 50.36 (a) because C.E. has not adequately monitored and provided j a design base for the Byron plant which will keep radiation levels as low as achievable as required for operation of the i

plant to protect the heaI5h and safety of the public. To keep radiation levels as low as-achievable, C.E. should provide and utilize:

A. More adequate environmental and discharge moni-l toring of radioactive emissions from the Byron plant, which include:

(1) Monitoring devices at more locations within and without the plant site.

1 I (2) Provisions for more frequent reading of monitors by independent analysts.

(3) Better monitoring devices which include:

(a) An automatic system of monitoring that notifies local authorities by an alarm when discharge emission exceed design limits; l

I (b) Monitoring devices that measure differences in alpha, beta and* gamma, dose levels, which presently are not proposed to be con-sidered and measured; (c) Monitoring and recording of emis'sions of all dangerous long lived radionuclides, in-cluding especially I-129 and Plutonium; (d) Bioaccumulative testing in a tiered system to assess the uptake of radioactive and chemical polutants from bottom sediments or soil to lower organisms and to contamination of the food chain of man and other life. ,.

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B. More accurate calculation of design doses which can be accomplished by utilizing information from the improved monitoring suggested above and also by:

(1) Providing for and constant update and replacement of equipment and analysis to respond to new experimental and analytical results. Byron was licensed for construction, for example, when some (including C.E.) asserted improperly that there was a threshold to radiation effects; (2) Including in calculation of doses hhe l large transient populations in the low population zones around the plant, including school children i when present in schools and others participating in recreational facilities; l

(3) Including internal radiation doses caused by inhaled and/or ingested radionuclides which are deposited in different parts of the body where they give repeated radiation or until they j are eliminated from the body; (4) Including in calculation of radiation doses, cumulative doses to the general population outside the site boundary caused by overlapping circles of radiation from any nuclear facility (whether on or off the site), including Zion, l

f _

Dresden, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and Braidwood Stations, as well as any new proposed facility and disposal facilities such as the Morris Waste Disposal Site; and (5) Including in the calculation, calcula-tion of doses to people by utilizing actual radio-nuclides for and in food, animals, plants, soil, water, and in other parts of the environment in, and around the Byron site.

l As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

112. C.E. has not met the requirements of NEPA and Part 20 because it has not adequately assessed'Ehe

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10 C.F.R. 6

effect of radiation on plant workers and provided a design base for the Byron plant which will provide radiation levels as low as achievable. To keep radiation levels as low as achievable there is a need for better use of preventive measures to reduce radiation, including neutron, exposure levels to regular plant personnel and transient workers. These include but are not limited to: -

(a) plant designs for reducing amount of radia-tion exposure which take into account new evidence on low levels of radiation which were,not considered in design of the plant.

(b) Improved record keeping of radiation,expssures, including cumulative exposures both at the plant site and at other facilities.

(c) Better training of personnel to prevent radia-tion exposures, including more use of regular trained personnel rather than transient or temporary workers with little experience and training. ,

(d) Limiting exposure to high levels of radiation to volunteers and/or only older workers beyond the child bearing age or others incapable of biological reproduction.

1 .

(e) Better education about radiation dangers to ensure cooperation of workers in keeping radiation exposures to a minimum.

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

113. The canulative radiation exposure to Rockford area residents from the, Byron Stat, ion in addition to Zion Station, 1

Dresden Station, LaSalle Station, Quad Cities and Braidwood exceeds safe limits, including but not limited'to those set forth in 40 C.F.R. S 190. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPs," and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

l 114. C.E. has not included in the Final Safety Analysis Report or the Final Environmental Impact Statement the possibility of cleanup of radioactive contamination buildup at l

Byron by use of chemical decontaminate chelating agents that will be necessary after about 20 years of operation (as in the

.'agoing decontamination project at Dresden) and therefore is

! not in compliance with NEPA and 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Additionally:

(a) Chemical cleanup has not been included in the cost benefit analysis. .

(b) An Environmental Impact Statement has not been completed for this decontamination process.

(c) Evidence shows that chelating agents increase mobilization of radionuclides into the environment where they are dispersed through ground water and uptake by, plants including vegetables.

(d) During the evaporation step an'd demineralizer l use radionuclides may be released to the environment.

(e) The solvent remaining after effluent and rinse water are removed may be flushed into the Rock River'where it will be absorbed by the river's sediment, become l l l

1 resuspended and migrate into the ground water and food i

chain. - -

4 (f) Disposal site after solidification must be designed for careful indefinite burial and because one ,

is not designated, consideration must be given to storage on site.

(g) Temporary workers used in decontamination process may be exposed to increased risk because of synergistic effects of solvent and radioactive material.

i (h) Use of a chemical decon.taminate chelating agent may deteriorate stainless steel components of the reactor and hasten future build up of contamination requiring more frequent cleanups and repairs.

While C.E. has contended that it does not intend to use this process, it has not satisfactorily explained how it will accomplish the relevant objectives. Because C.E. is in fact using this process at Dresden it must negate the possibility of using this process and establish a safe method for -the i

l elimination of radioactive contamination buildup in Byron by other means, which themselves must be subjected to the rele-vant cost benefit and safety analysis. As a result the appli-cable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

115. C.E. has not considered the full impact-of

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345 KV and 765 KV powerlines proposed or planned and alterna-

tives to their construction have not been adequately considered.

Therefore the health and safety of the public is not protected and a valid cost benefit analysis cannot be made all in viola-tion of the requirements of NEPA and 10 C.F.R. 50. 57 (a) (3) (i) ,

and 50.57 (a) (6) . Additionally:

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! (a) An adequate cost-benefit andlysis should include at least:

(i) All human, biological and health effects relative to measures to reduce electro-static fields, nonionizing radiation, corona and its effects, and shocks caused by electro-static and electromagnetic induction; (ii) All environmental, economic and 2 social impacts; a id (iii) Full consideration of the need for public education and awareness of hazards to minimize their impact and public participation in decision making planning for power lines.

(b) Alternatives to adding more power line corridors by routing to follow other transportation corridors, and the alternative of using underground and/or more efficient lines or means of transmitting electricity must ,be considered; l

! (c) Alternatives to increasing size and number of powerlines should be considered, including:

(i) Energy conservation measures such l as load management to reduce peaking capacity 1

and reserve needed; (ii) Use of localized generating stations, which use cogeneration and produce heat and other byproducts at more efficiency to reduce need for '-

more and higher voltage; and (iii) Use of renewable alternative sources of energy.

i (d) Environmental effects of powerlines, such as

! effects of moisture in the air from cool _ing towers must be analyzed.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a_ sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. .

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i As a result the findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

116. Based upon the information contained in these Contentions as well as the compliance Yiles of Region 3 Division

- of Compliance, and the various violations and other malfunctions l

which has occurred at other of C.E.'s plants and becduse of the inadequacy of inspection practices, C.E. will be unable to maintain a quality assurance and quality control program either in connection with completion or construction or operation of Byron all contrary to applicable regulations. This in turn poses an undue risk to the public health and safety. As a result the

_ applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA,'and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

117. C.E. has not adequately assessed the economic and environmental effects of using natural draft and mechanical draft cooling towers as a cooling system for Byron. Therefore the health and safety of the public will be endangered contrary to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. 3 4 (b) (4) and NEPA. These adverse environ-mental effects include but are not limited to

- ----w--* ,

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- , . _ - . - - - ,m. _ , . , , - --y. 4

(a) Weather modification, including fogging and icing. Ground icing from mechanical draft towers may effect essential water supply from wells.

(b) Contamination of land, air and water with contents of the plume, which will include:

(i) Chemicals, including salt, sulfates and polyvinyl chloride, which will have adverse effects on land use and human and other life in the area.

(ii) Radionuclides and possible increased health risks because of synergistic effects with chemicals. _.

(iii) New evidence on dispersal of pathogenic organisms from the river water, which may have adverse health effects. .

(c) Noise levels, which may be above EPA regulations and can cause adverse health effects.

Moreover, the social, economic and psychological costs of these adverse environmental effects are not adequately considered in the cost benefit and risk benefit analysis of Byron. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As 4

a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

118. Byron will not offer sufficient public benefit to offset the financial and environmental costs associatet there-with. Therefore Byron cannot survive an unbiased cost benefit I

,. e-.- --, . - . - , , - . . - - - , , - - - - - - , - - , - # . . - - - - - - . - - - . , - .- ,. ,- - - - - - - - - - , , -

analysis as required by NEPA and 10 C.F.R. S S 51. 2 0 (b) and 51.21. This is true for the reasons elsewhere contained here-in and at least for the following additional reasons:

(a) The rising cost of Byron coupled with C.E.'s lower demand projections, means that electricity generated from Byron will be Ineconomically priced and a burden on C.E.'s ratepayers. -

(b) C.E. has failed to demonstrate that there is a genuine "need for power" to be produced by Byron, given the high cost of that power and C.E.'s historic tendency to overestimate its demand projections. Additionally:

's (i) While the estimated cost of Byron increased dramatically, the demand projections on which C.E. bases its "need for power" argu-ment have dropped from 6% to 4.5% and C.E.

admits that it will have excess capacity (at least a 29% reserve margin which is greater than necessary) w h e n B y r o n g o e s o n 1 i n e .

(ii) C.E. is a part of the MAIN power grid system which has enough excess generating capa-city to make building of Byron unnecessary and therefore construction and operation of Byron will be wasteful of resources, damaging to the environment, and an economic burden'to C.E.'s ratepayers, and unjustifiable in terms of the cost benefit analysis required by NEPA.

(c) C.E. has failed adequately to consider conser-I vation and/or other and cheaper types of. power producing facilities as an alternative to building and operating Byron. Commonwealth Edison has done little to encourage conservation by its customers, such as changes in rate ,

' structure to encourage conservation and reducing the need

for more power by better load management. And in its' estimates of future "need for' power," C.E. has given little consideration to the effects of increasing conservation due to other factors, includin,g public awareness of the energy crisis because of fuel shortages and rising prices, more efficient use o'f energy, and a 4

national energy policy which is encouraging conservation, as well as the possibility of increasing use of alterna-tive sources of power, such as solar and local total energy systems. -.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision.

As a result the findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. -

119. C.E. will not have the financial ability to complete or operate Byron, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (4) for at least the following reasons:

(a) In 1979 three investment rating services lowered their rating on all publicly held bond issues of C.E. This has already caused problems in raising needed capital as costs escalate and the Byron construc-tion timetable is pushed back. C.E.'s heavy investment in nuclear plants makes it dependent on large rate. ,.

increases, which consumer ratepayers are resisting and the Illinois Commerce Commission is questioning.

(b) C.E. has a poor managerial and safety record as evidenced by NRC's Office'of Inspection and enforce-ment criticisms including in 1977 the thre'at to revoke C.E.'s operating licenses. These problems have continued to impact on C.E.'s financial structure.

(c) If a serious accident were to occur at one p

of C.E.'s plants, which seems likely with its poor managerial and safety record, because of C.E.'s off balance commitment to nuclear power, all of C.E.'s reactors might have to be shut down with devastating

. effects on C.E. Possibilities of difficulties in this ,

. area might be similar to those of the Pennsylvania Utility (General Public Utilities) owning the Three Mile Island i Plant, which has been' denied the right to pass costs of l

the accident on to its ratepayers, has had to buy power at higher costs, and has yet to pay costs of damages and i

repair to the reactor or any accident claims.

i l

l As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein. ,

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120. C.E.s Environmental Report and the cost benefit analysis for the Byron project completely fail to take into l

account or adequately discuss any of the facts set forth in t

a-l ,

the Contentions herein, and were illegally and invalidly

, s prepared to serve as an ex post facto just'ification for building l

the plant rather than as an aid to responsible' decision-making.

As a result, there does'not exist"a valid cost benefit analysis or environmental report as required by 10 C.F.R. SS 51.20 (b) and 51.21. ,

121. As a result of the incomprehensible ACRS report discussed above, and as a result of the failure of C.E.'s Environmental Report and the cost benefit analysis for Byron to take into account or adequately discuss any of the facts set forth herein,or any of the generic problems identified in NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony-previously cited, it is impossible to conduct the cost benefit analysis required by NEPA and by 10 C.F.R. SS 51.20(b) and 51.21. None of the ACRS' Byron reports, including Supplemental Reports and ACRS' reports to Congress applicable to Byron, affords information sufficient to the task of factoring the cost of compliance wi' h ACRS concerns into a cost benefit analysis; and the same -

lack of information applies to the matters identified in the Contentions herein and in NUREG-0410 and the Black Fox testimony previously cited.

122. C.E. is being illegally permitted to continue the construction of Byron without having in p ace resolution f

of all of the unresolved safety and environmental problems.

This in turn heavily sways, and illegally so, the cost benefit analysis and future safety modifications because C.E. is being D*

l permitted to construct before safety problems are resolved.

This practice is contrary to the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, and will have an adverse effect on the public health and safety.

123. C.E. is not building Byron in eIxactly the manner and method by whien it promised to do so in the con-struction application. Moreover, many of C.E.'s commitments in the construction application are now outdated and insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that further construction and operation will not adversely effect the public health and safety. This violates the Act, NEPA, and the Regs.

124. The safety and environmental problems associated I '

with Byron (many of them identified herein) as well as the other commitments of C.E. regularly are not proposed to be considered as technical specifications to the operating license and thus a condition of operation. Because of the serious nature of the safety and environmental issues and because of C.E.'s histori-l l cally coor record on safety, quality assurance'and environmental issues, Intervenor contends that the entire application should be referenced as a technical specification (that is conditions of any operating license) so that any commitment of C.E. which is not adequately implemented automatically results in a viola-tion of the license.

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125. In the event of an accident at the units, liability may be limited to $560 million by the Price-Anderson Act. The applicant has not provided a means to compensate for damages beyond the Price-Anderson liability limitation, although such damages may occur as various studies and TMI events show.

C.E. has not waived Price-Anderson and accepted liability for any and all damages that might follow from an accident at the units. It is unreasonable to expose the population living in the vicinity of the units to a safety risk when the applicant-will not accept the corresponding finan.cial risk. It is plain that the basis for the Price-Anderson Act is the refusal of the nuclear in6astry to accept the financial risk of.having to pay damages in the event of a major nuclear accident. This point is well established in the history of the Price-Anderson legislation. For example,'Willis Gale, Chairman, Commonwealth Edison Company, testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as follows:

"At this time we do not see any sound basis on which we can risk our solvency on the possibility, remote as it may be, of a major nuclear catastrophe." Quoted in Harold P.

Green, " Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and i

Indemnity," Michigan Law Review, Janaury, 1973, p. 484. -

Similarly, Charles H. Weaver, Vice President, Westinghouse Electric Company, noted:

"Obviously, we cannot risk the financial stability of our company for a relatively

. _ ~ . . ..

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small project.... [We] cannot exclude the possibility that a great enough fool, aided by a great enough conspiracy of circum-stances, could bring about an accident exceeding available insurance." Ibid.

Moreover, C.E. has failed to demonstrate that they have the financial capability for paying damages in the event of a major accident in the event of-Eepeal or non-applicability of the Price-Anderson Act. See also Contentions 9, 10, and 45, supra.

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

• 126. The increased cost of safety regulation has not been factored into the analysis of applicant's financial ability. There is no reserve for bad debts or reserves for ,

increased costs for new safety regulations or in connection with 1 .

resolution of issues raised herein. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

127. C.E. has not set out the cost (and whether they would be able to absorb it) of the inability to have a fuel supply particularly since uranium is in short supply and there are no reprocessing centers presently operating. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA and l the Regs, cannot be made herein.

2

< 123. C.E. 's environmental report has not estab-lished the need for the units. The purpose of the units is a said to be based on the "need for power." C.E.'s review of i

the "need for power" within the relevant service area is *-

inadequate and overlooks a wide range of relevant factors that

are receiving extensive consideration from energy policy planners in this country. -

Specifically, the analysis of the "need for power" consists of crude trend extrapolation. No model analyzing any type of "need" is presented. C.E. fails to separate out waste-ful and inefficient consumption of electric' power from necessary consumption for some useful end. C.E. fails to consider the effect of promotional rate structures and the inflated energy use they create on the alleged "need for power". C.E. fails to analyze alternative rate structures _.that could be used to control energy demand. C.E. fails to consider the impact on

energy demand of efforts to promote the efficient utilization of electric energy by, for example, developing new standards for insulating new and old residential and commercial office O- buildings, by the introduction of heat pumps in place of

resistance heating, developing new lighting standards for buildings, adopting energy efficiency labeling of new appli-ances, developing new standards for appliance efficiency, _

restricting wasteful use of electricity for space heating, air conditioning, and inefficient industrial and commercial opera-tions and processes. C.E. fails to consider measures designed to flatten peak loads, including time of day metering (charg-ing more for electricity used during periods of peak demand),

load staggering, and selective load shedding (by class of customer or category of use). Rather than an investig5 tion of the aforementioned factors that influence the demand for electric power, C.E. relies on forecasts provided by govern-ment agencies and industry sources. What, if any basis exists for what, if any, specific assumptions behind such fore-caste is not analyzed in the environment report. The popularity of a given forecast is distinct from its val'idity. Its valid-ity would have to be based on a comprehensive analysis consider-ing the factors noted above. Moreover, applicant has not analyzed what the cost would be if they changed from a peak load to an energy sales analysis, thereby limiting the cost of invested capital for electric generation remaining unused for substantial periods of time during the year. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the con-struction phase call .into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

i 129. C.E. has not analyzed the possibility of using cryogenic transmission or storage which would lessen the need or eliminate the need for any units. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase,. that hearing was a cham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

L

130. Applicant's need for power analysis is based, in part, on the lack of . ability to- purchase power. Yet appli-cant has recently entered into agreements to purchase power from others and that has not been reflected in their analysis. There is no support for any assertions by C.E. that it is unable to

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purchase power in the future from utilities With which it is interconnected in MAIN. Yet such an analysis in order to be supportable, must include the reasons why other MAIN utilities cannot sell to applicant. Thus, the construction schedule and demand curves and load growth of each o,f the utilities which applicant says cannot sell to them is as relevant to the analysis of need for power as are applicant's own figures on ,

. those issues. Thus, for example, if Consumers Power (or any other utility in MAIN or for that matter any utility outside

of MAIN but interconnected'with a utility in MAIN) could save energy in the future and have it available for sale by virtue of energy conservation or different load growth patterns or different pricing patterns, C.E. would have to, explain why such events which could reduce the need or eliminate the need

for the Byron units. Applicant's simplistic approach is to discuss need for power primarily or exclusively in Illinois when in fact power is bought and sold in a large regional area including more than nine states. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious-duestion that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, MEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

131. NEPA requires C.E. to assess direct and indirect effects of the generation of electricity. C.E. has not set forth any analysis concerning what impact on the environment certain products will create if'they are encouraged by a free flow of electricity. Thus, for example, what is the impact on the environment of having a free flow of electricity to build large cars which in turn adversely affect the environ-ment? This illustration is only by way,of example. There are numerous more indirect effects which have not been analyzed at

. all by C.E. Moreover, C.E. asserts as a benefit the, production of electricity, but does not categorize any of the costs of the generation of electricity except the capital cost. Thus, C.E.

completely ignores all of the indirect effects of the produc-i tion of electricity. While this issue may have been considered

' at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any i'

event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

132. The cost benefit analysis of alternative forms of power generation is fatally flawed in favor of the desired result. The ER cost benefit discussion is in fact a justifi-cation statement rather than an analysis of all of the factors which go into the selection of the appropriate alternativd',

assuming a need for electricity. The ccst benefit discussion ns-i

. . _ . ___ . _ m_ _, _ . _ _ _ _ , , - . _ . , , - _ _ _ _ _ . .

should consider, for example, but does not consider the following:

(a) The cost of uranium fuel does nor include the cost of storage either at the site or at some future but as yet undetermined facility.

Yet the coal alter-native includes both of these parameters; (b) The cost of securing both raw uranium and enriched uranium for processing into fuel does not consider the long-term probability of unavailability of either the fuel or the enrichment capability.

Presently there is a projected shortage of raw uranium and a shortage of enrichment capability which is aggra-vated by the failure of operating reprocessing centers.

This affects not only the availability of these materials but causes a " nuclear constipation" which is already evidenced in other applicant's facilities where improper and unsafe storage of fuel is occurring because of these problems; -

(c) The industry (and C.E.) hope to resolve the problem by the building of the breeder reactor in order to provide fuel in the future for nuclear facilities.

Aside from the problems inherent in the use of pluto-nium as a fuel, the cost benefit analysis does not consider the probable unavailability of the breeder reactor and/or its increased costs. Thustheorigind"1 estimates of the economics of Byron and other nuclear power plants based.upon the economics of_the breeder is no longer a reality; (d) In addition, the breeder reactor poses safety problems far greater than the nuclear safety problems posed by Byron which themselves are monumental. Since development of nuclear power is inevitably tied to the safe and economic operation of a breeder reactor, it is impossible to assess the full panoply of costs and benefits,without informa-tion, lacking in the analysis on the breeder reactor; (e) The comparison of coal and nuclear units is fatally flawed since no effort has been made to compare a large nuclear unit or units with a grouping of small size coal units which could achieve the same megawatt capability. Because the smaller the unit the less the reserve, the failure to have considered this alternative results in the applicant, projecting a higher reserve than may be necessary with a resul-tant increase in capital costs which is unnecessarily.

I high.

l -

While these issues may have been considered at the construction

( phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question those decisions.

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

l 1

I

133. The Environmental submissions. fail to set forth the effects of poor capacity and reliability of nuclear power plants and is based upon erroneous availability factors. Based upon industry projections oi installed nuclear capacity by the year 1990 the historic pattern of low capacity factors for nuclear plants result inincreasehcostsandindicatesanindustry-wide expenditure of billions for electrical generating capacity representing nothing more than a design overrun. The relation-ship of this figure to the C.E.'s cost benefit analysis has not been set forth completely but preliminary estimates indicate that if the proposed units (in terms of the cost of generation

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of electricity relative to unreliable capital cost equipment) will be billions higher than the figures asserted by C.E., The reliability pattern affects more than the cost of electricity.

2 Thus if a plant is supposed to be operating at 80% of the time but operates only 40% or 50% of the time, people relying upon the electricity which is not available will have to go elsewhere or may have to cut back on their operations, thereby adversely affecting the economy and the environment. No analysis has been made in this regard and C.E. has rather conceived of a perfect environment from the standpoint of economics and relia-bility for their nuclear proposal. See Chasing Down the Facts, David Dinsmore Comey, reprinted February, 1975 issue Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious i

l

- t . ~ . ,

\[' ,

, question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, MEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made-herein. ._ 3 n.,

134. C.E. and the Staff acknowledge that lod;.le' vel _

solid and liquid radioactive wastes will be generated by opera-

~{

tion of the Byron plant. There is, however, an inadequate ,

discussion of the character or environmental effects of such radioactive wastes; and (in the sense that each radionuclide s

is not listed either quantitatively or qualitatively), no a i

discussion of the incremental burden on the environment which 3 s will be created by such wastes from ope, ration of Byron. In ~ ,

p addition, neither C.E. nor the NRC have considered. fully where

- s -

such wastes will be transported and stored; accordingly, s a matter of law, there has been no consideration as,to whether , . g'

\

costs and risks created thereby will be outweighed by alleged k or asserted benefits. Indeed, there is no,discuscion or I.. ..

assurance that adequate facilities for storage and' disposal .

~

of low level radioactive wastes incrementally created'by the

, i proposed Plant will be available, considering the amount of low level radioactive wastes generated and available for

.s i disposition and storage by nuclear power plants in operation "

and planned to be in operation during the life of Byron.

While this issue may have been considered at the' construction phase, that hearing was a shan and in any event new facts ,

since the construction phase call into serious question that ,

, decision. As a result the applicable findings required'bp-the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein' .

\. .

s

'\

s,

p. m g .s -

3 x x 4

x i .

.J - 135. If Byron is operated, it will.have a defined life. At the completion of that period, something will have to be done with Byron and all its radioactive components.

Neither the NRC nor C.E. have adequately addressed themselves to the economic, environmental, and social costs connected with I decommissioning. Inadd[tiontothisfailure,C.E. has no idea 1= as to how it will decommission Byron, what consequences will result therefrom, what economic costs will be incurred, and i

what effect decommissioning will have upon the development of the relevant area and the health and sa,fety of the surrounding

. environment,. including man and all other organisms. Unless the 9

[ issu's or decommissioning is adequately resolved, an appropriate analysis of risks and benefits associated with completion and operation of the proposed plant cannot be made. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construc-l tion phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the,Act, IiEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

136. The environmental aspects of long term waste storage are not at all considered and the Table (S-3) which the NRC permits C.E. to use conclusively as the cost of waste i storage and transportation was derived illegally. Use of S-3 to foreclose consideration here would deprive Intervenor of f

their right to an adjudicatory hearing on the underlying-d'ssump-tions made therein. While this issue may have been considered O

e

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at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construc' tion phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

137. Throughout the Uranium Fuel Cycle, including up through decommissioning of Byron, various amounts of radio-activity in differing char $cter will be released to the environment. Since such radioactivity, by definition, does not dissipate immediately, it tends to build up in the environ-ment and various of its component parts, including man and other organisms and water. Since component parts of the environment tend to concentrate or biologically magnify radiation, the total amount of radiation which could affect nan and other organisms is underestimated by C.E. and the Staff. Accordingly, both short and long term risks 5and costs associated with such magni-fied radiation have not adequately been assessed in light of presumed or asserted benefits. Biological magnification or concentration occurs in various ways. Thus, for example, radio-active material which is deposited on plant life or soil will ultimately reach water and the organisms contained therein and the organisms depending on that water for their sustenance.

~

l Because of biological magnification and concentration, radio-activity originally deposited on the soil and plants will have i a far greater adverse effect when man and other organisms are exposed to or ingest such radioactivity at the end of the afore-said cycle. In addition, there is biological magnification or

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concentration of radioactivity in food chain cycles, which begin directly by the discharge of-radioactivity to water. A document published by the Environmental Protection Agency entitled " Environmental Radiation Dose Commitment: ,

An Appli-cation to the Nuclear Power Industry," EPA-520/4/73-002, and

~

other studies suggest that the analysis of radiation doses from normal, abnormal and 6ther releases to the environment has been improperly made by the NRC. The EPA study is based, in part, upon the now admitted reality that there is no thresh-hold to damage from radiation releases _and holds that the cumulative effect to man and his environment over a long period Yet the qurrent

~

of time of radionuclides must be assessed.

4 Part 20 Standards and Appendix I make no such comparison or analysis and assume that each radionuclide emitted to the 2 environment is the first of its kind. This is an improbable analysis not only in light of existing data but also in light of the obligation of the National Environmental Policy Act to l assess long term cumulative impacts upon man and his environ-_

ment. There are obviously increased effects from the accumu-t lated release of radioactivity from all plants and this is-i s

particularly true in the Midwest (and surely in Illinois) where I

l nuclear power plants have been in use for some time, thus creat-ing a background of man-made radiation which is increased by each additional release contemplated by Byron. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, thAY'h' earing

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1

was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result j the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

139. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 stresses that no particular source of energy should be given preeminence.

Byron was proposed prior to.the change in national policy and there has been no reanalysis to determine whether the research funds necessary in the nuclear industry and in particular in connection with these units ought to b_e, channeled into other resources such as solar energy, geothermal energy, and coal gasification. The proliferation of nuclear power plants and the construction of Byron will deter research and development into more sophisticated pollution controls for fossil fuel

- plants, into nuclear safety, in alternative methods of genera-l ting electricity, into an analysis of utilities' assertions as to rising demands for electricity and will deter exploration for gas, coal and other fossil fuels. Finally, completion and operation of Byron will further encourage a commitment to nuclear power (and indirectly the Breeder) at a time when there are substantial unresolved areas of scientifib and environ-mental concern. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

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139. Intervenor contends that there is no need for electricity from Byron,,in light of the short_and long term plans of C.E. to build additional facilities. Thus, electri-

~

city from Byron is unnecessary and results in an unwarranted cost to the environment. Moreover, C.E., without operation of Byron, will be able to md$t valid demands for the generation of electricity by virtue of purchasing power from one or more of the following sources:

(a) Power Pools and Regional Associations of

, which C.E. is a member; -.

(b) Power Pools and Regional Associations of which C.E. is not a member, but could join; .

3 (c) Making contractual arrangements for firm commitments for power resulting in a guaranteed source of supply, rather thaH making no commitments and rely-ing upon future availability; (d) From other than investor owned utilities, having different peak periods than C.E. with whom C.E.

~

could interconnect on a national or internationa1 basis; and ,

(e) From investor owned utilitieshaving differ-ent peak periods than C.E. with whom C.E." could inter-connect on a national or international basis.

In any analysis of the various alternatives available to C.E.

(instead of electricity alleged necessary from Byron) ,

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- . . . - - - - ~ _ _ - . , - - - - - - ,_ . , , ,

. _ _- _ - ,_ m - -- e

Intervenor contends that all of the long term construction plans of every available source of power must be considered. In other words, in order to ascertain what sources of power or alterna-tives are available to C.E., one must analyze and consider the short and long term construction program of every available source of power in the United States and Canada. Intervenor contends that an analysis of available sources of power, even assuming a need for power, will demonstrate that Byron results in an unwarranted cost to the environment. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, l

cannot be made herein.

140 C.E. and the Staff have erroneously concluded that natural resources are unavailable in sufficient quantities to supply fuel for fossil fired power plants. To the contrary, uranium of all fuels is in the shortest supply.and considering a rational exploitation of resources, C.E.--if they need power--

should be building other than a nuclear power plant. There are sufficient reserves of gas, oil, and coal, individually or collectively, to provide fuel for a fossil fired plant. More-over, it is within the state of the art or would be within the state of the art at the time of completion of construction of a fossil fired power plant, to abate all or substantiallv"all adverse and environmental effects which might occur as a result

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= _ ..

proper surveillance and monitoring, C.E. and the Staff will be unable to take remedial.and prophylactic measures regarding radiation effects. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. l(saresulttheapp'licablefindings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

142. There may be an adverse effect on the domestic water supplies in the relevant area as a result of the operation of Byron. However, C.E. has not fully _ presented or analyzed any data indicating survey of seeps or springs. Furthermore, there is no data relating to a recharge of ground reservoir,s. The failure to have analyzed seeps or springs or recharge of ground reservoirs indicates that any assertions with respect to effects, if any, on domestic water supplies are insupportable. In the

. area impacted by Byron there exists agricultural land which is, from time to time, subject to irrigation. There is no analysis of the effect which the generation of electricity and trans-l mission of electricity from Byron will have upon the inability of owners of agricultural land to irrigate their crops. Grids and transmission lines will prevent the agricu'ltural land situated near such grids and transmission lines from being irrigated by conventional sprinkler systems. The failure to have considered as a cost to the environment the amount of agricultural land which will be af f ected has not been c~on~s'idered in the cost benefit analysis. Moreover, the groundwater investi-

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i i 1. Phytoplankton;

2. Aquatic plants other than phytoplankton;

3. Terrestrial plants, including agricultural crops;

4. Zooplankton; -

5. Benthic organisms;

6. Agnathans;

7. Osteichthyes;

8. Amphibians;

9. Reptiles;

~~

10. Aves;

11. Mammals;

12. All sources of food grown or produced"within a 50-mile radius of the Byron plant, which food may be consumed within or without said 50-mile radius.

The radiation monitoring and surveillance program with respect to the above areas should be of a sufficient scope so that the monitoring will detect effects of direct radiation, such as

- directly on to soil and plants, and indirect rddiation such as when a terrestrial animal consumes a plant that has been irra-diated or when a man eats a terrestrial animal which has consumed a plant which has been irradiated. Moreover,.the program should in-clude methods to determine accumulation concentration and biological magnification of radiation in the entire food chain. Without such monitoring programs, an. adequate environmental assessment of radiation risks and costs will not be made; and also without

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of a fossil fired plant. Thus, considering availability of resources, pollution abatement, and nuclear safety, the choice of completing Byron over other alternatives represents an unwarranted cost to the environment. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase,'that hearing .

was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

141. The radiation surveillance program planned by applicant is not sufficient adequately to monitor the effects of Byron:

3 (a) Applicant's proposed radiation monitoring program will not provide, in the areas for which it'is intended, a sufficient understanding of background radiation and additive radiation created by the Byron plant because there are too few monitoring sites /

selected and because the frequency of monitoring at such insufficient sites is too irregular.' -

(b) Monitoring does not include cumulative .

radiation from. Byron and other nuclear fhcilities.

~

(c) There are several other areas of radiation I

A

! effects which C.E. does not plan to monitor at all.

substantial monitoring of such areas must be made pre and post operational in order adequately to assess the i

environmental impact of radiation emissions from Byron.

These areas include:

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(

gations made at the Byron site are insufficient to determine the flow patterns of groundwater below and away from Byron.

This data does not reliably demonstrate that nearby civilian water supplies and future potable water sources will not be contaminated to unacceptable levels of radioactivity from normal, abnormal or emergency operations of Byron, including accident conditions. Thus, there it no reasonable assurance that Byron may be operated without endangering the health of the local public. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a_, sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious

question that decision. As a resu.t the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

143. C.E. has failed to consider in its environ-mental submissions any information or substantial information in each of the following areas. The failure to have analyzed and considered issues in such areas results in an insufficient environmental analysis of the operation of Byron:

l (a) Social and philosophical effects of the displacement of people; .

(b) Wildlife aesthetics; (c) Population projections; (d) Effects of synergism between radiation and other pollutants; (e) Ef fects on fish and other organisms as a '-

result of the operation of intake structures;

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W (f) Decrease in property values as a result of each cost considered or failed to be considered; (g) Effects of the operation of transmission lines, including but not limited to, effects in the following areas: (i) visual aesthetics; (ii) displace-ment of land; and (iii) effects on bird migration; and (h) TMI type p5ychological fear.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into seriou's question that decision.

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

144. According to Department of Health figures, levels of radiation in milh and foodstuffs already exceed NRC l sta dards. Profiles of actual people in the relevant area I  :

should be available since many of these people consume some or l all of the following: milk from cows grazing in downwind l

sectors; vegetables grown in downwind sector; beef, pork, other meat fed grains and hay grown in downwind sector; cheese, butter, yogurt, cottage cheese made from milk,from cows grazing in downwind sectors; animals whose hhbitat is-within a few miles of the site; bread and other baked goods using flour from wheat grown in downwind sectors as well as other ground local grains such as oats and rye; and so on. Bio-concentration factors may be very high for some. The radiation monitoring t

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- e -h 1-program is inadequate; and MRC requirements may be inadequate, since the Atomic Energy. Commission- in the past considered dilu-tion of radionuclides in food sufficient, relying on mass market mixing and milk pools, etc. to provide for said dilution.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has never in the past profiled food habits of particulaf, susceptible people living, farming, or gardening in so-called " hot spots" downwind of nuclear plants.

Any program purporting to analyze low-level radiation risk to the population must include such specific risk assessments.

Specific doses must be calculated in mi,llirems, as equated from known pCi accumulations in all foodstuffs. Known concentration and bio-accumulation factors must be considered. While this issue may have been considered at the construction phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the con-struction phase call into serious question,that decision. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

145. C.E. has not addressed the co,nsequences of living in the so-called plutonium society. Byron will incre-mentally add to the production of plutonium and given the various uses of plutonium adequate protective measures will virtually require police-state measures. Indeed, the AEC, in a (origi-nally held secret and later released by the Senate Government Operations Committee) report disclosed that such a society will include armed guards and the control of the minds of'-

persons who would be charged with responsibility to guard the

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storage of long term radioactive waste. Since this obviously has an impact upon the environment, it must be discussed.

While this issue may have been considered at the construction 1

phase, that hearing was a sham and in any event new facts since the construction phase call into serious question that decision.

As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, l and the Regs, cannot be made herein.

146. The National Environmental Policy Act requires consideration of man and his environment. Nowhere is there any warrant for assuming that danger and ipjury can be afflicted on non-human forms of life. Thus, evacuation plans, radiation release standards, safety standards and all other parameters of the Byron proposal are based upon the fact that " harm" can be done to non-human forms of life. For example, radiation doses do not consider injury to animals, plant life, fish life, and other forms of aquatic organisms. Similarly, evacaution plans do not consider the possibility of transplanting trees and plant life, moving animal life or transferring fish and other organisms which might be adversely affected by accident conse-quences. While obviously there are priorities which must be asserted between human and non-human forms of' life, the National Environmental Policy Act does not permit an arbitrary lack of concern over non-human forms of life and capriciously relegate such forms of life to a secondary role in the environ-ment. Byron's environmental analysis is fatally flawed'iE favor of an assumed permitted killing of certain non-human forms

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of life. As a result the applicable findings required by the Act, NEPA, and the Regs, cannot be,made herein.

CONCLUSION On the basis of the foregoing Revised Contentions, the Rockford League of Women Voters demands that operating licenses for the Byron Station (Unit No. 1 and No. 2) be denied.

ROCKFORD LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS m, '

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~

By:

i i f'lhIi / /[/ )

ts~Attorhey

• Myron 11. Cherry CHERRY, FLYNN & KANTER One IBM Plaza ~

Suite 4501 .

Chicago, Illinois 60611 (312) 565-1177 b

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