ML19326C709

Forwards Response to NRC 760507 Request for Addl Info Re Analysis Showing That ECCS & Subsystems Meet Single Failure Criterion

ML19326C709
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	08/03/1976
From:	Cavanaugh W ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Zieman D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
7849, NUDOCS 8004250520
Download: ML19326C709 (12)

Text

NF * =ORu 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY 'M s SSION DOCKET NUMBER 42 Ta

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NRC DISTRIBUTION FOn PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL TO: MR D L ZIEb! ANN FROM: ^T o cuuEN AREANSAS POWER & LIGRT CO LITILE POCK, ARK -

I A W CAVANAUGH III DATE RECEIVED l,

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NUMBER OF COPIES RECE!VED

')(On GINAL UNCLASSIFIED aCOPy i hganh DESCRIPTION ENCLOSU RE LTR REF OUR 5-7-76 LTR.......TRANS THE FULIOUING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RE-EVALUAT ON OF ECCS PEREEMANCE WITH FIVE COPIES OF ELECTRICAL DRAWINGS E-22, REV 18 AND E f+16. . . . . . . . .

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• y A Director of Nuclear oactor Regulati -

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Subject:

Arkansas Power 5 Light company - -

Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 C' Docket No. 50-313 License No. DPR-51 Re-Evaluation of ECCS Performance Gentlemen:

Per your May 7, 1976, letter to Mr. J. D. Phillips, attached find the results of our analysis to demonstrate that the ECCS and supporting subsystems meet the single failure criterion pursuant to the require-ments of 10CFR50.46.

Also enclosed find five (5) copies of electrical drawings E-22, Rev.18 and E-416 (6 sheets), Rev. 4 as referenced in the attachment. These drawings supplement those drawings as submitted to you on September 4 and September 22, 1975.

If you have any questions and/or comments please contact us.

Ve truly y , ,

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William C anaugh I Assistant Director Power Production WC:ay Enclosure l

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Docket # - 3 F1 Contrst # %gqi Date R;;,vd. T-3 1 (e Regulatory Docket File RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Question Describe the design of the ECCS actuation system. Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971. Describe any changes proposed for meeting these requirements.

Response

The ECCS actuation system is part of the Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) and is described in the Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (ANO-1 FSAR), Section 7.1.3.

Topical Report, BAW-10003 " Qualification Testing of Protection System Instrumentation" (Rev. 4, January 1976) contains the single failure analysis of Babcock 6 Wilcox's (BGW) Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) used to initiate all ECCS. Although the ANO-1 ESAS equipment was required to be designed to IEEE-279-1968 rather than IEEE-279-1971, BAW-10003 has been generically acce"*-d hv the NRC for plants required to meet both the 1968 and 1971 v< 1 IEEE-279 (although plants required to meet the 1971 version obvi. .y are not identical to ANO-1). It should be further noted that, with respect to single failures, the 1968 and 1971 versions of IEEE-279 differ only in treatment of protection-control interfaces, and ESAS has no such interfaces. Therefore, the state-ment of single failure requirements applicable to ANO-1 is identical in both IEEE-279-1968 and IEEE-279-1971 and no changes are proposed for the ANO-1 ESAS.

Question l Describe the design of the onsite emergency power system, a-c and d-c.

Identify any non-conformance of this design with the single failure require-ments of IEEE Std. 279-1971. Describe any changes for meeting these requirements.

Response '

A complete description of al' plant electrical systems can be found in Chapter 8 of the ANO-1 FSAR. The onsite emergency power systems meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971 with respect to the single failure criteria.

Therefore, no changes are proposed for the ANO-1 emergency power systems.

Question -

Identify all the electrical equipment required for the ECCS and supporting subsystems to enable performance of'the ECCS safety function. Define the l l

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qualification status (ability to withstand the design basis seismic and environmental conditions) of this equipment, and the basis for such qualification, to provide reasonable assurance that the equipment will be capable of performing its safety function. Describe any proposed design modifications, analyses, or test programs for meeting the environ-mental and seismic qualification requirements.

Response

The following tabulation lists the electrical equipment designed to oper-ate during the ECCS mode and references the pertinent P6ID and Schematic diagrams.

Core Flooding System (PGID M-236)

Red Channel Green Channel No electrical components required to operate for safety function.

High Pressure Injection Systeu (PSID M-231, M-232)

Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

CV1407 E184 CV1408 B5164 "

B6164 C86 "

C91 HS1407 "

HS1408 P36A E211 P36C A306 "

A406 A307 "

A407 A308 "

A408 A309 "

A409 HS1241 "

HS1243 C86 "

C91

" j PS1250 PS1270 CV1219 E219 CV1227 B5151 "

B6151 C86 "

C91 HS1219 "

HS1227 CV1220 E219 CV1228 l B5152 "

B6152 l C86 "

C91 l HS1220 "

HS1228 l

P36B E212* P36B A307 "

A407 A306 "

A406 A308 "

A408

m Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

A309 E212 A409 HS1242 " HS1262 C86 "

C91 PS1260 "

PS1261 CV1234 E221* CV1234 B5553 "

BS553 C86 " C91 HS1234 "

HS1264

• 'Ihis equipment can be powered and controlled from either the red or green channel.

Low Pressure Injection (Decay Heat Removal) System (PGID M-232)

Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

CV1407 E184 CV1408 B5164 "

B6164 C87 "

C92 HS1407 "

HS1408

-P34A E181 P34B A305 "

l A405 A308 "

A408 A309 "

A409 C87 "

C92 HS1417 "

HS1419 CV1401 E183 CV1400 B51114 "

B6161

! C87 "

C92 HS1401 "

HS1400 CV1414 E182 CV1415 B51114 "

B6163

.HS1414 "

HS1415 WR35 "

WR34 l

CV1405 "

CV1406 B51112 -" B6166 HS1405 "

HS1406 Service Water System (M-209, M-210)

Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

SG1 E416 SG2 B51102A' "

B61102A t Pv m y y w -

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' Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

HS3720 E416 HS3721 SG3 E416 SG4 B5251A " B61102B HS3732 " HS3733 SGS E416 SG6 B5251B " B6521A HS3724 " HS3725 E416 SG7

" B6521B

" HS3726 P4A E275 P4C A302 " A402 A303 " A403 A308 " A408 A309 " A409 C86 " C91 HS3611 " HS3610 CV3646 E279, Sht. 2 CV3642 B5224 " B6224 A302 " A402 A303 " A403 HS3646 "

HS3642 l CV3644 E279, Sht. 1 CV3640 B5223 "

l B6223 A302 " A402 l_

A303 "

l A403 HS3644 "

l HS3640 CV3645. E277 CV3641 B51121 " B6184 l

A302 " A402 l  !

HS3645 " HS3641 l

CV3643 E278* CV3643 B5653 " B5653 i

( A302 " A402 l A303 " A403 HS3643 " HS3643 l

[ -CV3820 E282 CV3811 B5181 " B6182 C86 " C91 1 HS382C " HS3811~ l

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m i

Red Channel Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

CV3822 E283, Sht. 2 CV3821

' B5182 "

B6163 A305 "

A405

- HS3822 "

HS3821

' CV3801 E284 CV3800 B5213

" B6213 -

B5133 "

B6133 VUC1B E367 VUCIC B5133 " B6132 A305 " B6133 HS3801 " HS3802 SV3840 E186 SV3841 RSI " RS2 A305 " A405 CV3806 E283 CV3807 B5231 "

B6231 C107 "

C108 HS3806 "

HS3807 CV380S E283 CV3810 B5214 "

B6214 A306 "

A406 HS3808 "

HS3810 CV3809 E283* CV3809 BS534 "

B5534 A307 "

A407 HS3809 "

HS3809-P4B E276* P4B A303 "

A403 A302 "

A402 A403 "

A303 A308 "

A408 C86 " C91

' HS3609 "

HS3600 Electrical System (E-1, E-22, E-269)

Red Channel- Green Channel Ref. Dwg.

. DG1- E-1 DG2

.A3 "

A4

.X5 X6 .-  !

B5' " B6 1

t

Red Channel Green Channel

, Ref. Dwg.

B51 E-1 B61 B52 " B62 B53 " B63 D03 " D04 D01. - " D02 D07 " D06 RA1 " RA2 RS1 " RS2 RS3 " RS4 B55 " B55 B56 " B56 Y25 " Y25 DOS " D05 Red Channel Green Channel Yellow Channel HS0151 HS0152 HS0153 PT1041 PT1040 PT1020 PT1022 PT2405 PT2406 PT2407 C86 C89 C90 C87 C91 C88 C92 RS1 RS2 RS4

• This equipment can be powered and controlled from either the red or green channel.

(Note: All referenced drawings, save E-1, E-22, E-416 were provided by our September 22, 1975 transmittal to you.

Dwg. E-1_is the same as FSAR Figure 8-1. Dwgs. E-22 and E-416 are transmitted herewith (5 copies of each)).

Refer to Chapter 1 of the ANO-1 FSAR for the specific criteria used in the design of the ECCS. Section 6.1 and corresponding tables of the ANO-1 FSAR provide a definition of the ECCS design and qualification status.

Chapter 8 of the FSAR provides further design standards and references pertaining to electrical standards. Sections 9.1, 9.3, 9.5 and the appli-cable' Chapter 9 tables of the FSAR provide descriptions of 'the Auxiliary and Emergency Systems. No modifications are necessary to meet environ-mental and seismic qualification requirements as all have been met and required documentation is on file.

Question-Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, that may become submerged.as.a result of a LOCA.- For all such equipment that is not qualified for service in such an environment, provide an analysis to 4

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determine the following: (1) the safety significance of the failure of the equipment (e.g., spurious operation, loss of function, loss of accident /

post-accident monitoring, etc.) as a result of flooding, (2) the effects of Class IE electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such failures, .and (3) the proposed design changes resulting from your analysis. Your. response to item (2) should specifically address breaker

.and fuse coordination and isolation capabilities of this aspect of your design.

Response

The following tabulation gives all the electrical equipment and instrumenta-

. tion inside the primary containment building below elevation 357'-0".

Asterisked (*) items receive an ESAS signal.

A B C D E Equipment Reference Safety Affects on Changes Number Drawing Significance Class IE Proposed Power Sources CV1050* E-182 Yes Yes Yes CV1053* E-208 None None None CV1054* E-246 None None None CV1055 E-199 None None None CV1213 E-215 None None None CV1214 E-216 None None None CV1215 E-215 None None None CV1216 E-216 None None None CV1410* E-182 Yes Yes Yes CV1414 E-182 Yes None None CV1415 E-182 Yes None None CV2216 E-240 None None None CV2217 E-240 None None None i CV2287 E-230 None Nor.e None l CV2415 E-238 None None None I CV2419 E-238 None None None l CV4400* E-209 None None None CV4446* E-362 None None None HS2639 E-385 None None None HS2640 E-385 None None None i i

K119 E-331 None None None l K1515 E-427 None None None LT1051 E-331 None None None LT1405 E-331 None None None LT2415- E-266 None None None LT2416 E-266 None None None

m A B' C D E LT2601 E-263 None None None LT2609 E-263 None None None LT2610 E-263 None None None LT2613 E-263 None None None LT2614 E-263 None None None LT2651' E-263 None None None LT2653 E-263 None None None LT2659 E-263 None None None LT2660 E-263 None None None LT2664 E-263 None None None PDIS2211 E-331 None None None PDIS2212 E-331 None None None PDT1280 E-264 None None None PDT1281 E-264 None None None PDT1282 E-264 None None None PDT1283 E-264 None None None P41A E-385 None None None PM41B E-385 None None None PM114A E-230 None None None PM114B E-230 None None None PS2285 E-230 None None None PS2286 E-230 None None None PS2295 E-230 None None None PS2296 E-230 None None None PT1051 E-331 None None None PT2415 E-266 None None None PT2416 E-266 None None None PT6512 E-266 None None None PT6513 E-262 None None None PT6582 E-262 None None None PT6583 E-262 None None None RE8019 E-408 None None None-TE1051 E-331 None None None TE2214 E-480 None None None

.TE2215 E-480 None None None TE2401 E-252 None None None.

TE2403 E-252 None None None TE2411 E-252 None None None TE2608 E-480 None None None

-TE2614 ~E-263 None None None TE2615 E-263 -None None None TE2658 E-480 None None None

'TE2664 E-263 None None None TE2665 E-263 None None None W24 E-43 None None None

_ W25 -E-43 None None None W69 .E-43 None None None W70 E None None None

.XT1032 E-414 ~None None None

Column C of the tabulation designates whether or not the equipment performs an ECCS safety function. Only valves CV1050, 1410, 1414, and 1415 are required to operate during the ECCS mode. Failure or spurious operation of the remaining equipment has no ECCS safety significance. CV1414 and CV1415 and their related raceway are fully submersible. Fully qualified submersible valve operators for CV1050 and CV1410 have been shipped and will be installed during the first refueling shutdown. All circuits to these valves and the associated equipment are either fused or protected with circuit breakers. Class IE power sources serving this submerged equipment are protected by Class IE circuit breakers.

Question Identify any single electrically operated fluid system component, including manually-controlled electrically-operated valves, whose failure could result in loss of capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function. Failure in both the " fail to function" sense and in the " undesirable function" sense should be considered, and this should apply even though the component may not be required to function in a given safety operational sequence.

Response

Those single electrically operated fluid system components requested above are as follows:

CV2417 Core Flooding Tank Vent Valve (E-238)

CV2420 Core Flooding Tank Vent Valve (E-238)

CV3823 Service Water Discharge to Emergency Pond (E-283)

CV3824 Service Water Discharge to Flume (E-283)

Question With regard to the equipment identified in (5) (above), provide a detailed description of any proposed design changes deemed necessary by your analysis for r. eting the single failure criterion. Your response should specifically address but shculd not be limited to changes made to meet the single failure criterion by conformance to Branch Technical Position EICSB IS, " Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves", of Appendix 7A of the Regulatory Standard Review Plan. This position establishes the acceptability of disconnecting power to the electrical com-ponents of a fluid system as one means of meeting the single failure criterion.

Response

CV2417 and CV2420 are manually controlled-electrically operated passive isolation valves. The circuits for these valves were no+ required to meet IEEE-279 during the design and construction phases of ANC-1. The valves are not accessible during LOCA. However, dual indication of tank pressure is provided la the control room to detect any decrease in tank pressure which j may occur due to operator error or electrical fault. As stated in our <

July 9, 1975, letter to A. Giambusso, pressure reducing orifices are provided upstream of the valves so that the pressure would bleed off at a very slow rate allowing sufficient time for corrective action to be taken.

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• CV3823 and CV3824 are manually controlled isolation valves used to direct Service Water flow to either the Emergency Cooling Pond or the Discharge Flume, respectively. The circuits to these valves do not meet IEEE-279, but are accessible during LOCA. Per our July 9, 1975, letter to Mr. A.

Giambusso, we are now locking the breaker to CV3824 open during normal operation. We now propose locking the breaker to CV3823 open and tagged when this valve is opened and the breaker to CV3824 open and tagged when this valve is closed during transfer to Service Water flow to the Emergency Cooling Pond. . No other changes are deemed necessary.

Question Identify any electrical interlocks between redundtnt portions of the ECCS and supporting subsystems. Define the consequences of failure of any interlock on the capability of the ECCS to perform its safety function.

Describe any proposed design modifications resulting from this review.

Response

There are no electrical interlocks between redundant portions of the ECCS and supporting subsystems.

l Question Provide the electrical and physical separation criteria for your design of redundant safety equipment and functions. Include the features in your design that minimize the vulnerability of the ECCS and supporting subsystems  ;

i to common failure modes.

l

Response

For a description of the electrical and physical separation criteria see Section 8.2.2.8 of the ANO-1 FSAR.  !

Question Provide the following drawings for the ECCS and supporting subsystem:

A. Piping and Instrument Diagrams (PSID).

B. Electrical Control Schemai.ic Diagrams.

C. One Line Diagram of tha neo artwin nistributien System.

D. One Line Diagram of the DC Power Distribution Systen..

E. One Line Diagram of the Vital Instrument Power Distribution System.

Response

A. PSID of ECCS systems were provided to Mr. R. Boyd on Sept. 4,1975.

B. Electrical Control Schematics were provided to Mr. R. Boyd on Sept. 22, 1975, save E-416 which is transmitted herewith.

C6D. Figure 8-1 of the ANO-1 FSAR provides this information .

E. Transmitted herewith are five (5) copies of drawing E-22 to provide the requested information.