ML19253B583

Forwards Proposed Change to License NPF-2 Tech Spec Tables 3.3-3 Through 3.3-5,4.3-2 & Paragraph 4.8.1.1.2 Re Degraded Electrical Power Grid Conditions.Safety Evaluation & Class III Fee Encl

ML19253B583
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/10/1979
From:	Clayton F ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19253B584	List: ML19253B583 ML19253B588
References
NUDOCS 7910160440
Download: ML19253B583 (13)

Text

Alabar1a Power Company 600 North 18th Street

. , Post Office Don 7641 Birmingham. Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 323-5341 F. L CLAYTON, JR.

m Senior Vice President Mahama POWCf

!!au satinin tuInc s(tem October 10, 1979 Mr..A. Schwencer, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

RE: Changes to Operating License No. NPF-2 Technical Specifications Alabama Power Company propases the attached change to Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Operating License No. NPF-2 Technical Specification involving the following item:

Technical Specification Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, 3.3-5, 4.3-2 and paragraph 4.8.1.1.2 concerning degraded electrical power grid conditions.

The Plant Operation Review Committee and the Nuclear Operation Review Board have reviewed the above proposed change and have determined that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as shown in the attached safety etaluation.

The class of this proposed amendment is designated according to 10CFR170 requirements. This change is deemed not to involve a significant hazard con-sideration, which is considered as a Class III change according tc 10CFR Part 170. A check for $4,000 is enclosed to cover the fees required.

In accordance with 10CFR50.30(c)(1)(1), three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) additional copies of this proposed amendment are enclosed.

If you have any questions, please advise.

Yours very truly, b L. Clayton, Jr.

FLCJr/TNE:bhj SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS 10th DAY OF October ,

Enclosures 19 ,

j \

cc: Mr. R. A. Thomas j Mr. C. F. Trowbridge NOT5RY PUBLIC [/

My Commission Expires: 5-22-8 7 91016 0 + + A[ b

.q'.

SAFETY EVALUATION FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLES 3.3-3, 3. 3-4. 3.3-5 a. 3-2 AND W ARA. a.8.1.1. 2 Backoround:

The Farley Technical Specifications do not contain all the currently re-quired NRC test specifications to demonstrate the capability of the onsite power system to perform its intended function. Additional test specifica-tions are needed for (1) the undervoltage relays which provide voltage protection for the loss of voltage condition of offsite power, (2) the undervoltage relays which will be installed to provide voltage protection for the degraded voltage condition of offsite power, and (3) onsite power testing of the diesel generators. -

References:

(1) Alabama Power Company l'atter dated Noverter 7,1977 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

(2) NRC Staff positions contained in NRC letter to Alabama Power Company dated November 27, 1978.

(3) Alabama Power Company, letter dated January 15, 1979 to the NRC.

Bases:

The following provides the bases for the technical specification changes by tables and paragraph numoers:

Technical S :ecifica tion ~ Table 3.3-3 Item 7: In ac::ordance with NRC Staff Position 1.f., this item should be added to provide limiting c::ndi-tions for operation of the undervoltage relays for the loss of voltage condition and degraded voltage condition.

Technical Scecification Table 3.3-4 Item 7a: In accordance with NRC Staff Position 1.f., this item should be added to provide a trip set;:oint and allowable value for the undervoltage relays which provide protection for the loss of voltage condi- ~

tion. These relays will have a tap setting of 93V.

. Since the potential transformers associated with safety-related buses 17 and 1G have a turns ratio of 35:1, the resulting trip value and setpoint will be 3255V, or 78.24% of nominal bus voltage L~(93V x 35)/4160].

The allowable value was deter nined to te 3222V, or 77.45". of nominal bus vol tage. This value is sufficient-ly above the safety limit of 68% to accommodate in-accuracies associated with the relays.

I154 225

The manufacturer's published undervoltage relay time curves shall be used as a basic for accept-ance to verify the relay time delays are within 5% of that specified for tap value voltages. The 5% allowance is provided to accommodate the in-accuracy associated with the time delay of the relays. This inaccuracy is insignificant due to the fast responsa of the undervoltage relays.

Item 7b: In accordance with NRC Staff Position 1.f., this item should be added to provide a trip setpoint and allowable value for the undervoltage relays which provide protection for the degraded voltage condition. These relays will have a cap setting of 105V. Again, to determine the trip setpoint a tu-ns tatio of 35:1 is used for the potential transformere associated with safety-related buses 17 and 4G.The resulting trip value is 3675V or 88.34% sf nominal bus voltage (105V x 35)/4160V .

The allowable value was determined to be 3638V, or 87.44% of nominal bus voltage. This value is sufficiently above the safety limit of 3600V or 86.5% of nominal bus voltage to accommodate in-accuracies associated with the relays.

As discussed in Item 7a, the time _elay shall be verified by using the manufacturer's published time curves.

Technical Specification Table 3.3-5 Item 13: In accordance with NRC Staff Position 1.f., this item should be added to provide for response time testing of the undervoltage relays for the loss of voltage condition and degraded voltage condi-tion. The response time for the loss of voltage relays is based on the maximum ti=c delay of 1.2 seconds with the voltage of 68% of nominal voltage as assumed in the SAR. The response time for the degraded voltage relays is based on the time delay associated with the undervoltage relays plus an additional time delay of 1 second associated with interposing relay and circuit breaker operation.

Technical Soecification Table 4.3-2 Item 7: In acenrdance with NRC Staff Position 1.f., this item should be added to provide surveillance re-quirements for testing the undervoltage relays for the loss of voltage condition and degraded voltabs condition. The final trip actuation relay is actuated during response time testing and is therefore excluded from the channel calibration and channel functional test.

I154 226

Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2 Para. c.3.a - This paragraph is deleted. Verification of emergency bus de-energization and load shedding is being added in Para. c.6.a. in accordance with NRC Staff Position 3.a. Since the same circuitry performs this function whether or not a safety injection signal is present, there is na reason to verify this function twice.

Para. c.5: Regulatory Position C.2 in Regulatory Guide 1.9, dated 3/10/71, states chac the diesel generator loads should not exceed the smaller of the 2,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> rating, or 90% of the 30 minute rating of the diesel generator set. The 2,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> ratings of 4353 kw and 3,100 kw for the 4075 kw and 2850 kw diesel generators respectively are most limiting. The values presently included in the Technical Specifications do not reflect this limitation and should so be corrected.

Para.c.6.a: In accordance with NRC Staff Position 3.a., this surveillance requirement should be added to demonstrate for a loss of offsite power condition the emergency buses will be de-energized and load shed.

Para.c.6.b: In accordance with NRC Staff Position 3.b., this surveillance requirement should be added to demonstrate for a loss of offsite power condition the diesel generators will start automatically and energize the emergency buses with permanent loads and shutdown loads connected through the load sequencer.

Para.c.7: In accordance with NRC Staff position 3.c., this surveillance requirement should be added to demonstrate the capability of the diesel generators to start with only a safety features actuation signal present.

Conclusion:

lae proposed changes to Technical Specification Tables 3. 3-3, 3. 3-4, 3.3-5, 4.3-2, and Paragraph 4.8.1.1.2 do not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10CFR50.59.

iib 4 227

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This configuration is the result of the following energency situation:

- ?.ro unit operation, LCSP on both units and I4CA on Uni: 2, 3 e inadvertent trip of the Tie 3:eaker DF13 vill result in the auto =atic icad shedding of 4 KV Sus 17. Reclosing of the Tie 3reaker DF13 and starting of the Uni 1 Train A LOS7 loads on Bus 17 can be perfor=ed nanually, from the Control Room. For this situation the Uni: 1 Train 3 LCSP loads are supplied from Diesel Generator 13 through 4 KV 3us 1G.

I154 228 1

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l. CSP ' ) Ob3'1 LOACS AKV-EUS lu ._

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This configuration is the result of any one of the following emergency situations:

a. Two unit operation and LOS7 on both units.

b. Two unit operation, 'IDSP on both units and IECA on Unit 1.

The inadvertent trip of the Tie Breaker DF13-2 vill result in the autoe.atic lead shedding of 4 KV Sus 2F. Reclosing of the !ie 3reaker DF13-2 and starting of the Unit 2 Train A IDS? leads on Bus 27 can be perfor=ed canually from the Control Room. ?cr this situation the Unit 2 Train 3 ICSP loads are supplied from Diesel Generator 23 threugh 4 K7 Bus 2G.

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RWP5 This configuration is the result of any one of the following emergency situations:

a. Pao unit operation and I457 on both units,

b. Pao unit operation and LOS7 on Unit 1 only,

c. One unit operatica (Unit 1), LOS7 and Diesel Generator 1::

not available.

The inadvertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DF13 vill result in the automatic lead shedding of a U 3us 1H. Reclesing of the Tie 3 eaker DF13 and starting of the Unit 1 Train A River Water Pu=ps S, 9,10 can be perfor=ed manually, from the Control Room.

For each of the e=argency situations (a, b, c) described above and the inad-vertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DF13, the remaining river water pu=ps are:

a. Unit 2 Train A River Water Pu=p 6 on 4 U 3us 23, supplied from Diesel Generator IC.

Unit 1 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 4 and 5 on 4 W 3us U, supplied from Diesel Gamerator 2C or from Diesel Ganerator 13 in the event that Diesel Ganerator 2C is not available.

Unit 2 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 1, 2 and 3 on 4 W Bus 2J, -

supplied from Diesel Generator 2C or from Diesel Generator 23 in the event that Diesel Generator 2C is not available, ilS4 230 3

b. Unic 2 Train A River Water Purps 6 and 7 on 4 K7 Sus 23 supplisd from offsite power.

Unit 1 Train 3 liver Water Pu=ps 4 and 5 on 4 KV Bus 1J, supplied from Diesel Generator 2C or from Diesal Generator 13 in the event that Diesel Generator 2C is not available.

Unic 2 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 1, 2 and 3 on 4 K7 Sus 2J, supplied from offsica power.

c. Unic 1 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 4 and 5 on 4 KV Eus 1J, supplied -

from Diesel Generator 2C or from Diesel Generator 13 in the event that Diesel Generator 2C is not available.

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LOADS

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RWPT This configuration is the result of any one of the following emergency situations:

a. Two unit operation and LOS? on Unic 2 only,

b. One unit operation (Unit 2), LOS? and Diesel Generator 1C not available.

The inadvertent trip of the Tie Breaker DF13-2 vill result in the automatic load shedding of 4 KV Sus 2H. Reclosing of the Tie Breaker DF13-2 and starting of the Unit 2 Train A River Water Pu=ps 6 and 7 can be perfor. ed manually, from the Control Room.

For each of the emergency situations (a and b) described above, and the inadvertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DF13-2, the re=aining river water pu=ps are:

a. Unit 1 Train A River Water Pumps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 K7 Sus IH, supplied from offsite power.

Unic 1 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 4 and 5 on 4 KV Bus 1J, supplied from offsite power.

Unic 2 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 1, 2 and 3 on & K7 Bus 2J, supplied from Diesel Generator 2C or from Diesel Generator 23 in the event that Diesel Generator 2C is not available. .

b. Unit 2 Train B River Water Pumps 1, 2 and 3 on 4 K7 Sus 2J, supplied from Diesel Generator 2C or from Diesel Generator 23 in the ev at that Diesel Gen 6rator 1C is not available.

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. 9 A KV- EUS l a 9' Q dd A 5 V

RWPS This configuration is the result of any one of the following emergency situations:

a. Peo unit operation, ICSP on both units and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

b. ?ao unit operation, LOSP on both units, LOCA on Unic 2 and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

c. Peo unit operation, IDSP on Unit 1.only, and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

d. One unit operation (Unit 1), IDSP and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

The inadvertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DG13 will result in the automatic load shedding of 4 KV Sus lJ. Reclosing of the Tie 3:aaker DG13 and starting of the Unic 1 Train 3 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 can be perfor:ed manually, from the Control Room.

For each of the ec:argency situations (A, b, e and d) described above, and the inadvertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DG13, the renaining river water pu=ps are:

a. Unit 1 Train A River Watar Pumps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 KV Sus la, supplied frem Diesel Generator 1-2A. -

Unit 2 Train A River Water Pump 6 on 4 KV Sus 23, supplied from Diesel Generator IC.

Unit 2 Train 3 Ri*ir Water Pu=ps 1, 2 and 3 on 4 K7 Sus 2J, supplied from Diesel Generator 23.

1IS4 233 6

b. None. ,

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c. Unit 1 Train A River Water Pu=ps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 K7 Sus 13, supplied, from Diesel Generator 1-2A.

Unit 2 Train A River Water Pumps 6 and 7 on 4 K7 Bus 2H, supplied fro:n offsica power.

Unit 2 Train 3 River Watar Pumps 1, 2 and 3 on 4 K7 Bus 2J, supplied from offsite power.

d. Unit 1 Train A River Water Pumps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 K7 Bus 1H, supplied from Diesel Generator IC, or from Diesel Generator 1-2A in the event that Diesel Generator 1C is not available.

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1154 234 .

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CASE 6 4 EV - EUS 2.G jp )cG:13-2 ) Octc 8-2.

LOADS 26  ?

4 EV- BUS '2.tT _ ._

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b e%;@g R W P'S.

This con >4.r_ a.cion is the result of any one of the fell.:,ving energency situations:

a. Tuo unit operation, LOS? on both units u2d Diesel Generator 2C not available. ,

b. Two unit operation, LOSP on both units, ICCA on Unit I and Diesel Generator 2C tot available.

c. Two unit operation, IDSP on Unit 2 only and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

d. One unit operation (Unit 2), LCSP and Diesel Generator 2C not available.

2he inadvertent trip of the Tie Brea' .r DG13-2 vill result in the auto =atic load shedding of 4 K7 Bus 2J. Reclosing of the Tie 3:eaker DG13-2 and starting of the Unit 2 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 1, 2 and 3 can be perfor=ed e.anually, from the Control Room.

For each of the emergency situations (a, b, e and d) described abova, and the inadvertent trip of the Tie 3reaker DG13-2, the re=aining river water pu=ps are:

a. Unit 1 Train a River Water Pu=ps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 K7 Bus IR, -

supplied from Diesel Generator 1-2A.

Usic 2 Train A River Water Pu=p 6 on 4 K7 Bus 2H, supplied from Diesel Generator IC.

Unit 1 Train 3 River Water Pu=ps 4 and 5 on 4 K7 Bus 1J, supplied from Diesel Generator 13.

8 i154 235

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b. Uni 2 Train A River Water Pu=p '

6 on 4 K7 Bus 2H, supplied from Diesel Generator IC. -

c. Unic 1 Train A River Water Pumps 8, 9 and 10 on 4 K7 Bus 1H, supplied from offsite power.

Unic 2 Train A River Water Pumps 6 W 7 on 4 KV Bus 2H, supplied from Diesel Generator 1-2A.

Unit 1 Train 3 River Water Pumps 4 and 5 on 4 KV Bus 1J, supplied from offsica power.

d. Unic 2 Trafn A River Water Pumps 6 and 7 on 4 K' .,ur 1H, supplied from Liesel Generator 1C or from Diesel Generator 1-2A in the event that Diesel Generator 1C is not available.

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