05000289/FIN-2009003-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Deficient Coordination of Work Activities Resulted in NR-P-1C Becoming Inoperable |
Description | A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a was identified for failure to properly plan and coordinate maintenance and operational activities affecting safety related components. Specifically, station personnel did not properly coordinate implementation of work activities which affected the strainer function for all safety related river water pumps. Workers implemented a clearance which isolated backwash flow and deenergized the motorized rotating elements for all strainers almost 2 days before the associated valve repair maintenance activity was scheduled. During this period, the station performed the semi-annual clam kill evolution which involved starting and stopping several river water pumps. Debris from the river accumulated on the idle strainer for operating nuclear river water pump NR-P-1C. This restricted flow and the pump was declared inoperable. Operators promptly realigned the standby nuclear river water pump, exited the TS limiting condition of operation, and entered the issue into the corrective action program (Issue Reports [IRs] 926712 and 927439). This finding is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and the associated cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than the TS allowed outage time. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control component because station personnel did not properly coordinate work activities and assess the impact of hanging the strainer clearance tags prior to the clamicide evolution such that availability of NR-P-1C was optimized H.3.b]. (Section 1R13 |
Site: | Three Mile Island |
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Report | IR 05000289/2009003 Section 1R13 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Nimitz J Brand D Kern J Commiskey R Bellamy C Newport |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Three Mile Island - IR 05000289/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Three Mile Island) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Three Mile Island)
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