ML17348A774

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LER 90-011-00:on 901113,containment Spray Pumps 4A & 4B Placed Out of Svc in Violation of Tech Spec 3.4.2.a.1.Pump 4B Had No Oil in Bearing Oiler.Cause Undetermined.Bearing Oiler Refilled w/oil.W/901212 Ltr
ML17348A774
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/12/1990
From: PLUNKETT T F, POWELL D R
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-90-414, LER-90-011-01, LER-90-11-1, NUDOCS 9012180226
Download: ML17348A774 (8)


Text

'CCELERATED DIQ RIBUTION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM I I REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9012180226 DOC.DATE: 90/12/12 NOTARIZED:

NO ,DOCKET FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION POWELL,D.R.

Florida Power 6 Light Co.PLUNKETT,T.F.

Florida Power 6 Light Co.'ECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 90-011-00:on 901113;containment spray pumps 4A&, 4B placed out of svc in violation of Tech Spec 3.4.2.a.l.Pump 4B had no oil in bearing oiler.Cause undetermined.

Bearing oiler refilled w/oil.W/901212 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR t ENCL I SIZE: S TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 LA EDISON,G INTERNAL ACNW AEOD/DSP/TPAB NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DST/SELB 8D N~8D1 EG FIL 02 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EGGG BRYCE 1 J H NRC PDR NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1., 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3-3 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD AEOD/DOA AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/EMEB 7E NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPB1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 D D D~NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOih!Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROiVI DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 31 ENCL 31 Oe'C 1S@SO L-90-414 10 CFR 50.73 U.ST Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4 Docket No.50-251 Reportable Event: 90-011-00 Date of Event: November 13, 1990 Technical Specification

3.0.1 Entry

Due to Declaring Both Containment S ra Pum s Out of Service The attached Licensee Event Report is being provided pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 for notification of the subject event.Very truly yours, T.F.Plunkett Vice President Turkey Point Plant Nuclear KNH/DRP/MKA/mka cc: Stewart D.Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant 9012180226 901212 FOR ADOCi ov0002Si PDR an FPL Group company LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U s eeMc L EA A 1 s ov LA Toee Y coewe w icsi AseeIOYEO Oees eeO 71ICMiCs EX~iwtS EISIIM~ACIUTY NAME I'l Turke Point Unit 4 OOCKET~EN al 0 5 0 0 02 5 1 OF Technical Specification

3.0.1 Entry

Due to Declaring Both Containment Spray Pumps Out of Service.-~VENT OATS (0 Ltk N~EW (SI AESOAT OATE (7)OTIIEA SAC(LIT(Et INVOLVtO NI MONTH QAY YEAA YEAII eeQveNTIAL, MY'&NUeeesA e i Nveeees LIONTN OAY YEAN~ACILITY assess OOCXET NUMEEA(SI 0 5 0 0 0 1 113 9D 90 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 9 0 0 5 0 0 0 OSE I(AT(NO scoot (s)1 0 0 St.ett(e)EE.WS(e)ll l(U Wl.ett(el)1

)(I)EE.WS(e)Ill(W)t(L4%le lll)((el aO.~(e)a)(T)SE.MW(~)a.m(e)a)~E JQe)al a.77(e)a)(()W).7S(e)a)(S)t(LTS()al(w)LICtlwtt CONTACT SON TNN Ltw ('ltl~E.7$(e)al()el W.TE(e)a)(r I~E.TE(e)a)(~)%.7$(el al)TW)lAI W).7$(e)al)TW)(t)~E.TE(e)alla)O TNE IltoUIAEMtNTE OS (0 cSN$: (Cseet ese es~ee Ise TeiMawogl (11 TNIE AESOAT 0 NJWITTEO SUNEUANT 7 7171&(7X7l (e)OTNEA ISSee(ly iii AAeeee(~NM esS Is Feel.HAC Sees AI(EA CODt TELtSNONE NVMEEA David R.Powell, Licensing Superintendent 3 05 24 6-5 55 9~ETE ONE LINE SOII EACH COAWONENT SAILUAE OEW'NIEEO IN TNIE AESOWT (ISI CAUSE SYSTtM COMSONENT MANUSAC TV II EII COMSON t NT MANU S A(s TUNE II ESONTAEL TO NSNQS~@~pl+(i 4%/)7, R&fLEMENTAL IttSONT EXSECTtO (Ie(Ytt fly yee, eeesSNee f XSE Clf D SVEMISEIOle OA Sf)t XSECTt O WJEMItt)ON OATE ll~)MONTH OAY VEGAN~ACT IUsvI ee Ie(O weee, LA,~sMeeey INNes e(ssN~lyseselINs sseN lit(On November 13,,1990, Unit 4 was in Mode 1 (power operation) at 100 percent power.At 1915 EDT, containment spray pumps (CSPs)4A and 4B were placed out of service.Technical Specification (TS)3.4.2.a.2 requires that two CSPs be operable whenever the unit is critical.TS 3.4.2.b.2 allows one CSP to be taken out of service provided it is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.The TS allows performing maintenance on one pump provided the other pump is tested for operability.

Placing both CSPs out of service resulted in Unit 4 entering TS 3.0.1 which requires that within one hour after not meeting the Limiting Condition for Operation place the unit in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.During operator rounds, at 1615, a Senior Nuclear Plant Operator reported to the Plant Supervisor Nuclear (PSN)that containment spray pump (CSP)4B had no visible oil level in the bearing oiler.CSP 4B was declared out of service.Prior to performing maintenance on CSP 4B, CSP 4A was taken out of service to perform operability testing.This action rendered both CSPs out of service and TS 3.0.1 was entered.At 1945, TS 3.0.1'was terminated after CSP 4A was tested satisfactorily and declared back in service.The root cause for the low oil, level in CSP 4B is undetermined.

Eleven and one half ounces of lubricating'oil was added to refill the oiler for CSP 4B.

IIAC Svv SSSA 194)1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION V.S, IIVCLSAII ASOVI.ATOIIY COMMINSIOM ASSSIOVSO OMS IIO 5150MIOS SIISIII55.

5151/$5/ACII.ITY IIAMS 111 Turkey Point Unit 4 TgCI IJF acme MsM e~.UM aeNeaaat HRC Aerrs~'Sl 1171 OOCIIST NJINSII ISI o s o o o 251 90 I.SII N~58 I~I SSOUSHTIAI.

RUM A&Val0e leUM S A 11-00~AO5 151 2 oF 0 4 I DESCRIPTION OP EVENT On November 13, 1990, Unit 4 was in Mode 1 (power operation) at 100 percent, power.At 1915 EDT, containment spray pumps (CSPs)4A and 4B were placed out of service rendering the Containment Spray (CS)System (EIIS System Code: BE, Component Code: P)incapable of performing its intended safety function.Technical Specification (TS)3.4.2.a.2 requires that two CSPs be operable whenever the unit is critical.TS 3.4.2.b.2 allows one CSP to be taken out of service provided it is'restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />..The TS allows performing maintenance on one pump provided the other pump is tested for operability.

Placing both CSPs out of service resulted in-Unit 4 entering TS 3.0.1 which requires that within one hour after not meeting the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), to.place the unit in Hot Standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.At 1615, during operator rounds, a Senior Nuclear Plant Operator~(SNPO)(non-licensed nuclear plant operator)reported to the Plant Supervisor Nuclear (PSN)that containment spray pump (CSP)4B had no visible oil level in the bearing oiler.The PSN declared the pump out of service at this time.As a precautionary measure to prevent possible equipment damage, the breaker for CSP 4B was deenergized.

In accordance with TS 3.4.2.b.2 prior to performing maintenance on CSP 4B, CSP 4A has to be tested for operability.

At 1915, in preparation for the operability test, CSP 4A was declared out of service after manual discharge valve 4-891A was closed in accordance with procedure 4-OSP-068.2,"Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test." This action rendered both CSPs out of service.TS 3.4.2.b.2 was no longer satisfied resulting in TS 3.0.1 being entered.At 1945, TS 3.0.1 was terminated after CSP 4A was tested satisfactorily and declared back in service.Unit 4 was in TS 3.0.1 for only 30 minutes.Maintenance work commenced on CSP 4B.Eleven and one half (11.5)ounces of lubricating oil was added to refill the oiler for CSP 4B.After adding oil to the oiler, the pump was run for 15 minutes with no oil leakage observed.At 2220, the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> LCO was terminated when CSP 4B was declared back in service after post maintenance testing was completed in accordance with administrative procedure 190.28"Post'Maintenance Testing." As a common work practice, the SNPOs check and verify the oil level for the CSPs.If a low oil condition is identified, the SNPO contacts the watch engineer who in turn would notify the mechanical maintenance group to refill the oiler'.MAC SOIIM SSSA 15451 4 N

<<1C Sea AAA 10431 LICENSEE EYENT REPORT (LER}TEXT CONTINUATION AtelIOVtO OMI IIO t150 OIOA tXfllltt.IQI/$$U.t,<<VCLCAII lltOIILATOII Y COAAMI<<II~

SACILITY HAMC 111 OOCKCT~tII Itl Yt*A Llll IILANt<<ltl IAQUAHYIAL

<<VM AAV4ION M~AOt Itl Turkey Point Unit 4 TUCT Nmcwe<<eC<<~HWrrC vAA~HEMIC Ann~'el IITI o s o'o o 25 190 0 1 0 0 0 3 oF 0 4 The CSPs are part of the CS System.The CS" System function following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)is to remove heat, pressure and airborne fission products from the containmeht atmosphere.

The CS System is designed to ensure that containment pre'ssure does not exceed the design value of 59 psig at 283 degrees fahrenheit.

Per 10CFR 50.72(B)(2)(iii)(D) at 2024, the NRC Operations Center was notified of this-significant event.II CAUSE OP EVENT After CSP 4B was removed from service, TS 3.4.2.b.2 was followed resulting in CSP 4A being removed from service to establish its operability.

Adherence to the TS placed Unit 4 in TS 3.0.1.The Revised Technical Specifications (RTS), already issued and soon to be implemented at the site, will not require testing to establish operability of the second CSP train prior to performing maintenance on the first CSP train, thus avoiding a unit entry into TS 3.0.3 (TS 3.0.1 in the existing Technical Specifications is TS 3.0.3 in the RTS).The oiler, pump vent cap, pump drain plug, and oil seals'ere inspected; no evidence of excessive leakage was found.A test paper was placed under the oiler on November 14 at 1115 and removed on November 15 at 0715.One drop of oil was discovered.

The oil was traced to the drain plug which had been removed following discovery of the low oiler level.Deconning and painting activities were being performed in the CSP area during the time frame when the low oiler level condition was discovered.

Interviews with personnel conducting work in the area were performed along with a history check of the CSP to determine the cause for the low oiler condition.

An extensive investigation of the low oil..condition was performed and the root cause is undetermined.

A past history check revealed no oil ,leakage problems.The pump vent cap was found to be properly vented.III ANALYSIS OP EVENT The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)states in Section 6.3,<<10 AOAM tAAA%4tl

MAC~~SSSA 15451 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.t.HUCltAA 45OULATOSIY COSSMI45IOH ASS+OVtO OMt IIO 5150MIOS tXt1855: 515I/tt SACII.ITY IIAMt Ill OOCXtT~tll Itl YSAA Ltll IIUMStll Itl St CIIINTtAI.

~4VM A IISY4%<4 M SA SAOt 15I Turkey Point Unit 4 TEXT N~ISS 4 neeef.~~HIIC Fera~'Si I I Tl o 5 o'o o 25 190 4oF 04"Emergency Containment Cooling and.Filtering System," that adequate heat removal capability for the containment, is provided by two separate, full capacity, engineered safety feature systems.Thee are the containment spray system, whose components are described.

in Section 6.4 and the emergency containment cooling system, whose components operate as described in Section 6.3.2.These systems are of different engineering principles and serve as independent backups for each other.The design basis for containment heat removal considers simultaneous operation of one spray pump and two of the three emergency containment coolers.This is the basis for containment pressure transient calculations in the FSAR, Section 14.However, the operation of either the spray pumps or two of the three,.emergency containment coolers will provide heat removal capability to maintain the post, accident containment pressure below the design value.Based on the above, the health and safety of the public was not affected.IV CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1)The 4B CSP bearing oiler was refilled with eleven and one half ounces of oil.2).Plant personnel were reminded (via the plant's"To the Point" newsletter) of the importance of exercising caution when working near plant equipment and to identify any events or conditions which may affect the equipment.

This action was completed on December 7, 1990;V ADDITIONAL INFORMATION No LER reportable issues related to this event have been reported during the past two years.MAC SOIIM SASS I%451